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P R E F A C E .
Our one clear purpose in this thesis is to expound and 
criticise Spencer’s theory of social justice. We do not use his 
theory as a peg on whieh to hang all, or nearly all, that has been 
said and written on the vital problem of social justice. Neither 
do we use it as an excuse for propounding a totally different and
i
independent view of social justice.
All this does not exclude, however, a careful examination 
and appreciation of Spencer's theory in the light of other theories; 
nor does it prevent us from indicating clearly the direction in 
which our personal convictions lie. We examine Spencer to discover 
what help he can give us in finding a satisfactory solution of the 
problems arising out of our complex social relationships, and to 
find how far he succeeds in justifying the many claims that he 
makes for himself as against other ethical writers.
In Part I, which is mainly expository, we aim at stating 
concisely, and largely in Spencer's own words, his views on the 
subject; and we incidentally direct attention to some of the feat­
ures which seem to characterise much of his social and ethical 
writings, such as internal inconsistencies, ambiguities, and ten­
dency to argue in a circle. We also note the chief points of 
criticism which we develop in Part II. In the nature of the case, 
a considerable part of our thesis must appear to be negative in 
character. But we believe that in following carefully, from step 
step, the argument of a great thinker like Spencer, and in 
l i n i n g /
( i i )
critically the many claims made by him in support of his universal 
and abstract formula of justice, we are able to discover where 
not to look for a solution of the problem of the individual in 
his relation to society.
The outline which we follow in both the expository and the 
critical parts is the same. In Section I of both parts, we first 
deal with the relation, on which Spencer insists, between social 
justice and his peculiar view regarding the "ideal" state, with a 
view to seeing whether, because of this connection, his particular 
doctrine of social justice is really of more permanent value than 
the doctrines of others. We then concern ourselves with the way 
in which Spencer deduces his principle of social justice (l) from 
the doctrine of the Moral Sense or Intuition, and (2) from the 
principles of biology. Thereafter we pass to a consideration of 
the particular meaning that Spencer assigns to justice from his 
Utilitarian point of view, bringing out at the same time, as clear­
ly as we can, the relation that he maintains between justice and 
its twin-principle of beneficence. We devote Section II of both 
parts to the many applications to the practical questions of social 
life that Spencer makes of his fundamental formula. Our reason 
for devoting a whole section to this division of our thesis is the 
conviction that, in the case of such an intensely practical subject 
as social justice, even though any particular theory of it may be 
Philosophically defective, the results derived from the application 
°f this theory to practical issues may be highly valuable, as in 
the case of the Utilitarianism of Bentham and his followers.
The two chief writings of Spencer which we have studied in
detail, and which we use as the basis of our discussion, are 
"Social Statics" (1350 edition as well as the abridged and revised 
edition of 1892) and the "Principles of Ethics" (particularly 
Parts I and IV entitled the "Data of Ethics" and "Justice"). Some 
of the other writings of Spencer, we use only as reference.
*  *  *  *
It is necessary to say that in the course of our thesis 
we use the terms "justice" and "social justice" as interchangeable 
with no intention to suggest two partly or wholly different ideas. 
We realise the futility of attempting to draw an artificial and 
hard-and-fast distinction between justice as it concerns the indi­
vidual in his personal life and justice as it concerns him in his 
social relationships, for both are essentially the same. It is 
hardly possible to name a moral or immoral act -performed by an 
individual in his personal life which does not also have its 
social bearing.
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Part I Exposition
Section I .  Spencer's Theory of Social Just ice : How i t  is  Derived
and 'What i t  Means.
Chapter I .  I t s  Relation to Absolute Ethics and In tu it ion .
Both in Social Statics and in the Principles  of Ethics, the 
two chief writings o f  Spencer, which deal with the question of jus- 
tice, Spencer claims that he is  able to provide us with a single, 
abstract law of  justice by means of which many of the most import­
ant practica l problems which arise in the relationship o f  man to 
man in the social state can be solved, and that this lav/ is  the law 
of equal freedom. The road which Spencer trave ls  in arr iv ing  at 
this law is  a long and circuitous one, and i t  is  our purpose in this 
chapter to trace some o f  the important steps taken by Spencer in 
this long and circuitous road.
Turning our attention f i r s t  to "Social S tat ics" ,  the f i r s t  
important writing of Spencer, written as early as 1850, when the 
author was but th ir ty  years of age, we find that the central con­
ception of justice  presented here is ,  in i t s  essential features, 
identical with the conception stated in his la te r  e th ica l  and p o l i t ­
ical writings, though the way of approach to i t  is  large ly  different.
his preface to "Justice" (Part IV, Principles of Ethics),  Spencer 
says, "This work (Justice) covers a f i e l d  which, to a considerable 
extent, coincides with that covered by Social Statics, . . . .  though 
the two d i f f e r ,  a l ike  in extent, in form, and p a r t ia l ly  in their  
theas" (p . v i ) .  The primary object of Social Statics is ,  as the title-, 
°t the book i t s e l f  suggests, to discover an absolute and unchange- 
ahle code of morality, corresponding to the constant and universal
I
laws of the physical world, a science of ethics, in other words, 
which will apply to man in his perfect state, i.e., in a state of 
"social equilibrium", and which will act as a guide to present 
humanity in its struggle towards this state. 'Thus Spencer says, 
"Morality professes to be a code of rules proper for 'the guidance 
of humanity in its highest conceivable perfection'. A universal 
obedience to its precepts implies an ideal society. How then can 
it be expected to harmonise with the ideas, and actions, and insti 
tutions of man as he now is? .... Gongruity between a true theory 
of duty, and an untrue state of humanity, is an impossibility, a
contradiction in the nature of things.....Right principles of
action become practicable, only as man becomes perfect; or rather,
I
to put the expressions in proper sequence - man becomes perfect 
just in so far as he is able to obey them" (Social Statics, 1850 
edi., p.38). Once again, "unable as the imperfect man may be to 
fulfil the perfect law, there is no other law for him" (Ibid.)
To say that this ideal code of morality has no relation to 
man as he is, because it is designed for man in his perfection, 
and is based on that type of man, Spencer .says, is to forget that 
®an, like nature in general, obeys the law of unlimited variation, 
a mark of the unbounded optimism of Spencer's earlier years - and 
that he is ever adapting himself to circumstances. "Strange indeed 
would it be, if, in the midst of the universal mutation, man alone 
were inconsistent, unchangeable. But it is not so. He also obeys 
the law of indefinite variation. Hie circumstances are ever alter- 
lnS; and he is ever adapting himself to them" (p. 33).
'• Compare Social Statics, p. 50.
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I t  is  s ign i f ican t  that in the revised and abridged edit ion 
of Social Statics (1392), Spencer omits a l l  reference to the in­
definite v a r ia b i l i t y  of human nature and i t s  continuous adaptation 
to circumstances. In a note attached to the end of the chapter on 
the Evanescence (? Diminution) of Ev i l ,  he makes the fo llowing 
quali f ication to the law of adaptation:
" Qiote. - With the exception of small verbal improvements,
I have l e t  this chapter stand unaltered, though i t  is  now clear to 
me.that the conclusion drawn in i t  should be large ly  q u a l i f i e d .
1. various races of mankind, inhabiting bad habitats, and obliged 
to lead miserable l i v e s ,  cannot by any amount of adaptation be 
moulded into sat is factory  types. 2. Astronomical and geo log ica l  
changes must continue hereafter  to cause such changes of surface 
and climate as must en ta i l  migrations from habitats rendered unfit  
to f i t t e r  habitats; and such migrations must en ta i l  modified modes 
of l i f e ,  with consequent re-adaptations. 3. The rate of progress 
towards any adapted form must diminish with the approach to complete  ̂
adaptation, since the force producing i t  must diminish; so that, 
other causes apart, perfect adaptation can be reached only in in­
f in ite  time J tp -3 1 ).
Conceding to Spencer fo r  the sake of argument the possib il ity  
of ascertaining a set o f  absolute and imperative eth ica l laws, 
applicable to man in a state of "soc ia l  equilibrium", we shall next 
proceed to examine how Spencer arrives at these laws. Almost the 
first step which Spencer takes in this process is  to inquire into 
the nature of the individual to see what his "desires" ( p . 1 7 ) and 
powers are, in accordance with which alone, he believes a true 
scientific morality can be ascertained. His discussion of the doc­
trine of the Moral Sense opens with the statement, "There is  no 
way of coming at a true theory o f  society, but by inquiring into 
the nature o f  i t s  component indiv iduals . To understand humanity in 
its combinations, i t  is  necessary to analyse that humanity in i t s  
elementary form - fo r  the explanation o f  the compound, to re fe r  
back to the s im p le " (p . l6 ) .  ¡ >  the extreme form of individualism
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expressed in this quotation, which is  contrary to the organic con- 
ception of society which we have adopted in our trea t ise ,  Spence^ 1 
to a considerable extent, adheres to the end, notwithstanding his 
essay on S o c ia l ‘Organism and his elaboration of the b io log ica l  idea 
of race-preservation.J In the next paragraph, rea l is ing  perhaps 
that objection may be raised to this rather bold assertion, he gives 
the fol lowing explanation: "The characterist ics exhibited by beings 
in an associated state cannot arise from the accident o f  combina­
tion, but must be the consequences o f  certain inherent properties 
of the beings themselves. True, the gathering together may ca l l  out 
these character ist ics ;  i t  may make manifest what was before dormant; 
it may afford the opportunity fo r  undeveloped pecu l ia r i t ie s  to ap­
pear; but i t  evidently does not create them. No phenomenon can be 
presented by a corporate body, but what there is  a pre-existing 
capacity in i t s  individual members fo r  producing" ( p . 1 7 )* 4ater in 
the discussion we meet with the statement that "the f i r s t  princip le  
Sep of a code fo r  the r ight ruling of humanity in i t s  state of 
multitude. is  to be found in humanity in i t s  state of unitude - that 
the moral forces upon which social w equilibrium depends, are res­
ident in the social atom - man; and that i f  we would understand the 
nature of those forces, and the laws of that equilibrium, we must 
look for them in the human constitution" (p. 18).
These three quotations occurring almost one a f te r  another 
in the short space o f  less than three pages, apart from str iking an 
e>-treme ind iv idua l is t ic  note, seem to show c lear ly  the importance 
altached by Spencer to a study o f  the powers and facu lt ies  of the 
■
!
individual fo r  a r igh t understanding of society and i t s  lav/s. But
it is str iking that a l l  these quotations are omitted in the revised
edition of 1392. This omission, however, does not mean that Spencer
had abandoned his fa i th  in the importance of the ¿¿oral Sense to
ethics. A l l  that we can say with certainty, on the evidence of the
Note attached to the discussion on page 23 of the revised edition,
is that Spencer now finds himself forced to l im it  the working of
the floral Sense to "races which have been long subject to certain
kinds of d is c ip l in e " .  Taking into account only the points common to
the two edit ions, we find that Spencer holds the b e l i e f  that man
has a moral ins t inct ,  just as surely as he has physical instincts ,
«
and that the moral Inst inct ,  by whatever name he may ca l l  i t  - a 
'sentiment' ( p . 1 7 ) ,  an 'innate perception' (p .23), an ' in tu i t i o n ' ,  
a ' faculty ' (p .2 7 ) ,  a 'governing ins t in c t '  (p .29i ,  a ' fatendency' ,
etc - has fe e l in g  fo r  i t s  foundation. I t  is  an impulse, and from
\
it arise a 'perception' o f  what is r ight and wrong and a 'conviction' 
°f what is  good and bad. "Applied to the elucidation o f  the case 
in hand ( ju s t ic e ) ,  these facts  explain how from an Impulse to behave 
in the way we ca l l  equitable, there w i l l  arise a perception that 
such behaviour is  proper - a conviction that i t  is  good" (p. 26 ).  
fn the early part at least of Social Statics, Spencer does not make 
Yeny clear whether he considers the Moral Sense to be perfect from 
tne very beginning o f  man's history. I t  seems to be regarded as a 
fixed quantity in the case o f  c i v i l i s e d  communities which have been 
hider social d isc ip l ine  fo r  some length o f  time. In his la te r  wri- 
tin8s (the "0ata" and the "Inductions" part icu lar ly )  he def im ite ly  
8tates that our present moral ihtuit ions have evolved gradually in 
fhe course of man's history.
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Though Spencer thus places the Ijforal Sense at the root of 
morality, he does not regard it as an infallible guide. He argues 
that just as "appetite does not invariably guide men aright in the 
choice of food" (in the Hssay on Education, however, tne appetite of 
children is regarded as the best guide for them with regard to both 
the quantity and quality of food that they should have), so our 
moral instinct also may, if not applied properly, lead us astray, 
and that therefore it needs to be aided and supplemented by reason 
(in the sense of ' reasoning'). Speaking of the writers of the Shaftes 
-bury school, Spencer says, "They were right in believing that there 
exists some governing instinct generating in us an approval of cer­
tain actions we call good, and a repugnance to certain others we 
call bad. 3ut they were not right in assuming such instinct to be 
capable of intuitively solving every ethical problem submitted to 
it. To suppose this, was to suppose that moral sense could supply 
the place of logic" (1850 edi., p.29; 1892 edi., p.22). Though the 
iast sentence in the quotation is missing in the revised edition, 
both editions have the following statement, which clearly brings 
°ut the relation posited by Spencer between the Moral Sense and rea- 
8°n: ".... as it is the office of the geometric sense to originate 
a geometric axiom, from which reason may deduce a seientific geom- 
etry, so it is the office of the moral sense to originate a moral 
axiom, from which reason may develop a systematic morality" (p. 30; 
P-23).
But reason (i.e., reasoning) itself, according to Spencer, 
^supported by original impulses, can do very little. "Had we no 
°bher inducement to eat than that arising from the prospect of cer- 
advantages to be thereby obtained, it is scarcely probable that
6
7
our bodies would be so well cared for as now" (p.18; p.15)- Or,
''The intellect, uninfluenced by desire, would show both miser and 
spendthrift that their habits were unwise; whereas, the intellect, 
influenced by desire, makes each think the other a fool, but does 
not enable him to see his own foolishness" (p.25; P*2o£ - 'folly' 
in the revised edition.
A second qualification which Spencer adds in reference to 
the importance of the Moral Sense is that "there is a perpetual con­
flict amongst the feelings" resulting in "a proportionate incongru­
ity in the beliefs". "So that it is only where a desire is very 
predominant, or where no adverse desire exists, that this connection 
between the instincts and the opinions they dictate, becomes dis­
tinctly visible" (p.25; p:20). And as to what makes a desire pre- 
dominant or enables it to operate without contending with an adverse 
desire, we seem to find a clue in its survival value, testified to 
by the feeling of pleasure. In Spencer's own words, "Answering to 
each of the actions which it is requisite for us to perform, we find 
in ourselves some prompter called a desire; and the more essential 
the action, the more powerful is the impulse to its performance, 
the more intense the gratification derived therefrom. Thus, the 
longings for food, for sleep, for warmth, are irresistible; and 
Thite independent of foreseen advantages". Or again, "Every feeling 
is accompanied by a sense of the rightness of those actions which 
Sive it gratification - tends to generate convictions that things 
are good or bad, according as they give to it pleasure or pain; 
arid would always generate such convictions, were it unopposed" (p.25 
p‘20). The impulse of justice, then, it would appear, must be very
strong, because justice, according to Spencer, has a great survival 
value, and having such value, it would appear, that it must be ac­
companied by a large degree of pleasure. Thus we hear Spencer say 
that it is highly probable "that upright conduct in each, being 
necessary to the happiness of all, there exists in us an impulse 
towards such conduct; or, in other words, that we possess a 'Moral 
Sense1, the duty of which is to dictate rectitude in out? transac­
tions with each other; which receives gratification from honest 
and fair dealing; and which gives birth to the sentiment of justice" 
(p.20). (ffith a slight verbal change, the early part of the quota­
tion is retained in the revised edition; but everything after 'Moral 
Sense' is left out.) But later Spencer acknowledges that the senti­
ment of justice is still weak among many people because of the fact 
that they have not yet completely passed beyond their ancient pred­
atory state in which an impulse opposite to that of justice was 
required for survival. Answering his own question, "why is not man 
adapted to the social state?", Spencer says, "Simply because he yet 
Partially-retains the characteristics that adapted him for an ante­
cedent state. The respects in which he is not fitted to society, 
are the respects in which he is fitted for his original predatory 
life. His primitive circumstances required that he should sacrifice 
ffre welfare of other beings to his own; his present circumstances 
reluire that he should not do so; and in as far as nis old attribute 
stlU  clings to him, in so far is he unfit for the social state"
(P• 53; p.30, with slight verbal changes).
rfe have so far seen that, through his inquiry into human 
nature from a psychological standpoint, Spencer appears to conclude
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that there is  in man a moral fe e l in g  or impulse, answering to his 
sentiment of just ice  and that the strength of this fe e l in g  or im­
pulse is  in proportion to i t s  importance fo r  survival and that 
grat i f icat ion or the fe e l in g  o f  pleasure is a rough measure of that 
strength. (We use the word 'rough' de l ibera te ly ,  fo r  Spencer, la te r  
in Soeial Statics, bel ieves that some painful acts l ik e  work - pain­
ful in the early stages of race-development - have a survival value.
H  We admit that in "Social S ta t ics " ,  at any rate, Spencer's idea
*
of survival is  not so prominent as in some o f  his la te r  works, but 
that i t  is  t a c i t l y  assumed in the argument, there can be l i t t l e  
doubt. - Gp. Spencer's Essay on F i l ia t io n  of Ideas - ) From a l l  this 
it is eayy and natural fo r  Spencer to pass on to the view that 
Happiness is the ultimate end of human action.
A f i r s t  reading of the opening discussion on the Doctrine 
of Expediency in the o r ig ina l  edit ion of Soci&l Statics g ives one 
the impression that Spencer wholly re jec ts  the u t i l i t a r ia n  philoso­
phy and that his Summum Bonum l i e s  elsewhere. But this impression 
is soon corrected when we turn to the a lternat ive  t i t l e  of the book 
which reads "The Conditions Essential to Human Happiness Specif ied, 
and the F irs t  of them Developed", or when we proceed to read the 
chapters fo l lowing the opening discussion, where Spencer makes i t  
Plain that his quarrel with the U t i l i ta r ians  is  with regard to 
SSiiiod and not with regard to end. In a footnote on page 53 of 
Utilitarianism" (Everyman's Library Edition, 1910), M i l l  says 
hr. Herbert Spencer, in a private communication . . . .  , objects to 
Using considered an opponent of u t i l i ta r ian ism , and states that he 
eSards happiness as the ultimate end of morality; but deems that
end only p a r t ia l ly  attainable by empirical generalisations from
the observed results of conduct and completely attainable only by
«
deducing, from the laws of l i f e  and the conditions of existence, 
what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness and what 
kinds to produce unhappiness".
In this exposition of Spencer's theory of social justice ,  
it is not necessary to go into the de ta i ls  of his controversy with 
the empirical u t i l i ta r ian s ,  though we shall be obliged to do so 
in Part I I  o f  the thesis dealing with cr it ic ism. Limiting ourselves 
for the present to Spencer's own view of  happiness, we may state 
it in a series of related pEopositions. (1) ¡Iratest happiness (or
pleasure) is  the ultimate end of human action. Î2) Being the u l­
timate end, i t  is  not to be sought d irec t ly ,  What is  to be sought 
directly is  the fu l f i lment of those conditions derived from "the 
laws of l i f e  and the conditions of existence" (Data, p .57; also 
‘“i l l ,  Uti l itarianism, p .5 8 ) ,  which necessarily lead to happiness.
(3) The most important o f ' these  conditions is  just ice ,  which, para­
phrased in our own words, means absence of hindrance to the free 
gratification o f  human facu lt ies ,  within the l im its  necessitated 
by the social state. (4) A l l  unhappiness or e v i l  (and eventually, 
^justice) is  resolvable into a question of non-adaptation of con­
stitution to conditions, or of facu lt ies  to functioms.
With the Moral Sense supplemented by reason ( i . e . ,  reason- 
*ng) as his starting-point, and "greatest happiness" achievable 
through the law of  adaptation as the ultimate end of human action, 
Spencer traces three c lose ly -re la ted  and, in some ways, hardly to 
distinguishable routes, which, he claims, a l l  lead him to his
absolute formula of justice that "every man has freedom to do all
that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any
other man" (p. 103; P - 5-+)* These several routes are (1) reasoning
» • • •"our way from those fixed conditions under which only/greatest 
happiness, can he realised"; (2) drawing "our inferences from man's 
constitution, considering him as a congeries of facuities"; and (3) 
listening "to the monitions of a certain mental agency, which seems 
to have the function of guiding us in this matter" of "right social 
relationships" (p. 103; p.54-). Let us take these three methods one 
by one and expound them in detail.
(1) Deductions from those fixed conditions under which alone
greatest happiness can be realised. Here Spencer simply
assumes, and does not prove, that "greatest happiness" is "the 
creative purpose", and in thus assuming his ultimate end, Spencer, 
like other moralists, is quite justified. If 'greatest happiness", 
as Spencer claims, is "the creative purpose" or the first principle,
in other words, it needs no deductive proof. Among the fixed con­
ditions under which this end is to be realised, Spencer recognises 
that the first place should be given to the social state in which 
nan finds himself to-day. To quote his own words, "At the head of 
them (i.e., the essential conditions of happiness) stands this un­
alterable fact - the social state. In the pre-ordained course of 
things, men have multiplied until they are constrained to live more 
0r less in presence of each other. That, as being needful for the 
support of the greatest sum of Ilfe,such a condition is preliminary 
t° the production of the greatest sum of happiness, seems highly 
Probable. 3e that as it may, however, we find this state established
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are henceforth to continue in it; and. must therefore set it down 
as one of those necessities which our rules for the achievement 
of tne greatest happiness must recognise and conform to" (the re­
vised edition omits the phrase "in the pre-ordained course of 
things") (p.57; p. 32). And it is out of this "unchanging necessity',' 
this "appointed circumstance" - the social state - that Spencer 
deduces the four conditions essential to human happiness, viz.,
Justice, Negative beneficence, Positive Beneficence, and due pur-
\
suit of the ind iv idua l 's  "own private happiness" (pp.68- 9 ; pp. 33-4-,»
Since these four conditions or principles are o f  utmost 
importance to a r igh t understanding o f  Spencer's theory of morality 
in general, and of socia l  justice ,  in particular, i t  is  necessary 
to inquire into the exact meaning that Spencer puts into these 
principles and the relationship that he posits between them.
First in order and in importance comes the principle of jus­
tice. It is the only principle which is "almost always possible of 
exact ascertainment" (the revised edition leaves out the word 
'exact'£ (p.82; p. 39)* Its source is found in Spencer's peculiar 
conception of "the sphere of activity of each individual" in the 
social state. Quoting Spencer's own words, "In this social state 
the sphere of activity of each individual being limited by the 
spheres of activity of other individuals, it follows that the men 
who are to realise this greatest sum of happiness, must be men of 
whom each can obtain complete happiness within his own sphere of 
activity, without diminishing the spheres of activity required for 
the acquisition of happiness by pthers" (p.68; p.33). It is here, 
then, tnat Spencer finds "the first of those fixed conditions to
the obtainment of greatest happiness, necessitated by the social 
state" and "it is the fulfilment of this condition which we express 
by the word justice" (Ibid.)*
The other three principles deduced from the social state are 
closely related to justice. Negative beneficence, the first among 
them in order, is a supplementary principle "of kindred nature". 
According to it, "to compass greatest happiness, the human consti­
tution must be such as that each man may perfectly fulfil his own 
nature, not only without diminishing other men's spheres of activ­
ity , but without giving unhappiness to other men in any direct or 
indirect way" (p.68» p.33). But seeing perhaps that this principle, 
if carried out fully and literally, might contradict the primary 
principle of justice, which demands only non-interference with 
other persons' spheres of activity, Spencer qualifies it when he 
says that when the "normal" faculties of one person come into con­
flict with the "abnormal" faculties of another, the "abnormal" 
faculties must be sacrificed, whatever the resulting unhappiness 
®ay be, for, such sacrifice will, in the long run, have a beneficial 
value (Cp. p.30; p.37).
All that the principle of justice and the principle of neg­
ative beneficence are able to give us is the greatest amount of
II .isolated happiness" (p.69) imaginable. But positive beneficence 
8°es a step further and says that "to the primary requisite that 
®ach shall be able to get complete happiness without diminishing 
the happiness of the rest, we must now add the secondary one that 
each shall be capable of receiving happiness from the happiness 
the rest" (p.69; p.34). It means, in other word3, that each must
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be capable of "sympathetically part ic ipating in the pleasurable 
emotions of a l l  others", adding thereby to the sum to ta l  of happ­
iness .
The fourth and las t  princip le ,  which, unlike the others, 
concerns the individual d i r e c t ly ,  lays down the rule "that, whilst 
duly regardful o f  the preceding l im itat ions, each individual shall 
perform a l l  those acts required to f i l l  up the measure of his own 
private happiness" (p .69; p .34).
Spencer considers these four principles of such supreme 
importance that he says that "Everything must be good or bad, r igh t . 
or wrong, in v irtue of i t s  accordance or discordance with them" 
( Ib id . )  he rea l ises  that, in our present transit ional state, f u l ­
filment o f  these laws may not produce complete pleasure, but that, 
to him, does not mean that we should give up these laws and look 
for new ones. On the other hand, we must learn to derive pleasure 
from conformity to them, t i l l  eventually that pleasure becomes 
spontaneous. "The social state is  a necessity. The conditions of 
greatest happiness under that state are f i x e d . Our characters are 
the only things not f ixed. They, then, must be moulded into f i t ­
ness for  the conditions. And a l l  moral teaching and d isc ip l ine  
must have fo r  i t s  object to hasten this process" (p .7 0 ; p .34).
¿ater in the book, however, we are given to believe that the outer 
conditions also change, and not merely our characters, as here.
Thus, "In virtue o f  an essential principle o f  l i f e ,  this non-adapta 
-tion of an organism to i t s  conditions is  ever being r e c t i f i e d ;  
and modification o f  one or both, continues unti l  the adaptation i s 
SSSPlete11 (pp.59-60; p .27).
A second important point to note with regard to the aoove
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four principles is that Spencer is fully aware of the fact that 
objection may be, and often is, raised to the somewhat rigid and 
artificial distinction made by him between justice and beneficence 
on the one hand and between individual and social ethics on the 
other. Thus he says, "It will perhaps be said that the distinction 
between justice and beneficence cannot be maintained, for that the 
two graduate into each other imperceptibly. Some may argue that it 
is not allowable to assume any essential difference between right 
conduct towards others and right conduct towards self, seeing that 
what are generally considered purely private actions, do eventually 
affect others to such a degree, as to render them public actions;
.... Others again may contend that all morality should be classed 
•as private; .... " (p.70). While admitting that there is much truth 
in these charges, Spencer lightly passes them over, saying that 
similar criticisms may be passed upon all classifications whatever. 
Unfortunately he does not stop to consider whether the distinction 
made by at least some of the other classifications may not be one 
of methodology, instead of one of principle.
In passing from Spencer's delineation of his doctrine of the 
uloral Sense to the first of his three methods sketched above, it 
is interesting to note the shifting of emphasis from the all-import­
ance for action of human desires and impulses to rigid conformity 
certain abstract and unbending conditions which are derived from 
411 equally abstract and unbending assumption. In other words, the 
emphasis is shifted from pleasure as a rough guide for human action 
obedience to certain logical deductions under which alone great- 
est happiness is said to be realised.
1 6
(2 ) Drawing "our in ferences from man's constitu tion , con­
sidering; him as a congeries of faculties." Here, again,
happiness is the end of human action. But the way to attain that 
end is not, as before, directly through conformity to certain abs­
tract logical deductions; it is primarily through obeying the laws 
of the human constitution, although the result according to both 
methods is the same; they both lead to the same formula of justice. 
'To put briefly the argument of this method in Spencer's own words:
!'A desire is the need for some species of sensation. A sensation 
is producible only by the exercise of a faculty. Hence no desire 
can be satisfied except through the exercise of a faculty. But happ­
iness consists in the satisfaction of all the desires; that is, 
happiness consists in the due exercise of all the faculties" (p.75).
If happiness is the end of human action,and the exercise of 
faculties is the means to it, it is plain that "it is man's duty 
to exercise his faculties" (Ibid.) "But the fulfilment of this duty 
necessarily presupposes freedom of action. Man cannot exercise his 
faculties without certain scope .... He must be free to do every 
thing which is directly od indirectly requisite for the due satis­
faction of every mental and bodily want .... that is, he has a right 
t0 it" (p.77).
"^his, however, is not the right of one but of all. All are
endowed with faculties.....All therefore must be free to do those
things in which the exercise of them consists. 'That is, all must 
have rights to liberty of action". "And hence there necessarily 
anises a limitation. For if men have like claims to that freedom 
lfhich is needful for the exercise of their faculties, then must the 




The general proposition which spencer arrives at as a result  of 
this reasoning is  "that every man may claim the fu l l e s t  l ib e r ty  to 
exercise his facu lt ies  compatible with the possession o f  l ike  
liberty by every other man" (p .73; p .35) This, he la te r  ca l ls ,  the 
law of equal freedom.
Spencer is  conscious o f  the fac t  that there is  at least 
one other way of formulating into a general proposition the l ib e r ty  
of action that is  requ is ite  fo r  the exercise of facu lt ies .  " I t  may 
be thought b e t te r " ,  he says, "to l im it  the r ight o f  each to exer­
cise his facu lt ies ,  by the proviso that he shall not hurt any one 
else - shall not i n f l i c t  pain on any one e lse" (p .73; p .35). But 
he re jects at once this way of stating the fac t ,  his chief objec­
tion to i t  being that i t  w i l l  "stop the proper exercise of facu lt ies  
in some persons, fo r  the purpose of allowing the improper exercise 
of facult ies in the rest"  (p .79; p .37). In the in terest  of greatest 
happiness, therefore, Spencer says that,when in the exercise of 
faculties, the "normal" facu lt ies  of A come into con f l ic t  with the 
abnormal" facu lt ies  o f  B, the "abnormal" facu lt ies  should be sac­
rificed, though i t  may result in pain to B. The important question 
here, of course, is ,  what is  the standard o f  normality? Unfortunate­
ly for one o f  the i l lu s tra t ion s  that Spencer g ives to bring out 
ihe distinction between normality and abnormality, v i z . , that o f  a 
protestant in a Roman Catholic country refusing to uncover his head 
°r the passing o f  the host, many may find i t  hard readily  to agree 
7fith Spencer in assuming that the " faculty"  of the Protestant is  
the normal one.
While thus rejecting the alternative formula,, Spencer is 
not blind to the imperfections found in his own formula. The first 
serious imperfection is found in the fact that "Various ways exist 
in which the faculties may be exercised to the aggrieving of other 
persons, without the law of equal freedom being overstepped". Thus 
"A man may behave unamiably, may use harsh language, or annoy by 
disgusting habits; and whoso thus offends the normal feelings of 
his fellows, manifestly diminishes happiness" (p.80; p.33). Spen­
cer's reply in defence of his formula is that it is the lesser of 
two evils. The alternative formula, in cutting off improper actions, 
cuts off some proper ones too; while his own formula, in allowing 
full freedom for prooer actions, does not exclude certain improper 
ones. But the defect inherent in the latter case, Spencer is con­
fident, can be rectified by the principle of negative beneficence, 
while the former apparently has no such remedy. In mankind as 
ultimately evolved', of course, the faculties of each will be such 
(by constant selection) that the full exercise of them will offend 
no one. But why the final man should require the law of equal free­
dom at all for the regulating of right social relationships, is 
not very clear.
The second objection which, Spencer thinks, may be raised
Jagainst his general proposition is that "if the individual is free
do all that he wills, provided he does not trespass upon certain
specified claims of others, then he is free to do things that are
lnjurious to himself - is free to get drunk, or to commit suicide"
]• The point that we deal with in this paragraph is the same as 
net contained in the preceding paragraph, with a slight difference.




(p.31; p .39)- (The revised edit ion omits the case of su ic ide. )  In 
reply to this Spencer frankly confesses that,while his law forbids 
a certain class of actions as immoral, i t  does not recognise a l l  
kinds of immorality, and that i t  should, therefore, be supplemented 
by further laws. But he holds that these further laws are of "quite 
inferior authority" because they are not possible o f  such exact 
ascertainment as his own law, and cannot as such be s c ie n t i f i c a l l y  
developed in the present state o f  human progress. Therefore, he 
thinks that they "can be unfolded only into superior forms of ex- 
pedieney" (p .8 2 ; p .39). I f ,  he contends, we forbid drunkenness be­
cause i t  is  injurious to the individual, i t  may lead us on to f o r ­
bid such things as work, in te l lec tua l  a c t iv i t y ,  forethought, e tc . ,  
which are irksome at the beginning, but which are^needful fo r  the 
production o f  the greatest happiness" (p .83; p.40). The two gwneral 
reasons that Spencer g ives fo r  this are: ( 1) "we frequently cannot 
say whether the bad results" o f  an act "w i l l  exceed the good ones"; 
and (2 ) even i f  we can, "we cannot with certainty distinguish su f f ­
ering that is  detrimental, from suffering that is  b en e f ic ia l " (v e r -  
bal changes in the revised edit ion ) ( I b id . ) .  The same two reasons, 
spencer believes, hold good with regard to the ea r l ie r  objection 
to his law that i t  admits of in juries  to others.
Spencer’ s conclusion of the whole matter is  that the l im i ta ­
tions necessitated by the two chief imperfections inherent in his 
formula of justice are " l im itat ions which the ideal man w i l l  s t r i c t ­
ly observe", but which "cannot be reduced to concrete forms unti l  
th® ideal man ex is ts "  (p .84). To try to formulate them into ±a laws
i s 4o hurting the "normal" facu lt ies  o f  others, which is  just,, but which cannot be helped.
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now would mean the undoing o f  the primary law I t s e l f ,  Therefore, 
the only course open to us is to l e t  the tares grow along with the 
wheat, confident in the hope that the tares w i l l  become less and 
less as a result o f  man's increasing adaptation (passive) to the 
social state and w i l l  eventually disappear altogether. "Thus, the 
existing confusion o f  necessary and conventional fee l ings ,  necessary 
and conventional circumstances, and fee l ings  and circumstances that 
are partly necessary and partly conventional w i l l  eventually work 
Itself clear" (p .8 7 ; p .4-3).
As matters stand, "There is c lear ly  no a lternat ive  but to 
declare man's freedom to exercise his facu lt ies ;  . . . .  There is  clear 
-ly no a lternative  but to declare the several l im itat ions of that 
freedom needful fo r  the achievement of greatest happiness. And there 
is clearly no a lternat ive  but to develop the f i r s t  and chief of 
these l imitations separately; seeing that a development of the others1 
is at present impossible. Against the consequence of neglecting 
these secondary l im itat ions, we must therefore guard ourselves as 
well as we can; supplying the place o f  s c ien t i f i c  deductions by sucn 
inferences as observation and experience enable us to make" (p .8 8 ;
P-44) "freedom being the pre-requisite  to normal l i f e  in the
individual, equal freedom becomes the pre-requisite  to normal l i f e  
^ society. And i f  this law of equal freedom is the primary law o f  
night relationship between man and man, then no desire to get f u l ­
filled a secondary law can warrant us in breaking i t "  (pp.88- 9 ; p . 44).
(3) Listening "to the monitions of a certain mental agency"
Th‘ms method, according to Spencer's presentation o f  i t ,  is  a d irec t  
lttanifestation of the Loral Sense in man, though the other two methods 
also ar© intimately related to i t .  Spencer simply observes tnat
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there is in man himself an impulse to claim the exercise of facul­
ties and an impulse to respect the limits of such exercise, (cp.p.
90). In other words, man exhibits an instinct of personal rights 
and an instinct of sympathy (later in origin) (p.96; p.48), and it 
is out of an interaction of these two instincts that the all-import­
ant law of equal freedom emerges. Though at tne outset these two 
instincts seem to point in two different, directions, tnere is really 
no essential conflict between them; for the instinct of sympathy, 
to Spencer, is simply tne obverse side of tne instinct of personal 
rights* "the sentiment of justice", says he, "is nothing but a 
sympathetic affection of the instinct of personal rights - a sort 
of reflex function of it" (p.97; p.49), [it will be noticed that the 
interpretation of the doctrine of the Moral Sense here is narrower 
than it is in the earlier part of the book; and it is to this narrow­
er interpretation that Spencer adheres to the lastj ".... other 
things equal", Spencer claims, "those who have the stongest^of their 
own rights (i.e., those who are keen to see injustice done to them), > 
W1H  have the strongest sense of the rights of their neighbours"
(p.98; p. 50) and conversely "those who have not a strong sense of 
what is just to themselves, are likewise deficient in a sense of 
what is just to their fellow-men" (p.99; p.51). In the revised edi­
tion, fortunately for us, Spencer adds within brackets what he means 
other things equal"; "(i.e., if there are equal amounts of sym- 
Pathy)". it j_s He unnecessary to point out that, with the addition,
l̂e Proposition becomes very nearly a tautology. It is true that
n
‘Sneer places sympathy at the root of both justice and benefieencej 
it is sympathy as he understands it. fThe egoistic note struck
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by some of the quotations in the paragraph is somewhat modified by- 
Spencer in his Principles of Ethics, where the biological principle • 
of race-preservation is definitely admitted. But the idea of society 
as an organism, in the richest and best sense of the term, remains 
foreign to him."][
In order that the reader may not draw the legitimate conclu­
sion from ¡Spencer's premisses that the instinct of personal rights 
and the instinct of sympathy vary directly with one another, he adds 
the qualification that "there is no necessary connection between
a sense of what is due to self, and a sense of what is due to other&
n"Sympathy and inetict of rights do not always co-exist in equal
Istrength any more than other faculties do. Either of them may be
present in normal amount, whilst the other is almost wanting" (p.
100; p.51). If this be so, the intuition of justice which, in this 
connection, is regarded as the outcome of the instinct of personal 
rights and the instinct of sympathy, cannot be an absolute guide. 
Spencer adds, however, that "in the average of cases, we may safely / 
conclude that a man's sense of justice to himself, and his sense 
°f justice to his neighbours, bear a constant ratio to each other"
(p-101). But what does Spencer mean by 'average' 'i (The whole passage » 
is left out in the revised edition.)
There is one further fact which needs to be mentioned here 
it passing. In answering the objection as to what necessity there 
18 "for a special impulse to make a man do that which all his im­
pulses conjointly tend to make him do", Spencer says that "We do
n°i> find on inquiry that each faculty has a special foresight - 
iies thought for its gratification to come: we find, on the con-
trary, that to provide fo r  the future g ra t i f i c a t io n  of the facu l­
ties at large, is the o f f i c e  o f  facu lt ies  appointed so le ly  fo r  
that purpose" (p .95; p.47). (S l ight verbal changes in the revised 
ed it ion . ) According to this inquiry, then, facu lt ies  seem to be 
of two-types: those which simply express certain desires of man 
and those which keep these fa cu lt ies  in the ir  proper places..
This c la ss i f ic a t ion  is  bound to have i t s  bearing on the second
i
method which Spencer traces - that of acquiring greatest happiness ! 
through the due exercise o f  facu lt ies  ( "W i l l  to Power", Sublima*» 
tion, e t c . ) ,  and also on his b io log ica l  theory called the Use and 
Disuse theory.
Spencer's conclusion o f  the whole matter, in the work that 
we are expounding, is  that by whatever route we trave l  we are 
alike led to this law of r igh t social relationships, that "Every 
man has freedom to do a l l  that he w i l l s ,  provided he infr inges 
not the equal freedom of any other man" ( p . 103; p .54). further 
qualifications o f  the l ib e r ty  of action asserted in the law may
he necessary, but in the just regulation o f  a community "no further ’
qualifications of i t  can be recognised" ( I b id . ) .  "Such further 
qualifications must ever remain fo r  private and individual appli-
9
cation. We must therefore adopt this law of equal freedom in i t s  
entirety, as the law on which a correct system of equity is  t& be 
hased" ( I b id . ) .  (The word 'ever '  is  omitted in the revised ed it ion )
*  *  *
We have endeavoured to show so far ,  in our exposition of 
Social Statics" (p p . 1-109 in the o r ig ina l  edit ion, and corres­
ponding pages in the revised and abridged edit ion o f  1892) ,  that
Spencer's theory of social justice is intimately related to his
■
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unique view of the absolute state, and that this vie1/;, in turm, 
is held by him in close connection with the doctrine of the Moral 
Sense. Our purpose now is to pass over to "The Principles of Ethics" 
and sketch briefly the further development that the theory of 
Absolute Ethics.and the doctrine of the moral Sense there undergo 
in their relation to social justice. Confining ourselves first to 
the theory of Absolute Ethics, we find that when we turn to the 
"Data of Ethics", written nearly thirty years after the publication 
of Darwin's "Origin of Species", Spencer starts in the key of 
progressive or evolutional ethics, tracing "conduct" from its very 
humble origin as found among the animals of the lowest type (we 
should prefer to use the word "behaviour" in reference to animals) 
up to the moral conduct of man and defining it in such general t 
terms as "the adjustment of acts to ends" (Data, p.5̂ » but before 
we know what has happened, Spencer,at leapt temporarily, gives up 
the biological idea of the grim struggle for existence and repre­
sents social evolution as necessarily leading up to a perfect state,; 
where man is "completely adapted" to the conditions of society.
This perfect state,upon examination, turns out to be nothing less
than the pre-Evolutional ideal of "the perfect man in the perfect >
society".
It is true that, in the "Principles of Ethics", Spencer does 
n°t sneer at Relative Ethics, as he does in "Social Statics", but 
he still holds to the belief that "ideal conduct" can only exist 
hi an "ideal social state" and that, as such, a study of Absolute 
Ethics must precede a study of Relative Ethics. To put the matter
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"One who has followed the general argument thus far ,  w i l l  
not deny that an ideal socia l being may be conceived as so con­
stituted that his spontaneous a c t i v i t i e s  are congruous with the 
conditions imposed by the social environment formed by other such 
beings. In many places, and in various ways, I have argued that 
conformably with the laws o f  evolution in general, and conformably 
with the laws o f  organisation in particular, there has been, and 
is, in progress, an adaptation of humanity to the socia l state, 
changing i t  in the d irect ion  of such an ideal congruity. And tne 
corollary before drawn and here repeated, is  that the ultimate man 
is one in. whom this process has gone so fa r  as to produce a corre­
spondence between a l l  the promptings of his nature and a l l  the 
requirements of his l i f e  as carried on in society. I f  so, i t  is  a 
necessary implication that there exists an ideal code o f  conduct 
formulating tne behaviour of the completely adapted man in the 
completely evolved soc ie ty . Such a code is that here called Absolute 
Sthics as distinguished from Relative  Ethics - a code the injunc­
tions af which âfè ralonetto be considered as absolutely r ight in 
contrast with those that are r e la t i v e ly  r ight or least wrong; and 
which, as a system of ideal conduct, is  to serve as a standard fo r  
our guidance in solving, as well as we can, the problems of real 
conduct" (Data of Ethics, p .275).
Or again, " i t  is  manifest that we must consider the ideal man as 
existing in the ideal social state. On the evolution-hypothesis, 
the two presuppose one another; and only when they co-exist can 
there exist that ideal conduct which Absolute Ethics has to formu­
late, and which Relative Ethics has to take as the standard by 
which to estimate divergencies from r ight,  or degrees of wrong"
(ûata of Ethics, p.2B0) . ;
In passing we may say that i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to see how Spencer's
law, stated e a r l ie r  in the book (p .7 ),  that the less evolved is  the _
key to the more evolved, is  to be made applicable here.
}
Thé picture that we get o f  the ideal state in the "Data" - 
taith in which ideal state is  strongly re-affirmed in the "Induc­
tions", published in 1892 -,  is  somewhat more d e f in i te  than the 
r°ugh outline drawn in "Social S tat ics " ,  though one has a suspicion 
that Spencer is  not quite so sure o f  his grasp of the ideal as 
before. Thus, instead o f  proclaiming as boldly as he did in the 
0l,lginal edit ion o f  "Social Statics" that a perfect state in the
in his own words,
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remote future is  a certainty and that , through i t s  capacity fo r  "un­
limited adaptation", mankind w i l l  eventually reach that state, Spen­
cer now seems to say that, though the ideal i t s e l f  is  capable of 
being conceived by him, mankind can only reach ' in de f in i te ly  near" 
to i t  ('¿’i r s t  Pr inc io les ,  Sect. 175). Thus we are told that "however 
near to completeness the adaptation o f  human nature to the condit i­
ons of existence at large, physical and socia l,  may become, i t  can 
never reach completeness"; that " in the private relat ions of men, 
opportunities fo r  s e l f - s a c r i f i c e  prompted by sympathy must ever in 
some degree, be afforded by accidents, diseases, and misfortunes 
in general; . . .  (and that) f lood, f i r e ,  and wreck must to the last
oyield at in terva ls  ooortunities fo r  heroic acts" (Data, p .254).
[bompare the iMote appended to the chapter on the Evanescence ('? Dim- 
inution) o f  Evi l  in the revised and abridged ed it ion  of Social 
Statics, 1092, quoted on page 3 o f  our thes is . j  But unfortunately
Spencer gives no formal reason fo r  thus abandoning his ea r l ie r  cheer- 
-ful view and for  asserting that the ideal state contemplated by )
Absolute Ethics is  necessarily beyond our attainment. Overlooking 
this d i f f i c u l t y  in our exposition, we have the further d i f f i c u l t y  
°f explaining how Spencer is  able to arrive at a conception o f  an 
ideal state in the remote future which w i l l  be clear enough for  
guidance in the present state. In "Social Stat ics" ,  o f  course, he 
emPloys the doctrine of the Moral Sense to extr icate  him from the 
difficulty, but in the "Data" his dependence on that doctrine is 
n°t made clear. Whatever may be the way by which Spencer reaches 
nis ideal, the picture which he draws of that ideal is  worthy of
°Ur COnsideration . One important feature o f  the id ea l soc ie ty ,  he
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te l ls  us con f iden t ly ,  i s  that the voluntary actions o f  a l l  the 
members comprising that soc ie ty  w i l l  cause pure pleasure, or "pleas- 
-ure unalloyed with pain anywhere" (Data, p .261) to every one con­
cerned. Supposing f o r  the sake o f  argument that pleasure o f  th is  
sort is  capable o f  being conceived, the point tnat we must note 
here is  that ju s t ic e ,  which Spencer s t i l l  considers to be "the 
most important d iv is io n  o f  Ethics and the d iv is io n  which admits 
of the g rea tes t  d e f in i teness "  'Data, p .285), must also be produc­
tive of "pure p leasure".  But that th is  i s  not, and cannot be, the 
case w i l l  be seen in the sequel when we come to deal with the 
b iological o r i g in  o f  the law o f  equal freedom: the pr inc ip le  o f  
the survival o f  the f i t t e s t  or ,  dsn other words, the p r in c ip le  o f  
letting each ind iv idua l  take the natural consequences o f  his ac­
tions (paraphrase o f  Spencer's ' j u s t i c e ' ) ,  implies oain somewhere.
%
A second important feature o f  the per fec t  s ta te ,  which also 
has a close bearing upon Spencer's theory o f  soc ia l  ju s t ic e ,  is  
that in i t  there w i l l  be no compulsion or authority o f  any kind.
Even the f e e l in g  o f  moral ob l ig a t ion  or duty, what we may c a l l  s e l f -  
coercion, w i l l  disappear, because, Spencer contends, i t  belongs 
only to the t r a n s i t io n a l  state where men are im per fect ly  adapted 
to their environment. The idea l  man w i l l  spontaneously, i f  not 
Mechanically, do what i s  r igh t  and w i l l  consider the present-day 
Polit ica l,  r e l i g io u s ,  and soc ia l  controls  as out-o f-date .  To state 
the matter in Spencer's own words, "the sense o f  duty or moral ob­
ligation is  t ran s i to ry  and w i l l  diminish as fa s t  as moralisation 
lncreasf^ (Data, p. 127); "with complete adaptation to the soc ia l  
state, that element in the moral consciousness which is  expressed
by the word ob l ig a t io n  w i l l  disappear" (Data, p . 128); and " in  th e i r  
proper times and places and proportions, the moral sentiments w i l l  
guide men just as spontaneously and adequately as now do the sen­
sations" (Data, p . 129). The id ea l  man w i l l  have no" fear  o f  the 
v is ib le  ru le r ,  o f  the in v i s ib l e  ru le r ,  and o f  soc ie ty  at la rge"
(Data, p.114). The app l ica t ion  o f  a l l  th is  to Spencer's theory o f  
social ju s t ic e  i s  that,  in the f i n a l  state ,  the law o f  equal f r e e ­
dom, which i s  tne quintessence o f  that theory, w i l l  cease to be a 
law in the lawyer 's  sense o f  the word, or even in the sense under­
stood by mora lists .  Justice w i l l  come to be done in s t in c t i v e l y .
The idea l  s ta te ,  from Spencer's point o f  view, may be the state in 
which the law o f  equal freedom w i l l  be p e r f e c t l y  rea l is ed .  But i t  
will  also be the s tate  in which any other law o f  ju s t ice  which 
employs the same p r inc ip le  o f  im p a r t ia l i ty ,  say the law o f  equal 
restraints, w i l l  be f u l l y  rea l is ed .
The p e r fe c t  state w i l l  be not only a state o f  pure pleasure 
and a state where there w i l l  be no coercion o f  any kind. I t  w i l l
>
also be, Spencer t e l l s  us, a state o f  extreme d iv e r s i t y  or hetero­
geneity. Men w i l l  be as d i f f e r e n t  from one another as poss ib le ,  
and the present-day inequa l i ty  between them w i l l  be carr ied  to the
fullest possible l im i t .  And yet  such d i f f e ren ce  and inequa l i ty  i
■
will not cause any pain to any one because men w i l l  be in such 
complete harmony with the soc ie ty  around them that th e i r  f a c u l t i e s  
aud capacit ies 'ex e rc is e  o f  which, according to Spencer, i s  absol­
utely essen t ia l  f o r  human happiness) w i l l  not f a i l  to rece ive  the 
scope necessary f o r  th e i r  f u l l e s t  and f r e e s t  expression. The r e s ­
pective spheres o f  act ion o f  indiv iduals  w i l l ,  o f  course, be un^
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equal because o f  th e i r  nat ive  d i f f e ren ces  and l im ita t ion s .  But £ 
there w i l l  be no checks placed from outside upon a person's ac­
t i v i t y  and, in turn, upon his happiness. Or, as Spencer expresses
i I
i t ,  there w i l l  be a complete equ i l ib ra t ion  between men's des ires  
and the conduct necess ita ted  by soc ia l  condit ions".  Bach one in 
such an id ea l  state w i l l  be f r e e  to do whatever he ac tua l ly  does!
In an id ea l  state o f  the kind described by Spencer, one 
would think that there would be no need o f  any e th ica l  p r inc ip les  
to regulate tne s oc ia l  conduct o f  p e r fe c t ly -evo lv ed  men, and, even 
i f  there were a need, i t  would only be a nominal one. ^ut npencer 
apparently does not think so (except with regard to negative  Bene­
f icence).  The Bolden Age, he thinks, w i l l  be the re ign o f  jus t ice .
Thus he says' "This d iv is io n  o f  e th ics  (Just ice )  considered under 
its absolute form, has to de f ine  the equitable  r e la t ion s  among 
perfect ind iv idua ls  who l im i t  one another 's spheres o f  action by 
co-existing, and who ¿achieve th e i r  ends by co-operation. I t  has to 
do much more than th is .  Beyond jus t ic e  between man and man, jus t ice  
between each man and the aggregate o f  men has to be dea l t  with by 
it .  The re la t ion s  between the indiv idual and the State, considered 
as representing a l l  ind iv idua ls ,  have to be deduced - an important 
and a r e l a t i v e l y - d i f f i c u l t  matter. What is  the e th ica l  warrant f o r  
governmental authority? To what ends may i t  be le g i t im a te ly  exer­
cised? How fa r  may i t  be r i g h t l y  be carried? dp to what point id 
the c i t i z en  bound to recognise the c o l l e c t i v e  dec is ions o f  other 
citizens, and beyond what point may he properly refuse to obey £• 
them?" (Data, p . 285) .
Lin our exposit ion  we need merely point out that Spencer, in tne 
Present passage, unconsciously g l id e s  from Absolute Ethics into 
Relative Ethics in speaking o f  the fu l ly - e vo lv ed  state .  There can 
be no e th ica l  warrant f o r  governmental authority in such a state ,  
Tor no per fect  ind iv idua l  w i l l  coerce his equally p er fec t  neigh­
bour" (Maitland, Mind, O.S., V I I I ,  p.3o2).^ As to what exact ly  the 
Principle o f  id ea l  ju s t ic e  means, Spencer says that i t s  ch ie f  rules 
are ' 1) Injure no one in person, estate ,  or reputation, and (2)
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Observe contracts (Data, ch. 8, S oc io lo g ica l  View). I t  also means, 
from the b io l o g i c a l  and economic points o f  view, an exact propor­
tioning o f  returns to labours, f o r ,  without such propartioning, 
Spencer be l ie ves ,  tnere can be no voluntary co-operation, which, 
according to him, is  e ssen t ia l  f o r  soc ia l  ex istence,  and no f u l f i l ­
ment of  the primary law o f  l i f e  which demands that super io r i ty  
must p ro f i t  by the resu lts  o f  super io r i ty ,  and i n f e r i o r i t y  su f fe r  
by the resu lts  o f  i n f e r i o r i t y .  [ i t  would be out o f  place at th is
Kjunchre to go into the question whether ju s t ic e ,  as described here,
n
could g ive  us freedom from a l l  coercion as we l l  as "pure pleasure".J 
The other e th ica l  p r inc ip les  o f  idea l  soc ia l  l i f e ,  according 
tb Spencer, are Negative Beneficence and P o s i t i v e  Beneficence. But 
the former o f  these p r in c ip les ,  Spencer t e l l s  us, "has but a nom­
inal existence" "under id ea l  circumstances", the reason being that 
'In the conduct o f  the Idea l  man among id ea l  men, that s e l f - r e g u la ­
tion which has f o r  i t s  motive to avoid g iv in g  pain, p ra c t i c a l l y  
disappears, imo one having fe e l in g s  which prompt ̂ others , there can 
exist no code o f  re s t ra in ts  r e fe r r in g  to th is  d iv is io n  o f  conduct" 
'Data, p. 285). [Vhy the same argument does not apply to the pr in ­
ciple of idea l  ju s t ic e ,  Soencer does not make c lear  .J As regards 
tfne princip le  o f  p o s i t i v e  Beneficence, according to which, men, 
besides helping to complete one another's l i v e s  by spec i f ied  recip- 
r°c it ies o f  aid, . . . .  otherwise help to complete one anotner 's l ive& 
^Data, p . 14 9 ) by spontaneous e f f o r t s ,  we have to observe that the 
field, fo r  the exerc ise  o f  th is  p r in c ip le  w i l l  become narrower and 
narrower. ^ut f lood ,  f i r e  and wreck, accidents, diseases and mis­
fortunes in general,  Spencer t e l l s  us, w i l l  be with us to trie end,
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and w i l l  g iv e  us now and then a chance f o r  a heroic  act. "Th is" ,
II
as Maitland observes, may be the ult imate s ta te ,  but seemingly 
it  should not, cannot be the idea l  s ta te "  (Mind 0. S. XTH,  p .359)
It implies pain.
"Of p o s i t i v e  beneficence under i t s  absolute form nothing 
more s p e c i f i c  can be said than that i t  must become co-extensive 
with whatever sphere remains f o r  i t ;  a id ing to complete the l i f e  
of each as a r e c ip ien t  o f  serv ices  and to exa l t  the l i f e  o f  eacn 
as a renderer o f  serv ices .  As with a developed humanity the des ire  
for i t  by every one w i l l  so increase, and the sphere f o r  exerc ise  
of i t  so decrease, as to invo lve  an a l t r u i s t i c  competit ion, anal- 
agous to the e x is t in g  e g o is t i c  competition, i t  may be that Absolute 
Ethics w i l l  eventua l ly  include what we before ca l led  a higher 
equity, prescr ib ing the mutual l im ita t ion s  o f  a l t r u i s t i c  a c t i v i t i e s '  
(Data, 0.287).
[in  the la s t  sentence, i t  i s  not iceab le  that "an id ea l  code formu­
lating the r e la t io n s  o f  p e r fe c t  men begins to grow more per fec t  
before our very eyes" (Maitland, p . 370).
Poss ib ly  i t  is  because o f  the d i f f i c u l t y  that we have not­
iced o f  deducing any e th ica l  p r inc ip les  from his absolute state 
that Spencer i s  re luctant to admit that mankind w i l l  eventually  
become completely adapted to the soc ia l  s tate .  In the f o r c e fu l  
words o f  Maitland, "We must not have our ' s t r a ig h t  man' a l l  too 
straight, or there w i l l  be no place f o r  any theory o f  ju s t i c e  or 
Equality. The seer must keep his te lescope just a l i t t l e  dusty, 
in order that the outlook may not be tcto blank fo r  i n t e l l i g i b l e  
description. 'The s in less  innocence o f  the j e l l y - f i s h  or the angel 
^  not a good materia l whereof to fashion the c i t i z en s  o f  an 
instructive model commonwealth, without some admixture o f  simple 
human nature, and ' l a t e n t  ideas' o f  non-conformity" (Maitland, 
liind, 0 . s . p . 3 7 1 ).
We now go on to expound the a t t i tude  o f  Spencer to the doc­
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trine o f  the ¿¿oral Sense in the -Principles o f  E th ics".  In ouc ex­
position o f  "Soc ia l  S ta t ic s "  we noticed that, f o r  the determination 
of the laws o f  r igh t  l i v in g  in the idea l  soc ia l  s ta te ,  Spencer, 
to a large extent, depended upon moral in tu i t ions  supplemented by 
reason (.inithe sense o f  reasoning).  But in the "2>ata" moral in tu i ­
tions do not seem to play such a great  part. 'Their place, to a 
considerable extent,  i s  taken by the s c i e n t i f i c  and evolutionary 
method as revealed in and by such sciences as b io logy, psychology, 
and socio logy, Moral in tu i t ion s  are by no means discarded, but are 
given a minor place. The theory that Spencer holds with regard to
J
them is  somewhat c lea re r  in the "Data" than in "Soc ia l  S ta t ic s " .
|
In neither o f  these works does he regard in tu i t ion s  as something 
fixed and unalterable which have to be obeyed without question.
But in the "Data" he def ines  them more c lose ly  when he says that 
they "are the slowly organised resu lts  o f  experience rece ived  by 
the race while l i v in g  in the presence o f  the conditions to achieve­
ment o f  the highest l i f e "  ( p . 172). The same ooint o f  view is  ex­
pressed in his l e t t e r  to J .S .H i l l ,  where he says "'To make my p o s i t 5- 
ion fu l ly  understood, i t  seems needful to add that, corresponding 
to the fundamental propositions o f  a developed Moral Science, there ’ 
have been, and s t i l l  are, developing in the race, certa in  funda­
mental moral in tu i t ion s ;  and that, though these moral in tu i t ions  
are the resu lts  o f  accumulated experiences o f  u t i l i t y ,  gradually 
0rganised and inher i ted ,  they have come to be quite  independent o f  
c°nscious experience" (Data, p . 123). A s im ilar  note i s  struck in
M j  ^
ustice" where Spencer t r i e s  to show that our sentiments and ideas 
Progressively ad just themselves "to the modes o f  l i f e  imposed on
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them by the soc ia l  state into which they have grown" ( p .25).  Thus, 
he says, "here we sha l l  assume i t  to be an in ev i tab le  inference 
from the doctine o f  organic evo lut ion,  that the highest type o f  
l iv ing being, no less  than a l l  lower types, must go on moulding 
i t s e l f  to those requirements which circumstances impose. And we 
shall, by implicat ion ,  assume that moral changes are among the 
changes thus wrought out" (p. 25)'. Or again, "one who accepts the 
doctrine o f  Evolution is  ob l iged ,  i f  he is  consistent,  to admit 
that a p r io r i  b e l i e f s  entertained by men at la rge ,  must have arisen, 
if  not from the experiences o f  each ind iv idua l ,  then from the 
experiences o f  the race" ( p . 55)«
Passing over to the ’’ inductions o f  E th ics" ,  published in 
1892, we f ind  that Spencer endeavours to prove that the in tu i t io n a l  
theory o f  his time, which traced morality to an " o r i g in a l l y  implant­
ed conscience", is  fau l ty ,  and, in his endeavour, he makes a con­
fession which goes to show how fa r  away he has moved from his ear ly  
belief in the moral Sense possessed by man. Thus, he says, "Though, 
as shown in my f i r e w o r k ,  Socia l  S ta t ics ,  I ,once espoused the doc­
trine of the in tu i t i v e  moralists  (a t  the outset in f u l l ,  and in 
later chapters with some implied q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ) ,  ye t  i t  has grad­
ually become c lea r  to me that the qu a l i f i c a t io n s  required p ra c t ic a l ­
ly ob l i tera te  the doctr ine  as enunciated by them. I t  has become 
clear to me that . . . .  i t  i s  impossible to hold that men have in 
common an innate perception o f  r igh t  and wrong" (Vol.  I I ,  pp.470-1). 
but, while thus r e j e c t in g  the Moral Sense doctr ine in i t s  o r i g in a l  
form, Spencer s t i l l  thinks that " i t  adumbrates a truth and a much 
ai8her truth", the truth being that "the sentiments and ideas cur­
rent in each soc ie ty  become adjusted to the kinds o f  a c t i v i t y  pre­
dominating in i t "  ( p . 471) - substant ia l ly  the same truth as express­
ed in the quotations in the preceding paragraph. Moral in tu i t ion s ,  
Spencer further  sayd, are not o f  supernatural o r i g in  but o f  natural
¿rig-in; "being generated by the d is c ip l in e  o f  soc ia l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
internal and externa l,  they are not a l ik e  in a l l  men, but d i f f e r  
more or less  everywhere in proportion as the soc ia l  a c t i v i t i e s  d i f 4- 
fer; and . . . .  in v i r tu e  o f  th e ir  mode o f  genesis they have a co­
ordinate authority with the inductions o f  u t i l i t y "  ( p . 322).
The ch ie f  d i f f e r e n c e ,  then, between "Soc ia l  Statics ' '  and the 
"Principles o f  Eth ics" ,  in th e ir  r e la t io n  to the doctr ine o f  the 
Moral Sense, i s  that while in the e a r l i e r  w r it ing  Spencer simply 
assumes the Moral Sense to be an ult imate, in the la t e r  w r it ing  he 
attempts to g ive  an evolut ionary basis to i t ,  and, in so doing, 
believes that he is  able successfu lly  to mediate between Empiricism 
and Intuitionism, but r e a l l y  seems to decide in favour o f  Empiricism 
itself .  He further  seems to stake everything here upon the v a l i d i t y  
of the doubtful b i o lo g i c a l  p r in c ip le  o f  the inheritance o f  acquired J 
characters. (Op. Albee, A History o f  English U t i l i ta r ian ism ,  p .312.)
_
As regards the r e la t io n  o f  the p r in c ip le  o f  jus t ic e  to the 
boctrine o f  the Moral Sense, i t  w i l l  be remembered that in Socia l 
Katies Spencer g ives  to jus t ic e  a spec ia l  in tu i t i v e  character*and 
Places i t  almost on a olane by i t s e l f ,  regarding the companion 
Principles o f  prudence, negative beneficence, and p os i t iv e  bene­
ficence as lacking the d e f in i t e ,  in tu i t i v e  character o f  ju s t ice  and, 
therefore, only o f  secondary importance. (Gp.Albee, p .282) Although
this Posit ion is  not d e f i n i t e l y  stated in the P r in c ip les  o f  Ethics 
it» seems to be t a c i t l y  assumed by Spencer a l l  through, as is  seen in
?  JCi |  * cAv^vht (Tw
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the abstract and th eo re t ic a l  treatment o f  jus t ice  and tne empirical 
treatment o f  prudence and beneficence. In the t r e a t i s e  on 'Justice '1,
t ( .
he goes to the extent o f  saying that under one aspect, i t  (the prin 
-ciple o f  natural equity ,  i . e . ,  the freedom o f  each l im ited  only 
by the freedom o f  a l l )  i s  an immediate dictum o f  the human conscious 
-ness a f t e r  i t  has been suojeet to the d is c ip l in e  o f  prolonged so­
cial l i f e "  ( p . 6 0 ) .  fu rther ,  in the chapters on the "Sentiment o f  
Justice" and the "Idea o f  Just ice"  (chs. IV and V) o f  the same 
treatise, Spencer seems d e f in i t e l y  to come back to the part icu lar  
way in which he derived thé p r inc ip le  o f  jus t ice  from the moral 
Sense doctrine as seen in tne th ird  method that we sketched in our 
exposition o f  "Soc ia l  S ta t ic s " .  Instead o f  speaking o f  an in s t in c t  
of personal r igh ts  or an impulse to claim the exerc ise  o f  fa cu l t ie s ,  
as in Social S ta t ic s ,  Spencer now speaks o f  an " e g o is t i c  sentiment 
of justice",  and, in the place o f  an in s t in c t  o f  sympathy or an 
ifflpulse to respect the l im i ts  o f  the exerc ise  o f  f a c u l t i e s ,  Spencer 
now has an " a l t r u i s t i c  sentiment o f  ju s t i c e " ;  tne only material 
difference being that the gu l f  between the in s t in c t  o f  personal 
nights and the in s t in c t  o f  sympathy, which was l e f t  unbridged in 
u°cial Stat ics ,  i s  now bridged by a p r o -a l t r u is t i c  sentiment o f  jus­
tice. This p ro -a l t ru is t i c  sentiment, Sp. says, temporarily supplies 
place o f  the. a l t r u i s t i c  sentiment and ' 'res tra ins  the actions 
Prompted by pure egoism" (Just ice ,  p . 29); and he further adds that
]• (previous page) Compare, f o r  instance, Spencer's own statement : 
ns f i r s t  and a l l - e s s e n t i a l  law fJus t ic e ) ,  dec laratory  o f  tne 
D®rt.y of each l im ited  only by the l ik e  l i b e r t y  o f  a l l ,  i s  that 
and' ra?ntal truth o f  which the moral sense is  to g iv e  an in tu i t ion ,
!„ which the i n t e l l e c t  i s  to develop into a s c i e n t i f i c  mora lity"  
'°°cial S ta t ics ,  pp.90-01).
by means o f  i t s  component parts, tne dread o f  r e t a l i a t i o n ,  the 
iread o f  soc ia l  d i s l ik e ,  the dread o f  l e g a l  punishment, and the 
dread o f  d iv ine  vengeance, the p r o - a l t r u i s t i c  sentiment o f  jus t ice  
helps soc ie ty  to hold together and makes possib le  the development 
of sympathy through gregariousness, which g ives  r i s e  to the gen­
uine a l t r u i s t i c  sentiment o f  ju s t ice .
"But the a l t r u i s t i c  sentiment o f  ju s t i c e " ,  spencer observes, j 
"is slow in assuming a high form", the reasons being ( 1 ) tnat i t s  
primary component, sympathy, does not become h igh ly  developed u n t i l  
a late phase o f  progress ( i . e . ,  u n t i l  at leas t  "the e g o is t i c  s en t i ­
ment of ju s t ic e "  has a r isen ) ,  ( 2 ) that i t  is  r e l a t i v e l y  complex,
, II .
because i t  is  not concerned only with concrete pleasures and pains 
but is  concerned mainly with certa in  o f  the circumstances under 
which these are obtainable or prevent ib le "  ( p . 32), and ( 3 ) that i t  
implies a stretch  o f  imagination (wider than that required f o r  p ity  
and generos i ty ) ,  not possib le  f o r  low in t e l l i g e n c e s . But once the 
a l t ru is t ic  sentiment o f  ju s t ice  establishes i t s e l f ,  i t  would appear, 
according to Spencer, that i t  co-operates with the e g o is t i c  s e n t i ­
ment of  jus t ice  to produce the general sentiment o f  ju s t ice .  S t r i c t ­
ly speaking, however, i t  would appear that the sentiment o f  jus t ice ,  
as in the l a t t e r  part o f  Socia l S ta t ics  ( th ird  method), i s  der ived ' 
°nly from tne in s t in c t  o f  personal r igh ts  or the e g o is t i c  s en t i ­
ment of ju s t ice .  Justice ,  as before, i s  a sort o f  " r e f l e x  function" 
of the " ' inst inct  o f  personal r igh ts " .
The r e l a t i v e l y  vague sentiment o f  jus t ice  arr ived  at in the 
above way, Spencer seems to be conscious, is  in s u f f i c i e n t  to
regulai;e soc ia l  r e la t ion s ,  and hence he urges the need f o r  a
"de f in i te  and o b je c t iv e  idea" o f  ju s t ic e ,  but as to how th is  " idea" 
is to be ascertained, Spencer's surpris ing answer i s :  "The idea 
emerges and becomes d e f in i t e  in the course o f  the experiences that 
action ¡nay be carr ied  up to a certa in  l im i t  without causing r e ­
sentment from others, but i f  carr ied  beyond that l im i t  produces 
resentment. Such experiences accumulate; and gradually ,  along witn 
repugnance to the acts which bring reac t iv e  pains, there ar ises  
a conception o f  a l im i t  to each kind o f  a c t i v i t y  up to which there 
is freedom to act" (Just ice ,  p .3o ). And in determining th is  l im i t  
up to which a oerson has freedom to act,  Spencer proposes to f ind  
a middle way between a r t i f i c i a l  inequa l i ty ,  which he b e l ie ves  is  
the primordial id ea l  suggested and the a r t i f i c i a l  equa l i ty  view 
(according to Spencer's in te rp re ta t ion )  held by Bentnam and his 
followers. In other words, Spencer seeks to unite the elements o f  
truth contained in the two antagonist ic  views, i . e . ,  inequa l i ty  
as regards merit and reward, 'since men d i f f e r  in th e i r  powers" 
(Justice, p . 3 7 ) and equa l ity  as regards mutual l im ita t ions  to men's 
actions, since "Experience shows that these bounds are on the 
average the same f o r  a l l "  ( I b i d . ) .  The formula which expresses th is  
compromise, as one would expect i t  to be, i s  spencer's fa vou r i te  
law of equal freedom. To put the whole matter in Spencer's own word
" I t  (the formula) must be p os i t iv e  in so fa r  as i t  asserts 
for each that, since he i s  to rece ive  and su f fe r  tne good and e v i l  
results o f  his actions, he must be allowed to act. .And i t  must be 
negative in so fa r  as, by assert ing  th is  o f  everyone, i t  implies 
fnat each can be allowed to act only under the r e s t ra in t  imposed 
the presence o f  others having l ik e  claims to act. Evidently 
“he pos it ive  element is  that which expresses a p re - requ is i te  to 
l i fe  in general,  and the negative element is  that which q u a l i f i e s  
his p re -requ is i te  in the way required víhen, instead o f  one l i f e  
carried on alone, there are many l i v e s  carr ied on together.
"Hence, that which we have to express in a precise way, is^ 
ne l ib e r ty  o f  each l im ited  only by the l ik e  l i b e r t i e s  o f  a l l .  This
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we do by saying:-  Every man is  f r e e  to do that which he w i l l s ,  
provided he in fr in ges  not the equal freedom o f  any other man" 
(Justice, pp.45-6).
chapter I I .  I t s  Re la t ion  to the P r in c ip les  o f  B io lo gy .
I t  is  o f ten  assumed both by the fr iends  and enemies o f  
Spencer's theory o f  morality that i t  i s  in some peculiar way r e ­
lated to the doctr ine  o f  b io lo g i c a l  evo lut ion and that, in order 
to disprove i t s  v a l i d i t y ,  i t  i s  f i r s t  o f  a l l  necessary to d i s ­
prove the v a l i d i t y  o f  i t s  supposed evolutionary basis. An exce l len t  
opportunity f o r  examining th is  assumption, i t  seems to us, i s  
afforded by the theory o f  soc ia l  ju s t ic e ,  as enunciated by Spencer. 
In undertaking th is  examination, i t  i s  g r a t i f y in g  to note that our 
task is  comparatively l ightened by the fa c t  that In "Soc ia l  S ta t ic s 1 
written e ight years before the publicat ion  o f  barwin' s Orig in  o f  
Species", we nave what appears to be on the whole a pre-evo lu t iona l  
statement o f  Spencer's theory o f  ju s t ice ,  and i f ,  in  comparing 
and contrasting th is  e a r l i e r  statement with the l a t e r  statement 
found in j u s t i c e "  (fy'392), we f ind  some fundamental d i f f e r en ce ,  
we can sa fe ly  assume that such d i f f e ren ce  is  la rg e ly  ascribable 
to the "b io lo g i c a l  o r i g in  f o r  e th ics "  which has "been d e f in i t e l y  
set for th " in Justice.
Turning our a t ten t ion  f i r s t  to the o r ig in a l  ed i t ion  o f  
Social S ta t ic s " ,  i t  i s  s ign i f i c a n t  to note that Spencer here sets
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forth and stout ly  defends the general evolut ionary idea (not
lc
paricu lar ly  Darwin's idea) o f  "adaptation o f  const i tu t ion  to
Pn
conditions". But ne ither  in th is  work nor in the "P r in c ip le s  o f  
^tnics" does he pay much atten t ion  to the important truth that 
"adaptation to environment" does not mean the same thing in the 
ease o f  man, as i t  does in that o f  lower animals. I t  seems to us 
to be quite  evident that while "adaptation o f  an animal species 
to i t s  environment means adaptation to r e l a t i v e l y  permanent and 
comparatively simple physical condit ions" ,  in the case o f  man, i t  
means in d e f in i t e l y  more. "-Even phys ica l ly  considered", as Dr. Albee 
observes, man's environment " i s  subject to constant, and sometimes 
radical, change as the resu lt  o f  his own exert ions,  in his capacity 
as an in t e l l e c tu a l  being capable o f  dev is ing  means to the a t ta in ­
ment o f  h is  des ired ends. But what we may c a l l  his 'phychical en­
vironment' i s  much more important, and th is  o la in ly  Is  subject to 
almost endless m od if ica t ion"  (A History o f  English U t i l i ta r ian ism ,  
pp.278-9).
in te rp re t in g  the idea o f  adaptation to environment in a 
Physical and mechanical way, i t  i s  not surprising that when he 
comes to construct his theory o f  jus t ice  upon surv iva l ,  Spencer 
confines himself  to fa c ts  which invo lve  adaptation o f  a passive 
character. Already in Socia l  S ta t ics ,  where "a b io lo g ic a l  o r i g in  
for1 ethics" i s  "only ind ica ted " ,  Spencer sees the beneficence o f  
tne struggle f o r  existence. Thus, he says, "Pervading a l l  nature 
we may see at work a stern d i s c i o l in e , which Is  a l i t t l e  cruel 
triat i t  may be very kind. That state o f  universal warfare main­
tained throughout the lower creation, to the great p e rp lex i ty  o f
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of many worthy people, is  atjbottom the most merc ifu l prov is ion  
which the circumstances admit o f '1 ( p . 3 2 2 ) ;  and, applying the p r in ­
ciple contained herein to the case o f  human beings, ne says, "the 
well-being o f  ex is t in g  hucanity, and the unfolding o f  i t  into . . . .  
ultimate per fec t ion ,  are both secured by that same beneficent,  
though severe d is c ip l in e ,  to which the animate creation at large 
is subject: a d is c ip l in e  which is  p i t i l e s s  in the working out of  
goo||: a f e l i c i t y -p u rs u in g  law which never swerves f o r  the avoidance 
of par t ia l  and temporary su f fe r ing .  The poverty o f  the incapable, 
the d is tresses  that come upon the imprudent, the starvat ion  o f  the 
idle, and those shoulderings aside o f  the weak by the strong, whicn 
leave so many ' i n  shallows and in miseries', are the decrees o f  a
large, fa r -see ing  benevolence" (pp . 3 2 2 - 2 3 ).
I t  is  extremely s ign i f i c a n t  that the same two ideas -"adapta­
tion of const i tu t ion  to conditions" and the "stern d is c ip l in e "  o f  
nature - found in a work in which, according to Spencer himself ,  
the b io lo g ica l  o r i g in  f o r  eth ics  is  only indicated, are elaborated 
and i l lu s t ra ted  at great length in the l a t e r  and more mature w r i t  
tings which profess to be d e f in i t e l y  based upon the p r inc ip les  o f
biolgy. The only new fa c to r  o f  importance found in them is  tne
factor of race~preservation or what Spencer pre fers  to c a l l  " s o c ia l  
self-preservation". I t  is  true that th is  new fac to r  somewhat modi­
fies and q u a l i f i e s  spencer 's  simple f a i t h  in the beneficence o f  
fbe stern d is c ip l in e  o f  nature, but there are no signs to the l a s t  
show that such f a i t h  is  t o t a l l y  abandoned. Spencer to the end 
seems to b e l ieve  that the weak, the feeb le ,  and the i n e f f i c i e n t  
Members of soc ie ty ,  in going under, deserve to go under, and that
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the State or soc ie ty  in i t s  corporate capacity should do nothing 
to a l l e v ia t e  th e i r  su f fe r ing .  To p r iva te  charity  and d iscriminate
tion as to whether Spencer is  consistent with himself here may be
The app l ica t ion  o f  the ideas o f  adaptation to environment 
and the sternness o f  nature to the question o f  soc ia l  jus t ice  
would seem to be that each man should adapt himself  to l i f e  con­
ditions as best Srs he may, and that, in order to do so, he should 
have a l l  the freedom o f  the jungle. sut to the l a t t e r  part o f  the
. i
inference Spencer demurs in the ear ly  chapters o f  Justice" (Part
IV'of the P r in 's  o f  Ethics^, to an exposit ion  o f  which we now pass .
Spencer h e r e 'd e f in i t e l y  claims 'that, in the evo lut ion  o f  conduct,
"something which may he regarded as animal e th ics  is  implied" ( p . 1 )
and that human ju s t ic e  is  "a further  development o f  sub“ human jus- 
„
tice (p. 1 7 ) .  This pos i t ion  orima fe.cie s tr ikes  us as rather strange I 
because jus t ic e  is  the very la s t  thing that we expect to f ind  
among animals. In'.the words o f  Calderwood (Phi losoph ica l  Review,
Vol.I, p . 243), " I t  would seem that the very success o f  the Dar­
winian theory depends upon absence o f  any approach to jus t ice  in 
animal l i f e .  The masterfulness o f  force  is  the thing most cont 
spicuous as we mark the conduct o f  animals. Food is  the reward o f  
fight; what i s  to happen to the one who i s  beaten i s  matter o f  no 
concern fo r  the one who has secured a good repast. On any d e f in i t ion .  
°f justice that can be o f fe rdd ,  i t  would seem c lear  that any regard 
to i t  is  impossible under conditions o f  animal l i f e . "  But ye t ,
individual philanthropy, however,
le f t  over t i l l  we come to Bart I I . )
■
as the same w r i t e r  goes on to say, " I t  i s  natural and reasonable
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(in studying Spencer) that we should turn to animal life itself, 
to ascertain whether there are traces of the rudiments of ethical ■ 
distinctions appearing in the conduct of animals" (p. 244). 
Directing his attention first to animal life in general and exam­
ining the lav/s of life and the conditions of existence to which 
every species must conform to secure its preservation and pros­
perity, which are the proper objects of its aim in life, Spencer 
says that 'there inevitably emerge one most general conclusion 
and from it three less general conclusions" (p.o).
Let us sjsate these conclusions briefly and see to wnat 
extent they are really derivable from contemplation of animal 
life in general and what application they nave to man. "'¿'he modt 
general conclusion", says Spencer, "is that in order of obligation 
the preservation of the species takes precedence of the preserva­
tion of the individual" (p.5). “e grant to Spencer that this 
'most general conclusion" is in a broad way a valid deduction 
from the life of gregarious animals which defend themselves in 
groups, though we doubt whether the term "obligation" can be 
applied to them in any legitimate sense. But the question of 
supreme importance in relation to man is with regard to tne mean­
ing of the significant phrase "preservation of the species".
1 • Compare Calderwood's words "the weaker animal knows only its 
painful experience; the stronger knows only its own comfort; 
neither knows anythin as to the general good. That animals nave 
always acted as described, we are agreed; that the result has been 
ine advance of the species, is also matter of practical agreement 
among us now. But no one suggests that the weaker animals always 
yield, and tne stronger always persist in the struggle, with a 
regard to the common good of the species" (Phil'l Review, I, p.246)
Deferring a discussion of this question to Vart II, we may say 
that in the chapter on the "¡Sociological View" in the Dara of 
Ethics ( en. VIII) Spencer is at great pains to show that the prin­
ciple underlying his"most general conclusion" plays a large 
cart in the early stages of human life when wars prevail. The 
reason that he urges for the subordination of the ultimate end, 
individual preservation, to the immediate end, race-preservation 
- if and when nee the two come into conflict - is that such sub­
ordination prevents the disappearance of the species, implying 
disappearance of individuals, which will involve absolute failure 
in achieving the end.
among the "less general conclusions" which follow from 
the *most general conclusion", the one which is of great import­
ance and which is the central feature of human justice, even in 
its ideal form, is "that among adults there must be conformity 
to the law that benefits received shall be directly proportionate 
to merits possessed: merits being measured by power of self- 
sustentation" or by fitness to the conditions of existence. The 
two reasons which Spencer gives for considering this law of great 
importance are (1) that to act on an opposite principle, like 
proportioning of benefits to inefficiency, would mean the dis­
appearance of the species in a few generations and (2 ) that the 
principle of the survival of the fittest which underlies this
law' is the instrument that Mature has at hand for the gradual 
evolving of life into higher forms (cp.Justice, p.5). This
11 -l IIless general conclusion also, we are willing to concede to 
spencer, is deducible from contemplation of animal life In general
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But the point on which we must fasten attention is the tauto­
logical nature of the ' law ' which declares that merits are to be 
"measured by power of s e l f - s u s t e n ta t io n " ; which, in other words, 
says that whatever an adult animal manages to ge t  in keeping 
itself alive and in healthy condition is what it ought to get!
Bo one will object to this physical 'law' as a correct statement 
of facts with regard to animals in their struggle for existence. 
But very few will geant that it has any application to human 
society, even as interpreted by Spencer himself. Spencer does 
not think a person entitled to use any means he likes in order to 
kkep himself alive and in fit condition; he must, for one thing, 
Spencer believes, respect the institution of private property.
In explanation of this seeming contradiction, however, Spencer 
would say that the fact of gregariousness to which he directs 
attention a few pages later in his treatise on "justice" con­
siderably modifies the grim struggle for existence and introduces 
the need for respecting the rights of others. But it is extremely 
doubtful whether gregarious anmmals, apart from instinctively 
defending themselves in groups against external aggressors, which 
action occasionally means the reversal of the relation between 
benefits received and merits possessed, show much consideration 
for one another's sustentation. When food was scarce or difficult 
to get (and, perhaps, even under normal conditions), there Is 
ao reason to suppose that gregarious animals would either instlnc 
-tively or consciously limit their "spheres of activity". The 
strong would get whatever they could by whatever way they could, 
aad the weak would go to the wall.
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The second "less general- conclusion" or principle which
n self-Spencer arrives at is that during early life, before/sustentation
has become oossible, and also while it can be but partial, .... 
benefits received must be inversely proportionate to merits pos^ 
sessed" (Justice, p.7). To act otherwise, we are told, must mean 
disappearance of the species by extinction of its young. Whatever 
the importance of this principle may be, it is noticeable that it 
does not enter into the formulation of Spencer's theory of human 
justice, the simple reason being that justice, as Spencer conceives 
it, concerns itself only with tne relation between adult human 
beimgs in the social state. The principle enunciated here Spencer 
assigns to its proper sphere, which, he says, is the sphere of 
family ethics. Leaving aside for a moment the question of its prop­
er sphere, the principle itself needs to be noted in order to en­
able us to see what light it can throw on the elucidation and crit­
icism of the rights of children, which Spencer discusses in ch. XXI 
of ''Justice".
This second "less general conclusion" also, we must grant 
to Spencer, is on the whole a fair statement of the life of sub­
human beings in general. but it is necessary to note that even 
during early life there is a struggle for existence and that bene­
fits received are not always inversely proportionate to merits 
possessed. It is a matter of common knowledge that, among birds, 
the weakest nestling is often trampled under foot and sometimes 
even elbowed out of its nest by its stronger brothers and sisters 
in their anxiety to get all the nourishment that they can get from 
their parents. And if justice,- as Spencer contends, is merely a
further development of sub-human justice and if also, as we shall 
show later, it is arbitrary on the part of Spencer to exclude f- 
family ethics from the domain o/ social justice, ought we not, 
using our intelligence in the service of natural selection (whicn 
is recommended by Spencer's ’Ethics'), to do to our weak and de­
fective children even what Soartan mothers did to their weak and 
defective children? Would this not be a quicker and less painful 
way of reahing Spencer's ultimate state than the way advocated 
by him, that of providing benefits to children in inverse propor­
tion to their merits and of letting them suffer the discipline 
of natural consequences when they become adults?
A third ''less general conclusion" or principle to which 
Spencer draws attention, and which is but a particular expression 
of the "most general conclusion" stated above, is that "if the 
constitution of the species and its conditions of existence are 
such that sacrifices, partial or complete, of some of its indi­
viduals, so subserve the welfare of the species that its numbers 
are better maintained than they would otherwise be, then there 
results a justification for such sacrifices" (Justice, p.7). This 
principle, Spencer believes, is not as important as the former 
two, and he adds that what importance it has, is relative to the 
Presence of rival species in the case of lower animals, and of 
antagonistic societies in the case of man. °ecause of its condi­
tional importance Spencer gives it no place in his formulation 
0t ideal justice for man. -but this is not to deny its rigntful 
Place during transitional stages, and it remains to be seen whetner 
^Pencer gives due recognition#to this inference. Besides, we may
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ask with Sidgwicli the question, what does 'justified' here meanV 
It is probably shown to be in harmony with justice. If so, a wider 
and more comprehensive principle of Justice is required. (Op. 
Ethics of Oreen, Spencer, and ^artineau, p.255.)
vVe have so far seen that among the laws which are said to 
govern animal life in general, the law which definitely enters 
into Spencer's formulation of human justice, is that of propor­
tioning benefits to merits possessed, merit being measured by fit­
ness for the conditions of existence. For the origin of the other 
important law which enters human justice and which modifies the 
absolute freedom necessitated by the former law, Spencer turns to 
gregarious creatures and there finds that a law which governs 
their life absolutely is that "Each individual, receiving the 
benefits and the injuries due to its own nature and consequent 
conduct, has to carry on that conduct subject to the restriction 
that it shall not in any large measure impede tne conduct by whicn 
each other individual achieves benefits or brings on itself in­
juries" (p.12). The great importance of this law, Spencer urges,
out
is due to the fa c t^ v io la t io n  o f  i t  would lead to the undoing o f  
gregariousness and co-operation which, he claims, have come into 
being because o f  th e i r - g r ea te r  u t i l i t a r i a n  advantage (cp. p. 1 2 ) 
and eventually to the d isso lu t ion  o f  the group i t s e l f  through the 
law of  the surv iva l  o f  the f i t t e s t .  "Those v a r i e t i e s  only can sur­
vive as gregarious v a r i e t i e s  in which there is  an inher ited  ten­
dency to maintain the l im i t s "  ( Just ice ,  p p . 1 2 - 3 )*
With regard to this law, which Spencer later transforms i
nbo tne law of equal freedom in its application to man, we must
say, as we have said already, that it is extremely doubtful v.. : .*
whether gregarious animals show any trace of respect for the
life-sustaining activities of one another. In the words of Calder-
wood, Spencer's definition of justice "ia as clearly inapplicable
to animals, as it is certainly applicable to man. Justice asserts
that each must be allowed to act; and that each so restrain him-
1self as to allow to others equal freedom to act. Such a compro­
mise has no place in animal life. 'The struggle for existence' 
implies the reverse. The compromise never had any place:in natural 
history until the appearance of man. In tne absence of rational 
intelligence, it was impossible that such a compromise should, be 
contemplated,or even understood. Appetite, passion, force, are 
the commanding features of animal life; the fight for superiority 
is incessant because inevitable; and out of this has come every­
thing so clearly recognised under the general law providing for
survival of the fittest. 'The consequence for the present argument
two
(possibility Sf Animal Ethics) is obvious; of these We hypotheses, 
evolution of species, and 'animal ethics', we must surrender one. 
Under this alternative, 'animal ethics' disappears as a stepping- 
stone towards evolution of man. From whatever source we have ob­
tained our conception of justice, it has not come up to us from 
the animals which know nothing of compromise. Ethical conceptions 
must find their explanation otherwise" (Philosophical Review,
Vol.I, pp.248-0). Animal life, it seems to us, shows us nothing, 
either directly or indirectly, of the régularisation of the grim 




making his own application to man of the above laws which 
are said to govern the life of animals, in general, and that of
/v
greatures, in particular, Spencer says, "Of man, as of all inferior:'
creatures, the law by conformity to which the species is preserved, 
is that among adults the individuals best adapted to the conditions, 
of their existence shall prosper most, and that individuals least
adapted to the conditions of their existence shall prosper least -
UM- -
a law which, if interfered with, entails survival of the fittest, 
A
and spread of the most adapted varieties" (Justice, p.17). The 
ethical interpretation of this biological law, Spencer adds, is 
"that each individual ought to receive the benefits and the evils 
of his own nature and consequent conduct: neither being prevented. 
from having whatever good his actions normally bring to him, nor 
allowed to shoulder off on to other persons whatever ill is brought 
to him by his actions" (Ibid.). This, it would appear to Spencer, 
is the law of "pure Justice" (Justice, p.18).
An important modification of the principle of justice,
Spencer says, is introduced in the case of man by the character­
istic of fighting his own kind. "Having spread wherever there is 
food, groups of men have come to be everywhere in one another's 
way; and the mutual enmities hence resulting, have made the sacri­
fices entailed by wars between groups, far greater than the sacri­
fices made in defence of groups against inferior animals" (Justice, 
P-22). -out such obligation for self-subordination in the interests 
°f the group as results from this peculiar characteristic of the 
human species, is limited to defensive war, offensive war becoming 
uu justifiable as man reaches a stage at which ethical considera.imu^^
tions come to be entertained.1 Whatever the importance of this 
T Compare Justice !  o . 13.
modification may be in the un-ideal s ta te ,  i t  has no place in 
Spencer's formulation o f  id ea l  ju s t ic e .
In concluding our expos it ion  and inc identa l  c r i t ic ism  o f  
the b i l o g i c a l  laws o f  surv iva l  on which Spencer claims to base 
the p r in c ip le  o f  human ju s t ic e ,  i t  is  necessary to state ( 1 ) that 
the laws mentioned by Spencer are not the only laws o f  surv iva l ;  
(2 ) that even these laws are only genera l ly  true o f  animal l i f e  
and do not e a s i l y  lend themselves to the in te rp re ta t ion  put on 
them by Spencer; and }3) that there seems to be nothing among 
animals to suggest anything l ik e  a law o f  equal freedom.
Snap te r  I I I .  Its Meaning;.
r
in th is  chapter we propose to expound b r i e f l y  the p a r t icu la r  
meaning that Spencer assigns to his doctr ine o f  soc ia l  jus t ice  
and the re la t ionsh ip  that he posits between that aoctine and his 
general e th ica l  theory. D irect ing  our at tent ion  f i r s t  to the l a t t e r  
Part of our task, we must say that, in turning from "Soc ia l  Stat ic^ 
to tne "P r in c ip le s  o f  .Ethics", we f ind  that the ult imate end of 
bum an action is  not so simply stated. Spencer s t i l l  regards him-
I
sel f  as a 'U t i l i t a r ia n  ( in  his own sense o f  the word o f  course), 
but, into his discussion o f  the suoreme end, he introduces elements 
which, at f i r s t  s ight,  seem to come into c o n f l i c t  with the s t r i c t l y  
t i l i t a r i a n  standard o f  "g rea test  happiness". Sidgwick, in hie
Ethics o f  dreen, Spencer, and .lartineau, accuses Spencer of  regard j 
-ing now the quantity o f  l i f e  f- including duration as we l l  as 
quantity o f  change in a g iven time) and now the quantity o f  
pleasure as the ult imate end, without attempting to reconc i le  the • 
two. I t  would be a l toge ther  out o f  place at th is  point to examine 
minutely th is  charge against Soencer. I t  ps s u f f i c i e n t  to remark 
that the d isp a r i t y  between l i f e  and pleasure as end is  not so ' 
great as Sidgwick seems to imagine, though i t  must be noted that 
Spencer, when he comes to deal with jus t ic e ,  the most essen t ia l  
condition o f  l i f e ,  according to him, is  in danger of  regarding 
i t  as a p rac t ica l  ult imate,  as seen in his neg lec t ing  to take into  
consideration (and sometimes etfen d isregarding)  i t s  immediate 
e f fec t  upon pleasure. Whatever the discrepancy between l i f e  and 
pleasure (o r ,  f o r  our purposes, between just ice  and pleasure) 
may be, Spencer be l ieves  that, in the f in a l  state ,  they w i l l  
exactly coincide with one another so that l i f e - s u s ta in in g  acts 
(or ' . just1 ac ts )  w i l l  be synonymous with p leasure-g iv ing  acts - 
acts g iv in g  pleasure both immediate and remote. Thus we hear him 
say "When we have got r id  o f  the tendency to think that certa in  
modes o f  a c t i v i t y  are necessar i ly  pleasurable because they g ive  
us pleasure, and that other modes which do not please us are 
necessarily unoleasing, we shall  see that the remoulding o f  human 
nature into f i tn e s s  f o r  the requirements o f  soc ia l  l i f e  must 
eventually make a l l  needful a c t i v i t i e s  pleasurable, while i t  makes ; 
^^pleasurable a l l  a c t i v i t i e s  at variance with tnese requirements" 
(I’ata, p. 183). To the same e f f e c t  he wr ites  e a r l i e r  i n t he work 
ffhen he says, "Thus there is  no escape from the adr/^ssiomS^hat in
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ca l l ing  good the conduct which subserves l i f e ,  and bad the con­
duct which hinders or destroys i t ,  and in so implying that l i f e  
is a b less ing and not a curse, we are in ev i tab ly  assert ing that 
conduct is  good or bad according as i t s  t o ta l  e f f e c t s  are pleas­
urable or painful" (Data, p . 2 8 ).
Dut the question o f  supreme Importance from the U t i l i t a r ia n  
point o f  view f o r  which we seek an answer from Spencer, i s ,  what 
ought to be our moral procedure in the mn-ideal soc ie ty  ( i . e . ,  
the actual soc ie ty  or the only soc ie ty  that we know), where, 
according to Spencer h imself ,  the standard o f  l i f e  and the stand­
ard of pleasure do hot always point in the same d irec t ion?  In 
his own words, " . . . .  in our state o f  t rans i t ion ,  characterised by 
very imperfect adaptation o f  const i tu t ion  to conditions, moral 
obligations o f  supreme kinds o ften  necess ita te  conduct which is  
physically in jur ious"  (Data, p .76 ) .  Spencer does not seem to 
attempt a d e f in i t e  answer to th is  question, but i t  is  implied in 
a l l  his e th ica l  and soc ia l  wr it ings  that there are times when 
preservation o f  l i f e  should have p r io r i t y  over claims o f  pleasure, 
thjis i l lu s t r a t in g  A r i s t o t l e ' s  truism that to l i v e  we l l  we must 
l ive  somehow. In such cases, I t  seems that Spencer would regard 
l i f e  to be the d i r e c t  end and pleasure the Ind irec t  end; f o r  does 
be d<»6tg not say himself that i t  is  "qu ite  consistent to assert 
that happiness is  the ult imate aim of action, and at the same 
time to deny that i t  can be reached by making i t  the immediate 
aim?" I f  pleasure, then, Is  the ind irec t  end, which at times has 
be s a c r i f i c ed  in behalf  o f  l i f e ,  which is  the d i r e c t  end, i t  
would appear that the only ju s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  such s a c r i f i c e  i •
to the g rea tes t  happiness that i s  possib le  to a t ta in .  And Spencer,
*
as already indicated ,  has no doubt with regard to th is  inference.
'The chie f  reason which he has f o r  his op t im is t ic  b e l i e f  in the
final coincidence o f  l i f e  and pleasure would seen to oe the a l leged
b io log ica l  f a c t  that nature stamps with pleasure acts which help
self-preservation, or race- ^reservation or both, ar^with :>ain acts
»\
which have the opposite e f f e c t .  Thus, r e f e r r in g  back to the Brin- 
ciples o f  Psychology, Section 124, Spencer says in his "Data" that 
" i t  was shown tnat necessar i ly ,  throughout the animate world at 
large, ' pains are the co r r e la t iv e s  o f  actions in jurious organism,
A  ,
while pleasures are the co r re la t iv es  o f  actions -conducive to 
welfare; '  since ' i t  Is  an in ev i tab le  deduction from the hypothesis 
of -^Volution, that races o f  sentient creatures could have come into 
existense under no other cond it ions ' "  (Data, p .79)- I t  i s  n o t ic e ­
able that ne ither here nor l a t e r  in his wr it ings  does Spencer pay 
any great a t ten t ion  to those who claim that at best there is  only 
a general tendency f o r  I l f e - s u s ta in in g  actions to be also pleasure- 
giving and that, judging from ordinary experience there can never 
be a perfect coincidence between l i f e  and pleasure. I t  i s  also 
noticeable that Spencer does not g ive  much thought to the grea tes t  
possible happiness o f  e x is t in g  generations inasmuch as he oe l ieves  
tnat tne coincidence between l i f e  and pleasure (or jus t ice  and 
Pleasure) can come about only In the f in a l  state a f t e r  continuous 
painful adaptation; and th is  f in a l  s tate,  Spencer t e l l s  us 
sisewipere, can only be reached in in f in i t e  time.
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is the certainty of obedience to life-sustaining actions leading
We 'nave so fa r  seen that "general happiness'1 to Spencer Is  
the ultimate end o f  human action and that ta is  general happiness 
is not to be sought d i r e c t l y  (as is  the case with empirical U t i l ­
itarianism , as understood by Spencer), but by conformity to cer ­
tain l i f e -c on se rv in g  conditions (cp.Data, p .25). I f  any one doubts 
Spencer's a l leg iance  to U t i l i ta r ian ism ,  we have h is  own strong 
statement "So that no school can avoid taming f o r  the ultimate aim 
a desirable state o f  f e e l in g  ca l led  by whatever name - g r a t i f i c a ­
tion, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to 
some being or beings, is  an inexpugnable element o f  tne conception. 
It is as much a necessary form o f  moral In tu i t ion  as space i s  a 
necessary form o f  in t e l l e c tu a l  in tu i t ion "  (p .46).  I t  i s  to be noted 
that Spencer here considers "a des irab le  state o f  f e e l in g " ,  " g r a t i ­
f icat ion",  "enjoyment", and "happiness", as being a l l  interchange­
able with "p leasure",  understood in the U t i l i t a r i a n  sense.
Assuming with Spencer f o r  the time being that the U t i l i ta r ian  
end of general happiness can be attained only through obedience to 
l i fe-conserving conditions, a question which ar ises  at th is  point 
is, whose l i f e  or preservation are we to seek? Is  i t  that of the 
individual or that o f  the race? In the ear ly  part o f  the "Data", 
Spencer is  o f  opinion that ind iv idual preservation and race-orer-  
vation are mutually dependent upon one another. Thus he says that 
among superior creatures and among human beings "conduct which 
iurtijfers race-maiiitenunce evolves hand-in-hand with the conduct 
ffaicii furthers sel f-maintenance"; and that "speaxing genera l ly ,  
neither can evolve  without evo lut ion o f  tne other; and tne highest 




"conduct called good rises to the conduct conceived as best, when 
it fulfils all these classes of ends at the same time" (i.e., "the 
greatest totality of life in self, in offspring, and in fellow-men)
(Jumfcla»,- p.36).
Although Spencer thus believes in the simultaneous evolution 
of individual preservation and race-preservation, he recognises 
that, in our present imperfect society, they do not always go to­
gether. "As now carried on, life hourly brings individual interests 
face to face with the interests of other individuals, taken singly 
or as associated" (Data, p.284). But Spencer attributes this failure 
to conditions of war. When wars cease, he confidently believes, 
there will be no need for sacrificing individual preservation to 
race-preservation. "Complete living" of each will go hand in hand 
with the "complete living" of all. But till then individual preser­
vation, it would seem, is to be regarded as the ultimate end, and 
social or race-preservation as the proximate end. Putting the 
whole matter in Spencer's own words, "The life of the social or­
ganism must, as an end, rank above the lives of its units. These 
two ends are not harmonious at the outset; and though the tendency 
is towards harmonisation of them, they are still partially conflict­
ing1 (Data, pp.133-4). "As fast as the social state establishes 
itself, the preservation of the society becomes a means of preserving
its units.......Hence, social self-preservation becomes a proximate
en<i taking precedence of the ultimate aim, individual self-preserva­
tion” (p. 134). [The bearing of all this upon Spencer's theory of 
justice is this, that if justice, as pointed out here and in the 
Receding chapter, is in the first instance based upon race-preserva-
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-tion, it becomes extremely doubtful whether it is the best means 
to the maximum present happiness attainable through individual j
action. On the Utilitarian basis, there would appear to be no 
valid reason why the immediate happinesses of an aggregate of 
pleasure-seeking individuals should be sacrificed for the sake of 
the general well-being of society. Further, it is arbitrary on the 
part of Spencer to assume that the need for subordinating individual 
pleasures to race-preservation would cease with the cessation of 
war. Also, it is a debatable question whether Spencer's law of 
equal freedom is the best means to the achieving of "the greatest 
totality of life in self, in offspring, and in fellow-men".J 
Of the conditions which conserve life - individual and 
social -, the most important one, according to Spencer, as already 
said, is justice as interpreted by him. Thus he says in the Data 
of Ethics, "Not general happiness becomes the ethical standard 
by which legislative action is to be guided, but universal justice" 
(p.224). Or again, ".... maintenance of equitable relations between 
men is the condition to attainment of greatest happiness in all 
societies; however much the greatest happiness attainable in each 
may differ in nature or amount or both" (p.170). The way that Spen­
cer relates justice to general happiness may be stated in some 
such manner as this: The greatest equal happiness attainable through 
iSjAyidual action is the ultimate end of morality. (In the case of 
J,5.Mili} it will be remembered that the end is the greatest total 
happiness attainable through social action.) But the greatest 
individual happiness can be attained only through the exercise of 
Acuities (cp. ch. on Activity in Part III of the "Principles");
and in the social state of man, which is a fixed s condition of 
existence, the exercise of faculties means (1) that each individual 
(and he alone) should receive the results of the exercise of his 
faculties and (2 ) that he should have as much freedom as is com­
patible with the freedom of others for exercising his faculties.
(It is needless to say that it is altogether arbitrary for Spencer 
to assume that the "greatest happiness" of every individual depends 
upon "the exercise of his faculties"^ and that, even if such .1 a 
assumption is not arbitrary, it is not always easy to define such 
a general and vague expression as "the exercise of faculties".)
While Spencer believes that justice is the chief means to 
life and, in turn, to happiness, he admits that it is impossible 
to achieve the greatest possible happiness without the co-operation 
of beneficence and prudence. But these principles, he adds, are 
only of secondary importance, and are, unlike justice, incapable 
of reduction to scientific terms. Passing over the principle of 
prudence which does not much concern us here, Spencer says that 
the field for the cultivation of positive beneficence becomes 
narrower and narrower as we approach the ideal state and that 
negative beneficence has only a "nominal existence" in that state. 
3ut as regards the "un-ideal" state, with which alone we are 
Primarily concerned, it seems necessary to say that, on the Utili­
tarian basis of "greatest happiness", it would appear that a theory 
justice, which, on Spencer's own showing, is capable of giving 
°ffence to some of the "normal" as well as the abnormal" feelings 
one's fellow-men and which, for that reason, needs to be correct 
eb and limited by negative beneficence, requires to be profoundly
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altered. But Spencer does not think so. An important distinction 
which he makes between justice and beneficence,and which needs to
(Ibe noted here, is that justice, according to him, is needful for 
social equilibrium, and therefore of public concern", whereas 
beneficence is "not needful for social equilibrium, and therefore 
only of private concern" (Principles of Ethics, Vol.II, p.270).
We now pass on to state briefly the exact meaning that Spen­
cer puts into his doctrine of social justice. This meaning, it 
seems to us, can be approached (1) from the'legal point of view 
and (2 ) from the biological point of view, ^rom the legal side, as 
is well known, Spencer's contention both in "Social Statics" and 
in "Justice" is that the best way of realising justice, and indi­
rectly of "greatest happiness", is through his law of equal freedom. 
.This law, Spencer believes, is capable of "exact ascertainment", 
and it is on the basis of it that he claims to build his theory of 
State-duties and State-limits. The reason for emphasising equal 
freedom, or what meets Spencer's meaning best, maximum equal freedom
p
is that such freedom, according to him, is absolutely necessary 
for harmonious co-operation, which in turn is essential for social 
existence and for the exercise of the individual faculties - the 
fixed conditions for the attainment of the greatest possible happ­
iness. Thus, in accusing Bentham and his school of regarding pure
altruism as the ultimate end of moral action, Spencer says, "now 
i f * ’nappiness itself cannot be cut up and distributed equally, and if 
elual division of the material aids to happiness would not produce 
greatest happiness, what is the thing to be thus apportioned? - what 
is it in respect of which everybody is to count for one and nobody 
°r more than one? There seems but a single possibility. There
equally distributed notning but the conditions under 
fch each may pursue happiness. The limitations to action- the
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degrees of freedom and restraint, shall be alike for all. ¿ach 
shall have as much liberty to pursue his ends as consists with main­
taining like liberties to pursue their ends by others; and one as 
much as another shall have the enjoyment of that which his efforts, 
carried on within these limits, obtain. But to say that in respect 
of these conditions everybody shall count for one and nobody for 
more than one, is simply to say that equity shall be enforced" (Da&g. 
p. 225).
As to what exactly Spencer means by freedom, we find a clue in his 
inborn aversion to authority in general and to State-authority in 
particular. What a study of Spencer's views concerning the relation 
between the individual and society reveals to us is that freedom 
as conceived by him means, in the main, the least possible inter­
ference from the side of organised society. It is also worthy of 
note that Spencer's freedom for the most part is concerned with 
freedom from physical coercion and almost leaves out of account 
freedom from mental and moral coercion.
The most striking thing about Spencer's formulation of the 
law of equal freedom (in "Justice") is that no sooner is it formu­
lated than he proceeds to qualify it profoundly by saying "the 
truth to be expressed is that each in carrying on the actions which 
constitute his life for the time being, and conduce to the subse­
quent maintenance of his life shall not be impeded further than by 
the carrying on of those kindred actions which maintain the lives 
°f others. It does not countenance a superfluous Interference with 
another's life, committed on the ground that an equal interference 
may balance it. Such a rendering of the formula is one which implies 
Sweater deductions from the lives of each and all than the associat- 
ea state necessarily entails; and this is obviously a perversion 
its meaning" (Justice, p.45). What the qualification is meant




It is, therefore, with this qualification that we must understand 
Spencer's formula of justice when he comes to apply it later to 
the different rignts of man. Another qualification which must also 
be kept in mind (and to which reference has been made earlier) is 
that the formula is meant to be applied only to the ethics of the 
State, and not to the ethics of the family. (Cp. Justice, p.'+2)
A still further qualification which also is of great importance is 
that the deductions of the formula are subject to conditions neces­
sary for "social self-preservation".
From the biological side, as already indicated, Spencer 
believes that social justice means that each person ought to receive 
the benefits and evils of his own nature and consequent conduct; 
that, in other words, there ought to be ah exact proportion between 
benefits received and services rendered. Thus he says, "throughout 
past eras, the life, vast in amountand varied in kind .... has 
progressed in subordination to the law that every individual shall 
gain by whatever aptitude it has for fulfilling the conditions to 
its existence. The uniform principle has been that better adapta­
tion shall bring greater benefit; which greater benefit, while 
increasing the prosperity of the better adapted, shall increase 
also its ability to leave offspring inheriting more or less its 
better adaptation. And, by implication, the uniform principle has 
been that the ill-adapted, disadvantaged in the struggle for exist-
ence, shall bear the consequent evils Any arrangements which
in a considerable degree prevent superiority from profiting by the 
rewards of superiority, or shield super inferiority from the evils
entails - any arrangements which tend to make it as well to be
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inferior as to be superior; are arrangements diametrically opposed 
to the progress of organisation and the reaching of a higher life" 
(pp.188-9)• And as to how this proportioning of benefits to efforts 
is to be effected, Spencer's belief is that it can be best done 
by interdicting all "aggressions and counter-aggressions" (Justice, 
p.64) and by enforcing contracts freely entered into, except the 
contract of slavery. Thus, in the important chapter on the "Socio­
logical View" in the Data of Ethics, he says "the universal basis
of co-operation is the proportioning of benefits received to ser­
vices rendered. Without this there can be no physiological division 
of labour; without this there can be no sociological division of 
labour. And since division of labour, physiological or sociologic­
al, profits the whole and each part; it results that on maintenance 
of the arrangements necessary to it, depend both special and general 
welfare. In a society such arrangements are’maintained only if 
bargains, overt or tacit, are carried out. So that beyond the 
primary requirement to harmonious co-existence in a society, that 
its units shall not directly aggress on one another; there comes 
the secondary requirement, that they shall not indirectly aggress 
by breaking agreements" (Data, p.l45).
Section II. Application of Spencer's Formula of Justice to
the Practical Questions of Social life: Theory of
S ig h t s .
We turn our attention now to the second main division of 
Justice" (chs. VIII-XXI) and concern ourselves with the applica­
tions that Spencer makes of his formula of justice to the practical 
Questions of life in society. What Spencer does in this section is
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to deduce what are called the rights of man from his formula of 
justice (I.e., the law of equal freedom) and to trace their histor­
ical development In such a way as to show that as civilisation 
progresses and as man approaches the ideal social state (in Spen­
cer's own sense of the term, of course), these rights tend to coin­
cide with ordinary ethical conceptions and legal enactments. The 
list of rights, dealt with in this section, Spencer claims, are the 
only rights that man has ("There are no further rights, truly so 
called, than such as have been set forth" - Justice, p.176), and 
that all of them are deducible from his formula, which, he contends, 
is an ultimate ethical principle. Thus we hear Spencer say."rights, 
truly so called, are corollaries from the law of equal freedom, 
and what are falsely called rights are not deducible from it" (p.6 3) 
These rights, he further says, exist independent of "social arrange­
ments" (p.176), inasmuch as they are "the several particular f r e e f — 
doms" (p.6 2) composing the law of equal freedom which is directly 
derived from the biological and sociological laws of life.
Postponing a systematic and detailed statement of Spencer’s ’ 
so-called deductions to Part II, we may content ourselves here 
with briefly indicating which of the so-called deductions are fair 
and which are not and, in so doing, with noting the chief points 
that we wish to criticise in Partjll. Before undertaking this task,
Tt is advantageous to point out the ambiguity and inaccuracy lurk- 
*nS in Spencer's "precise expression" of justice, viz., the law of 
elual freedom. The law itself, it will be remembered, reads "Fvery 
!Ilan is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not 
the equal freedom of any other man" (p.46). First of all, what does
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Spencer mean by the vague and elusive expression "equal freedom" 
in any civilised society that we know to-day? (Elsewhere, to make 
the confusion worse, he uses the expression "like liberty" and 
"similar freedom" - Social Statics, p. 78). What is the "equal free­
dom" of the millionaire and the sweated labourer in reference to 
the material goods of life? Or again, what is the meaning of "equal 
freedom" of the genius and the dunce with reference to the opportun- 
-ities of life? Secondly, what is the force of the word "provided"? 
Is A free to take his life, so long as he does not prevent B from 
taking his? Does A have a right to give away his property to B or 
inherit property from C provided he does not stand in the way of 
D giving away his property to E or inheriting property from F? Is 
A's right to write a book and sell it only valid if he allows B 
also to do the same thing? Does A &ave a right to plagiarise pro­
vided he does not d,eny the same right to 3?t Thirdly, in respect 
to what is the equal freedom to be applied? What is the equal free­
dom of two people to the ownership of the same piece of land? Or 
again, does A have freedom to kill B provided he does not infringe, 
the like freedom of G to kill D, or does he have a right to kill 
B only if he allows him B to kill him in turn (which, of course,
Is physically impossible)? In the fourth and last place, does 
is free" mean that organised society or the State should provide 
this "equal freedom"? Is such freedom to be provided only in normal 
cases, or is it to be provided even in cases where it will be 
dearly hurtful to public welfare? These and many other such quest­
ions arise in our minds as we try to apply Spencer's law of equal
freedom to the practical problems of social life. We are not bound
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to answer these questions ourselves. Our business is merely to 
direct attention to them with a view to pointing out the formal 
defects inherent in Spencer's law of equal freedom.
In "Justice", which is one of Spencer's latest writings, 
to make confusion worse confounded Spencer qualifies his formula 
in several fundamental ways, when he tells us that the formula 
is to be applied only to cases which do not involve "superfluous 
interference" od "aggression and counter-aggression", and which 
are conducive to"maintenance of life"; that its deductions in the 
"relative" state, in which we are living to-day, characterised by 
frequent warfare and imperfect development of industrialism, are 
to be qualified by the need for "social self-preservation"; and 
that, in our present state of affairs, in many instances, nothing 
beyong "empirical compromises" seem possible. We need not stop h 
here to expatiate on these qualifications. The ambiguity and 
vagueness introduced by them into a formula which is already 
ambiguous and vague, are too patent to need any comment. Further, 
the qualifications, when properly understood, (especially the 
qualification regarding "social self-preservation"), seem to be 
°f such profound importance that they practically destroy the 
value of the law of equal freedom. (The question of "social self- 
Preservation" for Spencer arises, for the most part, when a society 
is defending itself against foreign aggressors.)
Now passing on to the various rights discussed by Spencer, 
both in Social Statics and in Justice, we may roughly group them 
under (1) the rights of life, liberty, and personal security;
(2) the right of property - corporeal and incorporeal; (3 ) the
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right of contract; and (4) the right of statua (or family rights).
Of these groups of rights, as we shall show in Part II, the first 
group is the only group which Is at all capable of deduction from 
the law of equal freedom by putting on that law the most lenient 
construction possible and by giving to Spencer the benefit of 
every doubt. The other groups of rights, it seems to us, are im­
possible of deduction under any conditions whatever. -Even with 
regard to the first group of rights, it must be said that a right 
like the right to freedom from communication of disease is not 
easily possible of deduction from the formula of justice. The law 
of equal freedom (emphasising the word "freedom") seems to contra­
dict such a right, whereas the qualifications regarding the "main­
tenance of life" and "social self-preservation" seem to demand it.
In this and several other-similar cases mentioned by Spencer, the 
law of equal freedom and its qualifications seem to work at cross 
purposes, making it difficult for one to hold to them both simul­
taneously. It seems to us that, in several cases, Spencer must 
abandon either the law or its qualifications. (Equality and freedom, 
It is obvious, cannot lie together peacefully.) A further illus­
tration of this criticism is found in the very next right discussed 
by Spencer - the right to free motion and locomotion. "As direct 
deductions from the formula of justice," Spencer says, "the right 
°I each man to the use of unshackled limbs, and the right to move 
from place to place without hindrance, are almost too obvious to 
need specifying" (Justice, p.73)* Put it is noticeable that, in 
aPPlying this formula here, Spencer does not take accountJpf one 
of its accompanying qualifications which renders the formula
applicable only to actions which are conducive to the maintenance 
of life. If Spencer were to take this qualification into account, 
it is obvious that the said right would have to be very much cur­
tailed. As regards a person's right to the uses of natural media, 
we may agree with Spencer that "the habitual interception of light 
by one person in such way that another person is habitually deprived 
of an equal share, implies disregard of the principle that the 
liberty of each is limited by the like liberties of all;" and that 
the like is true of interference with free access to air. But we 
fail to see how Spencer can possibly extend the same argument to 
justify private ownership of land subject to State-suzerainty. In 
applying his formula of justice to the case of land, Spencer, in 
"Justice", contends that "in the absence of standing ground" a per­
son "can do nothing" and that, therefore, "the Earth's surface may 
not be appropriated absolutely by individuals, but may be occupied 
by them only in such manner as recognises ultimate ownership by 
other men; that is - by society at large" (Justice, p.8 1). And as 
to what this "ultimate ownership by society at large" means, Spencer 
seems to say that it means nothing more than the occasional aliena­
tion of land from private persons for public purposes by means of 
acts of Parliament after full compensation is made to present 
holders - a practice which has prevailed in most civilised countries 
for a long time. jdn "Social Statics", however, Spencer tells us 
that "equity .... does not permit property irjland" (ch. IX, sect.1). 
3ut Private ownership subject to this "ultimate ownership", we 
aaall try to show in Part II, is not compatible with the law of 
elual freedom.^
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Going back for a moment to the first group of rights - the 
rights of life, liberty, and personal security we mu.pt say a 
word about the rights of freedom of belief, worship, speech, and 
publication, which Spencer considers separately towards the end 
of his treatise on Justice, which can very well be brought under 
the first group. These rights, it is noticeable, Spencer strings 
together in the form of a sorites and attempts to show that "in 
addition to each of them being a direct deduction from the law of 
equal freedom, they imply one another in such a way that to prove 
that a person has the right to freedom of belief means that he 
also has a right to freedom of worship, speech, and publication. 
Thus, Spencer argues, freedom of belief means nothing if it does 
not mean freedom to profess belief; and freedom to profess belief 
means almost nothing if it does not mean, in the realm of relig­
ious beliefs, freedom to manifest belief in acts of worship, and 
in the realm of both religious and non-religious beliefs, freedom 
of speech and publication. Although these rights, in Spencer's 
treatment, seem to be absolute at first sight, they are consider­
ably limited by him by using a qualification of the law of equal 
freedom, that it "does not countenance aggression and counter­
aggression". Thus freedom of worship extends only to acts which 
"do not inflict nuisances on neighbouring people" (Justice, p.137). 
Similarly, "freedom of speech, spokem, written, or printed, does 
hot include freedom to use speech for the utterance of calumny 
or the propagation of it; nor does it include freedom to use 
speech for prompting the commission of Injuries to others" (Justi 
P*142). A s regards utterances which pass "the limits of what is 
thought decency, or are calculated to encourage sexual immorality"
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(Justice, p.143), Spencer believes that, though there might be a 
necessity to check them in the interest of social preservation, 
they "must oe tolerated in consideration of the possible benefits" 
(Justice, p.144). The remoteness and artificiality of the law of 
equal freedom in reference to all these case?, together with the 
ready applicability t& them of' such principles as social order and 
public expediency, are so apparent as to need no comment. Spencer 
himself, it will be noticed, while giving the individual a very 
wide range of freedom (freedom of a theoretical and abstract kind) 
in the exercise of his rights to free belief, f worship, speech, 
and publication, practically limits it considerably by using some 
of the qualifications of the law of equal freedom.
Passing on to the group of rights which may be brought under 
the right of property, it is evident that by this right Spencer 
means the right of private property. This right, he says, is "orig­
inally dependent on the right to the use of the Earth" and adds 
that though the connection between the two rights to-day is "remote i 
and entangled" it "still continues" (Justice, p.95)- But if the 
right to private property in land can be shown to be not a valid 
deduction from the law of equal freedom, it is evident that the 
right of property will lose part at least of its justification.
The deduction that "each is free to keep for himself all those 
gratifications and sources of gratification which he procures with- 
SHt trespassing on the spheres of action of his neighbours" (Justice 
P 100), is too vague to be of any practical value. Every form of 
exclusive ownership, it seems to us, can be conceived as restraint 
uPon a person's freedom. We cannot naively assume with Spencer that
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most private property to-day is a result of "greater strength, 
greater ingenuity, or greater application" (Justice, p.100) on the 
part of some over others and that those who own it have earned it 
"without in any way trenching on the spheres of action of others"
(p. 110). If the right of private property in land or in any of the 
goods of life which have come from it directly or indirectly, is 
incompatible with the law of equal freedom, it is clear that pur­
chase, gift, inheritance, undisputed possession, etc., cannot make 
that right any more valid.
The right of contract (or what is called in "Justice" "the 
right of free contract"), Spencer regards as being most essential 
for the exact proportioning of benefits to efforts. Discussing it 
in close connection with the right of free exchange, he says, "of 
course with the right of free exchange goes the right of free con­
tract: a postponement now understood, now specified, in the com­
pletion of an exchange, serving to turn the one into the other"
(p. 129). But Spencer seems to forget, as Sidgwick points out, that 
the element of futurity which enters into the right of free contract 
makes all the difference between it and the right of free exchange. 
Examples of the kinds of contracts into which men voluntarily enter 
without aggressing on others, Spencer says, are "contracts for the 
uses of houses and lands; contracts for the completion of specified 
works, and contracts for the loan of capital". These contracts, he 
considers to be ethically warranted, because they are voluntary 
and do not infringe on the liberty of others to enter into similar 
contracts. The contract of slavery between A and B, however, which 
ây well meet the testa of being voluntary and not interfering
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with the equal freedom of G, D, etc., to enter into similar con­
tracts, Spencer regards as both morally and legally unjustifiable. 
The reasons which he gives for this interdict are (1) that slavery 
violates the biological law of justice that there should be an 
exact proportion between efforts and the products of efforts, if 
life is to continue and (2 ) that it violates the implication of 
contracts that "the contracting parties shall severally give what 
are approximately equivalents" (p.130). The terms of slavery, he 
says, are "incommensurable" (p.131). In the second reason stated 
here, it seems to us that Spencer introduces a qualification which 
is capable of going a long way in undermining what little prac­
tical value the law of equal freedom may have.
How far is the law of equal freedom from being practicable 
can be clearly seen when Spencer passes to consider the rights of 
women and children (rights which may be classed under what we have 
called the right of status). The first question with which Spencer 
concerns himself, in discussing the rights of women, is whether 
these rights should be restrained on some principle of "rights 
proportionate to faculties"; and he rightly answers it by saying 
that to do so would be to"add an artificial hardship to a natural 
hardship" (p.158). un the basis of this argument and fc* on the 
basis of the arguments that to proportion liberties to abilities 
would be impracticable, and, even if practicable, unnecessary, 
since freedom is not such a mechanical thing that what one has 
the other loses, Spencer concludes that the freedom of men and 
women should be treated as equal, "irrespective of their endow­
ments" (p.159). So far, of course, the law of equal freedom offers
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us no difficulty. But when Spencer comes to consider the rights 
of married women in particular and the political rights of married 
and unmarried women in general, we fail to see the applicability 
of his Birst Principle. In all the following cases, which deal 
with questions arising out of marital relations, it is evident that 
Spencer bases his conclusions not on the law of equal freedom but 
on some such law as the law of fair exchange: (1) As regards the 
right of property, he says that "it may be reasonably held that 
where the husband is exclusively responsible for maintenance of the 
family, property which would otherwise belong to the wife may 
equitably be assigned to him - the use, at least, if not the pos­
session" (p. 160). (2 ) With regard to a fair division of family dn«»«c 
duties, Spencer remarks "The discharge of domestic and maternal 
duties by the wife may ordinarily be held a fair equivalent for the 
earning of an income by the husband" (p.161). (3) In respect of 
authority over one another*s actions and over the household, he 
observes that "since .... man is more judicially-minded than woman, 
the balance of authority should incline to the side of the husband; 
especially as he usually provides the means which make possible 
the fulfilment of the will of either or the wills of both" (p.161).
With regard to the relation of women to men in the State, 
Spencer contends that the assumption that the political rights of 
women are the same as those of men, is faulty. The reason which he 
gives for this contention is that citizenship includes not only 
the giving of votes, but also undertaking serious responsibilities 
iike fighting for the country; and adds that since women do not 
furnish contingents to the array and navy such as men furnish", they
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cannot have the same political rights as men until there is reached 
a state of permanent peace. In local governments and administrations 
however Spencer says that women may have equal rights with men,
I
since the above reason does not apply there. It is obvious that 
Spencer's contention in this paragraph is not easily deducible from 
the lav/ of equal freedom.
The rights of children, it is clear, must on any social 
theory whatever receive a separate treatment from the rights of 
adults. Spencer himself admits this position when he draws an arti­
ficial division between the ethics of the State and the ethics of 
the family. But the curious fact is that when he comes to treat of 
the rights of children, Spencer believes in the applicability to 
them of his formula of the ethics of the State. A short outline of 
Spencer's discussion here will serve to show us the extreme diff­
iculty that he has in deriving the rightful claims and correlative 
duties of children from his formula of justice. Assuming preserva­
tion of the race to be a good end, Spencer argues that it can be 
achieved only by means of self-sustentation and sustentation of 
offspring and adds that the ethical significance of the latter 
condition is that children have rightful claims "to those materials 
and aids needful for life and growth, which, by implication, it is 
the duty of the parents to supply" (Justice, p.167)- But to be 
®erely supplied with food, clothing, and shelter is not enough. 
Children "have also to receive from them fparents) such aids and 
°Pportunities as, by enabling them to exercise their faculties, 
shall produce in them fitness for adult life" (Justice, p.168).
ĥile parents have thus to fulfil the obligation of meeting the
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rightful claims of children mentioned here and have further to 
fit them for adult activity, they are not to sacrifice themselves 
unduly in so doing. For "undue sacrifices are eventually to the 
disadvantage of the offspring, and, by implication, to the dis­
advantage of the species"; and further "since the well-being and 
happiness of the parents is itself an end which forms part of the 
general end, there is a further ethical reason why the self-sub­
ordination of the parents must be kept within moderate limits" 
(Justice, p.169)•
In return for sustentation and other aids which children 
receive from parents, they should give them "whatever equivalent 
is possible in the form of obedience and the rendering of small 
services" (p.170). But as children do not always remain children, 
but constantly approach adulthood, the transition from the ethics 
of the family to the ethics of the State "must ever continue to 
be full of perplexities" (p.170). ^either the law of equal freedom 
nor any other deductive principle can help us here. "We caru»e4 
expect only that the compromise to be made in every case, while 
not forgetting the welfare of the race, shall balance fairly bet­
ween the claims of the two who are immediately concerned: not 
sacrificing unduly either the one or the other" (p.170).
Not only does Spencer claim that all the rights of man 
truly so called", are derivable from the absolute law of equal 
freedom, but that they one and all coincide with ordinary ethical 
conceptions and legal enactments. (Where there is no actual cor­
respondence, Spencer would probably say that ordinary law and mo 
®°rality ought to be changed in accordance with his deductions.)
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Deferring a systematic examination of the coincidence claimed to 
Dart II, we may say that almost every important right that Spencer 
speaks of is capable of being understood and explained, independ­
ent of his formula. The right to life and liberty, the right to 
property, the right of status, and the right to contract, are all 
so very essential for social existence that no theory of social 
justice can fail to make adequate provision for them. Moreover, 
as already indicated in expounding the rights of women and children, 
in most of the chapters dealing with man's rights, Spencer intro­
duces so many extraneous and subordinate considerations in favour 
of his"deductions" that it is possible to maintain successfully 
that the coincidence claimed is due to some of these considerations 
and not due to anything like a conscious or unconscious attempt of 
society to provide "equal freedom" for everybody. To quote only a 
few illustrations in support of this criticism: (1) In discussing 
the important righttof life, Spencer observes that although murder 
is condemned largely because it is an "immeasurable and irremediable 
wrong done to the murdered man" (i.e., violation of his equal free­
dom to life), its condemnation is also partly due to its being 
looked upon as a destroyer of the social order. (What is there to 
Prevent an opponent of Spencer’s theory from claiming the coin­
cidence between ordinary law and morality and the right to life in 
support of a theory of justice which bases itself upon the con­
ception of social order exclusively?) (2 ) In his attempt to justify 
Private ownership of land as against a communistic system of manage­
ment and cultivation of land to which his law of equal freedom, as 
116 applies it to land, really seems to have no valid objection,
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Spencer remarks, "And the badness of the required system of admin­
istration (public management) is the only reason urged for main­
taining the existing system of land-holding; the supreme ownership 
of the community being avowedly recognised" Cp-T 1)- (3) The right 
to free speech, Spencer buttresses by the claim that, in the polit­
ical and religious spheres, free speech is still "the agency by 
which error is to be dissipated" (p.143) and, that, in the sphere 
of utterances bearing on decency and sexual morality, whatever evil 
results exercise of the right may entail "will always be kept in 
check by public opinion" (p. 144). ¿lay not the coincidence claimed 
by Spencer between his "deductions" regarding free speech and 
ordinary law and morality be really indirect evidence in support 
of the supplementary reason stated here? (4 j Lastly, in his discus­
sion on the right to incorporeal property, a supplementary argument 
which Spencer adduces in support of recognising the claims of the 
inventor is the argument based on considerations of policy that 
"among a people who ignore the inventor's claims, improvements are 
inevitably checked and industry suffers. For, on the average, in­
genious men will decline to use their brains without any prospect 
°f returns for their labours" (p.111). Is it not possible to argue 
that this supplementary argument is the only valid argument in the 
Present case?
The last important claim which Spencer makes in favour of 
his law of equal freedom, and which we shall examine in Part II,is 
that the deductions of that law (especially the deductions with 
regard to the rights of property and contract) coincide with the 
deductions of political economy. Stating the claim in Spencer's
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"This (political economy) teaches that meddlings with com­
merce by prohibitions and bounties are detrimental; and the law of 
equal freedom excludes them as wrong. That speculators should be 
allowed to operate on the food-markets as they see well is an in­
ference drawn by political economy; and by the fundamental principle 
of equity they are justified in doing this. Penalties upon usury 
are proved by political economists to be injurious^ and by the law 
of equal freedom they are negatived as involving infringements of 
rights. The reasonings of political economists show that machinery 
is beneficial to the people at large, instead of hurtful to them; 
and in unison with their conclusions the law of equal freedom for­
bids attempts to restrict its use. While one of the settled con­
clusions of political economy is that wages and prices 'cannot be 
artificially regulated with advantage, it is also an obvious in­
ference from the law of equal freedom that regulation of them is 
not morally permissible. 6n other questions, such as the hurtful­
ness of tamperings with banking, the futility of endeavours to 
benefit one occupation at the expense of others, political economy 
reaches conclusions which ethics independently deduces.
"What do these various instances unite in showing? -Briefly, 
that not only harmony of co-operation in the social state, but also 
efficiency of co-operation, is best achieved by conformity to the 
law of equal freedom." (Justice, p.155)
One furhter point which needs to be stated before we close 
this section is that the execution of some of the dictates of the 
law of equal freedom calls for extensive powers on the part of the 
State, which Spencer is chary of giving. It is plain that, according 
to Spencer, the law of equal freedom in politics is synonymous with 
the principle of minimum interference; but minimum interference 
is not conducive to the establishment of equality to a minute de­
gree, which Spencer desires. The truth of this criticism seems to 
be clearly brought out in the following instances. In the 6hapter 
on "Sanitary Supervision" (Docial Statics), Spencer claims that
" iman s rights are obviously trespassed against by any one who un- 
necesaarily vitiates the elements, and renders them detrimental 
health, or disagreeable to the senses, and in the discharge of 
functions as protector, a government is obviously called upon
own words:
to afford redress to those so trespassed against" (Sect.lj. In the 
Chapter on the "Rights to the Uses of Natural Media" (Justice), 
Spencer is of opinion that people have an equal right to light, un­
polluted air, to protection against "sounds of a disturbing kind", 
etc., and that the State more and more comes to recognise these 
rights. "When inflictions of this kind are public, or continuous, or 
both ~ as in the case of street music, and especially bad street 
music, or as in the case of church bells rung at early hours, the 
aggression has come to be legally recognised as such and forbidden 
under penalty"(Sect. 5 1)* In speaking of the communication of dis­
ease in Chapter IX of "Justice", Spencer says, "This is a kind of 
trespass which, though grave, and though partly recognised in law, 
occupies neither in law nor in the general conscience so distinct 
a place as it should do", and argues for a greater State control 
of it.
In all the above cases we do not dispute the advisability 
of the State to interfere. Nor do we say that Spencer departs from 
his theory that the function of the State is merely to uphold the 
law of equal freedom and that its work is of a "negative-regulative" 
hind. What we doubt is whether interference of such a minute char­
acter is consonant with Spencer's general theory of the State.
If the consideration of social and economic utility which 
sPencer seems to make use of in deciding in favour of individual 
ownership of land subject to State-suzerainty, were to be taken into 
acc°unt here, it would be right to say that the State should give 
primary attention to such "positive" measures as national edu­
ction, protection of health, poor relief, etc., and only its
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secondary attention to equality of freedom in such matters as 
light, air, etc. But to work of a positive kind Spencer would 
say that it is a violation of the biological laws of life and the 
conditions of existence. The only answer we can give in reply is 
that Spencer's biological law of social justice and his biological 
qualification of social self-preservation do not always work 
together smoothly in the present state of affairs.
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P A R T  II. C R I T I C I S M .
Part II Criticism
Section I. Derivation and Meaning of Spencer's Theory of
Social Justice!
In our exposition of the derivation and meaning of Spencerh 
theory of social justice in Section I of Part I, we noticed the 
following points to stand out prominently:
(1) That in order to know what justice is in our ordinary 
human relations here and now, we must first inquire into what 
justice is in the ideal social state, i.e., justice as it appeals 
to the perfect man in a perfect society, or, to use the terminol­
ogy of the Data of Ethics, to "the completely-adapted man in the 
completely-evolved society" (p.2 7 5);
(2 ) That this ideal justice is capable of scientific 
formulation and of affording us practical guidance in the mainten-
Iance of just relations in the present state;
(3) That while it is only partly arrived at througn the 
empirical method of orthodox Utilitarianism, it is fully arrived 
at through certain abstract deductions made largely (a) from the 
doctrine of the Moral Sense (primarily in Social Statics) and (b) 
from "the laws of life and the conditions of existence" (Data, p.57) 
in the Principles of Ethics, i.e., from "the affiliation of Ethics 
°n the doctrine of Evolution" (Justice, Preface); and
(4-) That in the form stated by Spencer, meaning maximum 
elual freedom and minimum State interference, it is the essential 
c°ndition to the attainment of the Utilitarian end of "greatest 
hnppiness", other principles like Prudence, Negative beneficence,
30
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and Positive Beneficence being only of a supplementary character 
and incapable of such "exact ascertainment".
We shall now take up these points in their order and 
criticise them; and, in so doing, attempt to snow in particular
(1) That, in order to know what justice is for us 
here and now, it is not very necessary (and, even if necessary, 
not possible) to formulate a theory of justice that will be 
applicable to the conduct of the perfect man in a perfect soci- 
ety;
ftM. "
f2) That even if it possible to formulate & theory of
/V.
justice through the ignoring of the facts of experience and the 
actual conditions of everyday life, as in the case of Spencer, 
the conditions which such formulation represents would be so far 
removed from the real conditions of life that the theory would 
be of little or no practical value to us; and that, even if it 
did have any value, such value could not be ascertained without 
the aid of the empirical method which the theory seeks to sup­
plant ;
(3) That, as a matter of fact, Spencer's formula of 
justice, the law of equal freedom, is inherently ji inapplicable 
to his "ideal" state and that its applicability to the "un-ideal" 
state is far from being clear or precise;
(4) That, in arriving at it, Spencer is far more depen­
dent on the empirical method than he admits to be the case, 
though he is never a thorough-going empiricist, and he is far 
less dependent on the doctrine of the Moral Sense and the theory
Evolution than appears at first sight;
(5) That justice, as he understands it, is not the best 
means to the attainment of "greatest hapoiness" or to tne ac­
quirement of tne greatest "net" freedom or the fruits of freedom;
l!
(6 ) That it fails to give us justice, according to any 
recognised theory of morality; and
(7) That, being built on a different basis from beneficence, 
its twin-principle, it not infrequently comes into conflict
with it.
Chapter I. An Enquiry into the Practical Value of Spencer’s 
Theory of "Absolute" or "Ideal" Justice.
In this chapter we shall deal with the setperal points 
mentioned under the first three heads of our criticism outlined 
above. Ill
The conception of certain absolute principles of morality,
comparable to the universal and unchanging laws of the physical
*
world, is so vital a part of Spencer's whole ethical theory that 
we may well begin our criticism of his theory of social justice 
with a discussion of absolute justice. We wholeheartedly agree 
with Spencer in thinking that, in order to be able to maintain 
just relations between the members of society, it is important 
to have before us an ideal of justice; for it is clear that not 
to have an ideal towards which our movements may be directed, is 
to be tossed to and fro with every passing wind and to have no 
standard by which to measure progress. But we totally disagree 
with Spencer in the manner of arriving at this ideal. As is well 
known, Spencer's belief is that the only ideal that w§;as moral 
beings can have, is the ideal of the perfect man in a perfect
8 2
society. In Social Statics, he definitely says that"a philosophic­
al moralist" can take no account of any ethical "problem in which 
a crooked man forms one of the elements" and that he deals only 
with the relationship in which a straight man "stands to other 
straight men." (Oh.I) But when we pass from this extreme position 
of Social Statics to the "Data", we are at once struck by Spencer's 
opening discussion of organic evolution, his tracing of the growth 
of morality from its humble beginnings, and his insistence that 
the more evolved in conduct should be interpreted by the less 
evolved; and when, on the basis of these, we are about to conclude 
that Spencer had probably given up his peculiar view of absolute 
Sthics, we again meet with it though in a slightly changed form. 
Instead of speaking of the perfect man in a perfect society, he 
now speaks of the "completely-adapted man in the completely-evolved 
society" (p.2 7 5), which means practically the same thing as the 
original view, though expressed in different language. Justice 
still remains the most important principle of morality for the 
ideal man and is considered to be capable "of tne greatest definite­
ness" (Data, p. 285).
The chief objection that we have to Spencer's way of reach­
ing a standard of ideal justice is that, morality being essential­
ly a product of social life, our end must be stated in terms of 
human experience. Any ideal which abstracts man from the actual 
conditions of life under which he lives, and places him in a 
Utopia of which we can say nothing with certainty, can give us no 
guidance in our present social relations. It is true, as R.Adamson 
Remarks, that "we can think only in and by the formation of ideals;"
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but, as the same writer continues, "on the practical side, perhaps 
more directly than elsewhere, we become aware of the weakness and 
uselessness of ideals that are not filled from the concrete wealth 
of actual life” (Development of Modern Philosophy, vol.2 ,p.l24).
If in reply to all this it is contended that Spencer's formula of 
absolute justice, viz., the law of equal freedom, is stated in terms 
of human experience, as seen in the elaborate practical applications 
that he makes of it both in Social Statics and in Justice, our 
answer is that the formula is primarily based upon relative Ethics, 
as conceived by Spencer, and is secondarily transferred to the ab­
solute state. To this point we shall return later in the present 
see chapter.
If our contention that a social ideal must keep in close 
and constant touch with the actual facts of life, is true, then it 
is evident that we can speak of such an ideal only in relation to 
a better state of affairs than what we have now, and not in rela­
tion to what is"abstractedly best" (Sp.'s Essay on Prison Ethics).
As T.H.G-reen remarks, we know only the 1 better*. Of the best we 
have only a dim idea. Our ideal thus becomes a progressive ideal, 
attained through induction. It proceeds from below upwards, and
hot from above downwards. 1 It keeps on receding all the time and
never remains as a fixed standard. Spencer's ideal, on the contrary, 
seems to be something fixed for all time. Thus in his Essay on 
Prison Ethics," Spencer states that "We must have some fixed stand- 
ar<I, some invariable measure, some constant clue." "Otherwise,"
'ne adds, "we shall inevitably be misled by the suggestions of 
immediate policy, and wander away from the right rather than advance 
Awards it" -- a conclusion which does not necessarily follow, if
___ rg '-j '"jv ■ 1 ' " . " g -  " .......... — —- i . i i . .
we have an ideal of the kind that we have described, [what right
Spencer as an evolutional thinker has got to a fixed end, we shall
While adopting a fixed code of morality (with absolute jus­
tice as its central principle) as the goal of all moral and social 
progress, Spencer does not minimise the fact that there is a wide 
gulf separating his ideal from the actual state of society that we 
know to-day. But this gulf, he confidently hopes, in tiie original 
edition of Social Statics, will be successfully bridged by man's 
capacity for unlimited adaptation. Thus, he says, "Strange indeed 
would it be, if, in the midst of this universal mutation, man alone 
were inconsistent, unchangeable. But it is not so. he also obeys 
the law of indefinite variation. His circumstances are ever alter­
ing; and he is ever adapting himself to them" (p.33). If Spencer 
had adhered to this optimistic view right through, his theory of 
absolute Ethics, in general, and of absolute justice, in particular 
would have a semblance of reality. But he does not do so. In his 
later writings, which express his maturer views, Spencer tacitly 
gives up his belief in absolute perfection reached through contin- 
u°us adaptatio.n, although he still believes in our reaching the 
closest possible approximation to the perfect state. Thus in the
revised and abridged edition of Social Statics (1892), he adds 
"Thne rate of progress towards any adapted form must diminish with
the approach to complete adaptation, since the force producing it 
®Ust ^iniinish; so that, other causes apart, perfect adaptation can 
be Cached only in infinite time" (p. 31 j; -- which amounts to say- 
that it can never be reached under ordinary human conditions.
more explicit is the statement in his Essay on Absolute Polit-I ¡¡¡ven
consider later
ical Ethics, where he says, "Should I be able to complete Part 
IV of the Principles of Ethics, treating of Justice .... I hope 
to deal adequately with the relations between the ethics of the 
progressive condition and the ethics of that condition which is 
the goal of progress - a goal ever to be recognised, though it can­
not be actually reached." The question which we ask ourselves at 
this point is this - if the ideal is something which cannot be 
realised even by the "perfect" man, on what basis can it act as a 
standard for conduct here and now? And the answer which we are 
obliged to give is that there is no such / basis whatever, that it 
is really illogical to apply to the "crooked" man - the only man 
that we have with us - the laws of the "straight" society, which 
the "straight" man himself is able to fulfil only approximately.
If, in reply to this criticism, it be said that even to have an 
ideal which can be approximately realised is a great help, our an­
swer is that, while admitting the truth of such a reply, we are 
bound to say that Spencer, who seeks to provide Ethics with a* sci­
entific' basis and free it from empirical uncertainties, cannot 
consistently put forth the present plea. To allow Spencer to main­
tain such a plea would be to eliminate the unique difference that 
there ought to be between the term ideal as understood by him and 
the term as understood by other moralists. Approximation implies 
empiricism of some sort. Further, if the "perfect" man can only 
SSfigoximately fulfil the law of a "perfect" society, neither the 
®an nor the society of which he is a member can be perfect. Conse­
quently the hypothetically "perfect" laws must be out of relation 
t° them; they must be merely imaginary. Hence our plea for filling 
°Ur> ideal "from the concrete wealth of actual life." Hence also it
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is that we require our ideal to help us to answer the question, 
what ought we to do here and now, without answering the hypothetical 
question, what would a "perfect" man do in a "perfect" society.
The general conclusion, then, to which we are driven as a 
result of the above considerations is that, in order to know what 
justice is for us in our present social relations, it is not nec­
essary, and perhaps even futile, to inquire into what justice is 
for "the completely-adapted man in the completely-evolved society."
We are satisfied that our ideal should help us to attain a better
p]Jstate of affairs than what we have now, and not a state which is 
"abstractedly best." We are also content that our conception of 
Ideal justice should keep on improving with the progress of society.
But by saying this we do not mean to suggest that we do not sub-
*
scribe to the permanency of the intuition found among civilised 
societies that "justice be done, though the sky should fall." Our 
contention is that, while justice as a theoretical principle of 
morality must ever remain with us, our practical understanding of 
it is bound to vary according to time and place, and that the con­
duct which is the result of such practical understanding is not 
what Spencer would call conduct which is "least wrong" or"relative- 
iy right", but that it is the perfectly right conduct for the par­
ticular time and place.
But ideal justice, as interpreted by us, Spencer would say, 
i8 not scientific, because it fails to provide us with an absolute 
iaw from which our actual code of justice could be deduced. In 
rePly to it, however, we may say that it is extremely doubtful 
whether we could deduce anything at all from an absolute law, which




reference already, says "I have not the smallest doubt that we 
cannot (from the absolute law) deduce the actual code of morality 
anywhere or at any time accepted" (Adamson, lb., p.105). Unlike 
Spencer, we hold fast to the Idea that "the social conditions of 
a given time are just, and perfectly good, so far as they represent 
the best possible approximation to the ideal" (E.Barker, Politic­
al Thought from Spencer to To-day, p. 95), because we believe 
that in the case of a problem like social justice particularly, 
which is essentially a practical problem, we cannot have a perfect 
solution which will suit all times and places, but that we can 
only have the nearest possible approximation to our ideal.
In reply to the main argument of our criticism that our 
practical ideal of social justice should be progressive, and as 
such can be defined only in tentative terms, and cannot be fixed 
for all time, a supporter of Spencer's theory is sure to say, as 
Prof. Sorley suggests, that all that a progressive ideal means 
is that it is an f ideal which is incompletely apprehended, and 
that an ideal which is completely apprehended, like Spencer's, 
can at once give us "a clear and definite view of the final end 
°f conduct" % (W.R.Sorley, Ethics of Naturalism, p. 201). This 
reply would be fatal to our argument if it could be shown that the 
ideal state which Spencer posits, together with its principle of 
absolute justice, reveals a more complete apprehension of the facts 
°T human life than our theory does. We shall therefore now turn 
to a consideration of the picture which Spencer draws of the final 
state and of the principles governing it.
For the sake of argument we may reverse our former position
and say that, in order to know what ju s t ic e  is  f o r  us here and 
now, i t  i s  o f  the utmost p rac t ica l  advantage to know what ju s t ice  
is for  the id ea l  man in the id ea l  s tate .  -But the question with 
which we are faced at once i s ,  i s  there any possib le  way by which 
the f i n i t e  i n t e l l e c t  o f  man, which, according to Spencer h imself ,  
must be an evo lv ing  i n t e l l e c t ,  can conceive o f  a p e r fe c t  state 
(which is  also s ta t i c )  with such clearness and de f in i teness  as to 
portray i t  in terms i n t e l l i g i b l e  to us? We are not bound to an­
swer this question ourselves; we are concerned only with Spencer's 
answer to i t .  His answer, o f  course, as already seen, i s  in the 
affirmative.
Although Spencer claims that R e la t iv e  Ethics ought to be 
preceded by Absolute Ethics and that the code o f  mora l i ty  ap p l ic ­
able to the absolute state can be ascertained by us s c i e n t i f i c a l l y ,  
he himself does not profess to g ive  us anything more than a rough 
outline o f  the id ea l  state or o f  the e th ica l  p r inc ip les  governing 
it. The important features o f  the idea l  state are, he says, en t ire  
absence o f  m il i tancy,  o f  the organisation o f  soc ie ty  according to 
status, and o f  compulsory co-operation; and o f  th e i r  complete 
supersession by industr ia l ism, by organisat ion o f  soc ie ty  accord­
ing to contract,  and by voluntary co-operation re sp ec t ive ly ;  en­
tire disappearance o f  the sense o f  ob l ig a t ion  ( including s e l f - c o e r ­
cion) ; and production o f  pure pleasure, i . e . ,  "pleasure unalloyed 
with pain anywhere" (Data, p.251) by the voluntary actions o f  a l l  
the members o f  soc ie ty .  I t  can be e a s i ly  shown that every one o f  
these features o f  the idea l  state is  o f  a h igh ly  disputable char­
acter and that they are a l l  a r b i t r a r i l y  chosen by Spencer. But 
' Data,  sect ion, 45.
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the important question i s ,  how does Spencer a r r ive  at them?
Spencer's claim, o f  course, i s  that he arr ives  at them by means 
of non-empirical, non-h is to r ica l  methods - part ly  in tu i t io n a l  and 
partly deductive. Deferr ing an examination o f  th is  claim, we may 
say that i t  seems to as to be beyond doubt that Spencer mistakes 
his sweeping genera l isa t ions  drawn from a few fac ts  f o r  conclusions 
derived from in tu i t io n a l  or deductive methods and that there fore  
a social theory, l ik e  ours, which keeps a close and constant con­
tact with a l l  the fa c ts  o f  experience and the actual conditions 
of l i f e ,  has a decided advantage over his theory. I f  the general 
conditions p reva i l in g  in the idea l  s tate  o f  Spencer are thus open 
to the charge o f  being one-sided and a rb i t ra ry ,  our presumption 
is that the p r in c ip les  o f  ju s t ic e ,  negative beneficence, and 
positive beneficence (as treated by Spencer), which are supposed 
to describe the harmonious co-operation o f  id ea l  men in  such a 
state, are also open to the same charge. As Sidgwlck points out, 
i t  seems "qu ite  impossible to fo recas t  the natures and re la t ion s  
of the persons composing such a community ( i . e . ,  Spencer’ s idea l  
°r perfect community) with s u f f i c i e n t  clearness and cer ta in ty  to 
enable us to de f ine  even in out l ine  th e ir  moral code" (Methods 
°f Ethics, p .468). Or, as H.Rashdall observes, in c r i t i c i s i n g  
Renouvier, "We can form so inadequate a p icture  o f  p e r fe c t  humanity 
and a morally per fec t  soc ie ty  that i t  is  hardly worthwhile to a t ­
tempt to draw out in  d e t a i l  the duties which in such a state man 
would owe to men" (The Theory o f  G-ood and E v i l , I , p .  ) .  And even 
ff for the sake o f  argument we grant to Speneer that his id ea l  
state as we l l  as his idea l  jus t ice  show a complete comprehension 
°f the fac ts  o f  l i f e  and are thoroughly l o g i c a l  and s c i e n t i f i c ,
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our pract ica l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  are in no way lessened. For, as Sidg- 
wick argues, "a soc ie ty  in which - to take one point only - there 
is no such thing as punishment, i s  necessar i ly  a soc ie ty  \wi'th' i/ts 
essential structure so unlike our own, that i t  would be id le  to 
attempt any c lose im ita t ion  o f  i t s  rules o f  behaviour” % (Methods 
of Ethics, p .458). I f  in rep ly  to th is  argument, that the p er fec t  
state is  so f a r  removed from us as to be o f  no p rac t ica l  value to 
us, i t  is  said that i t  i s  to our best in te re s t  to "conform approx­
imately" to some at l e a s t  o f  the rules o f  that s ta te ,  we have three 
considerations to urge: (1) To d iscover  what the id ea l  rules are 
which we must obey here and now, as we l l  as the extent to which 
they can be obeyed by us, we need the serv ices o f  the empirical 
method which Spencer's ' s c i e n t i f i c '  Fthics seeks to supplant.
(2) I t  is  p lausib le  to argue, as Sidgwick does, "even supposing 
that this id ea l  soc ie ty  (described by Spencer) i s  u lt im ate ly  to 
be realised, i t  must at any rate be separated fey from us by a con­
siderable in te rva l  o f  evo lut ion;  hence i t  i s  not un l ike ly  that the 
beat way o f  progressing towards i t  w i l l  be some other than the ap­
parently d i r e c t e s t  way, and that we shall  reach i t  more e a s i l y  i f  
We begin by moving away from i t "  (Methods &c, p .468). (3) I t  is  
Possible that the new ru le ,  say the law o f  absolute ju s t ic e ,  "though
would be more f e l i c i f i j i  than the old one, i f  i t  could ge t  i t s e l f
r<
dually established, may be not so l i k e l y  to be adopted, or i f  
a<iopted, not so l i k e l y  to be obeyed, by the mass o f  the community
which i t  i s  proposed to innovate" (Methods &c, p .479). In answer 
to this las t  argument, Spencer, o f  course, would say that human 
nature ought to be forced to f i t  i t s e l f  to the conditions o f  ex is -  
8riCe* But to say that i s  to overestimate the changeabil i ty  o f  hu-
Whatever fo rce  the above three considerations may have as 
a crit ic ism o f  absolute Ethics, i t  must be conceded to Spencer 
that they do not have the same force  when applied to h is  p r in c ip le  
of absolute ju s t ic e .  With truth i t  may be contended that Spencer's 
rulefiof idea l  ju s t ic e  l ik e  (1) " In jure  no one in person, estate ,  
or reputation" and (2) "observe contracts ,"  are qu ite  p ra c t ica l ;  
and i t  may even be argued, as Spencer does argue at grea t  length, 
that the law o f  equal freedom i t s e l f ,  the quintessence o f  absolute 
justice, i s  capable o f  immediate appl icat ion .  Under these circum­
stances, there fore  (and holding at the same time as we do that 
Spencer's absolute Ethics is  in  i t s  very nature unreal and cannot 
be expected to do f u l l  jus t ic e  to the fac ts  o f  experience and the 
actual conditions o f  human l i f e ) ,  we f ind ourselves compelled to 
suspect the 'absoluteness' o f  Spencer's theory o f  absolute ju s t ic e .  
We shall there fore  now turn our at tent ion  to an examination o f  the 
applicability o f  the formula o f  absolute ju s t ic e  to the ' i d e a l '  
state.
As already seen, both in  Socia l  S ta t ics  and in the Pr incip les
\j
° ” Ethics, Spencer holds the same view o f  absolte ju s t ic e ,  though 
there is  a s l i gh t  d i f f e ren ce  in i t s  expression. The formula o f  ab­
solute jus t ice ,  as stated in the P r inc ip les  o f  Ethics, i s  "Every 
®an is f ree  to do that which he w i l l s ,  provided he in fr in ges  not 
the equal freedom o f  any other man;" and the short name by which 
sPencer ca l ls  th is  formula is  the law o f  equal freedom. Our purpose 
êr,e is to d iscover  what v a l i d i t y  there is  in  the specia l  claim 
which Spencer makes in behalf o f  his law that i t  i s  the only import- 
ant law which w i l l  re ign  supreme in the Golden Age that he pos its .
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man nature.
In order to do th is ,  l e t  us f i r s t  b r i e f l y  recap itu la te  what Spencer 
says about the id ea l  state and the id ea l  man. The ult imate or id ea l  
state, he says, i s  a completely evolved state which allows no "scope 
for further mental culture and moral progress" ( F i r s t  P r in c ip les ,  
sect. 175)* Man in th is  state is  "p e r fe c t "  or "completely-adapted", 
though, as indicated above, Spencer at times has h is  own doubts 
about i t .  Yet he thinks that the voluntary actions o f  the idea l  man 
produce pure p leasure, i . e ., "pleasure unalloyed with pain anywhere" 
(Data, p .265). The f a c u l t i e s ,  by the exerc ise  o f  which alone man 
can derive happiness, become so p e r f e c t ly  adjusted in the idea l  stata, 
that there i s  no longer any question o f  a facu lty  not g e t t in g  i t s  
opportunity f o r  exerc ise  or o f  i t s  g iv in g  pain to any one concerned 
in its being exercised. The sense o f  ob l iga t ion ,  including s e l f -
<K
coercion, disappers e n t i r e l y  and man's "moral conduct" becomes synon­
ymous with his "natural conduct" (Data, p . 131). No one i s  prompted 
to molest his neighbours; nor does he have any fe e l in g s  which prompt 
acts which would d isagreeably a f f e c t  others. Man, in  short, becomes 
spontaneously, i f  not mechanically, moral.
I f  th is  p icture which Spencer draws o f  the id ea l  soc ia l  state 
and the idea l  man be true, our natural in ference i s  that, in  the 
ideal social s ta te ,  the law o f  equal freedom can at best have only 
a nominal existence. In such a s ta te ,  to speak o f  ' law ' or 'equa li ty*  
0r 'freedom', in the sense in which we use those terms to-day, w i l l  
e to use "p re t ty  archaisms." (1) There w i l l  be no law in our sense 
of word because there w i l l  be no one prompted to break the law. 
■ibstead o f  command, which is  the essen t ia l  feature  o f  the law o f  
"(lay, there w i l l  be counsel or advice. L eg is la t ion  w i l l  sink into 
background because i t  implies an imperfect adaptation o f  man to
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circumstances. A n  tha t ' laws '  w i l l  seek to do w i l l  be to formulate 
- not regulate - man's natural conduct. I f  they ever bid per fec t  
men do things which they are not inc l ined  to do, they w i l l  be per-
nicious. In such a s ta te ,  as F.W.Maitland remarks, man can be said
to obey the law o f  equal freedom only^in the sense in  which matter
2
is sometimes said to obey the law o f  g r a v i t y . "  There w i l l  be no 
legal or soc ia l  pressure. (2) Not only w i l l  there be no law in  the 
perfect state,  but there w i l l  be no a r t i f i c i a l  equa l i ty  e i th er .  The 
chief reason f o r  maintaining some form o f  equity or equa l i ty  (Spen­
cer seems to regard these two terms as equivalents )  in the present 
transitional s ta te ,  according to Spencer, is  that, man being not 
yet fu l ly  ' e v o l v e d ' ,  i t  i s  inexpedient to a llow him an unlimited 
sphere of action. But in the idea l  state where man i s  completely 
evolved ( i . e . ,  a state in which man reaches the maximum o f  hetero ­
geneity poss ib le )  and where every one o f  his f a c u l t i e s  i s  f u l l y  ex­
ercised without g iv in g  pain to any one concerned, there w i l l  be 
no limit placed on his a c t i v i t y .  Consequently, men w i l l  have un- 
limited "spheres o f  a c t ion , "  and whatever equa l i ty  there may be t o ­
day, brought about by le ga l  and soc ia l  r e s t r i c t io n s  on m®a.'a ac­
tions, w i l l  disappear and heterogeneity  w i l l  be carr ied  to the f u l l ­
est extent poss ib le .  Only Inequa l i ty  in th is  idea l  state ( r e su l t in g  
from people 's f r e e  actions) w i l l  not be resented by any one, because 
the sphere o f  act ion o f  each " w i l l  be l im ited  only by his own spon­
taneous wishes and his physical const itu t ion"  (Maitland, Mind, V I I I  
p .358). (3) The conception o f  freedom too w i l l  lose  i t s  mean- 
n̂6 in the id ea l  s ta te ,  f o r  what meaning can freedom have when no
°ne is ever tempted to in t e r f e r e  with the des ires  o f  h is  neighbours?
I^at-a, p. ' ' -—
1 Mind, V I I I  O.S., p .359.
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As Maitland observes, "There can be no 'freedom o f  speech' where 
no one is  ever tempted to say anything that w i l l  g iv e  pain to his 
neighbours. There can be no 'freedom o f  contract '  where no one 
dreams of entering into any agreements save those wnlch the whole 
society w i l l  admit to be advantageous to i t  and to every member o f  
it" (Mind, p . 365). The in ference that we draw from a l l  th is ,  then, 
is that Spencer's formula o f  absolute ju s t ic e ,  v i z . ,  the law o f  
equal freedom, has l i t t l e  or no app l ica t ion  to his ' i d e a l '  s tate .  I t  
can only have a nominal existence there. I f  in rep ly  to th is  c r i t i ­
cism, i t  be said that the r igh t  in te rp re ta t ion  o f  the matter i s  that
*
the law o f  equal freedom in the ' i d e a l '  s tate  is  f u l f i l l e d  natural ly  
and spontaneously, we ask the question whether the same may not be 
said of any other p r in c ip le  o f  soc ia l  ju s t ice  at a l l .  What ob jec t ion  
is there to saying, f o r  instance, that in the idea l  s tate  there w i l l  
be a natural and spontaneous fu l f i lm en t  o f  the law that everybody 
ought to ge t  exact ly  the kind o f  work f o r  which he is  best f i t t e d  
and a remuneration that w i l l  keep him in maximum e f f i c i e n c y  as a 
worker? I f  none, what reason is  there f o r  assuming the superiority o f  
the law of equal freedom over the counter-theory o f  soc ia l  ju s t ice  
that we have mentioned or over any other theory f o r  that matter?
A supporter o f  Spencer's theory is  l i k e l y  to say that we have 
no right to draw from Spencer's premisses as r i g id  and l i t e r a l  an 
inference as we have drawn, e sp ec ia l ly  in view o f  the fa c t  that Spen- 
cer himself, in his l a t e r  wr it ings ,  more than once warns the reader 
that while the id ea l  o f  Absolute Ethics must ever serve as the goal
Of*
®oral progress, the goal i t s e l f  can never be ac tua l ly  reached. 
iyen i f  we accept th is  argument to be v a l id ,  we are ju s t i f i e d  in 
asking Spencer, who proposes to estab l ish  mora lity  on a ' s c i e n t i f i c '
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basis and seeks to g iv e  us a set o f  universal and unchanging e th ica l  
laws, derived from the absolute s ta te ,  what r igh t  he has to pos it  
a less remote id ea l  than the id ea l  o f  Absolute Ethics as our prac­
tical goal. With Maitland we may say that just as the geometrician 
is not to be put o f f  with s l i g h t l y  crooked l in es  because they are 
the s tra ightest that can be made, the m ora l is t  cannot accept as 
straight a man who i s  on "extraordinary occasions" (Data) prompted 
to break the moral law. When Spencer speaks o f  the ' s t r a i g h t '  or 
'the completely-adapted' man, we must in s i s t  that we ge t  that kind 
of man. Not to do so w i l l  be to o b l i t e r a t e  the unique d i f f e ren ce  
between himself and moralists  who do not seek to g ive  to Ethics the • 
' s c ien t i f ic '  basis which Spencer be l ieved  he was able to secure.
It may be that the f i n a l  or ultimate state which mankind w i l l  ever 
be able to reach w i l l  be less  remote than the idea l  state o f  Spence^ 
but i t  c e r ta in ly  cannot be taken as the idea l  in our sense o f  the 
term.
Even a f t e r  accepting the above argument o f  ours, a supporter 
°f Spencer's theory might be inc l ined  to say, as we have argued be­
fore, that, in a p rac t ica l  matter l ik e  soc ia l  ju s t ic e ,  i t  is  imposs­
ible to have a p er fec t  solution, and that, there fo re ,  a theory o f  
Justice which w i l l  help us to reach a state which i s  as nearly 
ideal as possib le  (what Maitland c a l l s  the penultimate s t a t e ) ,  may 
be regarded as our p rac t ica l  id ea l .  For the sake o f  argument we may 
accept th is  pos it ion .  But in try ing  to see what a p p l i c a b i l i t y  the 
law of equal freedom has to the penultimate s ta te ,  we f ind  that i t  
llas l i t t l e  or none. There i s  no v a l id  reason why there should be 
1° the very end a wide divergence between the des ires  and aims o f  
t!ae individual and those o f  h is  neighbours; and yet  th is  divergence,
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it is c lear, underlies the law o f  equal freedom. There is  no reason 
to believe that man in the penultimate state w i l l  s t i l l  be so very 
selfish as to demand bene f i ts  in proportion to r esu l ts ,  as th is  is  
brought about by the " fu l f i lm e n t  o f  voluntary agreements," and w i l l  
not be s a t i s f i e d  with a f r e e  scope f o r  the exerc ise  o f  his fa c u l t i e s  
and a reward s u f f i c i e n t  to maintain him in maximum e f f i c i e n c y .  Even 
the general condition o f  a f f a i r s  which Spencer p ictures as p r e v a i l ­
ing in this  penultimate s ta te ,  where man is  s t i l l  subject to acc id ­
ents, diseases, and misfortunes in general,  is  not in the leas t  
near the per fec t  s ta te ,  which allows "no scope f o r  further  mental 
culture and moral progress" ( F i r s t  P r in c ip le s ,  sect.  175).
We, there fo re ,  conclude that Spencer's theory o f  soc ia l  jus­
tice, in point o f  f a c t ,  has l i t t l e  or no app l ica t ion  e i th e r  to the 
ideal or to the p re - id ea l  s tate ,  and that consequently i t  stands or 
falls so le ly  by i t s  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  to a soc ie ty  such as our own, i . e .  , 
by its a b i l i t y  to es tab l ish  i t s  claim to be "the best means o f  has- 
tening the advent o f  the happy time when men w i l l  be f u l l y  evolved 
and 'true s e l f - l o v e  and soc ia l  be the same'" (Maitland, Mind V I I I  
° ’S*,pp. 366-7). We also conclude that Spencer's representation o f  
the principle o f  ju s t ice  as we l l  as o f  the p r in c ip les  o f  negative 
beneficence and p os i t iv e  beneficence "suggests the b e l i e f  that they 
ai,e not so much guides which the id ea l  g ives  to thejreal as sugges­
tions for the construction o f  a Utopia gathered from the requirements 
oi> present soc ia l  l i f e "  (Sor ley ,  Ethics o f  Naturalism, pp.254-5).
We now go on to examine the a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  Spencer's theory 
of Justice to the present "un-idea l"  s tate ,  but do not propose to do 
tt at any great length as we shall  have to return to i t  in  S e c t . I I ,  
Ŵere we are to consider the p rac t ica l  app lications that Spencer
himself makes o f  h is  formula. We shall  content ourselves merely 
with a r e p e t i t i o n  and defence o f  an observation made in the Ex­
position that the meaning o f  Soencer's formula o f  s oc ia l  ju s t ic e
i
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is so fa r  from being c lea r  or prec ise  that i t  requires  considerable 
explanation and q u a l i f i c a t io n  on the part o f  Spencer before i t s  
application to our present-day soc ia l  r e la t ion s  can be rendered 
plain. Our reason f o r  in s is t in g  on th is  observation i s  that i t  
would seem that Spencer who claims to be able to solve a l l  the 
problems o f  soc ia l  jus t ice  deductive ly  by re ference to a s ing le  
abstract formula o f  jus t ice  is  bound to g ive  us a formula, whose 
meaning, so to speak, can be read and assented to by him who runs.
In our exposit ion  o f  Socia l  S ta t ics  (Ch.I ,  S e c t . I ,  P a r t i ) ,  we not­
iced that Spencer h imself  pointed out the serious imperfections 
inherent in the law o f  equal freedom: (1) "Various ways e x is t  in 
which the fa c u l t i e s  may be exercised to the aggr iev ing  o f  other 
persons, without the law o f  equal freedom being overstepped:" (Soc. 
Statics, p .80; rev ised  ed. p .38) (2) " . . . .  i f  the ind iv idua l is
free to do a l l  that he w i l l s ,  provided he does not trespass upon 
certain spec i f ied  claims o f  others, then he i s  f r ee  to do things 
that are in jurious to h imself"  ( l b . ,  p . 8 1 ; rev ised  e d . , p .39)* Of 
the arguments adduced by Spencer in support o f  h is  formula in sp ite  
°f these imperfect ions, the ch ie f  one i s  that the imperfect ions 
wH l  en t i re ly  disappear in  the id ea l  s tate.  But in view o f  our con­
tusion that the law o f  equal freedom i t s e l f  w i l l  only have a 
nominal existence in the idea l  s ta te ,  we cannot accept Spencer's 
rSument. Another argument advanced by Spencer is  that other theorie/V
of justice also are open to s im ilar ,  i f  not g rea ter ,  imperfect ions, 
in reply to th is  we may say that other theor ies  do not attempt
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to solve a l l  the problems o f  soc ia l  jus t ic e  by appeal to a s ing le ,  
abstract ̂ as Spencer's does. Even i f  they do, i t  i s  poss ib le  to prove 
that some o f  them at le a s t ,  l ik e  the a l t e rn a t iv e  formula discussed 
by Spencer in Socia l  S ta t ics  - that each has a r igh t  to exerc ise  his 
faculties so long as he does not i n f l i c t  pain on any one e lse -  are 
superior to Spencer's formula in the hastening o f  the U t i l i t a r i a n  
end of "g rea test  happiness". Thus, applying the a l t e rn a t iv e  formula 
to the case o f  the freedom o f  speech, i t  i s  qu ite  poss ib le  to main­
tain that per fec t  adaptation and, in turn, "g rea tes t  happiness" may 
"most read i ly  be produced rather by a rigorous suppression o f  a l l  
speech which poss ib ly  can g ive  pain than by granting a wide l i b e r t y  
to those who have unfavourable opinion o f  th e i r  neighbours" (MaitladJL 
P. 357).
In our exposit ion  o f  the ear ly  part o f  Justice,  we noticed 
that the most s tr ik ing  thing about the absolute formula o f  ju s t ice  
is that no sooner is  i t  enunciated than Spencer proceeds to qu a l i fy  
it profoundly by saying that his formula from one point o f  view 
applies ( 1 ) only in  the realm o f  cases which are conducive to the 
maintenance o f  l i f e ;  that, in other words, i t  does not countenance 
aggression and counter-aggression; and that from another point o f  
/iew i t  applies (2) only to the e th ics  o f  the State and not to the 
ethlcs of the family .  The vagueness and ambiguity introduced into the 
application o f  the formula by the f i r s t  q u a l i f i c a t io n  are too patent 
1,0 need any comment. With regard to the second q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  i t  i s  
Efficient to remark that the l in e  o f  d iv i s io n  i s  a r b i t r a r i l y  chosen 
sPencer and that i t  i s  r e a l l y  unfa ir  to exclude the re la t ion s  o f
•
^est ic  l i f e  from a general discussion o f  ju s t ic e .  For,, as Sidgwick 
argues, "the Common Sense o f  mankind cer ta in ly  recognises that re -
'
latione established by law or custom within the family ,  may be 
either just or unjust; and that even keeping within l e g a l  l im i ts  
a parent may be just or unjust in the treatment o f  ch i ld ren ;"  (
(Ethics o f  Green, Spencer, and Martineau, pp. 255-6).
1.-
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Chapter I I .  -Examination o f  the Derivation o f  Spencer's 
Theory o f  Socia l Justice from
(1) In tu i t ion ,  or the Doctrine o f  the Moral
Sense. ■
Here we propose to deal with the points mentioned unchsr tne 
fourth head o f  our out l ine  (p.$\ ).  In dea l ing with Absolute Jusfci- 
tice, we have already expressed our b e l i e f  that what Spencer r e ­
gards to be s c i e n t i f i c  deductions o f  h is  are r e a l l y  broad g e n e ra l i ­
sations based upon an incomplete apprehension o f  fa c ts .  In support
of this b e l i e f  o f  ours, we shall  s ing le  out only two o f  Spencer's
many op t im is t ic  in ferences: (1 ) That because wars between commun- j 
i t ies  have been t i l l  now a cause o f  the s a c r i f i c e  o f  ind iv iduals  
to the community, there fo re ,  when wars cease, a l l  need f o r  such 
sacrif ice w i l l  cease - an inference which e n t i r e ly  overlooks the 
fact o f  industr ia l  and other forms o f  antagonisms within s o c ie t i e s .  
(2) "That humanity .may be moulded into an idea l  form by the con­
tinual d is c ip l in e  o f  peaceful co-operation" (P r in 's  o f  Sth ics,  Vol.
p. 473) - a dogma which f l i e s  in the face o f  a l l  experience and 
(t°es scant ju s t ic e  to the inner aspect o f  mora l i ty ,  since s e l f ­
coercion or the sense o f  ob l iga t ion ,  judging from our ordinary 
moral consciousness, i s  bound to continue so long as man is  man - 
and man can never become mechanically moral. The usual method 
w4ich Spencer adopts in  these cases, o f  leading the reader from
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one step to the next in the realm o f  the ¿¿/{known (and even there 
waiving a l l  inconvenient fa c ts )  and then suddenly taking a wide 
leap into the unknown, is  so fa m i l ia r  to us that i t  i s  hardly worta 
our while to consider the question o f  his empiricism as such. We 
may, there fore ,  turn our at tent ion  promptly to an examination o f  
the two ch ie f  ways that Spencer t rave ls  in a r r iv in g  at his formula 
of justice: ( i )  the way o f  the Moral Sense and ( i i )  the way o f
Evolution.
(1) Derivat ion  from the Doctrine o f  the Moral Sense or In ­
tuition. In our exposit ion  o f  Socia l  S ta t ics  (Part  I ,  Sect. I ,
Ch.I) we noticed that Spencer used th is  doctr ine ex tens ive ly ;  and, 
in particular, we saw that with the Moral Sense supplemented by rea­
son ( i . e . ,  reasoning) as his s ta r t in g -po in t  and "g rea tes t  happiness" 
achievable through the law o f  adaptation as the ult imate end o f  hu-
•f
man action, he traced three c lo s e ly - r e la te d  and, in  some ways, hardl
A.
to be d ist inguishable  routes in a r r iv in g  at his theory o f  ju s t ic e ,  
which he claimed to be the ch ie f  means to the attainment o f  " g r ea t ­
est happiness." Our purpose here is  to examine what support the doc­
trine of the Moral Sense (o r  In tu i t ion lsm ) , as understood by i t s  
avowed adherents, r e a l l y  g ives  to the pa r t icu la r  formula o f  ju s t ic e  
advocated. I t  i s  not to inquire into the v a l i d i t y  or in v a l id i t y  o f  
intuitionism as such. I f  Spencer had used th is  p re -evo lu t iona l ,  in ­
tuitional mode o f  reasoning only in Socia l  S ta t ic s ,  we could e a s i ly  
dismiss consideration o f  i t  by saying that i t  would not be f a i r  to 
Judge any w r i t e r  by his e a r l i e r  views, e sp ec ia l ly  when he had taken 
the trouble to recast them in his l a t e r  wr it ings .  But the fa c t  i s  
that in sp ite  o f  the open embracing o f  the evolut ionary method in 
his Princip les o f  Ethics, Spencer s t i l l  adheres to the in tu i t io n a l
theory, though he fundamentally changes I t  before using i t .  The 
change, however, i t  must be noted a f f e c t s  pr imar i ly  Spencer's view 
of the. o r ig in  o f  the Moral Sense, and not very much the app l ica t ion
that he makes o f  i t .
We admit that when we turn from Socia l S ta t ics  to the Induc­
tions o f  Ethics (Part  I I  o f  the P r in 's  o f  Ethics/, published in 
1892), one o f  the f i r s t  things that s tr ikes  us i s  what appears to 
be an unqualif ied r e je c t io n  o f  Intuit ionism. But a care fu l  study o f  
some of the passages there, combined with a study o f  the -eahly cnap- , 
ters o f cthe Data o f  Ethics as we l l  as the chapters on the SentimentX
of Justice’ and A re trospect  with an Addition in Justice (Part IV o f  
the P r in 's ) ,  d ispe ls  th is  b e l i e f .  In the Inductions themselves, 
while confessing "Though as shown in my f i r s t  work, Socia l  S ta t ics ,
I once espoused the doctr ine o f  the in tu i t i v e  moralists  ( at the out­
set in f u l l ,  and in l a t e r  chapters with some implied q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ]
gradually /
yet i t  has become c lea r  to me that the qu a l i f i c a t io n s  required ob- r\
literate thè doctr ine  as enunciated by them" (Inductions, pp. 470-1), 
Spencer adds that the Moral Sense doctr ine "adumbrates a truth and 
a much higher truth" ( Ib .471 ) ,  viz . ;  t h a t ' " the sentiments and ideas 
current in each soc ie ty  become adjusted to the kinds o f  a c t i v i t y  
Predominating in i t "  ( l b . ) .  This l a t t e r  statement seems to us to be 
ih substantial agreement with the evolutionary in te rp re ta t ion  o f  
iutuitionism g iven in  the other parts o f  the P r in 's  o f  Ethics, in 
such statements as "moral fa c u l t i e s  have resu lted  from inher ited  
Verifications caused by accumulated experiences" (Data, p .55); and 
‘‘here ^been and s t i l l  are developing in  the race, certa in  fundamental 
ni0ral  in tu it ions ;  and that, though these moral in tu i t ion s  are the 
re8ults o f  accumulated experiences o f  U t i l i t y ,  gradually organised
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and inherited, they have come to be qu ite  independent o f  conscious 
experience" - quoted from the celebrated l e t t e r  to J .S .M i l l ,  in ­
cluded in the Data. This trac ing o f  the par t icu la r  moral in tu i t ion s
t
of man to the accumulated experience o f  the race, i t  i s  true, is  
not found in Socia l  S ta t ics ,  where Spencer i s  not very much con­
cerned with the o r ig in  o f  the Moral Sense. There he simply assumes 
its presence on the supposed ground that just as there i s  always
in us some prompter ca l led  a d es ire ,  answering to each o f  the ac­
tions which i t  i s  requ is i t e  f o r  us to perform, there probably exists  
in us an instrumentality  o f  th is  sort prompting us to mora lity .
Having thus t r i ed  to show that the doctr ine o f  the Moral 
Sense, in some form or other, is  sustained to the very end o f  Spen­
cer's e th ica l  thinking and that the d i f f e ren ce  between the e a r l i e r
and the la t e r  forms o f  the doctr ine pertains pr imar i ly  to the o r i ­
gin of part icu lar  moral in tu i t ion s ,  we shall  now proceed to show 
how from that doctr ine ,  Spencer der ives  the same formula o f  ju s t ice  
hoth in Socia l  S ta t ics  and the P r in 's  o f  Ethics. 1$ doing so, i t  
will be convenient to state beforehand the points which we seek to 
establish. They are (1) that the par t icu la r  form o f  ju s t ice  arr ived  
at by Spencer i s  not r e a l l y  deducible from Intfcit ionism and (2) 
that, conversely, the * In tu it ion !sm ’ which Spencer uses in a r r iv in g  
at his form o f  jus t ice  is  more or less  a caricature o f  true In t u i t ­
ion! sm. Since these two points are very c lo se ly  re la ted  to one & 
another and are, in fa c t ,  reducible to one, we shall  t r e a t  them
together.
At the very outset i t  must be confessed that i t  is  extremely 
d i f f icu lt  to de f ine  Intuit ionism in Ethics. Some c r i t i c s  regard i t  
as a d irec t  and immediate manifestation o f  Reason and contrast i t
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with Reasoning or argument and judgment; while others look upon 
it  as an in s t in c t  or impulse or f e e l in g .  From our expos it ion  o f  
Social S ta t ics ,  i t  seems c lear  that, in his introductory diecus^-
sion on the doctr ine o f  the Moral Sense, Spencer d e f i n i t e l y  places 
himself under the l a t t e r  group. The terms which he uses to des­
cribe the Moral Sense are a ’ sentiment*, an ' i n t u i t i o n ' ,  a 'faculty*/
a 'governing i n s t i n c t ' ,  a 'tendency ' ,  and a ' f e e l i n g ' ,  though at 
one place he uses the expression 'an innate p e rc ep t ion . ' Without 
pretending to judge between the two types o f  Intu it ion !sm that we 
have mentioned, we may point oikt the d i f f i c u l t y  that e x is ts  f o r  
Spencer's type o f  Intuit lonism. I f  the Moral Sense in i t s  operation 
is an in s t in c t ,  l ik e  other in s t in c ts ,  implying an impulsive tenden­
cy, rather than a " fa cu l ty  o f  abstract moral in tu i t io n s "  (Albee, 
History o f  Mnglish U t i l i t a r ia n ism ) ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to see how i t  
can have the au thor i ta t iv e  and universal character that In tu i t ion -  
isra claims. Under conditions o f  c i v i l i s a t i o n ,  i t  i s  genera l ly  
admitted that a l l  our in s t in c ts  cannot have a f r e e  play, even from 
the point o f  view o f  b io lo g i c a l  surv iva l ,  and that they must be 
organised and contro l led  by some other master motive. I t  i s  true 
that Spencer admits that Moral Sense i s  to be aided and supple-
1
mented by reason ( i . e . ,  reasoning).  But judging from the wide gap 
that he leaves between the Moral Sense and reason, we are tempted 
to ask, why pos i t  a Moral Sense at a l l ?  Cannot the "empir ica l-  
r e f le c t ive "  method o f  Sidgwick be a s u f f i c i e n t  guide to ue in  our 
social re la t ions?  I f  in  rep ly  to the l a t t e r  question, i t  i s  said 
that p r inc ip les  arr ived  at in  the way mentioned, w i l l  lack the
¿pencer seems unable to g ive  us a sa t is fa c to ry  answer to the 
objection ra ised by himself against his view o f  the Moral Sense,
;hqw fvrpm >an impulse to behave in the way we c a l l  equ itab le ,  there 
" t i l  ar ise a perception that such behaviour is  proper - a convic­




necessary emtional fervour which could alone come from an in s t in c tA*
or impulse, we have Spencer's own answer that whatever i s  necessary 
and useful f o r  surv iva l  and, in turn, to happiness, w i l l  eventually  
come to have the appropriate emotional tone attached to i£.
Supposing f o r  the sake o f  argument we grant to Spencer that 
his view o f  the nature o f  Intuit ionism is  on sound l in e s ,  the 
d if f icu lt ies  that he has to face on a purely in tu i t io n a l  basis are 
very many. As a U t i l i t a r i a n ,  Spencer accepts the "g rea tes t  happiness*' 
principle as the ult imate end o f  human action; and th is  p r in c ip le ,  
on the in tu i t ion a l  theory, must be the one c lea r  in tu i t io n  o f  the 
Moral Sense. But i t  is  a well-known fa c t  that,  in  sp ite  o f  the a t ­
tempt of Sidgwick and others to reconc i le  Hedonism with Intuition!srn^ 
Intuitionalists on the whole are not agreed in regarding "g rea tes t  
happiness" as a moral in tu i t ion .  To many o f  them, the d isproo f  o f  
Psychological Hedonism i s  s u f f i c i e n t  evidence o f  the in t r in s i c  i r ­
reconcilability o f  the "g rea tes t  happiness" p r in c ip le  and In tu i t io n ­
ism* To say in rep ly  to th is  that eventually  U t i l i t y  and In tu i t i o n ­
ism w il l  exact ly  coincide with one another , i s  not enough. How 
about the present moral consciousness o f  those to whom pleasure is  
n°t a value in i t s e l f ?  In the words o f  A.W.Benn, "To dec lare  p leas- 
ure a necessary form o f  moral in tu i t ion  must be pronounced a p iece 
of unwarrantable dogmatism" (Mind, Vol.V, O.S. P. ).
Sven i f  we grant to Spencer f o r  the time being that Happiness 
may be regarded as a "necessary form o f  moral in tu i t io n " ,  the im­
portant question as to how we sha l l  r e la t e  Justice to Happiness, 
re®ains to be answered. Spencer's answer, o f  course, which i s  im- 
plicit in a l l  h is  e th ica l  wr it ings  is  that Justice is  the ch ie f  
ilea,ris the attainment o f  Happiness, and th is  in sp ite  o f  hie r e ­
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peated assert ion  in Socia l  S ta t ics  that Justice i s  the one c lea r  
intuition o f  the Moral Sense. But to th is  answer In tu i t i o n a l i s t s  
in general do not agree. To them Justice i s  a value in  i t s e ly /  
and is  to be sought f o r  i t s  own sake. " U t i l i t y  i s  not th e i r  stand­
ard, pleasure is  not th e ir  motive" (A.W.Benn). They may be ready 
to grant that happiness or pleasure is  one o f  the by-products o f  
Justice. But to say this  is  not to es tab l ish  the r e la t io n  o f  
means and end between Justice and Happiness. How fa r  removed Spen­
cer's pos it ion  is  from the in tu i t io n a l  demand that " ju s t i c e  be 
done, though the sky should f a l l "  i s  seen in his b e l i e f  that in 
the predatory state antecedent to the soc ia l  state ( i f  i t  is  
proper at a l l  to speak o f  such stages in Socia l  ¿ th i c s ) ,  an impulse 
opposite to that o f  Justice was required f o r  surv iva l ,  and hence 
was r e l a t i v e l y  r igh t  f o r  that state. A co ro l la ry  o f  th is  pos i t ion  
which suggests i t s e l f  to us is  that i f  Justice is  thus o f  a 
relative value, dependent on i t s  conduciveness to surv iva l  and, 
in turn, to Happiness, i t s  value w i l l  cease i f  and when i t  i s  no 
longer an aid to surv iva l  and to happiness. But " I n t u i t i o n i s t s ,"  
says Benn, " w i l l  continue to maintain that the consciouness o f  
moral ob l iga t ion  has nothing to do with what experience t e l l s  
about the general consequences o f  actions . . . .  They hold that 
rightness and wrongness are in t r in s ic  q u a l i t i e s  o f  act ions, which 
°n being perceived become motives to perform or to abstain from 
them" (Mind, Vol.V. 0 . S. pp.504-6) .  Once more, to the I n t u i t i o n i s t s , 
the assertion 'This i s  r i g h t '  i s  the same as saying ' I  ought to 
i t ’ . But the sense o f  ob l iga t ion  in Spencer's ' s c i e n t i f i c '
Ethics, as already seen, belongs to the intermediate stages o f  
®°rality and w i l l  e n t i r e l y  disappear in the f i n a l  s ta te .  P e r fe c t
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morality to him is  spontaneous or in s t in c t iv e  mora lity .  But to 
this view, In tu i t i o n !s t s  in general are sure to demur.
Bet us f o r  the sake o f  advancing argument concede to Spen-
i
cer that In tu it ion lsm has no ob jec t ion  - th eo re t ic a l  or p ra c t ic a l -  
to regarding Justice as a means to Happiness, and ask ourselves 
what d e f in i t i o n  I t  can g ive  us o f  Justice. Turning to M i l l ' s  
Uti l i tar ianism, we f ind  the statement that the philosophic sup­
porters o f  intu it ion ism are now agreed that the in tu i t i v e  per­
ception is  o f  p r in c ip les  o f  morality and not o f  the d e t a i l s "  ( p . 28^ 
That th is  judgment o f  M i l l ' s  i s  by no means an exaggeration can 
be shown by re ference to other prominent w r iters .  H.Rashdall in 
his Theory o f  Good and E v i l ,  V o l . I ,  remarks that our f i n a l  appeal 
in Ethics i s  " to  In tu i t ions  or judgments o f  va lue , "  but that 
"these re la t e  not ho acts but ends". In a s im ilar  ve in  Sidgwick
writes in his Methods when he says that "even an extreme in tu i t io n -
ist would admit that the d e ta i l s  o f  Justice and other duties 
will  vary with soc ia l  in s t i tu t io n s . "  A general conclusion which 
seems to emerge from these statements is  that the utmost that the 
Moral Sense can do f o r  us i s  to help us to know in tu t i v e ly  cer­
tain abstract p r inc ip les  o f  moral ity ,  but p r in c ip les  which "are 
not su f f i c ien t  by themselves to g ive  (us) complete p ra c t ica l  
guidance" (Sidgwick, Methods o f  Ethics, B k . I I I ,  Ch.XII I ,  S ec t .3).
As Sidgwick says, "we can exh ib it  a s e l f - e v id en t  element in  the 
commonly recognised pr inc ip les  o f  Prudence, Just ice ,  and Ben­
evolence" ( l b . ) ;  but th is  i s  not to say that we can, by the same 
Method, ascerta in  what Prudence, Justice,  or Benevolence consists 
\ any par t icu la r  time or in any pa r t icu la r  place. Spencer's 
theory o f  Justice,  on the contrary, which is  c lose ly  connected
with the conception o f  the p er fec t  man in the p e r fe c t  soc ie ty ,  
professes to g iv e  a formula o f  ju s t ic e  applicable  to a l l  times and 
places. In Justice (Part IV ) ,  Spencer d e f in i t e l y  claims that his
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formula o f  ju s t ic e  is  "an immediate dictum o f  the human conscious­
ness a f te r  i t  has been subject to the d is c ip l in e  o f  a prolonged 
social l i f e "  ' (p .6 o ) ,  though he adds that i t  i s  ’ r e l a t i v e l y  vague' 
and requires 'methodic c r i t i c i s m . ' Even i f  we waive the advantage 
to be derived from th is  passage on account o f  the q u a l i f i c a t io n s  
introduced, there are ample proofs to show the pecu l iar  place 
assigned to ju s t ic e  by Spencer. Justice,  to him, as already seen 
in Social S ta t ics ,  i s  the one c lear  in tu i t io n  o f  the Moral Sense,1 
which is  p e r fe c t ly  f r e e  from ambiguity. I t  i s  capable o f  "the 
greatest d e f in i teness "  or o f  "exact ascertainment." I t  i s  d i f f e r e n t  
from other e th ica l  p r inc ip les  - ¡Brudence and Beneficence - in  de­
gree as wel l  as in  kind, f o r  they lack i t s  d e f in i t e  in tu i t i v e  
character and are incapable o f  s p e c i f i c  d e f in i t i o n  u n t i l  the advent 
of the per fec t  man. A c lea rer  proof o f  the in tu i t i v e  character o f  
Justice ( including that o f  the formula) i s  found in  a/ statement 
in Justice where Spencer sums up the two deductive arguments in 
support o f  the law o f  equal freedom: "By in ference from the laws 
°f l i f e  as carr ied  on under soc ia l  conditions, and by Inference 
inom the d ic ta  o f  that moral consciousness generated by the contin- 
u°us d isc ip l ine  o f  soc ia l  l i f e ,  we are led  d i r e c t l y  to recognise 
ihg_law o f  equal freedom as the supreme moral law" (Just ice ,  p. 155), 
I f  the above argument against Spencer to the e f f e c t  that our 
m°ral  in tu it ions  can at best g ive  us only an abstract p r in c ip le  o f
]^~~^ompare a statement from Socia l  S ta t ics ,  quoted e a r l i e r :  
ea r;3. f i r s t  and a l l - e s s e n t ia l  law, dec laratory  o f  the l i b e r t y  o f  
h,* -iiffli-ed only by the l ik e  l i b e r t y  o f  a l l ,  i s  that fundamental 
Jth of which the moral sense is  to g ive  an in tu i t io n ,  and which 
in t e l l e c t  i s  to develop into a s c i e n t i f i c  mora l i ty "  (pp. 90-1).
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justice that w i l l  be incapable o f  reduction to a formula o f  imme­
diate applicat ion,  i s  true, we may agree with w r ite rs  l ik e  Sidgwick 
who content themselves with de f in ing  jus t ice  in very broad terms 
and think that the only certa in  element in i t  i s  that we ought to 
treat s imilar cases s im i la r ly ,  or n ega t ive ly ,  that " d i f f e r e n t  in d i ­
viduals are not to be treated d i f f e r e n t l y ,  except on grounds o f  
universal app l ica t ion "  (Sidgwick, Methods o f  Ethics, p. 494). In 
other words, we may say that the p r in c ip le  o f  ju s t ice  from an in ­
tuitional standpoint, i s  i r reduc ib le  to anything beyond the law o f  
equity or im p a r t ia l i t y ,  and that th is  law might be wr it ten  under 
the principle o f  ju s t ic e  "as an explanatory commentary" (J .S .M i l l ,  
Utilitarianism, p. 58). But i t  i s  notorious that Spencer's mechanical 
and absolute formula o f  ju s t ic e ,  the law o f  equal freedom, is  in 
violent c o n f l i c t  with th is  explanatory commentary. I t  pays l i t t l e  
or no attention to the importance o f  in d iv idu a l is in g  persons and 
of finding out what is  just f o r  each o f  them as members o f  a common 
society. In other words, i t  ignores the importance o f  what Rashdall 
calls equality  o f  consideration; i t  groups people together i r r e ­
spective o f  th e i r  conditions or th e i r  moral and soc ia l  needs.
The points o f  c r i t i c ism  that we have advanced so f a r  against 
Spencer’ s theory o f  the Moral Sense in i t s  r e la t io n  to the p r in c ip le  
°f justice have been o f  a general character. We sha l l ,  there fo re ,  
now turn to an examination o f  the de ta i led  ways in which Spencer 
arnlves at his formula o f  jus t ice  from his in tu i t io n a l  premisses.
Th*s means that we should d i r e c t  a t tention  to the "three routes" 
that we expounded in  Part I ,  Sect. I ,  Ch. 1^. I t  is  true that Spen- 
Cer ¿ees not use these methods extens ive ly  in  his l a t e r  w r it ings ,  
since they are assumed a l l  through, i t  i s  necessary to examine
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them, however cu rso r i ly ,  in our c r i t ic ism .  These methods, i t  w i l l  
be remembered, are: ( l )  reasoning "our way from those fixjrfed con­
ditions under which alone . . . .  g rea tes t  happiness can be r e a l i s ed " ;
(2) drawing "our in ferences from man's const itu t ion ,  considering 
him as a congeries o f  f a c u l t i e s " ;  and (3) l i s t en in g  " to  the monition* 
of a certain mental agency, which seems to have the function o f  
guiding us ar igh t  in the matter o f  r igh t  soc ia l  r e la t ionsh ips "  (Soc. 
Statics, p. 103; rev ised  ed. , p. 5;4). Needless to say that the 
first o f  these methods g ives  in  a nutshell  the plan o f  those parts 
of the P r inc ip les  o f  Ethics which deal with Prudence, Justice ,  and 
Beneficence (Parts I l l - l f l ) ,  w r it ten  about f o r ty  years a f t e r  the 
completion o f  Socia l  S ta t ics ;  the second l inks i t s e l f  to the chap­
ter on the B io lo g ica l  View in the Data (Ch. V I ) ;  and the th ird  
has intimate re la t ion s  with the chapters on the Sentiment o f  Justice 
and the Idea o f  Justice in Part IV, chs. IV and V.
I t  i s  in  our exposit ion  o f  the f i r s t  method (cp. pp./i-j^), 
more than o f  the other two, that we saw the wide gap that there 
exists between Intuit ionism and Spencer's supposed deductions from 
it. We g lad ly  agree with Spencer in regarding the soc ia l  s tate  as 
a fixed condition o f  ex istence,  but we disagree with him in the 
interpretation that he puts on i t .  I t  seems to us more reasonable 
1° think that our moral consciousness would g iv e  us an in tu i t io n  
as to the true place o f  the indiv idual in soc ie ty  than that i t  
would provide us with a conception o f  soc ie ty  as composed o f  an 
aSgregate o f  ind iv idua ls ,  each indiv idual having h is  own p a r t icu la r
If
sphere o f  a c t i v i t y . "  I t  i s  not l i k e l y  that Spencer meant to r e f e r  
hia vlew o f  the soc ia l  state to his doctr ine o f  the Moral Sense.
in any case, i t  is^notorious fa c t  that, in  sp ite  o f  his
\
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elaborate use o f  the idea o f  a soc ia l  organism and his tendency 
to take metaphors too l i t e r a l l y ,  Spencer f a i l s  to reconc i le  the 
apparent an t i thes is  that there is  between s e l f  and "o ther - than -se l f  
Even in the P r in c ip les  o f  Ethics, where Spencer d e f i n i t e l y  admits 
the b io lo g ica l  p r in c ip le  o f  race-preservat ion  and r e a l i s e s  that 
no complete separation can be e f f e c ted  between ind iv idua l  eth ics  
and soc ia l  e th ics ,  he adheres to the p re -evo lu t iona l ,  in tu i t io n a l  
c lass i f ica t ion  and treatment o f  morals. The mechanical conception 
of each ind iv idual having his own*sphere o f  a c t i v i t y '  which under­
lies Spencer's p r in c ip le  o f  ju s t ice ,  i s  retained to the very end.
Not a word is  said about ju s t ice  in the f i e l d  o f  non-competitive 
goods l ik e  moral goods, where the notion o f  a mechanical sphere 
of a c t iv i ty  and the idea l  o f  proportioning returns to labours 
will be p la in ly  inappl icab le .  What, f o r  instance, ought to be the 
social returns to a person who helps to strengthen the bonds o f  
society by incessantly  preaching and prac t is ing  such soc ia l  v i r - . 
tues as trustworthiness, mutual good w i l l ,  a sense o f  group so l idar  
tty, &c? Gan the good that he does be measured by any market value?
Leaving aside f o r  the moment Spencer's conception o f  tne 
s°cial s tate ,  l e t  us turn to his der iva t ion  o f  the p r in c ip les  o f  
morality governing i t .  What we f ind  here is  that Spencer be l ieves  
that justice alone is  a c lear  in tu i t ion  o f  the Moral Sense and that 
other pr inc ip les  l ik e  Prudence and Beneficence lack th is  in tu i t i v e  
character. But in doing so, Spencer runs counter to the opinion
0 "f*
moralists who c a l l  themselves In tu i t io n is t s  and to whom Bene­
ficence (and possib ly  Prudence), just as much as Just ice ,  i s  an 
^tuition o f  the Moral Sense. Thus Butler,  says Pro f.  Sorley,  con­
tends " fo r  an o r ig in a l  p r in c ip le  o f  benevolence towards others in
human nature, as we l l  as s e l f - l o v e  or care f o r  one's own In te res ts  
and happiness" (Ethics o f  Naturalism, p .84). Spencer does not 
give any reason f o r  excluding Beneficence from the purview o f  the 
Moral Sense. I t  i s  more than l i k e l y  that th is  a rb i t ra ry  exclusion 
is one ch ie f  reason f o r  the c o n f l i c t  that there is  between Justice 
and Beneficence in his treatment o f  them. For i f  he had treated 
them both as axioms o f  the Moral Sense there could be no rea l  
contradiction between them - however much they might d i f f e r  from 
one another - because o f  the truth that f i r s t  p r in c ip les  are incap­
able of contrad ict ing each other. In the words o f  Calderwood, 
"Benevolence and Justice,  as they describe quite  d i s t in c t  forms o f  
action, cannot contradict each other" (Handbook o f  Moral Philosophy, 
p. 51). Speaking o f  the in tu i t i v e  p r in c ip le  o f  ju s t ic e  alone, we 
may say that Spencer's law o f  equal freedom f a i l s  to meet everyone 
of the requirements o f  an axiom proposed by Sidgwick, that i t  
should be (a) stated in c lear  and prec ise  terms (we have dea l t  with 
this point already under Absolute Jus t ic e ) ;  (b) r e a l l y  s e l f - e v id e n t ;  
(c) not c o n f l i c t in g  with any other truth; and (d) supported by an 
adequate 'consensus o f  experts '  (Methods o f  Ethics, B k . I l l ,C h .X I ,  
Sect. 2).
The second method, as we have seen e a r l i e r ,  a r r ives  at the 
law of equal freedom through an argument based upon the exerc ise  
°f facu lt ies .  As th is  argument has a natural a f f i n i t y  to the b io log-  
ical view o f  the P r in c ip les  o f-E th ics ,  and the ear ly  part o f  Justice
1 n #Particular, we may postpone a f u l l  consideration o f  i t  t i l l  we 
c°me to the next chapter which w i l l  deal with the doctr ine  o f  
Solution. But, in the meantime, looking at i t  from the in tu i t io n a l  
P°int o f  view, we may say that there is  no specia l  reason why the
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Moral Sense should lay down that the lav/ o f  equal freedom, as in ­
terpreted by Spencer, i s  the best way o f  the members o f  a soc ie ty  
achieving th e ir  "g rea tes t  happiness" through the exerc ise  o f  
facult ies. I t  seems more reasonable to think that the Moral Sense,
t!i f  i t  d ic ta tes  g rea tes t  happiness as an end at a l l ,  w i l l  lejtd 
greater support to the a l t e rna t iv e  formula which Spencer r e je c t s ,  
viz.., l im i t in g  "the r igh t  o f  each to exerc ise  his f a c u l t i e s ,  by 
the proviso that he sha l l  not hurt any one e ls e "  (Soc ia l  S ta t ics ,  
p. 78; revised ed. p. 35), than to his own. Thus P lato  in  his 
Republic says " I f  a man says that ju s t ic e  consists in repaying a 
debt, meaning that a just man ought to do good to his fr iends  and 
injure his enemies, he is  not r e a l l y  wise; f o r  he says what i s  not 
true, i f ,  as has been c le a r ly  shown, the in jury o f  another can be 
in no case jus t"  (Bk .I ,  p .375, Jowett 's  t ran s la t ion ) .  In support 
of his formulation o f  ju s t ic e ,  Spencer, o f  course, says that i t  
is the sure^st way o f  securing the "normal" f a c u l t i e s  o f  man and 
of abolishing his "abnormal" fa c u l t i e s .  But as the sequel w i l l  
show, the d i f f i c u l t  terms "normal" and "abnormal," in  Spencer's 
usage, turn out to be p re t ty  nearly tau to log ies .  A fa cu lty  which 
manages to survive comes to be regarded as normal and a fa cu lty  
which f a i l s  to do so, as abnormal. I f  th is  in ference o f  ours be 
correct and i f ,  as Spencer says, the purpose o f  jus t ice  i s  to 
hasten the time when "true s e l f - l o v e  and soc ia l  ( s h a l l )  be the 
same", the a l t e rn a t iv e  formula o f  ju s t ice  which forb ids  the i n f l i c ­
tion of in ju r ie s  on others may be regarded as a surer and quicker 
Way of reaching the desired end than Spencer's law o f  equal f r e e ­
dom. Furthermore, a formula o f  jus t ice  which takes no account o f  
a Person vo lu n tar i ly  hurting the "normal f e e l in g s  o f  his f e l low s "
in exercising his leg i t im a te  r igh ts  and which makes no prov is ion  
against the i n f l i c t i o n  o f  in jury upon onese l f ,  cannot be an i n t u i t i ­
on of the Moral Sense, and cannot be just.  But ye t  Spencer contents 
himself by saying that " fu r ther  qu a l i f i c a t io n s  o f  the l i b e r t y  o f  
action thus asserted may be necessary, yet  . . . .  in  the just regu- 
tion of  a community, no further q u a l i f i c a t io n s  o f  i t  can be recog­
nised" (Soc ia l  S ta t ic s ,  p . 103; rev ised  e d . , p . 54).
We now go on to the th ird  method (chapter on Secondary 
Derivation o f  a F i r s t  P r in c ip le )  and there f ind  that Spencer d e f ­
initely comes back to his doctr ine o f  the Moral Sense, but Moral 
Sense of an impoverished kind. The old conception o f  the Moral 
Sense as an ult imate,  which was presented in the second chapter 
of the Introduction, i s  t a c i t l y  g iven up and the conception that 
we now get  o f  i t  i s  o f  a specia l  fa cu lty  by v ir tu e  o f  which a per­
son "tends both to assert his own r igh ts  and to recognise the 
rights o f  others" (A H istory o f  English U t i l i ta r ian ism  by Albee, 
p.284; cp.Soc. S ta t ic s ,  p .90). And i t  i s  to th is  l a t t e r  conception 
that Spencer r e a l l y  adheres to the end o f  his e th ica l  and p o l i t i c a l  
writings. In the f in a l  analysis ,  Spencer p ra c t i c a l l y  reduces the 
Moral Sense to an " in s t in c t " o f  personal r igh ts ,  the " in s t in c t "
°f sympathy being much l a t e r  in o r ig in  and somewhat o f  a f a c t i t i o u s  
character to the end. Thus in Socia l  S ta t ics  we saw that Spencer 
reiterated the assert ion that, in order to understand the soc ia l  
aSgregate, we must f i r s t  understand the units o f  which i t  i s  an 
aSgregate, and that ene the one sure element o f  these units i s  
their " in s t in c t  o f  personal r i g h t s . "  Taking th is  in d iv id u a l i s t i c  
P°int of view, i t  i s  not surpris ing that, in sp ite  o f  h is  assumption 
°f a Moral Sense, Spencer f inds i t  d i f f i c u l t  to account f o r  the
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sentiment o f  ju s t ic e  without e n l i s t in g  the co-operation o f  sym­
pathy, sympathy i t s e l f  being viewed as the obverse side o f  the 
instinct o f  personal r ights  and a la t e  acqu is i t ion  o f  the race.
Thus, observes Spencer, "the sentiment o f  ju s t ice  i s  nothing but 
a sympathetic a f f e c t i o n  o f  the in s t in c t  o f  personal r igh ts  - a 
sort of  r e f l e x  function o f  i t "  (Soc ia l  S ta t ics ,  p .97; rev ised  e d i . ,  
p.49).
Apart from the de fec ts  o f  assigning to sympathy a much 
later o r ig in  than what is  r e a l l y  the case in the h is to ry  o f  man’ s 
moral growth and o f  regarding i t  as merely the obverse side o f  the 
egoistic in s t in c t  o f  personal r igh ts ,  Spencer, in  his Socia l  Statics 
at least, g ives  no adequate reason why or how man has come to be 
sympathetic. A l l  that he seems able to say there i s  that "s ince 
men are bound to f e e l  more or less  l i k e  each other, in s im ilar  
circumstances, they must end by f e e l in g  f o r  each other" (Aibee,
P*335).-But how th is  teans it ion  is  e f f e c ted ,  as Dr.Albee points 
°ut, is  l e f t  almost a mystery. In Justice,  however, an attempt at 
an answer is  made in the conception o f  the p r o -a l t r u i s t i c  sen t i ­
ment of ju s t ice .  There we are to ld  that man s tar ts  with an e g o i s t ­
ic sentiment o f  jus t ice  (phrase corresponding to in s t in c t  o f  per­
sonal r i g h ts ) ,  and that soc ia l  sentiments which come into e x i s t ­
ence through his dread o f  soc ia l  d i s l ik e ,  dread o f  l e g a l  punish­
ment, dread o f  Divine vengeance, and dread o f  r e t a l ia t i o n  in the 
s°cial state, g iv e  r i s e  to sympathy and that th is  sympathy, in 
turn, produces the genuine a l t r u i s t i c  sentiment o f  ju s t ic e .  Whether 
°r not this account may be true psycho log ica l ly ,  what we are con­
cerned with is  that neither  in Socia l S ta t ics  nor in Justice is  
there any convincing reason given why we ought uncondit ionally  to
obey the vo ice  o f  sympathy or that o f  ju s t ice .  What we are given 
to in fer  i s  that as f a r  as the ind iv idua l  i s  concerned, he has 
a ready-made " in s t in c t "  o f  sympathy (or  a l t r u i s t i c  sentiment o f  
justice) and so i f  he is  sympathetic, that i s  the only natural 
and spontaneous course f o r  him to fo l low .  This might very we l l  be 
the ideal to aim at;  but i t  i s  c l e a r ly  not In tu it ion ism. (An ac­
count o f  the o r i g in  and development o f  sympathy s im ilar  to the 
one found in Justice is  stated in the P r in c ip les  o f  Psychology,
Pt.IX, Chs.V-VIII.)
Intuit ionism rece ives  an even more severe blow in  Spencer's 
transition from the "Sentiment o f  Justice" to the " Idea o f  Just ice " .  
The general sentiment o f  ju s t ic e ,  to use the phraseology o f  the 
Principles o f  Psychology, has been defined as "the condition o f  
equilibrium which the e g o is t i c  sentiment and the a l t r u i s t i c  s en t i ­
ment co-operate to produce." But the important question i s ,  at 
what point in the apparent struggle between these two seemingly 
opposing tendencies, is  the equilibrium to be found? Or, how is  
the "idea o f  ju s t ic e "  to be ascertained? The surpris ing answer 
given by Spencer i s  that experience shows us that there are cer­
tain l im its  beyond which our fellow-men w i l l  not to le ra t e  i n t e r ­
ference and that l i b e r t y  to act within these l im i t s  const itutes  
the idea o f  ju s t ice .  Thus, he says, "The idea emerges and becomes 
definite in the course o f  the experiences that act ion may be 
carried up to a certa in  l im i t  without causing resentment from 
others, but i f  carr ied  beyond that l im i t  produces resentment. Such 
experiences accumulate; and gradually,  along with repugnance to
the acts which bring reac t iv e  pains, there ar ises  a conception o f  
a l imit to each kind o f  a c t i v i t y  up to which there i s  freedom to
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act" (Justice ,  ch. V, sec t .21 ) ;  and la t e r  adds that " I t  i s  a long 
time before the general nature o f  the l im i t  common to a l l  cases 
can be conceived" ( l b . ) .  I f  th is  in te rp re ta t ion  were true, we might 
well argue with Dr. Albee when he says that "there would in ev i ta b ly  
be a d i f f e r e n t  idea o f  jus t ice  f o r  every race, i f  not f o r  every 
minor soc ia l  group, f o r  the degree o f  human longsu f fe r ing  is  p la in ly  
a variable" ( p . 339). Once more, f ea r  o f  man, which-seems here to 
be placed at the basis o f  the idea o f  jus t ice  is  not in  accord with 
Intuitionism, f o r  no Intu it ionism o f  any descr ip t ion  b e l ie ves  that 
its d ictates are d i r e c t l y  or in d i r e c t l y  due to fea r  o f  any kind.
before we take leave o f  Spencer's handling o f  Intu it ion ism 
in its re la t io n  to the p r in c ip le  o f  ju s t ic e ,  we must say a word 
about the t ran sm iss ib i l i t y  o f  moral f e e l in g s  on which he continually 
harps in the P r in c ip les  o f  Ethics. Deferr ing consideration o f  the 
biological aspect o f  the subject to the next chapter, we may say 
that even i f  we are prepared to admit that our "moral f a c u l t i e s  
have resulted from inher ited  modif ications caused by accumulated 
experiences" (Data, p . 55), we are not freed  from the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  
explaining how these f a c u l t i e s ,  which are in te rp re ted *  "as caused 
by experiences o f  u t i l i t y "  (Psychology, p .520), can be a sure guide 
f°r the future. They are c e r ta in ly  a good index o f  the past and, 
at best, may be a good guide f o r  the immediate present. But so long 
as man (who, according to Spencer h im se l f , )  i s  s t i l l  f a r  from the 
Perfect state  and has to undergo continuous adaptation before reach­
es  i t ,  i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to see how his present moral f a c u l t i e s ,  
ffhich are consequences o f  past u t i l i t y ,  can serve future u t i l i t y  
as WeH* I l lu s t r a t in g  th is  d i f f i c u l t y  from the pr inc ip le  o f  ju s t ic e ,  
may say that even i f  we agree with Spencer, f o r  the time being,
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that his law o f  equal freedom is  "an immediate dictum o f  the human 
consciousness a f t e r  i t  has been subject to the d is c ip l in e  o f  pro­
longed soc ia l  l i f e " ,  there is  no guarantee whether that i t  w i l l  
continue to be an "immediate dictum" fo r  a l l  time to come. (Com­
pare "Just ice " ,  p . 6 0 . )
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Chapter I I I .  Derivation from the P r in c ip les  o f  B io lo gy .
We now go on to consider the claim made by Spencer that 
his theory o f  soc ia l  ju s t ic e  is  d i r e c t l y  deduced from the theory 
of Evolution. In doing th is ,  i t  is  f i r s t  o f  a l l  necessary to be 
clear ourselves as to what we exact ly  mean by evo lut ion,  f o r  evol­
ution, as is  we l l  known, is  a very complex a f f a i r ,  and i t  i s  f a i l ­
ure to take note o f  th is  primary fa c t  that accounts f o r  Spencer'*s 
one-sided conclusion that the law o f  equal freedom is  a d i r e c t  
deduction from the theory o f  evolut ion. By evo lut ion  to-day we do 
not simply mean development in general,  but development o f  the 
Particular kind made fam i l ia r  to us by Darwin, v i z . , development
through the natural se lec t ion  "o f  those v a r i e t i e s  o f  l i v in g  beings
which happen to be best f i t t e d  f o r  surv iva l  in the struggle  f o r  
existence" (Sor ley ,  Ethics o f  Naturalism, p. 14-1). Spencer c lea r ly  
adopts th is  Darwinian view o f  evo lut ion in  his l a t e r  e th ica l  
writings, but i t  remains to be seen to what extent h is  a l leged  
deductions from i t  are va l id .
Before we proceed to a d e ta i led  examination o f  the f i r s t
few chapters o f  "Ju s t ic e " ,  where Spencer states what seems to De 
a clear and concise view o f  the b io lo g ic a l  basis o f  jus t ic e  and 
which we have expounded and in c id en ta l ly  c r i t i c i s e d  in Part I ,  
we may note three general considerations which seem to throw some 
doubt on the causal r e la t io n  posited by Spencer between the theory 
of evolution and his pa r t icu la r  formula o f  ju s t ic e .  The f i r s t  o f  
these is  an in ference which seems to force  i t s e l f  upon us in 
passing from Socia l S ta t ics  to Justice.  In both o f  these wr it ings  
Spencer is  g r e a t ly  concerned with an exact d e f in i t i o n  o f  the no­
tion o f  ju s t ice  and in both o f  them, in sp ite  o f  the use o f  such 
diverse methods as the in tu i t io n a l  and the evolut ionary respective- 
•ly, he curiously a r r ives  at an id en t ic a l  d e f in i t i o n  o f  i t ,  except 
for a s l igh t  verbal change. This fa c t ,  in i t s e l f ,  does not prove 
anything in par t icu la r .  I f  i t  proves anything at a l l ,  i t  proves, 
according to Spencer, the supreme importance o f  his formula o f  
justice by es tab l ish ing  more than one way o f  reaching i t .  But 
when we take th is  fa c t  in conjunction with the conclusion to 
which our preceding discussion on Spencer's treatment o f  In tu i t -  
ionism pointed, v i z . , that Spencer seems to use the in tu i t io n a l  
method more or less  as a convenient garb f o r  presenting an inde­
pendent theory o f  ju s t ic e ,  we are led to suspect whether the 
evolutionary method also may not be used in the same way by Spen­
cer.
This suspicion o f  ours rece ives  add it iona l support when we 
come to the second consideration, that in Socia l  S ta t ics  which 
was published some f o r t y  years before the publicat ion  o f  "Justice" 
and in which, according to Spencer himself ,  the "b io l o g i c a l
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origin f o r  e th ics "  which is  " d e f in i t e l y  set fo r th "  in Justice,  
is "only ind ica ted " ,  (Just ice ,  Pre face )  the essen t ia l  features o f  
the "evolutionary p r in c ip le "  which enter into his formulation o f  
justice, are already found.;, in  a f a i r l y  wel l-developed form. Thus 
already in Socia l  S ta t ics ,  Spencer "recognises the 's te rn  d i s c i ­
pline o f  nature' which el iminates the un f i t  and secures the main­
tenance o f  a const i tu t ion  completely adapted to surrounding con­
tions, and i t  i s  in  the name o f  such d is c ip l in e  that he attacks 
the system o f  Poor R e l i e f "  (Ernest Barker, P o l ' l  Thought from Spen-
j : .
cer to To-day, p .92). In the name o f  the same d is c ip l in e  he also 
attacks S ta te -co lon isa t ion ,  State education, State care o f  public
¡¡I  jo !
health, and State regu la t ion  o f  industry. I t  i s  not very necessary
f] ]i
for our purpose to examine at length how Spencer came by th is  
evolutionary idea o f  the surviva l o f  the f i t t e s t  years before the 
announcement o f  Darwin's epoch-making theory o f  natural se lec t ion .
%t a study o f  the ear ly  wr it ings  o f  Spencer in comparison with 
bis la t e r  w r it ings ,  makes i t  seem more than probable that Spencer 
stafcted with a universal physical evolut ion, with i t s  centra l  ideas 
°f  perfect equilibrium, " ind iv idua t ion " ,  adaptation to environment, 
and possibly surv iva l  o f  the f i t t e s t  in some vague form, and that, 
later, when he discovered that the same centra l  ideas could be 
il lustrated by b io lo g i c a l  evolut ion, he included i t  under his sinj^.- 
$le all-embracing, physical evolut ion. Whether th is  view o f  ours, 
which is  corroborated by Dr. E.Barker, be correct  or not, a sus­
picion which grows upon us in fo l low ing  the development o f  Spen­
cer's e th ica l  and p o l i t i c a l  thinking, as’ recorded in h is  essay on
&
the Filiation of Ideas/in his Autobiography, is  that Spencer, early
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in his l i f e ,  had formed certa in  d e f in i t e  conceptions on matters 
of socia l ju s t ic e ,  which were f u l l y  expressive o f  his extreme 
individualism, his u t te r  lack o f  respect f o r  authority ,  and his 
inborn aversion to t r a d i t io n a l  ideas and sentiments, and that 
later, when he came to g ive  a r t icu la te  reasons f o r  his b e l i e f s  
and to construct a system out o f  them, he unconsciously chose 
such methods as would i l l u s t r a t e  and amplify the coneeptions that 
he had prev iously  formed - whether the methods were evo lut ionary 
(physical and b i o l o g i c a l ) ,  in tu i t io n a l ,  or supernatural. I t  is  
only in the l i g h t  o f  some such in te rp re ta t ion  as th is  that we can 
understand what seems to be Spencer's uncertainty in determining 
for himself what prec ise  part the theory o f  b io l o g i c a l  evo lut ion  
had played in  his e th ics  and how ear ly  that part had been played. 
Thus, in his Preface to Justice,  as we have already said, Spencer 
says that the " b io lo g i c a l  o r ig in  f o r  e th ics "  i s  only indicated 
in Social S ta t ic s ;  and yet  in his F i l i a t i o n  o f  Ideas, where he 
traces the evo lut ion  o f  his own mind, Spencer asserts that 
"throughout the whole argument (o f  Socia l  S ta t ic s )  there is  t a c i t ­
ly assumed the process o f  .Evolution, i n s0 f ar as human nature is  
concerned. There is  a perpetual assumption o f  the moral modif i -  
ab i l i ty  o f  man, and the progressive adaptation o f  his character 
to the soc ia l  s tate .  I t  i s  a l leged  that h is  moral evo lut ion  d e - . 
Pends on the development o f  sympathy, which is  held to be the 
root o f  both ju s t ice  and beneficence.............There is  also a pass­
ing recognit ion o f  the Survival o f  the F i t t e s t " (D.Duncan, The 
^ife and Le tte rs  o f  Herbert Spencer, p . 5^0). I t  i s 'p o s s ib l e  to 
account fo r  the inconsistency contained in the l a t t e r  quotation
by saying that i t  i s  a case o f  reading backward on the part o f  
Spencer, but what seems more than probable is  that, having arr ived  
at the essen t ia l  features o f  h is  theory o f  ju s t ic e  without the 
aid of b io lo g i c a l  evo lut ion and having la t e r  a cc iden ta l ly  found
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in this b io l o g i c a l  evo lut ion a re-inforcement o f  h is  o r ig in a l  
views, Spencer f a i l e d  to keep the two separate from one another 
and had indeed come to imagine that the r e la t io n  o f  cause and 
e f fect  had ex is ted  between them from the very beginning. A further 
proof o f  Spencer's indeterrainateness as to the part played by 
evolution in h is  eth ics  can W  perhaps be detected in  the con­
fession that he makes in his Preface to Negative Beneficence and 
Positive Beneficence (Parts V & VI o f  the P r in 's  o f  E th ics ) ,  
where he says, "The Doctrine o f  Evolution has not furnished te 
guidance to the extent 2  had hoped. Most o f  the c o r o l la r i e s ,  drawn 
empirically, are such as r igh t  f e e l in g s ,  enlightened by cu lt iva ted  
in te l l igence ,  have already su f f iced  to es tab l ish " .
A th ird  consideration to which atten t ion  must be d irec ted ,  
which also throws considerable doubt on the close connection 
posited by Spencer between the doctr ine o f  evo lut ion  and his  
theory o f  ju s t ic e ,  i s  the way that Spencer r e la te s  h is  evo lu t ion ­
ary conception o f  jus t ice  to the non-evolutionary theory o f  an 
absolute state .  I f  i t  be true, as Spencer says i t  i s ,  that, in 
order to know what jus t ic e  i s  f o r  us here and now, we must f i r s t  
discover what jus t ice  is  f o r  the idea l  man in the id ea l  s ta te ,  
that, in other words, the meaning o f  ju s t ice  in the t r an s i t io n a l  
states is  in exp l icab le  without knowing the meaning o f  ju s t ic e  in 
the ultimate s ta te ,  i t  i s  wxtremely doubtful whether the same 
theory o f  ju s t ice  can be le g i t im a te ly  derived from the doctmine
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of evolution. Expanding the matter somewhat at length, we may say 
that there appears to be a s e l f - e v id en t  contrad ict ion  in a theory 
of justice  which claims to be derived from evo lut ion,  but which
at the same time s tarts  with a doctr ine o f  the absolute state, 
which uses such non-evolutionary methods as the a rb i t ra ry  f i x in g  
of a point in the c i r c l e  o f  evo lut ion and d isso lu t ion  as end and 
the in te rp re t ing  o f  the e a r l i e r  in  evo lut ion  by the later^ and 
such non-evolutionary ideas as "a d e f in i t e  and there fo re  s ta t ion ­
ary goa l” (E .Barker),  a p er fec t  and f in a l  adaptation, and a com­
plete equilibrium or s ta t i c  repose. In sp ite  o f  th is  argument, 
however, we f ind  that, in point o f  f a c t ,  Spencer in  his "J u s t ic e ” , 
manages to deduce his theory o f  ju s t ic e  from the doctr ine  o f  
evolution. But th is ,  i t  seems to us, he does by temporarily sett ing 
aside the conception o f  the absolute s tate  with i t s  non-evolution­
ary basis and by confining himself to a contemplation o f  the modes 
of survival*
The three general considerations which we have stated so 
far, in a somewhat dogmatic form, can, at best,  only predispose 
as in favour o f  suspecting the causal r e la t io n  posited by Spencer 
between the doctr ine o f  evolut ion and his theory o f  ju s t ic e .  They 
do not d e f i n i t e l y  disprove i t .  We must, th e re fo re ,  now turn to 
ah examination o f  the theory o f  evo lut ion in d e t a i l  to see whether 
i t  may not a f t e r  a l l  be possib le  to es tab l ish  an essen t ia l  r e la t io n  
between evo lut ion and Spencer's idea l  o f  ju s t ic e .  In doing th is ,
°f course, i t  i s  necessary to keep the b io lo g i c a l  fa c ts  adduced 
by Spencer and expounded by us in Part 1̂  as the basis o f  our d i s ­
cussion. The part icu la r  points which we seek to es tab l ish  are:
I
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(1) that Spencer i s  at a l l  able to deduce his theory o f  ju s t ic e  
from the doctr ine o f  evo lut ion  only by s s k i l f u l  s e le c t ion  o f  
biological fa c ts ;  (2) that i f  the fac ts  o f  b io logy ,  which Spencer 
omits or pays l i t t l e  a t tent ion  to ,  are taken f u l l  account o f ,  a 
totally d i f f e r e n t  theory (or  even theor ies )  o f  ju s t ice  can be es­
tablished; and (3) that, even using Spencer's own b io lo g i c a l  prem­
isses and methods, opposed idea ls  o f  jus t ice  can be worked out 
with equal elaborateness and equal ingenuity. These three points,  
we admit, are not much d i f f e r e n t  from one another; and consequent­
ly, they are o ften  l i v e l y  to run into each other. They a l l  i l l u s ­
trate the same general truth that the fac ts  o f  surv iva l  are so 
numerous, and th e i r  in terpre ta t ions  so var ied,  that almost any 
ethical theory o f  soc ia l  jus t ice  can der ive  i t s  support from some 
of these fac ts  and th e i r  in te rp re ta t ions .  The only important reascn 
for l i s t in g  under three d i f f e r e n t  heads the same general truth, 
is to emphasise the weakness o f  Spencer's evolut ionary proof by
coming to i t  from s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  angles o f  attack.
two
We shall  now take up the f i r s t/ p o in ts  o f  our c r i t i c i sm  and
treat them together, Erom our exposit ion o f  the f i r s t  few chapters
of "Justice",  i t  w i l l  be remembered that Spencer's conception o f
justice i s  that i t  is  merely "a further  development o f  sub-human 
t.
justice1', that i t  concerns i t s e l f  only with the re la t ionsh ips  o f  
adult l i f e ,  and that, in the f in a l  analysis ,  i t  i s  p r a c t i c a l l y
1 * ■'•t is  open to us to refuse to accept th is  pos i t ion  o f  Spencer's 
0n ground that "the d i f fe ren ces  between ourselves and our near- 
er or remoter r e la t i v e s  are just as rea l  and s ign i f i c a n t  as the 
act of the common ancestry" (Evolution in the L ight o f  Modern ' 
nowledge, ch.XII by Pro f.  A .E .Taylor,  p .455) and that,  there fo re ,  
nere is  no l o g i c a l  necess ity  f o r  human ju s t ic e  to be merely "a 
urther development o f  sub-human ju s t ic e " .  But, in  rep ly  to th is ,  
Pencer would probably say that, from his point o f  view, i f  the 
uman species i s  to survive and prosper, the ru les governing such 
Prvival and prosper ity  cannot in p r inc ip le  be d i f f e r e n t  from the 
rules of surv iva l and prosper ity  governing the l i v e s  o f  lower
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reducible to the p r in c ip le  o f  "non- interference with the f r e e  a c t ­
iv i t ies  o f  others" - in ter ference  being ju s t i f i a b l e  only in the 
enforcement o f  contracté vo lu n ta r i ly  made, because such in t e r ­
ference, when necessary, i s ,  according to Spencer, absolute ly  es-
£
sential f o r  the proportioning o f  bene f i ts  to e f f o r t s ,  by mean^of 
which alone, he b e l ie ves ,  the existence and prosper i ty  o f  soc ie ty  
and, in turn, o f  the ind iv idual,  can be secured. Our purpose now 
is to see to what extent th is  pa r t icu la r  conception o f  jus t ic e  
is leg i t im ate ly  derived from the doctr ine o f  evo lut ion.
Let us f o r  a moment agree with Spencer that the p r in c ip le  
of human jus t ice  has i t s  c lose counterpart in "animal e th ics "  and 
"sub-human ju s t ic e "  and that i t s  d ic ta tes  are to be applied only 
to the re la t ionsh ips  o f  adult l i f e .  But the question o f  supreme 
importance f o r  which we seek an answer i s ,  how can we formulate
a theory o f  ju s t ic e  that w i l l  have i t s  app l ica t ion  both to human
, • course
beings and animals in general? Spencer s answer o f  aüsetî ee- i s  that
rs
be is able to f ind  a solut ion  to a univejaal theory o f  ju s t ice  
in the b io lo g ic a l  fa c t  o f  surv iva l ,  i . e . ,  in  the fa c t  o f  the pre­
servation and development o f  the ind iv idual and the group to which 
be belongs. But Spencer overlooks the f a c t , th a t ,  stated in  th is  
form, his so lution is  subject to certa in  serious de fec ts .  F i r s t  
°f a l l ,  as already pointed out in our th ird  consideration above, 
it brings him into c o n f l i c t  with his own theory o f  absolute ethics, 
for> just ice  which depends f o r  i t s  in te rp re ta t ion  on such a 
relative conception as preservation or development, cannot be 
absolute. Yet Spencer contends that his formula o f  ju s t ic e  4h is  
tbe same in the r e l a t i v e  as we l l  as in the absolute state .
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Secondly, even I f  f o r  the sake o f  s im p l i f ica t ion ,  we cut astoder 
the connection between jus t ic e  and absolute e th ics  and concern 
■ ourselves only with jus t ice  in the r e l a t i v e  s ta te ,  we are confront­
ed with the truth that surv iva l  i s  a complex matter, and that i t ;
has been atta ined through various ways. Thus, as Josiah Royce 
observes, "Even human evo lut ion exempli f ies  f o r  us in  a l l  sorts 
of e th ica l  products; and many o f  them survive even unto th is  day,
and w i l l  long surv ive .............The Chinese and the Prussians, the
czar (? )  and the American p o l i t i c a l  boss, the wise and the mighty, 
the pure in heart and wreckers o f  ra i l roads ,  are a l l  a l ik e  sur­
vivals, are adapted to some sort o f  environment, are the products 
of ages o f  evo lut ion.  Approve on id ea l  grounds o f  any o f  these 
types, as against i t s  opponent, and nothing is  eas ie r  than to . 
show how, in the course o f  evolut ion, the stars in th e i r  courses 
and the tendencies o f  the ages have wrought and fought to bring 
to pass just th is  product" ( In ternat iona l  Journal o f  Ethics, I I ,  
P*121). I f  the doctr ine o f  surv iva l ,  then, i s  thus a very p la s t i c  
doctrine, we have good reason to suppose that Spencer, who pro­
fesses to found his theory o f  jus t ic e  on that doctr ine ,  can do
so at a l l  only by s k i l f u l l y  s e lec t ing  such fa c ts  o f  surv iva l  as 
his
would f i t/ case .  Thus i f  Spencer, f o r  instance, were not an in ­
dividualist before he was an evo lu t ion is t ,  he could have taken 
such b io lo g ic a l  fac ts  as the surv iva l o f  parasites  or surv iva l  
and progress o f  the group through s e l f - s a c r i f i c e  and s o c ia l i t y  
0r "evolution by degeneration" (P ro f .  Tay lo r ) ,  and developed out 
°f them t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  theor ies  o f  ju s t ice .
in the th ird  place, i f  ju s t ic e ,  as Spencer understands i t ,  
is in the l a s t  resor t  p ra c t i c a l l y  the same as the surv iva l  o f  the
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f i t t e s t ,  in that i t  consists la r g e ly  in l e t t i n g  ind iv idua ls  take 
the natural consequences o f  th e i r  act ions, we have a r ig h t  to 
ask Spencer whether his theory o f  ju s t ic e  should not c a l l  f o r  a 
"free f i e l d  f o r  the operation o f  natural laws?" (E.Barker) This 
question is  extremely important in the case o f  Spencer, because,
ifin his doctr ine o f  evolut ion, the truth indicated by such fac ts
as sexual se le c t ion  among higher animals, ac t iv e  adaptation o f
man to environment and o f  environment to man, v i z . , the truth o f
what has been ca l led  in t e l l i g e n t  or purposive se le c t ion ,  plays
1
l i t t l e  or no part.  Yet when he comes to t r ea t  o f  ju s t ic e ,  Spencer 
seems to be o f  opinion that, instead o f  l e t t i n g  natural s e lec t ion  
do i t s  own work o f  s e lec t ing  those who happen to be cons t i tu t ion ­
ally best f i t t e d  in each generation f o r  l i f e  s trugg le ,  the State 
(or purposive se le c t ion )  should be summoned to do part o f  i t s  
work, to the extent o f  enforc ing the fu l f i lm en t  o f  contracts o f  
exchange vo lu n ta r i ly  made and o f  provid ing p ro tect ion  against ex­
ternal and in terna l  erTemies. But, in summoning the " in te r fe r en ce "  
of the State, Spencer seems to fo rge t  that his natural s e le c t ion  
oeases to be "natural" and, what is  more, that the d i f f e ren ce  b e t ­
ween his view and that o f  his opponent, the extreme State Soc ia l-
I
1st, ceases|to be one o f  p r in c ip le ,  and turns out to be one o f  de­
tail . As Rashdall observes, "There i s  no d i f f e r en ce  in  p r in c ip le  
(though, o f  course, there may be wide d i f f e ren ce  in th e i r  empirical 
Justif ication) between the p rotect ion  o f  l i f e  and property, together
I f  the c i v i l i s e d  man, as Pro f .  A .E.Taylor observes, f inds that 
his environment and his f e l t  wants are at variance, he "se ts  to 
w°rk not to change himself but to transform the environment" (Evol­
ution in the Light o f  Modern Knowledge, p .449). The idea o f  adapta­
tion means that o f  the subject o f  evolut ion and i t s  environment, 
he is  r e l a t i v e l y  more stab le ;  and, in the case o f  human beings, 
l} means the modif icat ion  o f  physical nature by the r e l a t i v e l y  
¿¿able Ideals o f  man.
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with the r e s t r i c t e d  voluntary 'benef icence '  f o r  which Spencer con­
tends, and the in ter ferences  advocated on u t i l i t a r i a n  grounds by 
the most advanced champions o f  Socialism" ( V o l . I I ,  p . 389). A quest­
ion which goes to the very root o f  Spencer's doctr ine  o f  soc ia l  
justice, in pa r t icu la r ,  and o f  his e th ics ,  in  genera l,  i s  th is  - 
i f  the operation o f  natural s e lec t ion  may be set aside by man's 
re f le c t ive  in t e l l i g e n c e  and forethought, at what point in i t s  pro­
cess is  th is  supersession to come to a stop? In other words, i f  
Spencer's theory o f  soc ia l  jus t ice  has no ob jec t ion  to the State 
or society provid ing such a r t i f i c i a l  conditions as the enforcement 
of contracts and pro tect ion  against external and in te rna l  enemies, 
within which natural s e le c t ion  may operate, why should i t  ob jec t  
to a complete supersession o f  natural s e le c t ion  by ra t ion a l  s e le c ­
tion, except i t  be on empirical considerations? Adapting the e l o ­
quent argument o f  T. Huxley to the context, why should jus t ice  
object to human endeavour being d irec ted  "not so much to the sur­
vival o f  the f i t t e s t ,  as to the f i t t i n g  o f  as many as poss ib le  to 
survival?" (Quoted in S o r ley 's  Recent Tendencies in  E t ics ,  p .46)
We have used the idea o f  natural s e le c t ion  so f a r  in  the 
sense in which Spencer himself  seems to use i t ,  v i z . ,  freedom from 
human intervention .  But i t  i s  sometimes said that th is  meaning o f  
Spencer'8 is  not v a l id  even on a purely evolut ionary basis;  f o r ,  
is argued that man's in te l l i g en c e  has come into being in the 
c°urse o f  evo lut ion  and has survived because o f  i t s  grea t  u t i l i t y  
value and that, there fo re ,  to exerc ise  one's in t e l l i g e n c e  in  the 
°hiering o f  soc ie ty ,  on the we l l-be ing  o f  which depends the w e l l -  
Deing o f  the ind iv idua l,  i s  more "natural" than to leave the pro-
'
gress of  soc ie ty  to the mercy o f  acc idental va r ia t ions  and chance 
adaptations. I f  th is  in te rp re ta t ion  o f  the evolut ionary method he 
correct, i f ,  in other words, man's in s t in c t  i s  no more "natural" 
than his reason and i t  i s  "natural" f o r  human beings to be " a r t i ­
f ic ia l " ,  Spencer's theory o f  ju s t ice  loses a considerable part o f
i
its supposed evolut ionary foundation. Justice i s  no longer capable 
of such precise expression as "super io r i ty  must be allowed to bring 
to its possessor a l l  the n a tu ra l ly - resu lt ing  b en e f i t s ,  and i n f e r i o r  
ity the na tu ra l ly - re su l t in g  e v i l s "  (Quoted from a l e t t e r  to W.H.
1 •Mallock, wr it ten  by Sp. in 1898, included in Duncan's ' L i f e ' ,  p .4-08)  ̂
for what in the realm o f  human in te l l i g en c e  is  the meaning o f  such 
expressions as "n a tu ra l ly - resu l t in g  ben e f i t s "  and "n a tu ra l ly - r e su l t ­
ing e v i l s " ,  i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to say. The struggle  is  no longer bet-
I
ween individuals as such. But i t  is  between a lower set o f  id ea ls ,
;
sentiments, and views o f  l i f e ,  and a higher set, as they are in te r -
j
preted by reason. Justice may s t i l l  demand the withholding o f  ex-
|j
ceptional advantages from the weak and i n e f f i c i e n t  members o f  s o c i ­
ety, but sich withholding w i l l  be not f o r  the sake o f  l e t t i n g  
blind natural s e lec t ion  have a f u l l  sway among human beings, but in 
the name o f  a higher good.
With the point o f  view in the above paragraph as h is  s tart ing  
P°int, P r o f . S. Alexander who, l ik e  Spencer, b e l ie ves  in the evo luv :• 
tionary in te rp re ta t ion  o f  e th ics ,  develops a l in e  o f  argument which 
to ta l ly  opposed to Spencer's theory o f  ju s t ic e .  I t  i s  in s t ru c t ­
ivo to state th is  argument] however b r i e f l y ,  not because we neces- 
■
sariiy agree with i t ,  but because o f  the lesson i t  teaches in show-
ing how varied the in te rp re ta t ion  o f  natural s e lec t ion  may be. 
^b^ernat ioña l  Journal o f  Lth ics ,  v o i . i i ,  pp.409-4d9.
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Natural s e lec t ion ,  as popularly understood, P ro f .  Alexander says, 
means "a cruel and heart less  doctr ine" which seems to "reduce 
l i f e  to a succession o f  internecine c o n f l i c t s "  (p .410);  hut th is  
interpretation o f  the doctr ine,  he argues, i s  not v a l id  in  the 
realm o f  human in t e l l i g e n c e ,  where the progress o f  soc ie ty  is  
brought about not through accidental va r ia t ions  and e l im ination  
of the u n f i t ,  but through the conscious e f f o r t  o f  reformers o f  
societies who use persuasion and education in helping people to 
reach higher l e v e ls .  Natural s e lec t ion  in human a f f a i r s  does not 
consist in the destruct ion o f  indiv iduals  as such, but in the 
adoption by soc ie ty  o f  those soc ia l  idea ls  which are " r e a l l y  s u i t ­
e d  to the needs which are f e l t "  (p .417)» One id ea l  i s  accepted 
and another r e jec ted  on the basis o f  th e i r  conduciveness to soc ia l  
welfare. The weak and useless members o f  soc ie ty  are not eliminate» 
-ed, but are helped to become strong and useful.  A war i s  waged, 
not against th e i r  bodies, but against th e ir  idea ls  and sentiments 
which make them what they are, f o r ,  natural s e lec t ion  in human 
affa irs ,  as said before,  "does not su f fe r  any mode o f  l i f e  to 
prevail or p e rs is t  but one which i s  compatible with soc ia l  we l­
fare". Natural s e lec t ion  as such is  ne ither op t im is t ic  nor p ess i ­
mistic, though i t  is  on the side o f  constant amelioration. I t
it ,
ma ês neither  f o r  a competit ive nor co-operative  or c o l l e c t i v e  
structure". In the ear ly  h is to ry  o f  human c i v i l i s a t i o n ,  when 
constant warfare was the order o f  the day, "the presence o f  a 
large- body o f  weak though otherwise useful persons" was "a source 
°f weakness to the whole" ( p .429), and hence such people were got 
°ut of the way. And in the la s t  century, with the movement o f  
d isintegration, "the system o f  competition o f  ind iv idua l  l e f t  f r e e
to f igh t  with ind iv idua l"  ( p .429) came into being, not because 
of i ts  in t r in s i c  super io r i ty ,  but because "the i t a t e  in  i t s  wisdom 
discovered that i t s  work was best done by leav ing  ind iv idua ls  f r e e  
to get f o r  themselves as much as they could, i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  th e i r  
fe l low -c i t i z en s "  ( p .430). I t  was not a f r ee  and unrestrained com-
1
petition. Neither was i t  the kind o f  individualism advocated by 
Spencer, according to which, "the lazy ,  the improvident, the maimed, 
deserve th e ir  f a t e ,  and in going under they leave soc ie ty  stronger"
- a doctrine which at no time has "been enforced cons is ten t ly "
(p.427). I t  was a " l e g i t im is ed " competition. But now when such 
competition i s  found to be incompatible with soc ia l  we l fa re ,  a 
new idea l,  v i z . ,  c o l le c t iv ism ,  tenderness f o r  the unfortunate, is  
coming into existence. This idea l  w i l l  soon es tab l ish  i t s e l f  and 
displace competition, because " i t  possesses certa in  characters by 
which i t  appeals more to the minds o f  men than other plans o f  l i f e "  j 
(p*4l8), and is  adapted to the conditions o f  existence. According
j:!
to this id ea l ,  the weak w i l l  be helped to become strong, and "each 
person shall  do honestly the work fo r  which he i s  best f i t t e d " ,  
i f  he refuses, morality  w i l l  use "the instrument o f  punishment in 
order to reform him, or i f  he is  incurable, to render him incapable 
°f mischief, l i k e  a lunatic  or an id i o t "  ( p .429). Justice w i l l  no 
longer mean the subjecting o f  each ind iv idua l ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  
his circumstances, "to  the e f f e c t s  o f  h is  own nature and consequent 
conduct" (Spencer). I t  w i l l  no longer ind iscr im inate ly  group t o ­
gether the wreckers o f  soc ie ty ,  the p e rs is ten t ly  lazy ,  and the 
Incurable mental d e fe c t iv e s  with the poor and unfortunate who are 
such through no assignable fa u l t  o f  th e ir  own.




argument o f  P ro f .  Alexander's .  We have said enough to show that 
i t  is  possib le  to deduce a theory o f  jus t ice  t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  
from Spencer's from the doctr ine o f  natural s e lec t ion .  Although 
we may not agree with P ro f .  Alexander in the very wide in te rp re ­
tation that he puts on natural s e lec t ion  and would p re fe r  to fcse
‘ f
the phrase " r a t io n a l "  or "purposive" se lec t ion  in many o f  the
places where he uses "natural" s e lec t ion ,  we have to recognise
the fac t  that to speak o f  natural s e lec t ion  in the sense o f  an
unlimited and unrestrained competition, in the case o f  man, is
meaningless. Even our commercial competition, we have seen, i s  a
. .
leg it imised" competition. Moreover, i t  would appear that with
the appearance o f  r e f l e c t i v e  man on the stage o f  evo lut ion,  natural j
*  I fselection by necess ity  g ives  b ir th  to purposive s e le c t ion  and soon j
wipes i t s e l f  out in favour o f  i t s  progeny.^ A general conclusion,
then, to which these considerations lead us, i s  that Spencer's
individualism has no exclusive  r igh t  to be ca l led  an evo lut ionary
doctrine. I f  anything, i t s  r igh t  is  less  c lear  than that o f  the
some of  the opposing idea ls  that we have considered.
Going back to Spencer's use o f  the idea o f  surv iva l ,  with
which we have been c h ie f l y  concerning ourselves so fa r ,  we may
note a fourth and la s t  point o f  c r i t ic ism .  We have h itherto  seen
that, in Spencer's judgment, the ult imate ju s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  ju s t ic e
is to be found in i t s  surv iva l  value. But Spencer says the same
thing about beneficence when he observes in  Part V, ch .V I I I  o f
may even be said that human sympathies and human sentiments 
which set themselves strongly against l e t t i n g  the poor and the un­
fortunate, i r r e sp ec t iv e  o f  th e ir  specia l  conditions, go to the wall, 
ought r e a l l y  to be the basis o f  human ju s t ic e .  For, as P ro f .  A.E. 
f&ylor remarks, "we have no guarantee that any new product o f  a 
development w i l l  not exh ib it  some characters o f  which the ante- 
oedents exhibited no sign, and these new characters may be just
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his P r inc ip les  o f  Ethics that the ult imate ju s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  neg-
ative (and the same applies to p o s i t i v e )  beneficence i s  to be
found in i t s  conduciveness to maintenance o f  the species or to
increase o f  happiness.1 A question which ar ises  at th is  point i s
this - i f  Spencer thus be l ieves  that both ju s t ic e  and beneficence
are necessary f o r  the persistenee o f  l i f e  and tnat, further ,  the 
State acting in the name o f  the union o f  ind iv idua ls ,  should ren­
der conditions making f o r  surviva l poss ib le ,  whether i t  i s  not 
i l l o g i c a l  f o r  him to say that ju s t ice  is  "needful f o r  soc ia l  
equilibrium and there fo re  o f  public concern" and that benefivence 
is "not needful f o r  soc ia l  equilibrium and there fo re  only o f  
private concern" ?Vol. I I ,  Part V, p .270). The only conclusion 
that seems to be warranted by Spencer's premisses is  that i f  i t  
is r ight f o r  the State to control natural s e le c t ion  - as Spencer 
thinks i t  i s  in the treatment o f  jus t ice  - the basis o f  contro l  
should be ne ither  jus t ice  nor beneficence as such, but a funda­
mental axiom l ik e  soc ia l  preservation or the success o f  the com­
munity o f  which the two pr inc ip les  are c o r o l la r i e s .  Instead o f  
making the l im i t  o f  S ta te-act ion  coincide with the l im i t  o f  jus­
tice, Spencer should combine jus t ice  and beneficence in one funda­
mental p r in c ip le ,  and c a l l  upon the State to carry out th is  
Principle, using expediency as a guide. He should say that whatever
Icon.-} those which are in every way the most important characters 
°f the product.** Later develooment does not mean a mere "re-shuff-  
ling of p re -ex is ten t  mater ia ls " .
^ "The admitted desideratum being maintenance and prosper ity  o f  
the species, or that va r ie ty  of the species const i tu t ing  the soci* 
ety> the implicat ion  i s  that the modes o f  conduct here enjoined 
under the head o f  Negative Beneficence, have th e i r  remote justica- 
“ion in th e ir  conduciveness to such maintenance and orosper i ty "  
E r in 's  o f  Ethics Vol. I I ,  p . 328).
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the State can do on a conventional basis,  without excessive trouble 
and expense, i s  i t s  proper duty; and that the re s t  should be l e f t  
to private e f f o r t .  I f  Spencer ob jects  to th is  in te rp re ta t ion  o f  
survival, we must in s i s t  that the only a l t e rn a t iv e  l e f t  to him i s  
an uncontrolled natural se lec t ion ,  which has no room e i th e r  f o r  
justice or f o r  beneficence. For, as Bosanquet apt ly  observes, when 
" l i f e  has at f i r s t  been i^ken  as s e l f -p rese rva t ion  in the narrow 
sense", "the attempts to add on other determinations o f  ju s t ic e ,  
beneficence and what not, apart from a reconstruct ion o f  the idea 
of se l f ,  only heap contradict ion upon contrad ict ion" (MIND, N.S.,  
XII, pp. 389-90). Spencer, i t  would seem, has no r igh t  to d i s ­
tinguish a " s t r i c t "  or "pure" jus t ice  from beneficence in the way 
that he does.
Postponing a f u l l e r  discussion o f  Spencer's treatment o f  the
relation between jus t ice  and beneficence to a l a t e r  place in  the
present Section (ch.IV£, we may b r i e f l y  note some o f  the b io lo g i c a l
facts which we have not ye t  considered, but which come under the 
AXr*
f irst  points o f  our c r i t ic ism  mentioned on p . lA t .  Among these 
facts, the f i r s t  place must ce r ta in ly  be g iven to the gregarious 
0r social nature o f  man. Spencer at f i r s t  considers th is  fa c t  to 
be of such supreme importance f o r  surv iva l  that he indeed der ives  
from i t  two o f  the three laws which govern human l i f e ,  v i z . ,  the 
law which necess ita tes  each indiv idual l im i t in g  h is  freedom o f  
action to the extent necessary f o r  others to carry on a c t i v i t i e s  
similar to his and the law which ju s t i f i e s  " s a c r i f i c e s  en ta i led
f,(bf course these considerations concerning the nature o f  
eneficence at la rge ,  here appended as a commentary on the actions 
glassed under the head o f  Negative Beneficence, equally apply, and 
indeed apply s t i l l  more manifest ly ,  to the actions classed under 
ine head o f  P o s i t i v e  Beneficence" (P r in c ip les  o f  Ethics, V o l . I I ,
p .332).
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by wars between groups". But ye t  in  his argument, as a whole, as 
Sidgwick observes, "the e f f e c t s  o f  gregariousness, in  the h ighly 
developed form in which i t  appears in the human race, are too 
l igh t ly  trea ted"  (Mind, Iff.S., V o l . I ,  p . 111). Even in  dea l ing  with 
purely animal evo lut ion,  Rashdall remarks that "Spencer has ove r ­
looked the importance o f  habits o f  co-operation or s o c ia l i t y  in 
promoting the surv iva l  and progress o f  race or group" (Vol, I I ,  
p.383). Eacts l ik e  ac t ive  sympathy which goes out to meet the 
needs o f  others and universal benevolence and cer ta in  in s t in c ts  
of animals which lead them to s e l f - s a c r i f i c e  in cases other than 
the defence o f  the group or pro tect ion  o f  the young (the only 
cases admitted by Spencer), r ece ive  scant ju s t ice  from Spencer.
He too "h a s t i ly  assumes that the necess ity  f o r  subordinating the
I
welfare o f  the ind iv idual to that o f  the species ar ises  so le ly  
from war" (Mind, N.S.,  I ,  p . 111). He f a i l s  to r e a l i s e  that i t  i s I
npossible to in te rp re t  the gregarious nature o f  man ( in  the ab- 
solute, i f  not in the r e l a t i v e  s ta te )  in such a way as to render 
his view o f  ju s t ice  that each should bear the e v i l s  o f  h is  own 
nature impracticable or unmeaning.
This f a i lu r e  to take f u l l  note o f  the gregariousness o f  
®an is  probably la r g e ly  responsible f o r  Spencer's i n a b i l i t y  to 
get at the true meaning o f  the idea o f  a soc ia l  organism, in  sp ite  
° f  his extensive use o f  the term in several o f  his w r it ings .  The 
chief ideas that we have in  mind when we speak o f  an organism 
are that " i t  i s  (1 ) a l i v in g  structure composed o f  parts d i f f e r e n t  
In kind; (2) that those parts, by reason o f  th e i r  d i f f e r e n c e ,  are 
complementary to one another and mutually dependent; (3) that the 
health o f  the whole consequently depends on the healthy discharge
by each part o f  i t s  own proper function" (E.Barker, p . 107)* But 
none of these ideas seem to enter f u l l y  into Spencer's theory o f  
society or o f  ju s t ic e ,  and, when they do enter, they do not seem 
to become an in t r in s ic  part o f  his argument. To the end Spencer 
manages to look upon soc ie ty  as an aggregate o f  ind iv idua ls ,  and 
the conception that i t  i s  "a union o f  minds to achieve a common 
purpose" (E.Barker, p . 105) remains fo re ign  to him. Justice ,  to the 
last, consists la r g e ly  in l e t t in g  each ind iv idual take the natural 
consequences o f  h is  actions and in  recognis ing the r igh ts  that 
belong to him by nature; whereas the organic conception o f  soc ie ty  
seems to us to demand a view o f  ju s t ic e  which would regard a l l  
the indiv iduals o f  soc ie ty  - the weak and the strong, the high and 
the low - as "members one o f  another", each f i l l i n g  the place f o r  
which he is  best f i t t e d  in the common l i f e  o f  the group, and each 
receiving in return that which is  necessary to keep him in maxi­
mum e f f i c i e n c y  as a member o f  soc ie ty .  Spencer does not seem to 
see that in the realm o f  p o l i t i c s ,  one who uses metaphors as l i t e r ­
ally as he himself  does, can deduce from the analogy o f  an organ­
ism (with i t s  central idea o f  a nervous s tructure ) ,  a theory o f  
State Socialism with grea ter  ease and g rea te r  l o g i c a l  consistency 
than he is  able to deduce his extreme individualism, with i t s  ac- 
oompanying theory o f  natural r igh ts .
Erom a consideration o f  the above two fac ts  - gregariousness 
ahd society as an organism - to which Spencer does not g iv e  th e i r
importance, and from which i t  i s  easy to der ive  theor ies  o f  justioe 
totally d i f f e r e n t  from h is,  we now pass on to note two points on 
which Spencer places undue emphasis and see to what extent the 
force o f  his theory o f  ju s t ic e  depends upon his exaggerated e :
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emphasis. The f i r s t  o f  these is  what i s  o rd in a r i ly  ca l led  the 
transmissib i l i ty  o f  acquired characters or what Spencer chooses 
to ca l l ,  the " inheritance o f  functionally-wrought m od i f ica t ions" ,  
fife are not much concerned with the b io lo g i c a l  d e ta i l s  o f  th is  con­
troversial question, although we are convinced that the s c i e n t i f i c  
position, in the words o f  P ro f.  J.A.Thomson, "should remain one 
of active scepticism - leading on to experiment" ( 'H erber t  Spencer’, 
English Men o f  Science Ser ies ,  p . 179). What we are concerned with 
is to point out the ways in which i t  adds weight to Spencer's theory 
of justice. In the f i r s t  place, ju s t ic e ,  to Spencer, as already 
seen, consists la r g e ly  in l e t t in g  each ind iv idual ge t  bene f i ts  
exactly proportioned to his deserts,  as deserts are measured by 
his power o f  s e l f -susten ta t ion ;  and the reason f o r  l e t t i n g  th is  
painful struggle f o r  existence continue under conditions o f  c i v i l i ­
sation is  that, in course o f  time, i t  w i l l  e l iminate the weak and 
the in e f f i c i e n t  members o f  soc ie ty  and leave only those whose 
structures are best f i t t e d  f o r  the conditions o f  existence. I t  i s  
needless to say that th is  op t im is t ic  conclusion i s  a rr ived  at only 
by careful omission o f  such b io lo g i c a l  fa c ts  as a t a v i s t i c  degenera­
tion and spontaneous va r ia t ion  and by a naive assumption that our 
acquired characters - not only physical,  but also mental and moral, 
al l  of which are necessary f o r  surviva l in  the case o f  man - are 
transmitted from generation to generation. (Borrowing an idea from 
James Ward, P ro f .Tay lo r  says that what is  "h e r i tab le "  in  psychology 
is not indiv idual personal i ty  or character; but simply a "tendency" 
°n the part o f  the new indiv idual to develop along cer ta in  l in es .
Family v ir tue  and v i e e " ,  he further says, are not in the same 
class with " fam ily  nose" and that a person who i s  natura l ly  quick-
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tempered can, by constant cu l t iv a t ion  and contro l ,  blossom out 
into a sweet-tempered in d iv id u a l .......... The sentiment o f  ju s t ic e ,
b
we may be sure, does not become "h e r i tab le "  in Spencer's sense o f  
the word«') I f  the doctr ine o f  t ran sm iss ib i l i t y  were proved to be 
not a fac ty  i t  seems f a i r  to think that Spencer's theory o f  justice 
which rests part o f  i t s  case upon i t ,  would lose  some o f  i t s  ju s t i ­
fication. The son o f  a superior fa ther  has a r igh t  to in h e r i t  h is  
father's property only i f  he is  also superior. I f  he is  not superi­
or, or not as superior as the superior son o f  an in f e r i o r  fa ther  
who has no property to leave ,  his inheritance makes him s ta r t  l i f e  
with an unjust advantage and, consequently, there i s  a g la r in g  
violation o f  the law o f  equal freedom. I f  the super io r i ty  o f  the 
son of a superior fa ther  and the i n f e r i o r i t y  o f  the son o f  an 
inferior fa ther  cannot be guaranteed, ju s t ice  should base i t s e l f  
not on natural se lec t ion ,  but on purposive se le c t ion  which aims 
at f i t t i n g  as many as poss ib le  in -each generation to survive.
In the second place, Spencer, as a U t i l i t a r ia n ,  i s  able to ju s t i f y  
the pain that i s  now produced by the prac t ice  o f  ju s t ic e  (Spencer's 
justice) on the ground that such pain w i l l  p rogress ive ly  disappear 
with the gradual disappearance o f  the sense o f  ob l ig a t ion  and with 
ooral p r inc ip les  becoming more and more in s t in c t iv e .  But i f  the 
transmissibil ity o f  acquired characters is  not true in the moral 
sphere and i f  ju s t ic e  to the end f a i l s  to produce "pleasure un­
alloyed with pain anywhere" (because o f  the presence o f  s e l f - c o e r ­
cion and the g iv in g  o f  pain to o thers ) ,  we shall  be j u s t i f i e d  in 
asking Spencer to f ind  other ways o f  r e a l i s in g  "g rea tes t  happiness" 
than through jus t ic e  as he def ines i t .  Spencer h imself  seems to
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have seen the supreme importance o f  t r an sm lss ib i l i t y  f o r  his 
theory o f  evo lut ion  when he went to the length o f  saying "E ither 
there has been inheritance o f  acquired characters or there has 
been no evo lut ion" (Quoted by J.A. Thomson, p. 205)* -But Balfour 
(now Lord) c e r ta in ly  overestimates th is  dependence o f  Spencer's 
when he says, "Were i t  ( inheritance o f  acquired characters) to 
be upset . . . .  i t  is  scarcely  too much to say that his (Spencer 's )
Ethics, his Psychology, and his Anthropology would a l l  tumble to
*
the ground with i t "  (Quoted by Duncan in  his L i f e  and Le t te rs  o f  
H.Spencer, p . 34-4).
A second con trovers ia l  question which enters into Spencer's 
theory o f  ju s t ice  is  the question r e la t in g  to the equa l i ty  o f  
man. In our exposit ion o f  the ear ly  part o f  "Ju s t ice " ,  we noticed 
that Spencer, in formulating a theory o f  ju s t ic e ,  sought to com­
bine the p r in c ip le  o f  in equ a l i ty  with the p r in c ip le  o f  equa l i ty :  
Inequality as regards merit and reward, "s ince men d i f f e r  in  
their powers" and equa l i ty  as regards mutual l im ita t ion s  to men's 
actions, since "experience shows that these bounds are on the 
average the same f o r  a l l "  (Just ice ,  p . 37). But we are now bound 
to say that Spencer here seems to overlook the fa c t  that i f  men 
"d i f fe r  in th e i r  powers" and i f  th e ir  r igh ts  are to be " e t h i c a l " «  
and to th is  Spencer r e a l l y  has no ob jec t ion ,  inasmuch as he be­
lieves in one's r igh ts  being restrained by the presence o f  one's 
fellows - th e i r  l im ita t ions  cannot and ought not to be the same. 
We may wel l  agree with Spencer that the physical freedom required 
by the m i l l ion a i re  and the sweated worker f o r  motion and lo co ­
motion, fo r  access to unpolluted a i r ,  and f o r  ather such things,
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should be the same. But we cannot agree that th e ir  freedom in 
economic matters also should be a l ik e ,  because th e i r  respect ive  
bargaining or coerc ive  powers are nowhere near being equal. Expe­
rience "shows us", remarks Dr. E. Barker, "no small number - labour 
ers on the verge o f  subsistence, overworked women, denizens o f  
London yards - who can only enjoy Spencer's law o f  equal freedom 
when the State by every manner o f  ' in t e r fe r e n c e '  has removed the 
obstacles from th e i r  path" ( p . 126). I t  seems to us that Spencer, 
in formmlating an exact theory o f  ju s t ic e ,  ought to have taken f u l l  
account o f  th is  f a c t  o f  experience, e sp ec ia l ly  when he c r i t i c i s e s  
Util itarians f o r  th e i r  i n a b i l i t y  to estimate, in  th e i r  ca lcu la t ion  
of pleasure, "d i f fe ren ces  o f  age, o f  growth, o f  cons t i tu t iona l  
need, d i f fe rences  o f  a c t i v i t y  and consequent expenditure, d i f f e r e n -  
ces of des ires  and tas tes "  (Data o f  Ethics, p . 223). A conclusion 
to which we are in ev i tab ly  led,  in studying the app l ica t ion  that
j
Spencer makes o f  his law o f  equal freedom, is  that his p r in c ip le
0f justice " i s  f r u i t f u l  only on the supposition o f  the equa l i ty
Vol.V,
of the members o f  a soc ie ty "  (Mind 0 .S . ,/ a r t i c l e  by Means). This 
seems to be the conclusion o f  Prof.J.S.Mackenzie too when he r e ­
marks in his Outlines o f  Socia l  Philosophy that "Spencer appears 
to have overemphasised the connection between equity and equa l i ty " .
Before we pass on to the th ird  and la s t  point o f  our c r i t i ­
cism on p.pav, we must g ive  an example o f  certa in  re levant fa c ts  
°f biology and socio logy which Spencer e n t i r e ly  ignores in a r r iv in g  
at a d e f in i t io n  o f  ju s t ice .  We have already d irec ted  at ten t ion ,
C one form or other, to the fa c t  that Spencer f a i l s  to take note 
of the general truth that conditions which held good in  the wild  
Cate, do not necessar i ly  hold good under conditions o f  c i v i l i s a t i o n
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because o f  the " s t a r t l in g l y  new" (P ro f .  f a y lo r )  stage o f  develop­
ment arrived at by the r e f l e c t i v e  in t e l l i g e n c e  o f  man. I t  i s  gener­
ally agreed to-day by psychologists  and others that even our in ­
stincts are not always a safe guide f o r  action, since some o f  them 
at least were adapted to a t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  set o f  conditions.
The example to which we wish to c a l l  our a t ten t ion  is  found in 
man's charac te r is t ic  o f  saving and inves t ing  whatever "b en e f i t s "  
he does not require  f o r  immediate " s e l f - su s ten ta t io n " , an exact 
parallel f o r  which we f ind  nowhere in the animal kingdom. I f  Spen­
cer had not overlooked th is  unique feature o f  man's nature, i t  
seems f a i r  to think that he would not have na ive ly  assumed that 
human jus t ice  was merely a further development o f  animal and sub­
human jus t ice .  I f  human beings were l i k e  b irds, f o r  instance, each 
of which appropriates only that oortion o f  the ea r th 's  produce
I
which is  necessary f o r  the immediate use o f  i t s e l f  and o f  i t s  o f f -
'spring, i t  stands to reason that there would be a great deal more 
le ft ,  at leas t  o f  the raw material o f  the earth, f o r  the sustenta-
fi
tion of  those members o f  soc ie ty  " le ss  f i t "  f o r  surv iva l  more than 
Is the case under conditions o f  c i v i l i s a t i o n .  Population, indeed, 
would not have increased so fa s t  and the economic gu l f  now separat­
ing the " f i t "  from the less  " f i t "  would not have been so great .
Irfhat happens to-day under our competit ive system is  that "the stroqg 
do more serv ice  towards the increase o f  wealth than des irab le  
themselves or the s ta te ,  and shut out the feeb le  from doing 
what they otherwise could" ( In ternat iona l  Journal o f  Ethics, v o l . I J  
art i c l e  by Pro f.  S.Alexander, p .428). Hence "our problem is  no 
other than that o f  f ind ing  a d is t r ibu t ion  o f  work which would allow ;
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the weak to render a serv ice  proportioned to th e i r  a b i l i t y ,  in
the same ra t io  as the serv ice  required o f  the strong" ( I b i d . ) -  I f
in reply to our c r i t i c ism  o f  Spencer here, i t  be said that the
strong by doing more than what is  s t r i c t l y  necessary f o r  th e ir
immediate sustentation, make i t  possib le  f o r  many who are " le s s
f i t "  fo r  l i f e  conditions to survive, we may answer that, in the
action
f irs t  place, buch/retardsjour r e a l i s a t io n  o f  Spencer's id ea l  o f  jus­
tice. Secondly, i f  i t  can be shown that the superior bene f i ts  o f  
the "more f i t "  are la r g e ly  due to the lack o f  organisat ion  and 
ignorance on the part o f  the " less  f i t " ,  what ob jec t ion  i s  there 
for the " le ss  f i t "  (when they can) to r i s e  up in wrath against the 
"more f i t " ,  con f iscate  th e i r  wealth, and make i t  the common prop­
erty of a l l ?  W il l  they not, in so doing, help to create (o r  restore; 
a state of a f f a i r s  which w i l l  be c loser  to "nature" than the system 
that they destroy? Whatever the answer may be, i t  seems to us that 
there can be l i t t l e  doubt that the analogy between animal ju s t ic e  
and human ju s t ice  i s  useless when we consider man's unique chararac- 
ter ist ic  o f  saving and invest ing  whatever bene f i ts  he does not 
require f o r  the immediate "s e l f - sus ten ta t ion "  o f  h imself  or o f  his 
offspring.
The th ird  and la s t  point o f  our c r i t i c ism ,  i t  w i l l  be remem­
bered, i s  that, even using Spencer's own b io lo g i c a l  premisses and 
Methods, i t  i s  easy to work out idea ls  o f  ju s t ic e  t o t a l l y  opposed 
to his! JVe have already -given our reason f o r  b e l ie v in g  that an
Speaking o f  Spencer's pacifism arr ived  at by him by his  pecu l iar  
fading o f  h is to ry  and study o f  the p r inc ip les  o f  b io logy ,  P ro f .  
faylor r ig h t ly  remarks that "as f a r  as Spencer's os tens ib le  prem­
is es  go, they would equally ju s t i f y  the most m i l i t a r i s t i c  o f  
Russians in h is  very d i f f e r e n t  moral judgment" (Evolution in  the 
fght o f  Modern Knowledge).
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ideal o f  ju s t ice  which seeks to im ita te  the modes o f  survival, 
found in nature (using the word 'nature ' in i t s  l im ited  sense, 
i . e . ,  excluding man's a c t i v i t y  from i t ) ,  must c a l l  f o r  "a f r e e  
f ie ld  f o r  the operation o f  natural laws", must, in other words, 
call f o r  adoption hy soc ie ty  o f  a p r in c ip le  o f  ju s t ic e  based 
upon a r i g id  la is s e z  f a i r e  theory, and not on the theory o f  
"Specialised Administration" advocated by Spencer. We sha l l ,  
therfore, not say anything more about i t .
The point that we go on to consider next i s  in r e la t io n  to
the importance o f  the preservation o f  the r a c ia l  or nat ional 
group f o r  ju s t ic e .  In our exposit ion o f  the f i r s t  few chapters 
of "Just ice " ,  we saw that, barring the law concerning the care
of the young, Spencer la id  down three laws governing the l i f e  and
prosperity o f  man, which were merely further developments o f  the 
laws which govern the l i f e  and prosper ity  o f  the higher gregarious 
creatures which defend themselves in groups against enemies.
The f i r s t  law is  the in d iv id u a l i s t i c  law that "each ind iv idua l 
ought to rece ive  the bene f i ts  and e v i l s  o f  his own nature and 
consequent conduct" (Just ice ,  p . 17)- The second law pertains to 
the mutual r e s t ra in t  o f  one another's freedom to the extent neces­
sary f o r  the carrying on o f  l i f e - s u s ta in in g  actions by a l l .  The 
third law is  a modif icat ion o f  the f i r s t  two "required f o r  pur­
poses o f  s e l f -de fence ,  when the community i s  attacked by fo r e ign  
aggressors" ( In ternat iona l  Journal o f  Ethics, vo l .  I I ,  a r t i c l e  
hy J.Royce, p . 119). Overlooking the ob jec t ion  that these three 
are not the only laws o f  surv iva l ,  we f ind  that when Spencer comes 
to g ive a prec ise  d e f in i t i o n  o f  ju s t ic e ,  he develops i t  only from
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the f i r s t  two laws, ju s t i f y in g  himself  on the ground that defensive 
war being only r e l a t i v e l y  just,  the "formula o f  ju s t ic e  may be 
developed f o r  the soc ia l  conditions o f  a community at peace with 
its neighbours" ( I b i d . ) *  3ut th is  a rb i t ra ry  procedure o f  Spencer's, 
which is  a d i r e c t  resu lt  o f  his f irm b e l i e f  in Absolute Ethics, 
renders his theory o f  jus t ice  incapable o f  app l ica t ion  to a l l  the 
facts of actual human l i f e .  I f  the preservation o f  the race i s ,  
as Spencer says, o f  supreme importance and should precede the 
preservation o f  the ind iv idua l,  anc "exact-” formula o f  ju s t ic e  which 
excludes such preservation must be d e fe c t iv e .  Spencer o f  course 
easily gets out o f  the d i f f i c u l t y  by saying that the preservat ion  
of the race i s  simply a question o f  se l f -de fence  against fo r e ign  
aggressors, ahd that as wars w i l l  probably soon cease, a s c i e n t i f i c  
formula o f  ju s t ice  need not take account o f  a temporary condition. 
Agreeing with Spencer f o r  the time being that wars w i l l  probably 
Boon cease, we ask ourselves whether i t  i s  true to fa c t  to say that 
race-preservation merely denotes protect ion  in war against external 
enemies. Do not modern p o l i t i c ia n s  and statesmen undertake the 
promotion o f  co lon isat ion  and the formulation and administration 
°f immigration laws, g ive  State bounties to industr ies  adversely 
affected by fo re ign  competition, and advocate o f f e r in g  o f  induce­
ment to the upper layer o f  soc ie ty  to perpetuate i t s e l f  - a l l  in  
the name o f  nat ional defence and race-preservation? I f  i t  i s  r igh t ,  
as we think i t  i s ,  to in te rp re t  race-preservat ion  in  the wide sense 
indicated, i t  seems f a i r  to say that a theory o f  ju s t ic e  which 
hases i t s e l f  upon surv iva l ,  should consider the law o f  race-preva- 
tion to be at leas t  as permanent a feature o f  ju s t ice  as the f i r s t
f
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two laws to which alone Spencer g ives  f u l l  a t ten t ion  in formulating j  
his b io lo g ic a l  theory o f  ju s t ice .
Reference has already been made to Spencer's in a b i l i t y  to 
appreciate the true meaning o f  the idea o f  a soc ia l  organism in 
spite of  his e laborate use o f  the term in his e th ica l  and soc io ­
logical wr it ings .  I f  the analogy o f  an organism is  to be f r u i t f u l  
at a l l  in our soc ia l  r e la t ion s ,  i t  should suggest f o r  end the 
health or w e l l - l i v i n g  o f  the group as a whole and not the pleasures 
of an aggregate o f  indiv iduals .  In the realm o f  the d is t r ib u t io n  
of economic goods, i t  should suggest as standard the maximum e f f i ­
ciency o f  each ind iv idua l member o f  soc ie ty  rather than the mechan­
ical meting out o f  bene f i ts  according to ind iv idua l  deserts ,  i r ­
respective o f  circumstances. For, as Sidgwick says, we do not on 
re f lec t ion  think i t  just that a person should su f fe r  f o r  what i s  
not due to w i l fu l  wrong-doing. By a s le ight-o f-hand the analogy 
of an organism may even be used to lend support to the communistic 
formula: "From every one according to his a b i l i t y ,  and to every 
one according to his need"; and by taking l i t e r a l l y  the analogy 
of the soc ie tary  form o f  bees that Spencer g ives  in Section 9 o f  
"Justice", we may ar r ive  at an idea l  o f  ' j u s t i c e 1 that w i l l  d e l i b ­
erately put out o f  existence a l l  the parasites  o f  soc ie ty ,  and
.
leave the world safe f o r  workers. In the f i e l d  o f  p o l i t i c s ,  the 
organic conception o f  soc ie ty  seems to be somewhat more compatible 
with an extreme form o f  centra l ised  administration than with a 
rigid individualism o f  Spencer's type.
1We sha l l  c i t e  just one more example to show how easy i t  i s
1 • The argument o f  the fo l low ing  two paragraphs is  a b r ie f  summary 
of a "Book Review" by J.Royce in the I n t e r '1 Journal o f  Ethics 
v o l . I I ,  pp. 1 1 7 - 1 2 3 .
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to arrive at an id ea l  o f  jus t ice  t o t a l l y  opposed to Spencer's, 
using his own b io lo g i c a l  premisses and methods. This time we turn 
to the f i r s t  law o f  surv iva l  mentioned in the la s t  paragraph. This 
law, says Spencer, applies not only to man but to animals in gener­
al; and, in i t s  wide appl icat ion ,  i t  reads that "among adults tnere 
must be conformity to the law that ben f i ts  rece ived  sha l l  be d i r e c t ­
ly proportionate to merits possessed: merits being measured by 
power of se l f -sus ten ta t ion "  (Justice ,  p .5 ).  «But what i s  the exact 
meaning o f  th is  law? In the words o f  J.Royce, does i t  mean merely 
"that p rec ise ly  those adult animals ought to survive and keep we l l  
which are phys ica l ly  so constituted that they do survive,  and keep 
well"? I f  so, the proposit ion becomes very nearly a tautology and 
our "ought" turns out to be "but a mere stamp o f  p r iva te  approval 
placed upon the ij3 o f  nature". But i f  the propos it ion  i s  to mean 
more than th is  and be o f  p rac t ica l  s ign i f icance  to us, we must con- * 
aider the type o f  sub-human jus t ice  i l lu s t r a t e d  by the case o f  a 
domesticated breed o f  animals, as to which Spencer's argument is  
curiously s i l e n t .  Those who breed and maintain domestic animals 
deal out bene f i ts  to them"which are in a fashion 'd i r e c t l y  propor­
tionate to merits possessed" ' .  "Only, among the t r a i t s  presented 
by the ind iv idual animal's nature, the breeder chooses what ones 
shall be accounted fo r  his purposes as true 'm e r i t s ' " .  I f  he is  
a breeder o f  horses, " i t  may be e i ther  swiftness or; draught-power 
that he regards as constitu t ing  the des irab le  'power o f  s e l f - su s -  
tentation'. Se lec t ing  accordingly, and breeding true to the s e l e c t ^  
traits, he v io la te s  no condition o f  the 'su rv iv a l  o f  the spec ie s ' .
°n the contrary, he may g rea t ly  aid such surv iva l  . In so fa r
he is  ' j u s t '  to that species as such; f o r  hw keeps i t  in l i f e  
and improves i t s  chances o f  surv iva l  in  i t s  domesticated envi-: 
romment". -But in a l l  th is ,  i s  he qu ite  lo ya l  to Spencer's further  
maxim, "that the ind iv idua l shall  experience a l l  the consequences 
good and e v i l  o f  i t s  own nature and consequent conduct?" The an- ^
swer is  both yes and no. I f  by "consequences" we mean freedom
from in ter ference  from the breeder or any one e lse ,  the breeder 's  
selection is  an in ju s t ic e  to dogs and horses in th e i r  w ild  state .
But i f ,  on the other hand, "the breeder 's  in te r fe ren ce ,  a id ing as 
i t  does, the surv iva l  o f  the domesticated, but much modified 
horses and dogs is  ' j u s t '  to them, in  the 'sub-human' sense o f  the 
word jus t ice ,  - just to them because i t  does make the species 
survive and improve, desp ite  i t s  own in te r fe rence  with the in d i ­
viduals - then Spencer's maxim is  may s t i l l  be regarded as f u l ­
f i l l e d  in th is  case. The indiv idual o f  the domesticated, stock does, jj
namely, 'experience a l l  the consequences good and e v i l  o f  i t s  
own nature and consequent conduct". Only now i t  i s  the breeder 's  
choice that determines what shall  be good and e v i l  in nature and 
so in consequences".
The app l ica t ion  o f  a l l  th is  to man l i e s  p rec is e ly  in the 
fact that c i v i l i s e d  man at leas t  i s  a domesticated animal. "No man 
ever c i v i l i s e d  himself ;  the thing has been done by endless in t e r ­
ference. One man has domesticated another man, and, on the whole, 
every man his neighbour". And i f ,  as Spencer says, human ju s t ice  
is merely "a further  development o f  sub-human ju s t i c e " ,  may not 
the S o c ia l is t ,  the lo ve r  o f  S ta te - in ter fe rence  say that "what the 
breeder^do f o r  horses and dogs, we should be glad to do, i f  we
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could, fo r  man, v i z . , to breed the race from the best stocks, and 
for the purposes o f  the wisest and c leveres t  breeders !"  This id ea l  
may not be immediately r e a l is a b le ,  but we shall  put up with what 
Spencer sometimes c a l l s  "an empirical compromise". i'he important 
point, however, is  that " i t  i s  s t r i c t l y  ' b i o l o g i c a l '  to in t e r f e r e ,  
i f  you do so a f t e r  the fashion that has achieved such b r i l l i a n t  
results with the other domestic breeds: That i s ,  you ought f o r c ib l y  
toijtrain, and, as fa r  as may be, to s e le c t " .  "To do so w ise ly  i s  
to help the domesticated race to survive. To do so unwisely i s  a 
l i t t l e  unfortunate, o f  course; but wisdom is  learned only by t r i a l ;  
and they doubtless did not f ind  out how to breed dogs f o r  a long 
time".
Such, stated very summarily, and la r g e ly  in Royce's 'own words, 
"is a suggestion o f  what one could do with the doctr ine o f  evo lu­
tion, and with the nature o f  'sub-human ju s t i c e ' ,  in  case one were 
not Spencer, nor ye t  an in d iv id u a l is t ,  but were misled, l i k e  Spen­
cer, into supposing that a survey o f  the physical accidents o f  sur­
vival can o f  i t s e l f  ever ju s t i f y  a coherent id ea l " .  "The b io lo g i c a l  
origin 4f justice', ' as in terpreted  by Spencer, " furnishes a mere 
soil wherein any and every possible  idea l  o f  ju s t ic e  besides his 
07m . . . .  individualism could take root and grow rankly" - State 
Socialism, Communism, Alexander's Co l lec t iv ism  (s tated  above), and 
an ideal based on a s t r i c t  la is s e z  f a i r e  theory. The only way o f  
escape from such d iverse in terpre ta t ions  o f  the b io l o g i c a l  o r ig in  
of justice, i t  would appear, i s  to recognise the fa c t  that b io lo g i c -  
al evolution is  e s s en t ia l ly  a h is t o r i c a l  doctr ine ,  which is  h e lp fu l  
as a guide but treacherous as a master. Analogy, as P ro f .  Taylor,
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reminds us, does not mean id en t i t y .  As the same w r i t e r  goes on to 
say, "Philosophy, no doubt, needs to make use o f  the conception o f  
evolution (here b i o l o g i c a l ) ,  but a philosophy based on the concep­
tion must necessar i ly  end in i l lu s io n "  (Evolution in  the Light o f  
Modern Knowledge, p . 448).
100.
SOCIAL JUSTICE.
We now go on to  a cons id era t ion  o f  the l a s t  three  po ints  mention-
/ s ®sd in our o u t l in e  on page (1 )  that  j u s t i c e ,  as Spencer understands
i t ,  is not the best  means to  the attainment o f  " g r e a t l i S s  happiness”
© S "tor of the greatness "n e t "  freedom o f  S o c ie ty  and o f  the frumts o f
i
freedom; ( 2 ) that i t  f a i l s  to  g iv e  us ju s t i c e  accord ing to  any r e ­
cognised theory o f  m o ra l i t y ;  and (3 )  tha t ,  being b u i l t  on a bas is  
different from that o f  bene f icenee ,  i t s  twin p r in c i p l e ,  i t  not in -  
frequently comes in to  c o n f l i c t  w ith  i t ;  i t  a lso  exposes i t s  own i n ­
adequacy when considered in  r e l a t i o n  to  bene f icence .
(1) Spencer’ s ju s t i c e  as a means to  uhe attainment o f  " g r e a t e s t  
"happiness" . In  our exp os i t ion  o f  the "Data o f  E th ics ’’ in
Part 1 , Sect. 1, Ch. I l l ,  we saw that Spencer considered h im se l f  a 
Util itarian and said that the only d i f f e r e n c e  between him and h is  
opponents, the orthodox U t i l i t a r i a n s ,  was tha t ,  wh i le  orthodox or 
empirical U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  took "w e l f a r e  f o r  i t s  immediate o b je c t  o f  
"pursuit", h is  own form o f  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m ,  the e vo lu t ion ary  or 
"sc ient i f ic "  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m ,  took " f o r  i t s  immediate o b je c t  o f  
"pursuit conformity  to  c e r ta in  p r in c ip le s  which, in  the nature o f  
t h i n g s ,  causa l ly  determine w e l fa r e "  (Data, p. 162).  Granting to 
sPencer f o r  the sake o f  argument that the em p ir ica l  U t i l i t a r i a n s  do 
n°t make use o f  the " s c i e n t i f i c "  or deductive method and t r y in g  to  
Recover the p r in c ip l e s  o f  w e l fa r e  or happiness which Spencer i s  ab le  
to deduce by using h is  " s c i e n t i f i c "  method, we f i n d  that the only • 1
Principle/
CHAPTER 111. THE MEANING OF SPENCERf S THEORY OF
principle arrived at, "by him which is not too vague or general to he
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useless, is t,he principle of Equity or Justice. Thus he says, 
“Harmonious co-operation hy which alone .... greatest happiness can
I"be attained, is .... mâ fe possible only by respect for one another's
"claims: there must be neither those direct aggressions which we
"class as crimes against person and property, nor must tnere be 
"those indirect aggressions caused by breaches of contracts. So
"that maintenance of equitable relations between men, is the
H 0Lcondition to attainment of greatest happiness in all societies;
■J;
"however much the greatest happiness attainable in each may differ 
"in nature, or amount, or both" (Data, p. 170). While Spencer 
thus gives a very high place to justice as a condition of "greatest 
happiness", he at the same time admits that "greatest happiness" 
is unattainable without the aid of negative beneficence, positive 
beneficence, and enlightened egoism. But these latter factors, 
he believes, are not as important as justice; the field of 
positive beheficence becomes narrower and narrower as we approach 
the ideal state, and the restrictions imposed by negative beneficence
and prudence "are of quite inferior authority to the original law 1
(justice). Instead of being like it, capable of strictly 
scientific development, they (under existing circumstances) can be ! 
unfolded only into superior forms of expedite®)© y •"
It is worthy of note that in spite of his definite assertion 
that justice is only a means to happiness (cp. Data, Ch. Ill), 
sPencer, when he comes to deal with justice in Part IV of the 
Principle^ is in danger of regarding it as a practical ultimate.
In Social Statics, to®, ne says, "the supplementary limitations 
(imposed by negative beneficence and prudence) involve the term
happiness, and as happiness is for the present capable only of a
generic and not of a specific definition, they do not admit of
scientific development” (Data, p. 84) - a statement carrying with
it the implication that justice does not ”involve the term happiness”
and, therefore, admits of scientific development • But yet, in the
very next section, Spencer adds, "Indeed, we may almost say that the
lawfirst law is the sole/5 for we find that of the several conditions
A.
to greatest happiness it is the only one at present capable of a 
systematic development; arKl w6 further find that conformity to it 
ensures ultimate conformity to the others” (Data, p. 87).
Overlooking for the time being what seems to be Spencer’s 
lack of faithfulness in adhering to happiness as the ultimate end 
of human action, we may grant that the general point of view adopted 
by him is that justice is the chief means to "greatest happiness” ; 
and, in examining this point of view, it is necessary that we should 
place as much emphasis on the word " greatest” as on "happiness” . 
fc'or, merely to show that justice, in conjunction with beneficence 
and prudence, produces happiness or pleasure is not enough. It 
®ust be shown that it prcdices the greatest possible happiness, which 
is the true Utilitarian end. In the words of Rashdall, "Spencer 
haB to establish not merely that actions which produce survival 
(0,g* justice) produce some pleasxire (on the whole, no doubt, with 
some reservations, a probable statement), but that they produce the 
greatest pleasure that is possible. Only if that is proved, can 
We accept the fact that a race has survived by uhe observance of 
Centain rules as a proof that it has got in that way a maximum of
possible pleasure, and should therefore be imitated by us. It is 
possible that with less survival (e.g. a smaller population or ab­
sorption in a conquering people) there might have been more pleasure.
Or again there is the possibility that two sets of rules might have beer 
equally conducive to survival, but the one which was not adopted might  ̂
have produced the larger amount of pleasure” (The Theory of Good and 
Evil, vol. 11, p. 382). What a study of the course of evolution seems 
to reveal to us is that, az best, tnere has been only a general
.
tendency for life-preserving actions to coincide with pleasure-giving 
actions. Spencer himself ratner vaguely says, "ti^ose races of beings 
only can have survived in which, on the average, agreeable or desired 
feelings went along with activities conducive to the maintenance of 
life, while disagreeable and habitually-avoided feelings went along
I1.
witn activities directly or indirectly destructive of life” (Data, p.
?9, quoted from the Principles of Psychology, Sect. 124). The in­
fluence of natural selection, for instance, has not prevented actions 
hurtful to life from being sometimes accompanied by pleasant sensa­
tions - certain kinds of poisons for instance. Nor aas it prevented 
acts necessary for the continuance of life like birth, child-bearing, 
etc, or those conducive to welfare like spox-ts, which Spencer condemns,
from being accompanied by painful sensations. If, therefore, the
~
coincidence between fcfesc life and pleasure is not true wholly and with- 
°Ut exception, if, in other words, "life and pleasure do not advance 
Proportionately, nor even always concomitantly"(Sorley, Ethics of 
‘̂turalism, p. 307), tnere is no a priori reas.on for believing that 
Ûstice, which is regarded by Spencer to be the most essential i
tion of life in society, will (in conjunction with beneficence and
1
ence) necessarily produce the greatest pleasure that is possible. There 
reasons, on the contrary, for supposing that Spencer’s theory of justice 
conjunction with beneficence and prudence) will probably not produce the 
.est possible happiness.
i) In the first place, it ?/ill be remembered that, in our exposition of 
Statics in Part 1, we noticed that an argument which Spencer thought 
be raised against his theory of justice by his adversaries, and to
l o4 .
l he did not seek to give a satisfactory reply, was that "various ways
cin which the faculties may be experised to the aggrieving of other
*
cos without the law of equal freedom being over-stepped. A man may
I
reunamiably, may use harsh language, or annoy by disgusting habits; and 
thus offends the normal feelings of his fellows, manifestly diminishes 
ness" (p. 80, 1850 edi.). jjtf in justification of Spencer's position, 
said that Spencer here is arguing only against "superfluous interfer- 
asi in fact, he himself does say later, it must be remarked that such 
®wer lays Spencer open to the charge of arguing in a circlef] It is 
evident that the same argument applies to Spencer's theory of justice 
8 later form too, as expounded in Part IV. of the Principles, for there 
the law of equal freedom is the central feature of justice. An obvious 
Dism which suggests itself to us is that so long as the greatest 
Me happiness attainable through individual action, is the end of human 
*n8 “> and this seems to be spencer's interpretation of "greatest 
ne3B" -, there is no reason why a person should curtail his liberty "to 
eve °ther persons" ,
 ̂ P®ncer, in his Data of Ethics, acknowledges "a deep and involved" - 
U a permanent - "derangement of the natural connections between
8 and beneficial actions, and between pains and detrimental actions"*-
if such action brings him a surplus of pleasure over pain. "The 
%
Evolution-theory" , prof. Seth aptly observes, "is unable to explain 
that superiority of the social to the egoistic instincts, upon which 
it so strongly insists. As mere instincts, they are at' once 
opposed to one another, and on the same level. Accordingly 
Evolution fails, as the old Utilitarianism failed, to bring home 
the social End to the individual" (Mind, XIV, 0. S., p. 45^.
This explains why Spencer’s Utilitarian and Evolutional theory is 
unable to give us a clue as to when to enforce justice and when to 
temper it by negative beneficence.
But Spencer, we may be sure, would not agree to the above 
criticism, his reason being that for every person to take all the 
advantages which justice gives him, without tempering it by means of 
negative beneficence, would be to hinder "harmonious co-operation
by which alone .... greatest happiness can be attained" Overlooking
'
the doubtfulness of the assertion that harmonious co-operation alone 
(of the kind advocated by Spencer) can produce "greatest happiness", 
it seems fair to argue that harmonious co-operation depends on many 
complex factors, which can be ascertained only by using the empirical- 
rsflective method of orthodox Utilitarianism. To say that it 
depends solely on a recognition and maintenance of the state of 
things as they are - for that is what Spencer^s theory amounts to,
Wuen he makes justice consist in refraining from direct aggression 
on the rights of person and property, as understood to-day, and from 
aggression caused by breaches of contracts - is altogetner 
arbitrary. it even seems plausible to argue that, to the extent
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that Spencer does not concern himself much with the greatest 
immediate pleasures of individuals, a theory of justice which 
destroys the possibility of all actions that perpetrate the 
aggrieving of other persons and which aims at giving positive 
benefits to the members of society, making adequate provision 
at the same time for the successful energising of their faculties, 
will in the long run be productive of greater pleasure than 
Spencer’s theory of justice supplemented by his princ iples of
i ibeneficence and prudence.
(ii) Secondly, we have already S6en in our exposition that 
it is Spencer’s belief that the defects consequent to his law of 
equal freedom can be remedied by applying the principle of
negative beneficence. But, as already indicated above, there is
.
no valid reason on the Utilitarian theory for an individual to
refrain from taking full advantage of all his legitimate '’rights”
(In Spencer’s sense of the word) or to sacrifice his interests
to the in t e r e s t s  of Ooiiers, unless he has reason to think that such
refraining or sacrifice will bring him a surplus of pleasure over
Pam. 'Po be able to ascertain this, however, he must fall back
uPon his own experience, the recorded experience of the race, and
the experience of his contemporaries, rather than upon Spencer’s
"acientific" Utilitarianism. "J As Prof. Sorley remarks,
„
the feeling of pleasure is just the point where indifidualism is
atrongest, and in regard to which mankind, instead of being an
■
0rganism in which each part but subserves the purposes of the whole, 
ffiust rather be regarded as a collection of competing and co-operat­
1SB-
l o 7 .
ing units" • (Ethics of Naturalism, p. 183).
From the point of view of pleasure, then, it is evident that 
society is not an organism, hut a loose collection of individuals, 
whose interests sometimes harmonise with one another hut often do 
not. Spencer tries to extricate himself from this difficulty 
by saying that, in the ideal state, there will be a perfect coin­
cidence between the happiness of the individual and the interests 
of society. But it is patent that such a solution cannot give us 
any help as to what our procedure should he here and now. Further, 
so long as interest is interpreted purely in terms of pleasure, we 
can be almost certain that there never can he a complete identity 
of interests. ...> With special reference to beneficence (positive 
and negative) , the importance of which for the attainment of "great­
est happiness” Spencer sees, it must he said that, if we accept 
Spencer^s definition of pleasure and pain, the necessity for 
practising tmeficence in many cases disappears. Pleasure, says 
Spencer, is "a feeling which we seek to bring into consciousness 
and retain there" and pain "a feeling which we seek to get out of 
consciousness and to keep out” (Data, p. 79, Quoted from the 
Principles of Psychology, Sect. 124). On the basis of this 
definition of pleasure and pain, it is clear that if sympathy with 
anouher*s pain be painful, "we must necessarily seek to expel it 
from consciousness, as soon as it appears; and there are generally 
quicker ways of effecting that expulsion than the relief of the 
Offering which occasions it" (Rashdall, Vol. 11, p. 380). The
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only way of escape for Spencer is to say that sympathy with the pain
•£of another is always pleasant, but, as Rashdall observes,"Spencer
A
shows no disposition to adopt such a mode of bridging over the gulf 
between Altruism and Egoism” (lb.).
(iii) Once more, from what we have said in connection with the 
last two points, it is fairly clear that if "greatest happiness" is 
to have any intelligible meaning at all, it must mean the greatest 
present pleasures - except in cases where the future pleasure "is ,
more certain or of greater amount or degree" (Sorley, Ethics of etc., 
p. 80) - of a collection of separate individuals. But Spencer’s 
theory of justice seerrs to do violence to this interpretation of 
the Utilitarian end. His chief contention with the empirical 
Utilitarians, we have seen, is that pleasure is not to be sought 
directly. Thus, in his celebrated letter to J. S. Mill, he says
that "it is the business of Moral Science to deduce from the laws
of life and the conditions of existence, what, kinds of actions 
necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce 
unhappiness" and that, when it has done this, "its deductions are to
be recognised as laws of conduct; and are to be conformed to ir-
££g£eotive of a direct estimation of happiness or misery" (Quoted in 
Data, p. 5 7 ). The same apparent lack of faithfulness to the greatest 
Present pleasure as end is found in a more pronounced way in Justice,
PP* 57 and 58, where Spencer tries to establish the principle of 
Justice as an a priori dictate of reason; and, in commenting upon 
Phis point, Rashdall says that "in Justice the ultimate end of 
c°Muct becomes, not as in the Data, that mere ’welfare1 in general
(no matter whose welfare it is) but the promotion of Justice,
which is something other than and possibly inconsistent with the 
promotion of general welfare - the rule that 'Every man is to do 
what he wills, provided he infringes not the freedom of any other 
man"1 (Vol. 11, p. 369). Dr. E. Albeealso urges a similar criticism 
against Spencer when he says that in "Jus tice“ Spencer is in danger of 
regarding justice as an ultimate in itself. Passing over the 
debatable question raised by these two authors, we are bound to say 
that there seems to be little doubt that justice, as interpreted by 
Spencer, is not calculated to tfce production -©£ a maximum of present 
pleasure. Spencer’s justice, the essential condition of life, 
chiefly concerns itself with the adapting of man to the conditions of 
social existence, for which he has not become completely fit yet.
But adaptation or adjustment involves present pain, or at least 
absence of pleasure, except in so far as it affords room for the 
successful energising of faculties; and it is conceivable that a 
whole life time may be spent in adjustment without much gain to 
individual pleasure. And so long as adaptation is continuous and 
"perfect adaptation can be reached only in infinite time" (Social 
Statics, 1892* Edi. , p. 31), generation after generation may pass 
way without realising the greatest pleasure that is possible for it 
to attain. Moreover, if the present generation is called upon on 
Spencer* s theory to make the happiness of some future generation 
ln the far-off distance more certain of realisation and greater
i n quantity or intensity by adapting itself to life conditions, and, 
in so doing, possibly sacrifice part of its own present pleasures,
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iot pleasure itself but some other principle turns out to be the
1.
ltimate end of conduct.
If, in reply to this, Spencer should say that, though adaptation 
,o life conditions may involve some pain, the future pleasure of each 
ndividual, in his own lifetime will "be more certain or of greater 
mount or degree" or that his total pleasure will be greater than what 
ill be the case if he does not adapt himself, we have the answer that 
pencer does scant justice to the subjective and complex nature of
i
leasure. "Happiness", says Elliot, "resides, not in sensation, nor 
n intellect, but in emotion: and no philosophical principles can in-
uce emotion where there is naturally little" ("Herbert Spencer” p. 58). .
■
urther, it is a matter of common experience that "a kind of object 
f action which is pleasurable at one time may become painful at an­
ther time, and that what is now painful may cease to be so and may 
acome pleasant" (Sorley, Ethics of etc., p. 253). In the last 
nalysis, therefore, the individual himself must be the judge of what 
Mistitutee his present happiness. As to what will be his future 
aPpinesa, the individual may not be the best judge. But that does not 
scesaarily mean that he should unreservedly accept Spencer's deductive 
Monism. it seems more reasonable to think that empirical Hedonism, 
Wording to which, "we have in each case to compare all the pleasures 
pains that can be foreseen as probable results of the different 
^ernatives of <eonduct presented to us, and to adopt the alternativeM
'̂Ch seems likely to lead to the greatest happiness on the whole,
j.ge^k observes, in the article mentioned above~, ^happiness 
a matter of individual experience, and in so far as the individual 
yiers by the general evolution, the hypothesis of Hedonism is dis- howed" .
Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, p. 458)jsupplemented by a scientific
knowledge of the physiological and psychological causes of pleasure
and pain, will be a better guide as to wnat " greatest happiness” is - 
andiresent/fuiure - than Spencer* s deductive Hedonism, wnich cannot become 
the best guide to happiness until it can be shown that life and
£L
lappiness exactly coincide with one another and that an increase or 
decrease in one is marked by a proportionate increase or decrease in 
he other. Merely to say that Evolution on. the whole has been on the i 
side of pleasure - a statement probably true, though with some reserva­
tions - is not enough. If the present generation is more susceptible 
'0 pleasure than its predecessors, so is it to pain (cp. Sorley, Ethics
1.if etc, p. 224). Both Prof. Sorley and L.F. Ward agree that new 
lources of pleasure as well as pain are opened up to a refined 
sensibility. "It is .... notorious", says Sidgwick, “that civilised 
Ben take pleasure in various forms of unhealthy conduct and find con- 
'ormity to the rules of health irkrfsome; and it is also important 
to note that they may be, and actually are, susceptible of keen 
deasure from acts and processes that nave no material tendency to 
'reserve life." (Methods of Ethics, p. 191).
hie general conclusion, then, to which the above considerations 
!eem to force us is that Spencer's theory of justice, seated in 
dological terms, probably is not the best guide to the greatest 
laPpiness that is possible to attain - whether present or future.
0 8ay that "pleasure will eventually accompany every mode of action 
landed by social conditions" is unduly optimistic. It takes no
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account of a fact like pleasures becoming indifferent, if not painful, 
through monotony or habit. Neither does it give enough attention 
to gensual appetites, wnich bulk large in the popular conception of 
pleasure or to what are called aesthetic pleasures“ , which have 
little or no relation to the promotion of life in the biological 
sense. In the lignt of all this, therefore, it seems eminently 
right to conclude with Sidg^wick that there is at least at present 
"no scientific short-cut to the ascertainment of the right means to 
the individual^ happiness" (Methods, p. 195), although we may agree 
that Spencer's justice gives us a vague and general rule of happiness, 
"the relative value of which we can only estimate by careful observa- 
tion and comparison of individual experience" (ibid.). It is pro­
bably reasonings like the above wnicix have leid Prof. borley to say 
that Spencer was only nominally a Utilitarian. (cp. Ethics of etc, 
p. 198.)
There may be some like W. H. Hudson (author of the Philosophy 
°f Herbert, Spencer) who would accuse us of having interpreted 
Spencer's Utilitarianism in a narrow way and would require us to 
U0e it to mean the wider conception of social well-being. In that 
case, the question will be whether justice, as meaning the law of 
equal freedom, is the best means to the attainment of social well- 
being. ■ This question can be best discussed later when we come to
deal with the meaning of distributive and economic justice.....
have throughout our argument assumed the possibility of a summation 
of pleasures, since a criticism of it is not called for in discussing 
Oncer's Utilitarian method.
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If Spenoer:s theory of justice, which is conveniently expressed 
in the law of equal freedom, does not immediately (and perhaps 
remotely, too) produce the greatest happiness that is possible to 
attain, it may still be maintained that it is absolutely necessary 
for the realisation by each individual of the greatest possible 
freedom, which, according to Spencer, is essential for the full ,
exercise of his faculties and for his harmonious co-operation with 
others, upon which alone depends the greatest possible happiness of 
the future. In examining Spencer's claim that maximum freedom is 
possible for each individual only on the tneory of least inter­
ference, it is necessary to bear in mind constantly (l) the vast
difference that there is between freedom in the narrow, mechanical
sense of the word, freedom of the market place, in ocher words, and 
thue or actual freedom, or what we may call in the present context, 
"total net freedom" of society, and (2) the fact that freedom in the 
Practical sense in which we are using it, in studying a subject like
social justice, is not a good in itself, but that ins value depends
solely upon the social results it produces. The first of these 
Points, it seems to us, is one to which Spencer does not give much 
attention (except in cases such as those of Skye Crofters - Negative 
beneficence, Ch. 111. - in which the making of contracts though 
SorciniLiiy free is not actually free" (Principles of Ethics, vol. 11,
P* 288], Unfortunately this important distinction is not used in
'
( 2 ) J u s t i c e  and Freedom.
his treatment o f  j u s t i c e . )  He tends to  regard freedom f o r  the most 
part in terms o f  absence o f  phys ica l  co e rc ion  (from the Snate or 
individual),  and Lakes l i t t l e  or no account o f  the p o ss ib le  tyranny 
of u n o f f i c ia l  pub l ic  opinion,^ o f  moral co e rc ion ,  o f  mental annoy­
ance, and o f  in d u s t r ia l  and economic s la v e ry  - a l l  o f  which are 
sure to reduce the g rea te s t  happiness that  i s  p o ss ib le  f o r  one to  
attain - , and o f  the abuse o f  freedom by a few which o f ten  renders 
the theoieticalfreedom o f  others p r a c t i c a l l y  u se le s s .  As regards the 
second po in t ,  we muse say tha t ,  wh i le  Spencer merges freedom and 
other minor ends in  the grand end o f  ind iv idua l-and  ra c e -p re s e r v a t io n ,  . 
and, in turn, o f  general  happiness, there are in d ica t ion s  th a t ,  at  
times, he v i r t u a l l y  stops w ith  freedom, tak ing  l i t t l e  t roub le  to  d i s ­
cover what e f f e c t  i t  has on " g r e a t e s t  happiness" - whether we i n t e r ­
pret " g r e a t e s t  happiness" to  mean the g r ea te s t  present  happiness o f  
the ind iv idual or the maximum w e l l -b e in g  o f  s o c i e t y .
Postponing a full discussion of the present topic, from the 
practical point of view, to Section IT, which will concern itself 
with a detailed examination of the practical applications that 
Spencer makes of his law of equal freedom, we shall content ourselves 
with a brief consideration of the theoretical difficulties to which 
Spencer’s law of equal freedom is subject; and, in doing this,
We Propose merely to develop the lines of criticism indicated in the
In fairness to Spencer, it must be said tuat he is aware of "a ' 
p0ercive public opinion" (p. of E. vol. 11, p. 388) in dealing with 
poor-relief. But he does noc consider it a tyrarhy in that case, 
rather upholds it.
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opening paragraph. Tine conception of freedom,- we must say at the
very outset, is extremely difficult to comprehend, because of its
complexity and many-sidedness. It has its political, its social,
°gios moral, its philosophical, and its theol/ical aspects, although
in studying the question of social justice it would be irrelevant
to go into all these aspects. We are tnere concerned only with
the relation of the individual to society, of the one to the many.
But it is precisely there that we find that Spencer^ treatment, of
freedom is defective. Tne unsuccessful effort which his great
contemporary, J.S.Mill, had made in trying to draw a clear line of
demarcation between what concerns self and what concerns others,
-
ought to have shown Spencer that the right solution to the problem 
of social freedom lay not in regarding society as a loose collection 
of isolated individuals, each surrounded by a "territory inviolable", 
but in looking upon it as an organism which so unites into a whole the
individuals comprising it that the good of eauh is bound up with the
.good of all. But yet, in point of fact, Spencer, to the end of his 
,, „ of■‘hie, firmly believed in the theory/natural rights and thought that 
an individual could attain his maximum freedom only wnen there was 
tne least possible interference from the side of organised society, 
vtz., the State, or from that of his fellow-men. It is this faith­
ful adhesion to natural rights which is at the bottom of Spencer's
Passionate advocacy of "Specialised (or limited) Administration" and
of oneeach individual giving to every/else freedom to do whatever he
himself does. But what if the theory of natural rights were found
16u •
to be false, not only historically but also philosophicallyr Man:s 
rights would cease to be natural and. absolute; and his freedom 
would become conditioned by his ability to make a right use of it, 
i.e., utilise it in finding his good in the good of the community.
More "freedom" than this he would not ask for, and, even if he did, 
it would nor be given him.
To prove the inherent weakness of Spencer’s theory of freedom, 
it is not, really necessary to go into the question of natural rights.
iIt can be easily shown that the law of equal freedom, paradoxiaal
though it may seem, is contrary to the attainment of maximum net
freedom either by the individual or by society at large. If it is
to nave any practical meaning at all, it musu call for an extreme
,
form of State Socialism. In the words of Sidgwick, "if it be said
that the richer man, as such, enjoys more freedom than the poorer,
the fundamental aim of Individualism - to secure by law eaual freedom 
.to all - seems to transform itself into the fundamental aim of ex­
treme Socialism, to secure equal wealth to all" (Elements of Politics, 
p. 48). As the same writer says in another of his wricings (Methods), 
however much equality of freedom may commend itself to us as an 
abstract proposition, "it soon comes to wear a different aspect"
®hen it la brought "into closer relation to the actual circumstances 
of human society" (p. 275).
(i) Equality of freedom, in the first place, fails to cover 
a large group of cases where persons bring ruin upon themselves 
through the abuse of their freedom or through their inability to 
utilise it properly, due to defects of temperament and character.
It involves, in otrier words, "the negative principle that no one
should be coerced for his own good alone" (Methods, p. 275).
Spencer's answer to this objection, of course, would be, as can be
gathered from his essay’ on Education, that we must let the discipline
1
of natural consequences have its free sway. But, in the previous
chapter, dealing with the evolutionary "basis" of Spencer's theory, 
we have given enough reasons why this answer cannot be accepted as 
final. What should we say if the abuse or misuse of freedom by in­
dividuals le^d to the weakening of society or to laying it open to the 
attacks of outsiders (not only attacks in the form of war - which alone 
Spencer considers - but indirect attacks through immigration on a 
large scale, commercial rivalry, etc.,) - events which have to be
prevented on opencer's biological theory of society? Or again, what
ihgW111 happen to justice and beneficence which, accord/to Spencer, are 
based upon sympathy, if we constantly sear our sympathies by merci­
lessly letting each individual take the natural consequences of his 
actions? i f  in reply to this latter question, Spencer says, as, in 
fact, he does say, that positive beneficence should enable us to save 
« ¡nan from himself if and when he ruins himself (say through gambling 
or opium-smoking) and that his (SpenceHs) objection is really .to 
S u a t e - in t e r ference in such a matter, in seems pertinent, to remark 
lhat as between advice, persuasion, and public opinion on the one hand 
^State regulation on the other, the difference is not one of
sPencer himself passes beyond natural consequences to a considera- 
l0n of> social consequences in the essay referred to.
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principle, but one of method and degree. Both involve "interference"
1
with the lav/ of equal freedom so long as we think witn Spencer that 
the complete and universal establishment* of trio right to equal free­
dom "would be the complete realisation of Justice” (Sidgwick, Methods,
p. 274]. We ma,y well agree that "interference" of the kind typified
A)
by advice, persuasion, and public opinion^, in many cases, prefer-
able to State control, but such agreement will »e*, be on the basis of/N
the kind of distinction made by Spencer between justice and bene- 
icence or between collective and individual action, but on grounds 
like social expediency and. the importance of developing one's moral 
character without invoking the fear of the State. The truth 
enunciated long ago by Rousseau that a person may be "forced to be 
free" (Social Contract) and which was later stumbled upon by J.S. Mill
(but not fully utilised) in his classical example of a man being
:
earned by another when he tries to cross an unsafe bridge (Liberty),
remains fo r e ig n  to Spencer 's  way o f  th ink ing .  I f  in  r e p l y  to a l l
this Spencer should say that his law of equal freedom is meant to be
aPplied only to persons who “are sufficiently intelligent to provide
for themselves better than others would provide for tnem" (Sidgwick,
Methods, p. 275) and not to children, idiots, insane persons, mental
‘tofectives, and otner such persons, we may reply with Sidgwick that
the principle of freedom in that event "would jresent, itself not as
p" 10 quote Rashdall in this connection, "the difference between in- 
'®r:ference with a code of absolute Ethics by the individual or a
society and interference by the compulsory action of 
T3 S'oaue is not a difference of princ iple but of detail" (The Theory 
Good and Evil, vol. 11, p. 390%
absolute, but merely a subordinate application of the wider principle 
of aiming at the general happiness or well-being of mankind" (Ibid.). 
(li) A second criticism which closely follows upon the first is that 
a theory of justice which reduces itself to a literal obedience to 
the law of equal freedom commits the serious mistake of indiscrimin­
ately grouping together all the members of society, without making any 
effort to study the special conditions of life under which they live 
or their special requirements and needs. As Rashdall aptly observes, 
"It is obvious that equal conditions of Well-being will not produce 
equal amounts of Well-being to persons of differing mental and bodily 
constitution" (Vol. 1, p. 228). And if social welfare is the end
which justice and other moral principles must serve, it is clear that
the only equality that we can rightly ^lairn is equality of considera­
tion. It is not equality of wealth or political power or any other
kind of external equality whatever. It is not even equality of 
opportunity, which "would bear too hardly on the weak" (Ibid, p. XVIll).
If we are agreed, then, that equality of consideration is the 
true guiding principle of social justice and that "every individual 
Is more or less unlike every other and therefore to some extent wants 
a different kind of life to satisfy him" (Rashdall), it is fair to 
oonclude that justice will suggest not a mechanical kind of equality 
of freedom., but some degree of inequality of freedom. Maximum equal
4
freedom will become the ideal law of justice only when men are equal, 
f'6*» only when equal amounts of freedom produce equal amounts of 
ffeU-being. Under present conditions, it seems to us that maximum 
elUal freedom cannot, produce the greatest happiness or the highest good
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that a person is capable of realising.
(iii) Further, if every person has the right to do whatever he 
likes, provided that he does not infringe the like freedom of others, 
we must assume witn Sidgwick "that the right to Freedom includes the 
right to limit one's freedom by contract"1 (Methods, p. 276). It also 
includes the right to combine with others. But whether such con­
tracts and such combinations will always produce greatest happiness 
or maximum freedom to the individuals concerned and to the community 
at large, it is difficult, to say beforehand without an empirical 
knowledge of all relevant facts. Spencer s answer to this question, 
however, is in the affirmative, except in the case of slavery, where, 
hs says, the parties to the contract do not give what are fair 
equivalents and that, therefore, socieoy ought not to enforce such 
a contract. But, in making this exception, Spencer does not seem 
to be aware that he is undermining his own theory ir^two fundamental 
respects: (l) Social justice no longer aims at giving individuals
9qual shares of a mechanical^ abstract kind of freedom, but, using 
freedom as a chief means, it aims at producing the greatest possible 
good of the community, of which the good of the individual is an 
intrinsic part. For, as Sidgwick says, we "cannot see that enforce­
ment of contracts is strictly included in the notion of realising 
Ih’eedomj for a man seems to be most completely free when no one 
of> his volitions is allowed to have any effect in causing the 
££idlrnal_ coercion of any o^her" (Methods, p. 276). (2) If the
State may set aside the contract of slavery on the ground that the
parties to the contract do not give one another fair equivalents, 
there seems no valid reason on Spencer's premisses why it should not 
interfere further for the production of greater equality. The 
function of the State, instead of being a mere police one, becomes one 
of "hindrance of hindrances to good life" (Bosanquet, Philosophical 
Theory of the Suatey Ch. Vlll). Instead of State "interference", 
we now speak of State control and State regulation.
The law of equal freedom, thus, in relation to contracts at 
least, turns out to be incapable of giving maximum freedom without 
the aid of the State. But such aid from Spencer's point of view must 
be strictly regarded as interference, whereas from ours it is regula­
tion. For, it seems to us that both the enforcement of such 
voluntary contracts as do not violate the freedom of otners and the 
setting aside of the contract of slavery required by Spencer, are not 
intrinsic parts of the law of equal freedom.
(iv) Once more, as pointed ouu above, Spencer seems to use free- 
as between man and man in the sense of freedom from physical 
coercion or constraint alone. Buu such freedom does not really give 
Us maximuij net freedom. Sidgwick's discussion of this point is so 
instructive that we may be allowed to reproduce it somewhat at length, 
if"» be says, "we interpret - it (freedom) strictly, as meaning Freedom 
°f Action alone, the principle seems to allow any amount of mutual 
annoyance except con^-raint. But obviously no one would be satisfied 
’bth such Freedom as this. If, however, we include in the idea 
absence of pain and annoyance inflicted by otners, it becomes a t once
evident that we cannot prohibit all such annoyances without restrain­
ing freedom of action to a degree that would be intolerable; since 
there is scarcely any gratification of a man’s natural inpulses which 
may not cause some annoyance to others. Hence in distinguishing the 
mutual annoyances that ought to be allowed from those that must be 
prohibited we seem forced to balance the evils of constraint against 
pain and loss of a different kind: while if we admit the
Utilitarian creed so far, it is difficult to maintain that annovance i
to individuals is never to b6 permitted in order to attain any 
positive good result, but only to prevent more serious annoyance” 
(Methods, pp. 275-6).
(v) Lastly, the weakness of Spencer's lav/ of equal freedom is 
seen most clearly when we stop to consider what little actual freedom 
a person has to the material means of life and happiness in any 
civilised society. If by freedom we simply ..mean, as Spencer seems 
to do, "that one man's actions are to be as liuule as possible re­
strained by ouiers, it is obviously more fully realised without
1
aPpropriation” (Methods, p. 277) than with appropriation. If 
Spencer objects to this interpretation of freedom and says that free­
dom includes "facility and security in the gratification of desires", 
and that this cannon be realised without appropriation", we may 
rePly with Sidgwick "that in a society wnere «te&Yly all material things 
are already appropriated, this kind of Freedom is not and cannot be 
dually distributed. A man born into such a society, without in­
heritance, is not only far less free tnan those who possess property,
* Sidgwick: Principles of Political Economy (3rd Edi. 5~i pu 501
âragraph 3 for a proof of this assertion.
but he is less free than if there had been no appropriation" (Methods, 
pp. 277-8)* If, in criticising this reply, Spencer is inclined to say
srson possesses freedom of contract, he can ex- 
for the means of satisfying his wants; "and that 
lecessarily give him more than he could have got 
¡d in the world by himself” and there was no 
.y say that, while this may be quite true as a 
obviously not so in all cases. For, as Sidgwick 1 
•metimes unable to sell their services at all, and
V,n in echange for them an insufficient subsistence” 
And even if we grant spencer's argument to be true 
m, "it does not prove that society, by appropria­
t e d  with the natural freedom of its poorer members, 
ipensates them for such interference, and that the 
uate: and it must be evident that if compensation
ial commodities can be justly given for* an en- 
m, the realisation of Freedom cannot be the 
ributive justice" (Methods, p. 278).
of all this to Spencer is that he cannot con- 
ttainment of maximum equal freedom as the foe-all 
1 justice (of course as a means to happiness) 
hold as rigidly as he does to the institution 
(limited ownership in the case of land) and
adical inequality - a perpetual interference with
serve God and Mammon. If ne would save at
s borne out by Rashdall when he says, "The very 
, as could be demonstrated out of Spencer's own
all costs private property, as we know it to-day, it seems that he
must reject maximum freedom from coercion (eitner from the side of 
the State or from that of his fellow-men) as illogical and unattain­
able. Freedom, understood strictly, thinks Sidgwick, does not imply 
more than a person's ''right to non-interference while actually using 
such things as can only be used by one person at once: the right to
prevent others from using at any future time anything that an in­
dividual has once seized seems an interference with the free action
of others beyond what is needed to secure the freedom, strictly speak-
1
ing of the appropriator"- (Methods, p. 276).
(Con.) the law of equal freedom: for every private appropriation of
the instruments of production is so much interference with the right - 
to Spencer the sacred a priori right- of the individual to use his 
labour to his own advantage. A labourer without Capital is about as 
free to appropriate the value of his labour as a lew© man without 
crutches is free to walk" (vol. 2, p. 393).
1; If a Spencerian should object to the argument of Sidgwick, out­
lined in the above two paragraphs on the supposed ground of its 
being somewhat too abstract and dialectical to be of practical value, 
we may state the same argument in more practical terms, endeavouring 
to show that "coercion" underlies all our social and ecomomic relations 
and "that the most laissez-faire Industrialism necessarily involves 
quite as much mutual interference as Militarism, though interference 
a different kind" (Rashdall, vol. 11, p. 392). Let us first 
ask ourselves what happens when the government protects a property 
rignt in a laissefft’aire state, or for that matter in any other form 
°f State. To a superficial observer, such action means only pro­
tection against forcible dispossession. But in reality, "in pro­
tecting property the government protects each owner, not merely from 
violence, but also from peaceful infringement of his sole right to 
enjoy the thing owned" (Political Science Quarterly, Article ‘Coercion 
and Distribution', by Hale, September, 1923). Looking at the same 
Westion from the oide of the owner, there is still another form of 
coercion. There is no law to compel the owner to pare with his food 
0r nothing and, therefore, unless "the non-owner can produce his own 
00|I, the law compels him to starve if he has no wages, and compels 
hn to go without wages unless he obeys the behests of some employed" 
uiale). Putting the same truth in the words of Rasndall, "The Work- 
an who is compelled to accept subsistence wages under penalty of 
arvation is just as much ’compelled* or ’interfered with’ as if
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Although the above five points of criticism lead us to the 
inevitable conclusion that Spencer :s law of equal freedom does not 
produce maximum net freedom and is noti Conducive to the fruits of 
freedom, such as the greatest happiness of the individual or maximum 
well-being of society or the fullest and freest development of 
the moral person, we cannot afford to neglect the truth that freedom 
must be an essential part of social justice, in that "a large part of 
the well-being of individuals can only be secured by their own efforts'* 
(Outlines of Social Philosophy by J .S.Mackenzie).
mtd.Jhe were tnreatened with imprisonment by the State" (vol. 11, p".
391). If Spencer cakes exception to this argument on the ground that 
workers can as a rule exert sufficient counter-coercion to limit 
materially the power of the owners, and therefore concludes that there 
is no violation of the law of equal freedom, we have his own reply 
that the law of equal freedom does not countenance aggression and 
counter-aggression. And even if we grant for the sake of argument 
that the coercion and counter-coercion referred to, should not be 
taken to mean aggression and counter-aggression, how is it possible 
to say beforehand that the mutual interference involved in each case 
will be of equal degree?
Tne law of property not only secures for the owners of factories 
their labour; "it also secures for them the revenue derived from 
the customers. The penalty for failure to pay may be light, but 
it ia sufficient to compel obedience in all those cases wnere the 
consumer buys rather than go without" (Hale). It is true that the 
customers also, like the workers, have in their hands the instrument 
°f counter-coercion. They can exercise "their law-given power to 
withhold access to their cash" (Hale). But thao does not solve the 
Problem of equal freedom.
A truth which shines through this discussion is "that nearly 
®dl incomes are the result of private coercion, some with the help of 
“he State, some without it" (nale)j and a plain inference which we 
iraw from this truth is that to admit the coercive nature of the
process is not necessarily to condemn it....... Instead of speaking
coercion in the present context, we should probably use the word 
r‘egulation; or : control1. But inasmuchjas Spencer does not seem 
,? draw any real distinction between ’regulation’ and annoying 
interference’ or meddlesomeness, we may be justified in using theword coercion' to cover both conceptions.
Our objection is only to regarding social justice as identical with 
the law of equal freedom and to attempting to solve all the difficult 
problems which arise in our social relations by reference to any 
exact or universal formula of justice, however attractive and full of 
seeming nope the method may be- Social justice, it seems to us, is 
far too wide in scope to he confined to the law of equal freedom, and 
can only be ascertained by applying practical reason and good will to 
every particular case as it arises. We must, at the same time be 
silling to grant that to the extent that Spencer's advocacy of equal 
Teedom makes for a healthy and manly individualism - and this it does 
to some degree in its relation to the Charity Organisation principles - 
•t deserves our commendation. Especially in this day of socialistic 
Ireaming, when a low value tends to be placed upon individual initiative 
md enterprise - qualities which are absolutely necessary for the 
'ealisation of one's end, in whatever way that end may be conceived - , 
’Pencer's enthusiasm for freedom - though of a defective and one-sided 
maracter - may be productive of great good. But yet it would he 
êer folly to lose sight of the fact that so long as we believe that 
the individual for whose^ake the State exists is the moral individual 
)v the person", his true freedom "implies a large measure of State 
iontrol or interference (regulation)" (j.Seth, Ethical Principles,
306). Thus, it turns out that, paradoxical though it may seem, 
r®edom requires "interference", and the law of equal freedom requires 
l0B̂ interference. On a previous page we saw that it was biologically 
l0Urid to interfere with the laws of evolution, and now we find that 
 ̂ia night to "interfere" for the sake of freedom itself. Spencer’s
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treatment of freedom, while more than emphasising the value of in­
dependence and the evil of dependence, overlooks the importance of 
interdependence - a factor of which the world to-day is becoming in­
creasingly conscious.
(3) Justice, as interpreted by Spencer, does not give us .justice 
according to any recognised theory of morality.
In our attempt to show that Spencer's law of equal freedom is not 
¡the best means to maximum net freedom or to the fruits of freedom, we 
have indirectly shown that it is not the best means to the maximum 
(social justice that it is possible to attain. What we propose to try 
to do now is to see how far short of ideal justice the law of equal 
freedom falls, especially in its practical application to distributive 
justice, which is often considered to form a major part of social 
justice, if not to be identical with social justice itself. In under­
taking this task, it is not our purpose to collect all the theories of 
(justice which have been advocated by the different schools of gthical 
Fd political tnougnt and to compare and contrast them with Spencer’s 
Itueory of justice. That would be beyond our power. We merely propose 
0 select some of the outstanding theories of the day like the laissez 
the Utilitarian individualist, and the idealistic theories.(the 
prat two are probably not mutually exclusive), and to examine what 
pght they can throw upon Spencer's theory. We omit the socialistic 
[nci Coiri®-Uni8tic theories on the whole because of the wide divergence
Confining our attention first to the problem of justice in the 
distribution of economic goods, which bulks large in the common notion 
of distributive justice, we find that Spencer’s answer is for the most 
part in terms of the traditional laissez faire theory, tnough he 
builds it on a biological and Utilitarian foundation. Thus he says 
that the chief law by which life has evolved in the case of human 
beings and which alone constitutes "pure justice” is "that each 
individual ought to receive the benefits (and the evils) of his own 
nature and consequent conduct” ("Justice” , p. 17). As to what 
exactly this primary law of life and happiness means in the field of 
economics, we have Spencer's own answer that "there must, be adjustment 
of amounts to deserts" (Data, p. 222). But the question which offers 
us most perplexity is, how are we to determine what a person deserves! 
Are deserts to. be in proportion to the moral effort a person puts 
forth or to his real needs or to the hardness and-unpleasantness of 
his task? Spenoer returns a negative to all these alternatives, 
deserts, he seems to say, consist of all that a person can earn in 
a society where the law of equal freedom prevails to the utmost, i.e, 
ln a society where there is no direct aggression on the person or 
property of any one and no indirect aggression especially in the form 
of breaches of contracts (cp. Data, p. 165), where, in other words, 
the power of the State is strictly limited to the fulfilling of its 
Police function of protecting life, liberty, and property. To the 
8elf-evident truth that a loose expression like "indirect aggression"
between them and Spen cer 's  th eo ry .
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is capable of a very wide legitimate interpretation and to the fact 
that the law of equal freedom, in order to be practicable at all, 
would require an extreme form of State Socialism probably annulling 
the need for private property, we have «already directed attention. 
Consequently, we may pass over them for the time being and, concerning 
ourselves only with the spirit in which Spencer would want us to under' 
stand the law of equal freedom - justification of a form of ■ laiasez 
faire we may ask ourselves whether a theory of least possible
interference or "Specialised Administration" will be able to give us 
maximum possible justice.
m e  chief difficulty in applying the law of equal freedom to the 
distribution of economic goods is the familiar fact that the law of 
property in most modern states has evolved and reached a high degree
of complexity without the aid of, and often in opposition to, the 
law of equal freedom, and therefore to apply this law to present-day 
conditions in discovering what a just reward should be, seems to be 
quite illogical. No/concervabl© theory of justice, for instance, can 
claim that all the presenu-day holdings in land were originally 
appropriated by people who left "enough and as good for others" (Locke) 
and if we thus find that the law of equal freedom breaks down at the 
VerY start, in its application to property in land, the primary 
commodity out of which all the other forms of wealth have been 
iirectly or indirectly derived, it seems fair to say that Spencer e 
formula can nave a plausible application to-day only to a society 
,Vlllch starts with no accumulated private capital in any shape or 
manner. if Spencer objects to uhis conclusion on account of the
impracticability of starting society anew, in order that it may from 
the very beginning obey the law of equal freedom (if such obedience 
is pobsible at all), and says that we must put up with the unideal 
state of society in which we live, working persistently, however, 
through "empirical compromises” for a steadily-increasing realisation 
of equal freedom, it seems right uo argue that it is highly unjust to 
apply the law of equal freedom, in all its rigidity, to a society 
which up till now has been, to a greater or less degree, founded upon 
unequal freedom. Tne philosophy of common sense demands that those 
who have profited by such unequal freedom should, to some extent at 
least, compensate those whose chances of survival and prospsri-ty 
have been considerably diminished on account of the small degree of 
freedom allowed to them or their ancestors in the past. Spencer him­
self, in his later treatment, of land (Justice, Appendix B), seems to
ex,see the rightness of reparation for past injustice, when he claims 
that the money spent on the relief of the poor during the last three 
centuries is more than enough to compensate for whatever land may have 
been taken away from the poor of the past. But in thus virtually 
supporting private property in land, Spencer does not seem to see 
that his argument is a two-edged weapon, which, while apparently 
BUPport,ing a limited ownership of land, may at the same time be used 
t° support such things as a graduated income tax and supertax on large 
States and other fortunes that are not earned through personal 
sffort; for very few people will agree that violation of the law of 
S(3Ual freedom in the past was confined merely to the appropriation of 
ând and that, even in the matter of land, the poor-relief which has
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been spread over three centuries is a just compensation to the present 
landless, especially when we consider the enormous unearned increment 
of value, due to increase of population. In short, property in the 
pastjit will be generally admitted, has not had too respectable an 
ancestry. A lover of State-inuerf erence, it seems to us, can easily 
prove, on Spencer’s own premisses, that free education, public 
libraries and public parks, State supervision of sanitation, and State-• I
aided colonisation, to all of which Spencer is deadly opposed, are all 
compensations for past injustice, i.e, for past violation of equal 
freedom, as well as for the institution of private property, which, 
as we have said before, is not a necessary corollary from the law of 
equal freedom.
It is evident that some such reasoning as reparation for past 
injustice underlies the writings of present-day laissez faire 
economists who endeavour to correct and limit the inherent shortcomings 
of titeir txieory by the abstract principle of equality of opportunityo 
T*ey realise that under modern conditions where there is a great deal 
of artificial inequality, largely dme to the accident of birth or 
a°rce guQh -thing por which the individual himself is not responsible, 
and where the possession of capital does not necessarily mean the 
Possession of qualities necessary for social welfare (or the lack of 
°aPital, the lack of such qualities), to let each individual take the 
'C8-tural consequences of his actions, as Spencer wants them to do 
(without a modification of the principle), would be unjust. There- 
f°re> tuey propose to start individuals equally as far as possible
and then leave them to make the most use of their opportunity. Some 
of the measures which they advocate in particular in bringing about 
this equality of opportunity, and for the realisation of which they 
do not hesitate to call for the aid of the Suate, are universal 
education, graduated inheritance tax, and mimimum wage law. In all 
this, much of modern legislation seers to be on their side, because 
it is concerned with the removal of artificial differences and the 
equalising of opportunities, and, in so doing, with the providing of 
an open road to talent.
IIt cannot by any means be pretended that the idea of equal 
opportunity is th^Last word in social justice. It can be easily 
shown that a literal realisation of it is impracticable, and that, 
even where practicable, it would, not always give us ideal justice.
ITo furnish equal opportunities", for instance, as Rasndall says',
"to the dunce and the genius" would he "far removed from the ideal 
°T just distribution" (vol. 1, pp. 230-1 )j_ But the point to note 
is that a disproof of the principle of equality of opportunity, as 
a true canon of ideal justice, is no^ necessary for our purpose, be­
cause we are concerned merely with establishing its superiority to the 
law of equal freedom, and this, we believe we have succeeded in doing 
in what has been said so far. It will be generally conceded that the 
Principle of equal opportunity as a negative principle, in spite of 
lls limitations, is of great practical value in removing many 
ar>tifioiai differences. There can be little doubt that, otner things 
^ing equal, a much greater measure of equality of opportunity than 
ai we have to-day, is socially desirable, and that it will bring us
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nearer the goal of ideal justice than the mechanical and unpractical 
law of equal freedom.
Spencer1s idea of justice, then, which, in spite of his protest 
cp. his Essay on Specialised Administration and Study of Sociology 
pp. 351-3), may be regarded as a species of the laissez faire type of 
theory, lets fall precisely those elements of that theory - reparation 
for past injustice and equality of opportunity - wnere it is relative­
ly strong. It falls short of other theories too which, like itself, 
calculate just reward in terms of the economic productivity of in­
dividuals under conditions of ordinary competition. If justice 
demands that there should be a close correlation between work - 
mental or bodily - and material rewards, those who advocate such a 
theory of distribution are bound ruthlessly to criticise inherited 
wealth, unearned increment, holding of stocks, etc. But Spencer, 
it is clear, does not indulge in sucn criticism. To him, to inter­
fere with a person's inheritance or unearned increment is to violate 
the law of equal freedom. Still another respect in which his theory 
°f justice compares unfavourably with the theories of other 
Utilitarian individualists is that even the most extreme of these in­
dividualists seems to realise that justice would be incomplete if it 
did not give some attention at least to the welfare of generations yet
be; and it is in the name of concern for future generations that
,, derdo not oppose the State unmaking such things as the preservation
°f forests, encouragement of scientific discoveries, etc. But
Spsnceu is opposed to State-action in all these matuers. One further
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matter where Spencer s theory is less just than ohe theory of en­
lightened individualists, and to which reference has been made already 
in a different connection, is that the law of equal freedom does not 
scruple "to let a man suffer for failures not due to wilful wrong­
doing or neglect" (Sidgwick). Common sense demands that the cases of 
the sick, the disabled for life, and the unfortunate should be con­
sidered separately from those of able-boded adults; and that, even 
among the able-bodied adults, the cases of those who are willing to 
work, but are unable to find work or are thrown out of work, owing to 
general social conditions over which they have no control, should re-
Hceive a separate treatment from that of the persistently lazy and in­
dolent. But Spencer, as we have had occasion to remark before, ■ 
groups all people together, irrespective of their special circumstance^ 
and contents himself with the canon that there "must be an adjustment 
of amounts to deserts" (Data, p. 222). In Social Statics he goes to 
the extent of saying that "Inconvenience, suffering, and death are 
the penalties attached by nature to ignorance as v̂ ell as to incom­
petence - are also the means of remedying them" (p. 578); and the 
same idea receives its scientific formulation in the biological law 
of survival recorded in "justice". It does not seem to have 
occurred to Spencer that, in order that his law of equal freedom, 
which aims at universal application, may have an intelligible meaning 
at aH, it must be limited by a law whicn aims at treating persons 
ln *]?? similar circumstances similarly. Spencer does not appear to 
see that.to allot "special privileges and burdens to special classes 




unjust. (It is true that Spencer considerably modifies the
position that we criticise here, in his treatise on Beneficence. But 
that does not invalidate our criticism in considering his peculiar 
view of justice. )
We have so far seen that Spencer s theory of justice, in what it 
omits, fails to give us as much justice as theories to which it is 
most closely related - the laissez faire and Utilitarian individualism.
We shall now proceed to show that, even from a positive point of view, 
it falls short of justice as enunciated by Utilitarian individualists. 
Many of these theorists realise that economic value is essentially 
relative and not absolute and that, if competition be excluded, there 
is no way of fixing values or of comparing services (cp. Rashdall, 
vol. l,p. 244). They further realise that there are many kinds of 
valuable services for which there is no market value in our existing 
competitive society. Tney also grant the force of the truth that a 
person may be as industrious to-day as he was yesterday, and yet his 
wages may be less than half, simply because of an unforeseen decrease 
in the demand for his services (cp. Sidgwick, Principles of Political
1Economy p. 504). In the light of these facts, therefore, they 
hesitate to assume naively with Spencer that whatever a person is able 
get in a free and open market is in accordance with the law of 
ideal justice. Nevertheless, tney believe that, under our present 
conditions, it is right for a person to expect a reward in proportion
jf|
his economic productivity; but such belief is not in the name of 
ideal justice; it is in the name of economic welfare or social 
9xpediency. . Such at least seems to be the point of view adopted by
186.
a writer like .ualton (author of Inequality of Incomes) who, on the 
basis of Prof. Cannanfe distinction between considerations of economy 
and considerations of equity, concludes that justice is something that 
cannot be definitely ascertained and that, therefore, we must confine 
our attention merely to questions of economic welfare. Many persons 
will be inclined to agree with Utilitarian individualists when they 
claim that there is no other practical way of rewarding a man than 
that of giving him his market price and that, under any other system 
of distribution, there would be " increased idleness, decreased saving, 
lessened efficiency of capital, pressure of population, checked growth ; 
of culture" (Sidgwick, Political Economy, p. xxll.), etc. But the 
same persons will refuse to believe with Spencer that a mechanical 
proportioning of benefits to efforts (work), unrelieved by any 
qualifying condition, is the highest form of justice that we can have, 
either in the present state or in the ideal state of ideal men 
posited by him. Furthermore, if just reward, as Spencer imagines,
PI!can be accurately measured by a person's earning capacity, as that is 
determined by the law of demand and supply operating in individualistic 
societies to-day, his tx^eory seems to reduce itself to the curious 
position that justice consists in the mere maintenance of the s oatus 
3H2. “ a position which even extreme individualists will find it 
difficult to accept without qualification. That this inference of 
°urs is not unfair to Spencer can be shown from the fact that, in his 
evolutionary treatment of the laws of life and the conditions of 
existence, the presumption of his argument is in favour of existing
moral rules which have managed to survive in the passive struggle for 
existence.
A second important point where Spencer:s theory of a just reward, 
from the positive point of view, seems to be deficient, is in 
connection with the question of contracts. We have already touched 
upon this question in its relation to freedom. But now looking at it 
from the point of view of distribution, we must say with Means who, 
like Spencer, appears to hold general happiness. &§ end, that it 
"cannot be admitted that justice consists in the fulfillment of con­
tracts" (Mind O.S. V, p. 397). For, as the same writer continues,
"Very few persons in the lowest ranks of labour, perhaps, regard their 
wages as an equivalent for their pains. It is all the., can get and 
they take it, bu^ to say that justice is confined to giving them it, 
is to say that existing social arrangements are perfectly just, which j 
Mr. Spencer does not maintain. If he is ^bething of justice in the 
ideal state, he still has to suppose every person in making a contract
I]
to be able to decide what will be an equivalent for his sacrifice and
ifto do this without comparison of pleasures" (Ibid.). Even/we grant 
to Spencer for the sake of argument that the fulfillment of contracts 
is the best means of every person getting wnao he ought to get, we 
are faced with a difficult question fopfrhich there is no answer from 
the aide of trie law of equal freedom. Are the contracting individuals 
t° contract with one another in the capacity of separate individuals 
0r> as members of "coercive" groups? The reason for asking this 
Ideation is that it is quite conceivable that a class of labourers 
Vltl be able to sell their services at a much higher price as an
aggregate than as individual labourers, and that, conversely, an 
employer acting in unison with otner employers of the same kind will 
get cheaper labour than if he should act alone. In short, it is 
clear that factors like monopoly and combination introduce into con­
tract an element that is insoluble by the law of equal freedom. Any 
one of the four possible wages that a labourer may get according to 
the presence of one or more of the four conditions mentioned aboue, 
will be ideally just on uhe basis of the law of equal freedom, so 
long as there is no physical coercion or intimidation. If Spencer 
accepts this conclusion of ours, we seem justified in doubting, if 
not in denying, the exact or "scientific" nature of his absolute and 
universal formula of justice, which seems unable to provide us a 
precise canon of distribution, in the light of which our future action 
may be directed. Whatever a person can get through profiteering, 
artificial monopoly, obstruction, etc, within the law of equal freedom, 
turns out to be his just reward. But common sense certainly sets 
itself against "justice" of that kind. Even Spencer's own laws of 
life laid down in the early part of "Justice" do net support such 
justice. Adapting an argument used by Spencer in his chapter on 
Sub-Human Justice (Ch. 11.) to the present, context, we may say tnat
lilie profiteer, the monopolist , and the obstructionist so habitually 
iueak the relation between the conduct and normal consequence of 
their victims that in very few individuals are those^elations long 
®aintained (Section 6). The sustentation of these enemies of 
8°ciety frequently means the destruction of "the best individuals as
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readily as the worst", so muon so that human justice becomes "extreme-
1
ly imperfect alike in general and in detail". Therefore, we cannot 
dogmatically assert that those who go under in oh^feconomic struggle 
necessarily deserve to go under.
Turning to individualistic thinkers Ooher than Spencer, what we
find there is that, while most of them consider the enforcement of
'
contracts to be fundamentally important, they do not agree with 
Spencer in thinking that equitable relations between members of 
society, resulting in a just proportion between effort (labour) and 
benefit, would be best maintained, if contracts were freely entered 
into and fulfillment, of them was uniformly enforced. Tuey insist 
on the value of contract-enforeement only within limits. Sidgwick 
who has/devoted considerable space and attention to the question of 
contracts in several of his writings (Elements of Politics, Ch. VI, 
Principles of Political Economy, Bk. Ill, Ch. VI, and Methods, Bk. 
ill, Ch. V) gives us an indication as to what these limits are; and 
it is instructive to state them briefly to see to whau extent Spencer 
could consistently accept them on the basis of his law of equal free­
dom. pn the first place, Sidgwick says that "It is generally 
Hfedient to enforce contracts, if deliberately made between persons 
possessing at the time mature reason, and without illegal coercion 
or intimidation, or wilful or negligent misrepresentation of material
facts; and if the effects that they were designed to produce involve
    •___________________________________
Compare Justice Chapter 11, Section 6.
no violation of law or cognisable injury to the community” (Politics, 
p.  xlv)• It seems fair to suppose that for the words ”It is
generally expedient” , Spencer would substitute "the State ought to";
that he would altogether omit the condition regarding "wilful or
"negligent misrepresentation" , leaving each individual to take the
necessary precaution against such contingency (cp. the stand that he
takes against the prosecuting of unlicensed medical practitioners in
Social Statics); ana that he would reject the condition of "cognis-
1
able injury to the community" , except in the case of slavery- On his 
theory of equal freedom, moreover, selecting examples from outside 
tne realm of distribution, contracts which involve sexual immorality
iand oppressive usury would probably have to be enforced. A second 
serious limitation which Sidgwick places on the enforcement of con­
tract̂  and of which Spencer s law of 9qual freedom seems unable to 
take account, is that " It may become, tnrougn change of conditions, 
impossible or on the whole inexpedient to fulfil a contract to render 
future services" (Ibid-)- A further limitation considered by 
Sidgwick which is outside the scope of the law of equal freedom, is 
the "limited liability" of a body of persons who, in their capacity 
°f "an artificial person" form one of the contracting panties- In 
these ways, then, Spencer's theory of justice which unduly 
Amplifies present-day economic conditions by assuming that everybody 
will get what he ougnt to get when che State rigidly enforces all 
c°ntracts freely made, falls short of justice as determined by the
j ~  | i - ,'■ Contracts ....must be strictly adhered to and legally enforced; 
save in cases where a man contracts himself away" (Principles of
Ethics, vol. 11, p. 287).
I
1
U t i l i t a r ia n  individualist tneories in g e n e r a l .
An observation which does not seem to have occurred to Spencer 
is that the laissez faire doctrine (including the law of equal freedom) 
is at best only "a rough induction from our ordinary experience of 
human life" (sidgyrick, Politics). Consequently, he does not see that 
laiasez faire or the law of equal freedom , in its very nature, is 
incapable of giving us precise guidance in the apportionment of 
material goods.
fe have up till now concerned ourselves with a criticism of 
Spencer's theory of economic distribution from the point of view of 
theories closely akin to it - what we have called laissez falre and 1
Utilitarian individualist theories. We shall now approach the larger ji
question of distributive justice, in particular, and of social justice,
in general, from the standpoint of idealistic theories, i.e, theories
which never regard mere happiness as the supreme end of conduct. Prom
toe point of view of these theories Spencer's principle of distribution,
resting as it does on the economic law of demand and supply, is open
to the following defects: (a) that people do not, always find the
work for which they are best fitted; (b) that their demands are not
always for tilings tnat tiiey really need - sometimes they are e-een
tor things that are positively hurtful; and (o) that sometimes things
1
°f the greatest value are very little in demand. This criticism, we
tomit, will have little or no weight with Spencer, to whom justice
/
Waists in letting each individual sink or swim for himself. But 
to the conclusion reached by us earlier in this thesis is valid, -
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that, even on Spencer's/biological and Utilitarian premisses, the 
organic view of society is the only true view, the above-mentioned 
defects cannot be passed over lightly. On that, view, justice would 
aim not at the mere apportioning of benefits to services, if such 
mechanical apportionment is possible at all, but at giving each in­
dividual a share in the common good of the community. While it may 
find it socially and economically expedient, under the complex con­
ditions of modern life, to preserve our present economic system to a 
large degree (at least as far as the middle ranges of income are con­
cerned), and regard poverty as punishment to some extent, it would at 
the same time correct and limit the inherent weakness of the economic * I
system by paying due attention to differences of need on the one side
and differences of capacity on the other. If a member of society
is unable to earn for himself his share of social good, it
would endeavour to make it possible for him to earn it through such
neans as minimum wage laws, good methods of technical instruction,
efficient labour exchanges, and State control of the supply of some
1
of the more important needs. If would treat each person as an 
®nd in himself and not as a mere means to an end. In otner words, 
it would regard each person's good as of equal intrinsic value with
toe like good of evervone ^lse and would consider superior capacity
2
as constituting a claim to superior consideration - though not always
°f a material character. Instead of trying to effect some kind of
i* Compare Mackenzie s Outlines of Social Philosophy, Ch. V”.




compromise between competing individuals, it would look upon these
individuals as members of a common group, and endeavour to promote
right relationships between them. It would elevate the question of
distribution of external goods from the plane of economics to the
plane of personality. It would secure to a considerable extent
"that no unnecessary obstacles are placed in the way of each one
discovering for himself what is the position for which he is best
fitted, and eventually gaining tha^ position" (Mackenzie, Cn. V.).
It would also do something at least to remove sucn extreme poverty
as would prevent, a person from securing the necessary materials and
instruments for the proper discharge of his functions, and such
1extreme wealth as might tempt him to waste them. Instead of mechanic­
ally ascertaining the just reward of each person by means of a 
universal and objective formula of social justice, it would aim at
strengthening in the community as a whole, ¿he disposition to ascertain
2
and carry out what is just for each individual. In addition to 
emphasising justice in the realm of competitive goods, it would 
emphasise the cultivation of non-competitive goods like goods of the 
b°<iy (e.g., physical health) and goods of the soul (e.g., moral goodness, 
culture, knowledge, etc.,). Instead of forcibly fitting itself into 
a preconceived notion as to the proper function of the State, it would 
regard the State as an instrument for the realisation of the good life 
of the community. Justice would become the master and the State its
^""Compare Mackenzie :s Outlines of Social Philosophy, Ch. V.1 *
In the words of H.Rashdall "An abstract 'distribution' cannot be 
a good, but a disposition and a will to distribute justly may be."
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servant, and as servant, the State migut be required to do much or 
do little, depending upon the intellectual and moral level reached 
by the community and the hbgdncy or otherwise of the acts to be 
performed. Merely to call an act individualistic would not be to 
uphold it. Neither to call acts paternal or socialistic would be 
enough to condemn them. The good life of the community, which, to 
a large degree, is self-earned, would be the deciding factor, and 
the question regarding the limit of State-action would present itself 
as a matter of detail.
Tne superiority of tne above view to Spencer:s law of equal
atefreedom is so obvious that we think it unnecessary to expati/ on it. 
We believe we have said enough to show that tne law of equal freedom, 
when and where practicable, falls short of the laissez faire, the 
Utilitarian individualist, and the idealistic theories of social 
justice.
1
(4) Justice and Beneficence.
Our efforts hitherto have been directed toward the expounding 
and criticising of Spencer's principle of justice (expressed concise­
ly in his law of equal freedom), looking at it more or less as an 
independent principle of morality. But it is in its relation to its 
twin-principle of beneficence that we see in a most striking way its 
inadequacy and its inconsistency with itself. It is, therefore, 
now necessary to turn to a brief examination of the differentiation
L Use the terms "beneficence1 and 1 beflevolence ’ interchangeably,
, °Ugh Spencer appears to see a sligut difference between them 
Icp. Principles of Ethics, vol. 1_1 p. 376).
made by Spencer between justice and beneficence. Earlier in this
thesis we noticed that justice to Spencer is the primary law of
morality and that it consists in letting each individual take the
natural consequences of his actions, that, in other words, it consists
in letting the superior have the advantage of his superiority, and the 
the
inferior/disadvantage of his inferiority. But this lav/, Spencer 
confesses, in the "Data" as well as in "Negative Beneficence" (Sects. 
d4 and 387) , isjnot enough. Its sternness should be mitigated by
the principle of beneficence. Thus, he says, in Part V, "the highest 
form of life. individual and social, is not achievable, under a reign 
of justice only, but that there muse be joined with it a reign of 
beneficence" (p. 269). QOn Spencer's -Utilitarian and evolutional 
view, we must assume that what he really means by the phrase "the 
highest form of life" is "the greatest quantity of life and happiness 
that is possible to attain"]] At the same time, however, he adds
that "justice and beneficence are to be discriminated", as justice 
is of public concern and beneficence only of private concern. For, 
he says, "Beneficence exercised by society in its corporate capacity, 
B'usl consist in taking awgcy from some persons parts of the products 
°f their activities, to give to ocher persons, whose activities have 
n°t brought them a sufficiency. If it, does this by force it inter­
feres witn the normal relation between conduct and consequence, alike 
those from whom property is taken and in those to whom property is 
given. Justice, as defined in the foregoing pages, is infringed 
uPon. The principle of harmonious social co-operation is disregarded 
antl the disregard and infringement, if carried far, must bring
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Masters" (p r i n . o f  E t h i c s ,  v o l .  11 , p. 2 7 1 . )
Deferring to a later place in the present chapter consideration 
of the obvious contradiction that there is between justice and
abeneficence in this quotation, we should remark with Sidgwick that we 
"do not see how the argument applies to Negative Beneficence” (Ethics
•Sof Green, Spencer, and Martineau, p. 304). The beneficent re^raints, 
for instance, imposed by Spencer on Free Competition and Free Contract 
(cub. 1_1 & 111 of Part Vh_), do "not necessarily involve the taking of 
A'b products to give to B; but only limitation of A ’s activities 
inB's interest" (ibid.).
Using the time-worn distinction between wnat is of public and 
what of private concern, Spencer makes a furtner distinction when he 
maintains that justice is "needful for social equilibrium , ■ and there­
fore of public concern", while beneficence is ‘'not needful for social 
equilibrium, and therefore only of private concern" (vol. 11, p. 270). 
It is our purpose now to see wnether Spencer is able consistently to 
adhere to this distinction in his treatise on beneficence and if not, 
whether such inability is not due to the narrow and inadequate way in 
which he conceives justice. Turning our attention firfct to the 
important chapter on Restraints on Free Competition (cn. _ll), we find 
Spencer say that "In strict equity (or justice) the more capable are 
Justified in taking full advantage of their greater capabilities”
277); and that trade unions are "unprincipled" wnen they 
Prevent an artisan from outstripping^iis fellow-artisam by his 
8uperiority in the ordinary competitive process. And yet he adds 
that in the case of employers, free competition may go too far; in
an employer, for instance, may ruin his competitors by unscrupulous 
underselling; thus inflicting "intense evils" which "might not 
unfitly be called commercial murder"; he employs "the forms of 
competition .... to destroy competition" and achieve "a practical 
monopoly" (p. 282). But the principle of negative beneficence,
Spencer goes on to say, enjoins "Anyone who, by command of great 
capital or superior business capacity, is enabled to beat others who 
carry on the same business .... to restrain his business activities, 
when his own wants and those of his belongings have been abundantly 
fulfilled" (p. 282). "This conclusion, however", as Sidgwick 
rightly remarks, "would seem to go beyond what the premisses justify, 
as what seems injurious- is not the extension of business through 
cheapness, so far as cneapness is bona fide obtained by economies; 
but the adoption of underselling at unremunerative prices (cf. Sect.
397, p.  281, the case of Stewart of New York) in order to injure 
competitors and establish a monopoly1) (Ethics of Green, etc., p. 306). 
is the same writer continues, "both in the case of trades-unions 
establishing monopoly txirough combination, and employers establishing • 
-monopoly by aggressive combination, industrial freedom, advocated 
as loading to the advantages of free competition, in fact- leads to 
the opposite result. Why is so important a result, if as bad as Mr.
, Spencer holds, not to be prohibited by lawY Why is it not a dis­
turbance of social equilibrium, and a breach of JusticeY" (Ibid.).
Passing on to the chapter on Restraints on Free Contract (ch. 
iil>) we find several illustrations, more startling than the one 
^htioned above, of the narrowness and inadequacy of Spencer;s
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principle of justice. In discussing the case of a landlord who, 
in strict justice, may raise the rent of a tenant who has taken 
a stony or ‘boggy tract of land on a short lease and reclaimed it. 
by persistent labour, Spencer claims that the sentiment of negative 
beneficence will restrain the landlord "from taking advantage of 
his tenant's position" and that he will feel "that in this case 
what is here distinguished as negative beneficence does but enjoin 
a regard for natural justice, as distinguished from 1egal justice" 
(vol. 11, p. 288). In making tnis new distinction between natural 
justice and legal justice, which incidentally serves the purpose of 
covering up the inherent weakness of his principle of justice, it 
seems to us that Spencer lays himself open to & certain serious 
objections. In the first place, there is no reason to suppose 
that natural justice would enjoin the above restriction, supposing 
tne terms of the contract to be understood by the tenant. Secondly, 
if we grant Spencer's view as to what natural justice enjoins,
"why should it not also be legal justice - since in ch. viii of 
Part IV we seemed to be told that Legal Justice derives its 
warrant from Natural Justice. If Justice is in some cases not to 
be enforced by law, how are we to distinguish the cases in which 
it ought to be so enforced:" (Sidgwick, p. 308). Lastly, if 
8trict or legal justice allows the landlord to take full advantage 
of his tenant's weakness, what is to become of Spencer's law of 
suitable distribution - the exact "proportioning of benefits 
deceived to services rendered" (Daua, p. 146)?
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Another striking illustration in the present chapter of the 
narrow and inadequate way in which Spencer conceives justice (to 
which we called attention earlier in thes treatise in a different 
connection), is found in cases such as those of the Skye crofcers, 
in which, Spencer says, "the making of contracts though nominally 
free is not actually free" - cases in which there being no 
competition among landlords, a local landlord has "an unciiecked 
power of making his own terms" and the people "having little or no 
choice of other occupations and being too poor to emigrate, are 
compelled to accept the terms or starve" (vol. 11, p. 288). In 
such cases, therefore, Spencer says, '"'it remains for the promptings 
of negative beneficence to supplement those of equity which are 
rendered inoperative. The landlord is called on to refrain from 
actions which the restraints of technically-formulated justice 
fail to prevent. But surely, as Sidgwick remarks, this funda­
mentally important Idmftati'Criof the notion of Freedom should have 
been introduced, if at all, in the previous discussion of the 
Right of Free Contract in Part IV of the -Principles (ch. XV, p.
129). It is an essential part of justice and is "needful for 
social equilibrium". "burely the 'Freedom1 of the Law of Equal 
Freedom ought to be real and actual: if a contract is not in
reality free when one of the parties is in extreme need, surely 
the whole previous deauction (in Part IV) needs remodelling" 
(Sidgwick, p. 308). For, it will be remembered that, In Part IV, 
Spencer regards the Rights of Property, Free Exchange, and Free
I
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Contract as necessary corrollaries from the Law of Equal Freedom;
"and as therefore embodying not merely 'legal' or technical Justice 
but Justice pure and simple” (Ibid.j.
A furcner illustration of the criticism that we are urging against
5pencer's theory of justice, we find in the present chapter, in the 
:ase of
"A contractor who has undertaken an extensive work on terms which, 
to all appearance, will leave him only a fair remuneration, making due 
allowance for ordinary contingencies - say a heavy railway cutting, or 
i tunnel a mils or two long. No one suspected when the contract was 
oade, that in the hill to be tunnelled there existed a vast intrusion 
of trap. But now where the contractor expected to meet with earth to 
be excavated he finds rock to be blasted. What, shall be done? Unless 
18 is a man of large capital, strict enforcement of the contract will 
min him; and even if wealthy he will do the work at a great loss in­
stead of at a profit. It may be said that even justice, considered
oot as legally formulated but as reasonably interpreted, implies that 
there should be a mitigation of the terms; since the intention of the 
contract was to make an exchange of benefits; and stiTIImore is 
Mitigation of the terms required by negative beneficence - by abstention! 
from that course which the law would allow. But clearly it is only .J
ihere a disastrous contingency is of a kind greatly exceeding reasonable
anticipation, that negative beneficence may properly come into play”
( rinciples of Ethics, vol. 11. pp. 289-90).
Host people will probably say that in the present case both "natural 
justice" and "legal justice" should hold the contractor responsible 
f°r his mistake on tne ground that he is supposed to nave expert 
knowledge of his wOrk (personal knowledge or knowledge gained through 
^ploying an expert), even before the contract was made. Taking, 
however, a similar case, like that of a building which in the process 
of construction is destroyed by " an act of God" , say through lightning, 
the same people would probably say that neitner "natural justice" nor 
legal justice" (in the ideal form) ought to hold the contractor (in
;
he ideal state) completely responsible. Spencer, on the otner nand,
would probably say that justice "legally formulated5' should throw the
whole burden upon the contractor, while justice "reasonably interpreted"
Biiould ease that burden.
Even on Spencer’s own ground of "social equilibrium", which may
be paraphrased as "public advantage" or "conditions necessary for the
smooth working of society" and which is the test used by Spencer as to 
a
ihether/thing shouldjcome under the province of justice or not, it will 
be generally admitted that whether or not a contract like the one under 
iscussion (building struck by lightning in the course of construction) 
hould be literally enforced should not be left to the generous impulse 
of interested parti-es, but should be brought under the control of the
-
cate. Further, if the contracting parties are to take into considera- 
ion "the intention of the contract'" as "an exchange of benefits", 
oes not the State, as a disinterested body and as the enforcer of 
ontracts, have even a greater right (and even duty) to do the same? 
finally, are we to infer from Spencer s statement that no contracts
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°hght to be enforced that turn out to be highly disadvantageous to
1
)ne of the contracting parties? If such is the inference, it will 
be interesting to know what effect it will nave upon modern business, 
Wen of which rests upon speculation and readiness to take risks, 
nail we be working toward a state of affairs similar to a Christian 
°cialism? Pernaps an answer to this question is not urgent for our
eKativs beneficence, says Spencer, forbids "unduly pressing against 
pother an advantage which circumstances give" (vol. 1_1 p. 296); 
trther, "negative beneficence .... forbids making a contract unduly 
Vantageous to self" (p. 297).
present purpose. In any case, a question of this kind serves to 
emphasise the fact that the implications of some of tne qualifications 
of justice introduced by Spencer in his treatment of negative benefi­
cence are destructive of his theory of justice itself.
Taking justice, then, to mean "social equilibrium", we have seen 
that in all the cases quoted above, what Spencer calls "Negative 
Beneficence" should really be called "Justice". . Consequently to the 
extent that the law of equal freedom is unable to accommodate these cases, 
it needs to be supplanted by some wider principle. Expressions like 
"natural justice", justice "reasonably interpreted", and "intention of 
a contract" as "an exchange of benefits", eat up the very roots of the 
law of equal freedom.
Let us now pass over to Part VI of the "Principles" (Positive 
Beneficence), and see how it comports with justice. The most important 
chapter in tuis Part from our point of view is the chapter on the 
Relief of the Poor (On. Vll). Using Spencer s definition of benefi­
cence that ".exercised by a society in its corporate capacity", it 
consigns "in taking away from some persons pares of txie products of 
tneir activities, to give to other persons", we may say that poor- 
relief by the State is a clear case of beneficence, and that, therefore, 
Spencer's view, it ought not to be undertaken by the State. But,
> °n tue otner hand, it can be shown that relief of the poor is 
"needful for social equilibrium", it automatically becomes a part of 
lUBtice and, therefore, a part of Scat e-duty. In the words of Prof.
S‘ Alexander " I t  is a strange conception of social equilibrium which
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leaves out of account some of the forces concerned, and what forces 
can be stronger than the sentiments of those wno rebel against being 
left to the full operation of tneir inferiority?" (Mind, N.S., 111, 
p. 128). Mo doubt, as Spencer says, State-relief of the poor, if 
carried too far, will brinr disasters, but "it do^s not therefore 
follow that if carefully limited, it may not do more good than narm" 
(Sidgwtck, Ethics of Green etc., p. 311).
If tne relief of the poor by State-aid, then, as "needful for
socialjequilibrium" be legitimately regarded as a part of Spencer's
justice, it seems to have a far-reaching conseouence on the hard and 
fast, distinction made by him between justice and beneficence. Justice 
and beneficence, hereafter, it would seem, cannot be regarded as 
mutually exclusive of one another. Beneficence should really be
looked upon as higher justice, and the Suate should become the
custodian of it. Spencer's own admission that "the nighest form of 
life" (which we paraphrasedjfelsewhere as "the greatest possible 
Quantity of life and happiness") cannoo be reached without beneficence, 
seems to support us in this view. For, if justice and beneficence 
have the same basis (increase of life and happiness, cp. Justice ch.
Ill* and Negative Beneficence, ch. Vlll) , "why should it be palpably 
Wrong for the state to ordain beneficence for the public good, seeing 
that it ordains justice for the public^oodt" (Alexander, p. 12?) We, 
therefore, come back witn fresh proof to a conclusion that we reached 
on an earlier page that, on Spencer's own premisses, the question to 
a8k ourselves in deciding whetner or not a certain measure should be
undertaken by the State is not whether it comes under justice or 
beneficence, but whether it makes for public good. We grant that 
there may be cases wnere, even after ascertaining that a thing will be 
for public advantage, it will not be undertaken by the State due to 
the excessive trouble and expense involved or to the difficulty of 
finding a definite and conventional basis on which law can act. But 
the point that we seek to emphasiseis that neither in Spencer's kind 
of social philosophy nor in any other kind of social philosophy is 
there logical ground for the limitation of State-action to justice, 
narrowly conceived. Dr. Albee rightly observes that "while many 
practical statesmen have a healthy dread of a too paternal government 
it is safe to say that no practical statesman ever did, or ever will, 
try to keep justice and beneficence, in whatever sense understood, 
separate in the way that Mr. Spencer would seem to require. It would 
e-g., take but a famine or a pestilence to show how unworkable such an 
abstract theory would be" (A HistDry of English Utilitarianism, p.
349).
If further proofs be required of our conclusion that, on 
Spencer s own premisses, public advantage is the decisive factor with 
regard. to the collective action of the State, we may for a moment 
hark back to Spencer's theory of Absolute Ethics and then turn to his 
treatment of public opinion. Justice, we have already seen, alms at 
Saving each man the exact equivalent of what he has done. But a 
tarsh operation of this law upon the sick, the feeble, and the old, 
Spencer allows^ mayjbe mitigated by a considerable amount of voluntary
leneficence. For this mitigation, however, as far as we can see, 
here is no warrant in the code of Absolute Ethics. And yet Spencer 
llows it on the ground that, "when duly restricted to cases of un- 
,voidable misfortunes, the immediate pleasure resulting from beneficence 
utweigtethe indirect good, which would result from following the teach- 
ng of absolute Ethics and allowing the unrestricted struggle for 
xistence to exterminate those whose extinction by natural law would 
rove them (under the conditions) unfit to live" (Rashdall, vol. 11,
. 390; cp. Spencer s Principles, vol. _11 p. 394). But it is obvious 
hat the same reasoning ma,> be used to justify "any amount of inter- 
6rence witn tne evolutionary struggle, and with the laws which Absolute 
thics derive from it, in all cases where tne gain to Society, bn the 
hole, may seem to outweig/'any which may be expected to result from the 
^restricted struggle" (Rashdall, vol. 11, p. 390).
Turning to the question of public opinion, we find that, in reply- 
ng to those of his critics who say that "if there is no compulsory 
rising of funds to relieve distress, and everything is left to the 
fomptings of sympathy, people who nave little or no sympathy, forming 
^rge part of the community, will contribute nothing; and will leave 
Blue burdens to be borne by the more sympathetic" ("Principles", vol.
-> PP° 387-8), Spencer says "that in the absence of a coercive law 
Bsre often exists a coercive public opinion" (p. 588). Here 
RParently we nave a case where Spencer realises the need of a certain 
for public good so much so that he is willing to cast aside his 
°nted enthusiasm for freedom from interference, which elsewhere he
I
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regarded as the one essential condition to life and happiness. But, 
in so doing, Spencer seems to forget that there is no difference in 
jrinciple between the enforcement of justice by the State and the 
snforcement of beneficence by public approbation and disapprobation.
We have so far endeavoured to show that the basis of Spencer’s 
,heory is narrow and inadequate and that, on his own premisses, the 
Amit of State-action should be the limit of public advantage, 
neither the whole of justice, e.g., gratitude to parents, nor the 
ihole of beneficence can conveniently come under State control.) 
fe now pass on to a criticism which we have hinted at earlier and 
rtuch( we believe^ seriously undermines Spencer's justice - the inner 
¡onflict tnat there is between justice and beneficence in his Ethics.
■t is generally agreed that, however much justice and beneficence may 
liffer from one another, and whatever distinctions we may draw between 
-hem for the sake of convenience, they are incapable of contradicting 
3ach other in theory, and often in practice too. A writer like 
lenry George, who has many points of contact with Spencer, says that 
That which is above justice must be based on justice, and include 
justice, and be reached through justice" (Social Problems, p. 114).
‘>r°f* Seth, a writer of a different type, argues that justice and 
Benevolence are respectively the negative and positive aspects of 
B°cial virtue and that benevolence is justice made perfect. "When 
justice", he says, "has done its perfect work, there will be little 
bcj-t for elder philanthropy to do" (Etnical Principles, p. 281), and,
0n the basis of this, asks the pertinent question, "Might it not be 
le3s misleading to apeak only of justice in the social relations -
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jf negative and positive justice - than of justice and benevolence?"
(pp. 281-2'). He even says, "Benevolence is more just than justice, 
jecause it is enlightened by the insight into that ’inequality* and 
miqueness of individuals wnich is no lessjreal than the ’equality’
)f persons" (p. 282). Rashdal} observestrue Justice and true 
¡enevolence represent two sides, each of them unintelligible or, at 
[east, certain to be misunderstood if taken apart from the other - 
)f the single all-inclusive duty of promoting the different kinds of 
$ood in proportion to tneir true intrinsic worth or place as elements 
.n the good.” (vol. 1, p. 275). But Spencer s treatment of the 
'elation between justice and beneficence goes against all these views.
We shall not hold Spencer responsible for the practical 
lifficulties which he has in reconciling the duties dictated by 
justice and those dictated by beneficence« Such difficulties are 
Sound to Be difficulties for almost any system of Ethics (though in 
Spencer1 s Ethics they are greater in number and more serious in degree) 
iut we have a right to hold him responsible for virtually abandoning 
the biological principle of "survival of the fittest" while passing 
frcro justice to beneficence. If it is wrong for the State to render 
positive help to the weak and inefficient members of society, so it is 
the individual; the character of the agency makes no difference 
Whatever. Nature's laws, whether broken by the collective action of 
State or by individual action, will have the same serious conse­
quence. if "the mutual dependence of parts in the social organism, 
ne°es8itates that alike for its total life and the lives of its units, 
tll8re .... snail be maintained a due proportion between returns and
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abours; the n a tu ra l  r e l a t i o n  between work and w e l f a r e  s h a l l  be p r e ­
served intact" , to temper this law of justice by means of beneficence
1
Ls to tamper with it and, to tnat extent, to render "the laws of life
i
ind the conditions of existence" (Letter to J.S.^ill) futile. To 
uote just one instance, Spencer is greatly concerned that paupers 
ihould not propagate; "but this certainly would not be prevented If 
eft to private almsgivings" (Sidgwi ck, Ethics of Green, etc., p. 512), 
rhich Spencer recommends. On the other hand, if it were left to
the workhouse and the Cnarity Organisation Society", they "might do 
something to prevent it" (Ibid.) Our conclusion, then, is that, to 
he extent to which beneficence counteracts and contra.dicts the primary 
aw of justice, it has no logical place in Spencer's Ethics, for >;
ipencer himself claims tha.t "the primary lav/ of a harmonious social 
o-operation (justice) may not be broken for the fulfillment of the 
lecondary law (beneficence)" (Principles of Ethics, vol. 11, p. 271).
If Spencer tries to extricate himself from this difficulty by 
laying that, inasmuch as justice (as understood by him) is incapable 
>f complete realisation in the relative state in which we live to-day,
,s ought not to insist on too rigid an application of it, but ought 
sally to find room for beneficence, it would appear that he must give 
JP his claims to having discovered a "scientific" or "exact" basis for 
tilitarianism dnd a final solution of the vexing question of the
I
':'e have Spencer’s own words that """what is not just (in Spencer' s 
sense of the word of course) is in the long run not beneficent" 
(vo1, 11» P* 381) .
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proper sphere of government, and must fall hack upon the empirical- 
reflective method of ordinary Utilitarians, using social good or public 
advantage as his guide. It may e v m  be contended that, so long as 
Spencer admits that his justice cannot be fully realised in our present ; 
state of affairs, and so long as limited beneficence, as we have shown 
above, is "needful for social equilibrium" (i.e., for maximum life and 
happiness possible), beneficence on the whole should precede justice 
in the activity of the State. This contention is supported by a 
former conclusion of ours that Spencer's theory of justice is fruitful 
only on the supposition of the equality of the members of a society. 
Therefore, till we reach that equality, why should not the State bend 
all its energies to giving its members as many positive benefits as >
possible, and equalising their opportunities, with a view to hastening 
the absolute state when justice and equality shall reign unchecked?
f
Will this not be in strict accordance with Spencer s theory? Whether 
it will or not, there can be little doubt that, in many of the cases 
discussed by Spencer in Parts V. and Vl^ "to secure the individual by 
a right is both a manlier and more satisfactory arrangement than to 
leave him dependent on the good feeling which prompts others to render 
him services which he cannot accept without a sense of inferiority"
(s« Alexander, Mind, H.S, vol. Ill p. 130). It is strange that a
writer who is so passionately fond of freedom as Spencer is, should,
ln hhe case of the poor and the unfortunate members of society, be
.
80 unmindful of their true freedom, their self-respect, and their man­
hood , as to recommend them to the mercies of the rioh, the fortunate, 
antd otner such who often, owing to circumstances, occupy positions of 
Vantage.
■
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Section 11• a derailed Examination of Spencer's Application 
of his Formula of Justice to the Practical
Questions of Social Life.
We propose in this concluding section of our thesis to attempt 
a systematic examination of Spencer’s application of his formula of 
justice O  the practical questions of social life, with a view to 
seeing to what extent Spencer is able to make good his claims
(l) That the particular legal rights of man that ought to be 
established in any se-cdad. society (the only intelligible meaning of
tne conception of natural rights employed by Spencer) are a11 ascer­
tained by simple deduction from his absolute formula of justice, viz., 
the law of equal freedom,
(2) That "they one and all coincide with ordinary ethical 
conceptions" (Justice, p. 63),
(3) That "they one and all correspond with legal enactments" 
(Justice, p. 63),cuwoL
Hi
(4) That what is found to be ideally just, (according to Spencer)
also turns out to be economically expedient.
In undertaking this task, it, is necessary to bear in mind constantly 
an important fact that Spencer seems entirely to overlook, that even 
if it is possible for him to establish his claims, especially the 
first one, that is not necessarily to prove the superiority of his 
law of equal freedom to other theories of justice which, though not 
rigorously deducing all the rights of man from an absolute or ultimate p
®fhical principle, as Spencer does, make an adequate provision for them.
oiT Spencer's own words, "political economy reaches conclusions 
ethics (i.e., the law of equal freedom in the present context) 
hependeritly deduces" •
! a
A detailed study of Social Statics and Justice reveals the fact that 
many of the rights discussed hy Spencer in these writings are of such 
supreme importance for social existence that no theory of justice can 
fail to account for them. Such a study seems also to show us that 
rights, instead of being simply deduced from the law of equal freedom, 
are really forced out of it. Prof. Alexander, in an article con­
tributed to Mind (N.S. vol. 3^) comes to a similar conclusion when he 
says, i!Tiie difficulties of deducing actual rights from the formula are 
very great. Mr. Spencer himself sees that freedom of mutual 
aggression would satisfy the formula, and it is not open to him to 
urge that his formula is not intended to apply to aggression, for how
lacan he know general liberty to murder to be a liberty to commit 
aggression unless he knows already that there is a right to life?
Indeed, many of Mr. Spencer s deductions of right from the law of 
equal freedom seem open to the objection brought against Kant's 
deductions from the categorical imperative, that the deduction was 
convincing only on the presupposition tnat the conduct was already 
allowed to possess moral value” (p. 129).
A further important fact which also needs to be borne in mind, 
and which Spencer forgets, is that to establish a parallelism between 
Ms deductions and our ordinary ethical conceptions and legal enact- !i |
ments is not necessa.rily to establish a causal or any other kind of 
Intimate relation between them. The correspondence may after all be 
accidental; and ordinary law and morality may, through the long 
history of mankind, have independently arrived at many of Spencer's 
3o“called deductions without a conscious or unconscious attempt at
2 1 1 .
Before we proceed to criticise closely Spencer's deductions 
from his fundamental formula of justice, it is necessary at the very 
outset to state two important qualifications which he introduces into 
his formula and which seriously weaken, if not destroy, its absolute­
ness, and render its meaning rather vague and indefinite. The reason
.
for insisting on the necessity of the absoluteness of the formula and
the clearness and precision of its meaning is that not to do so would
be to obliterate the unique difference that there ought to be between
Spancer, who is on 'the high priori road’, seeking to solve many of
the most important practical problems of society by simple reference
to a mechanical and abstract formula of justice, and writers who, not >
being so ambitious as that, regard social justice as a problem for
which there is no perfect or complete solution, but which can only be
stated as a question of approximation. We must, it seems to us,
.insist that Spencer should, in a practical way, show that "the limit 
put to each man's freedom by the like freedom of every other man, is
■
a limit almost always possible of exact ascertainment” • (Social 
Statics, p. 82), Tne first of the qualifications to which reference is 
ma>de in the above quotation from Prof. Alexander's article, and which 
Spencer states in various ways in "Justice", is that his formula is 
n°t meant to support aggression and counter-aggression" (p. 64), that 
it does not "countenance a superfluous interference with another's 
life, committed on the ground that an equal interference may balance 
it" (p. 46), and that it is to be applied only to actions conducive
to the "maintenance of life" (p. Spencer seems to be hardly aware
that 'the form of words employed by this qualification is such as
2 1 2 .
real is ing maximum equal freedom.
213.
to render the law o f  equal freedom almost im prac t icab le .  I t  i s  true 
that in the case o f  r i g h t s  p e r ta in in g  to  personal s e c u r i t y  and l i b e r t y ,  
expressions l i k e  "super f luous in t e r f e r e n c e ” and "a c t io n s  conducive to  
maintenance o f  l i f e "  can be used without g i v in g  much room f o r  con fusion  
But what meaning do they have in  r e fe r en ce  to p r o p r i e t a r y  r i g h t s ,  wnere 
men’ s in te res ts  are not always harmonious and wnere sometimes one 's  
gain means ano t r ie r : s loss?  Do they non r e a l l y  l a y  Spencer open to  
the ciiarge o f  tending to  argue in  a c i r c l e ?  Bes ides ,  on h is  own 
showing, ought not the f i e l d  o f  nega t ive  b en e f icence ,  e i t h e r  in  whole 
or in part,  to  be s t r i c t l y  brought w i th in  the f i e l d  o f  ju s t i c e .  For 
wnat is the r e a l  d i f f e r e n c e  between nega t iv e  ben e f ic en ce ,  which f o rb id s  
giving pain to  ooners by u t i l i s i n g  a l l  the advantages that s t r i c t  >
justice accords, and ju s t i c e  which fo rb id s  "super f luous in t e r f e r e n c e "
with the l i v e s  o f  others and re fuses  to  contenance aggress ion  and
counter-aggression?
A second q u a l i f i c a t i o n  to  which Spencer d i r e c t s  a t t e n t io n  at  the 
end of almost every  one o f  the chapters in  "J u s t i c e "  d ea l in g  w ith  
nights, i s  that in  our present s t a t e ,  in  which abso lute e th ic s  cannot 
be fu l ly  o p e ra t iv e ,  the law o f  equal freedom i s  sub ject  to a fu r th e r  
law, v i z . ,  the law o f  s o c ia l  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n .  To quote h is  own 
words, "wh i le  in a system o f  absolute e th ic s ,  the c o r r o l l a r y  here 
brawn from the formula o f  ju s t i c e  i s  u n q u a l i f i e d ,  in  a system o f  
relative e th ics  (w ith  which alone we are concerned in  the a p p l i c a t i o n  
of Spencer’ s formula o f  j u s t i c e ) ,  i t  has to  be q u a l i f i e d  by the
■
According to the f o l l o w in g  statement ju s t i c e  a lso  fo rb id s  p a in : -  
Considered as the statement o f  a cond it ion  by conforming' to  which 
“he greatest  sum of happiness i s  to be obta ined, the law " ( o f  equal 
reedora) fo rb id s  a m  act, wh i oh i nf  1 i r.t.s phys ica l  pain or derangement" 
(^ a t i c e ,  p. 64 ).  - ---------
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necessities o f  s o c ia l  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n "  (p. 71 ) .  The important
question here, o f  course , i s ,  what are we to understand by the
signif icant phrase " s o c i a l  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n " !  The genera l  tone o f
Spencer ; s answer seems to be that by " s o c i a l  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t io n "  we are
to mean "nauional defence and s o c ia l  o rd e r " ,  o r ,  put in  other words,
"defensive war and pu n i t iv e  j u s t i c e " • In h is  theory o f  the S ta te ,
it w i l l  be no t iced  that Spencer i s  not weary o f  r e i t e r a t i n g  that
government, e x is t s  e x t e rn a l l y  f o r  war and in t e r n a l l y  f o r  the enforcement
of contracts. " I t  has no fu r tn er  ra ison  d ' e t r e  or funct ion "
(E. Barker, p. 115).  But th is  narrow in t e r p r e ta t i o n  o f  " s o c i a l  s e l f - .
preservation", i t  w i l l  be g e n e ra l l y  admitted, i s  due to  Spencer 's
ingrained pre jud ice  aga inst  government and a u th o r i ty  in  g en e ra l ,  and
not due to any caref iJl and reasoned-out argument. I f  " s o c i a l  s e l f -
a
preservation" i s  to  be/guiding p r in c ip l e  o f  S ta t e - a c t i o n ,  Spencer 
gives no v a l id  reason why the Stare should never undertake p o s i t i v e  
regulation, but should s p e c i a l i s e  e x c lu s i v e l y  on n ega t iv e  r e g u la t io n .  
"Social s e l f - p r e s e r v a t io n "  r i g h t l y  in t e rp r e t e d ,  i t  seems to  us, w i l l  
mean d i f f e r e n t  things at d i f f e r e n t  times and in  d i f f e r e n t  p la ces ,  
varying according to  the urgency o f  the th ings to  be done and the 
temper and the s o c ia l  development o f  the governed. Spencer h im se l f  
clearly passes beyond h is  own narrow in t e r p r e ta t i o n  o f  the phrase 
"social s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n " ,  when he comes to deal w ith  the important 
question o f  land in  Just ice .  In d iv id u a l  ownership sub ject  to  S ta te -  
suzerainty as advocated by him, i t  w i l l  be r e a d i l y  seen, i s  n e i th e r  
ln the in t e r e s t  o f  d e fens ive  war nor in  that o f  p u n i t iv e  ju s t i c e  .(or
of social and economic u t i l i t y .
An important t ru th  which seems to emerge from the above two 
qualif ications introduced by Spencer, i s  that  they so pro foundly  
alter the character o f  h is  absolute formula tha t ,  s t r i c t l y  speaking, 
some general p r in c ip l e  l i k e  public  advantage (o r  s o c ia l  expediency) 
or the h ighest  good o f  the community, which can e a s i l y  b r in g  under 
its wings the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  considered by Spencer, should be regarded 
as the fundamental p r in c ip l e ,  with freedom as a secondary and 
subordinate p r in c ip l e .  That we are not wrong in  th i s  in fe r en ce  can 
be shown from the f a c t  tha t ,  more than once in  " J u s t i c e " ,  Spencer 
draws a d i s t in c t i o n  between id e a l  ju s t i c e  and expediency, and evades 
the necessity  o f  r i g i d l y  app ly ing  h is  law o f  equal freedom, by saying 
that under present cond it ions  "no th ing  beyond a qu i te  em p ir ica l
compromise seems poss ib le "  ( J u s t i c e ,  p. 124). I f  Spencer i s  anxious 
tnat we should take in to  cons id era t ion  " th e  in t e n t io n  o f  the formula" 
as the f i x i n g  o f  bounds "which may not be exceeded on e i t h e r  s ide "
(pp. 46-47), he must at the same time be w i l l i n g  to grant that  th is  
intention can only be r e a l i s e d  through the p r in c ip l e  o f  the w e l l - b e in g  
of the community. I t  seems f a i r  to  remark th a t ,  on Spencer : s own 
Premisses, the State  should be regarded as an i n s t i t u t i o n  which 
respects, p ro t e c ts ,  and checks the i n d i v id u a l ' s  impulse to  act  f r e e l y  
f°r the sake o f  the h ighest  w e l fa re  o f  tue s o c i e t y ,  and in  con form ity  
i ts  requirements."  (Schurman, P h i l ' l  Review, v o l .  I  p. 87) Or, 
to use T.H. Green's phraseology,  " th e  s ta te  i s  an i n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  the 
Promotion o f  a common good" ( P r in c ip l e s  o f  P o l i t i c a l  O b l ig a t io n ,  p.
We may even go fu r th e r  than th is  and say that once we adopt
21o
enforcement o f  c o n t r a c t s ) .  I t  i s  f i r s t  and l a s t  in  the i n t e r e s t
social good as the u l t im ate  gu id ing p r in c ip l e  o f  publ ic  a c t io n ,  i t  
nakes no rea l  d i f f e r e n c e  whether we regard  the law o f  equal freedom 
or the law of  equal r e s t r i c t i o n s  as the secondary and subordinate 
principle. On th i s  v iew ,  i t  would seem that the f i n e  d i f f e r e n c e  that 
Ipencer draws between h is  own p o s i t i v e  treatment o f  freedom and Kant : s 
legative treatment o f  i t  (Appendix A in  " J u s t i c e " )  i s  more apparent 
,han real.  In the words o f  P r o f .  A lexander, "What seems to  r e s u l t  
rom his (Spencer 's )  argument i s  that in  c e r ta in  cases,  such as 
uiysical i n t e g r i t y  and l i b e r t y  o f  locomotion, r e s t r i c t i o n s  have been 
tradually removed, as the publ ic  advant,a;-e nas been found in  l ea v in g  
lerfect freedom to the in d iv id u a l ,  wh i le  in  other  cases ju s t i c e  has 
etermined how much o f  h is  powers each in d iv id u a l  may e x e r c is e  w ith  
advantage to s o c i e t y ,  or compatibly  with tne equ i l ib r ium  o f  s o c ie t y "
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Mind, N.S. v o l .  3, p. 129) .
are ,
I f  we/agreed, then, tha t  on Spencer 's  own premisses, some such
general p r in c ip le  as s o c ia l  w e l fa re  or the h ighest  good o f  the
iommunity ought to  be the u l t im ate  e t h i c a l  p r in c ip l e  o f  s o c ia l  l i f e ,
1
>ur cr i t ic ism o f  h is  law o f  equal freedom, s t r i c t l y  speaking, w i l l
• •!
lave to come to an end au th is  po in t .  But that w i l l  probably be hard ly  
air to Spencer who may, and, in f a c t ,  does, claim that  the w e l l - b e in g  
of society, which from h is  po int  o f  view means g r ea te s t  happiness, i s  
best promoted by maximum equal freedom. Granting to  Spencer f o r  the 
bake of argument the v a l i d i t y  o f  th is  c la im , we are faced  w ith  the 
^f f iculty  o f  r e c o n c i l in g  i t  with h is  repeated a s s e r t io n  that  the 
Rotates o f  the law o f  equal freedom are to  be mod i f ied  and l im i t e d  
by the neea f o r  s o c ia l  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n ;  and s o c ia l  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n
ie have already seen, can, accord ing to  no reasonable in t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  
It (including the b i o l o g i c a l ,  on which Spencer lays  much s t r e s s ) ,  be 
sonfined to d e fen s iv e  war and pu n i t ive  ju s t i c e .  Thus, in whatever way 
re may look at the law o f  equal freedom, our t h e o r e t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  
applying i t  to  p r a c t i c a l  questions seems to  be g rea t ,  and Spencer 's  
irgument in  support o f  i t  seems to  run round and round a v i c i o u s  c i r c l e .
With the general  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r i s in g  out o f  Spencer ’ s q u a l i f i c a ­
tions of the law o f  equal freedom made p la in ,  we are now in  a p o s i t i o n  
to examine c a r e fu l l y  the d e t a i l e d  manner in  which Spencer a pp l ie s  the 
law to the quest ion o f  man1 s r i g h t s .  I t  i s  easy to  dismiss Spencer 's  
application o f  the law o f  equal freedom w ith  the argument tha t ,  s ince 
10 two ind iv idua ls  are ex a c t ly  a l ik e  or equal,  there  can p e r fo r c e  be
io equal freedom. But we need not have recourse to  th is  or any such
1
extreme argument. We may put as ch a r i ta b le  an in t e r p r e t a t i o n  as
possible on Spencer 's law, and take i t  to  imply e q u a l i t y  o f  a 
sonventional and outward character ,  and i f  in  sp i te  o f  t h i s  l i b e r a l  
Interpretation, we can show that the formula i s  unmanageable and o f t e n  
inadequate, our c r i t i c i s m  w i l l  be convinc ing  and be f r e e  from 
hsti l i ty .
Tne f i r s t  group o f  r igh ts  to which Spencer naturally directs
attention i s  the group p e r t a in in g .to  l i f e  and l i b e r t y  or personal
8ecurity. Some o f  the r i g h ts  here d iscussed, i t  seems to  us, must be
oonceded to Spencer. I f  A k i l l s  B, i t  i s  p h y s ic a l l y  imposs ib le  f o r
B to k i l l  a , and i f  A puts B under lock  and key, A assumes, at  l e a s t
i Compare Philosophical Review, v o l .  1, p. 86, where an adverse " c r i t i c  
says, " o f  the various natural Rights spec i f ied  by Mr. Spencer, . . . .  
it must be said that not one o f  them i s ,  or can be, deduced from the 
law of equal freedom."
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so long as the r e s t r a in t  l a s t s ,  more freedom than B. But when we 
coirie to consider some o f  the other r i g h t s  claimed by Spencer, the 
deduction does not seem so obvious. What does equal freedom say about
the mutual d ea l in g  o f  wounds and blows? In  the words o f  Mait land 
(only in re fe rence  to  the question: in  Soc ia l  S t a t i c s ) ,  " I f  A smites
B, t'he l a t t e r  not unfrequent ly  f in d s  h im se l f  p e r f e c t l y  f r e e  t o  repay 
tne blow with in t e r e s t "  (Mind, O.S. v o l .  8, p. 521). But here Mait land 
does not have b e fo re  him the q u a l i f i c a t i o n  r e l a t i n g  to  "super f luous 
interference" found in 'Ju s t  i c e . "  Granting that  the g i v in g  and
.I;
receiving o f unca l led  f o r  blows co n s t i tu te  "agg ress ion  and counter-  
aggression", and th e r e fo r e  are to  be excluded, what s h a l l  we say about i 
injuries " th a t  there i s  mutual agreement to a l low  ( e . g . ,  Rugby f o o tb a l l ) , :  
for consent excludes coerc ion"  (S idgw ick ,  E th ics  o f  Green, e t c . ,  p.
280)? Must not the law of equal freedom support such a c t ion s?  And
. 1
la
yet Spencer says tnat "considered as the statement of a condit ion by
conforming to  which uhe g rea te s t  sum o f  happiness i s  to  be obta ined ,
the law ( o f  equal freedom) fo rb id s  any act  which i n f l i c t s  ph ys ica l  pain
°r derangement, ** ( J u s t i c e ,  p. 64 ) .  ( I f  so, where does n ega t ive
beneficence come in ? ) .  R ig n t l y  in t e rp r e t e d ,  the law ought on ly  to
forbid acts that cause surplus o f  pain over p leasure .  But i f  Spencer
accepts this  in te rp re ta t ion ,  w i l l  he not, in  his ca lcu la t ion  o f
Pleasures and pains to  some extent at l e a s t ,  be f a l l i n g  back upon the
s®pirical method o f  the orthodox U t i l i t a r i a n s  that  he so h e a r t i l y
iespises, and, to  that ex ten t ,  g ive  up h is  deductive U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  
.
ln the department o f  ju s t ic e?  Further ,  as we have had occas ion  to  
r®®ark be fo re ,  freedom, so long as i t  aims at the exc lus ion  o f  pain or
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annoyance as fa r  as po ss ib le  (cp .  J u s t ic e ,  p. 64 ),  r e f e r s  not on ly  to
freedom from phys ica l  coerc ion  or confinement, but a lso  to  freedom
1
from moral r e s t r a in t  and mental annoyance* What i s  to be the v e r d i c t
of the law o f  equal freedom upon the l a s t  two kinds o f  subt le  but none 
the less sure forms o f  v i o l a t i o n  o f  freedom, i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  say.
To take a p r a c t i c a l  example o f  moral r e s t r a in t ,  i t  i s  qu i te  conce ivab le  
that in every s o c i e t y  there are many in d iv id u a ls  who r e f r a i n  from 
breaking some o f  the laws o f  the State  because o f  the f e a r  o f  punish­
ment. Are we to  imagine that  the law o f  equal freedom would condemn 
such r es tra in t  as a v i o l a t i o n  o f  the equal freedom o f  some in d iv id u a ls ,
I
and that i t  would th e r e fo r e  work toward a s ta te  o f  anarchy or no-
!
government? Even i f  we do, our d i f f i c u l t y  w i l l  probably s t i l l  remain, j 
For there may be others in  tnat  new s ta te  o f  a f f a i r s  who w i l l  r e f r a i n  
from doing many th ings that  they would l ike ' to  do because o f  " th e  f e a r  
of lawless v io len ce "  (S idgw ick , Eth ics o f  Green, e t c .  p. 250). There­
fore, whether there i s  government or there  i s  no government, moral 
restraint o f  some kind seems in e v i t a b l e .  In r e p ly  to  th i s  adverse
i
criticism, however, Spencer might say that we are not tak ing  in to
consideration the " inden t ion "  o f  h is  formula and that  freedom does not
mean freedom to  do things that  are in ju r iou s  to  the w e l l - b e in g  o f
oneself or o f  socieuy. In  that case,  i t  seems r i g h t  to  argue that  the
formula that every  man i s  f r e e  to  do that which he w i l l s ,  prov ided 
h. •e infringes not Lhe equal freedom o f  any otner man (o r  government),  
will have to be a l t e r e d  to  read that every  man i s  f r e e  to  do a l l  that 
Wnich he honest ly  b e l i e v e s  i s  necessary f o r  h is  becoming what he i s
* ^Offlpare S idgw ick , Ethics o f  Green, etc." pp. 279-281. A lso  Spencer, 
Justice, p. 115.
capable o f  becoming in  e o c i e t y ,  and is  recogn ised  to  be so f r e e  by
society* Aw regards freedom in  the mental sphere, we roust say w ith
Sidgwick that " g ra n t in g  that the p r in c ip l e  ( o f  equal freedom) i s  to
exclude a l l  pain or annoyance as f a r  as p o s s ib le ,  r e f l e c t i o n  w i l l  
a
snow that i t  i s / d e l i c a t e  matter to  app ly  the ru le  in  the case o f  
mental annoyance; because we cannot prevent mental annoyance to  A, 
without s e r iou s ly  i n t e r f e r in g  with the freedom o f  a c t ion  o f  B" ( p . 281).
A pecu l ia r  r i g h t  considered by Spencer under the r i g h t  to 
physical i n t e g r i t y  i s  in  connection w ith  the communication o f  d is ease .  
Rigidly apply ing Spencer 's  fundamental formula of equal freedom to  
this r igh t ,  i t  seems p la u s ib le  to  argue that a fa t t ie r  has a r i g h t  to  
"fetch home h is  boy s u f f e r in g  from an epidemic d isease "  (J u s t i c e ,  
p. 69) by r a i lw a y - c a r r ia g e  prov ided he in f r in g e s  not the equal freedom 
of another fa th e r  who does the same th ing .  But Spencer o b je c ts  to  
this deduction unreserved ly  and b e l i e v e s  that  under no cond i t ions  
should the mischievous a c t ion  be a l lowed. I f  in  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  h is  
position Spencer should say tnat  the ac t ion  which he condemns i s  
contrary to the "maintenance o f  l i f e "  and o f  " s o c i a l  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n "  
the two important q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  introduced by him in to  the formula, 
it seems f a i r  to contend that  some general p r in c ip l e  l i k e  publ ic  
cafety should be the guid ing f a c t o r  in  the present case, and not the 
law of equal freedom. I t  indeed seems a r t i f i c i a l  and pedantic to  
insider the present case as a v i o l a t i o n  o f  the law o f  equal freedom.
I*1 this case, as w e l l  as in  many other cases to  which we s h a l l  d i r e c t  
attention as we proceed, we note an e s s e n t ia l  confusion  be bween the 




them claims fo r  h im se l f ,  and the r e s u l t in g  freedom to  a l l  concerned 
from the act ion  o f  any one in d iv id u a l .  Moreover, i f  conduciveness 
to "maintenance o f  l i f e "  and " s o c i a l  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n "  -  (understood 
in the broad sense in  which they are used h e re Ahot con f ined  to 
lefensive war or pu n i t iv e  ju s t i c e  or enforcement of c o n t r a c t )  -  are to  
lay down what things are to be p roh ib i t ed  by law and wnat no t ,  the 
limit of State a c t ion ,  we may be sure, w i l l  exceed the l im i t  o f  a c t ion s  
accessary to  the s t r i c t  maintenance o f  the law o f  equal freedom.. For 
Instance, ve ry  few people w i l l  agree that  f o r  an un licensed medical 
jractitioner in  a c i v i l i s e d  community to ca rry  on h is  p ro fe s s io n  un- 
lindered is  not contrary  to  ac t ions  conducive to  maintenance o f  l i f e  
or of soc ia l  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n .  And ye t  Spencer holds that  n e i tn e r  
the law of  equal freedom nor i t s  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  ought to  p lace  any 
restrictions upon such a p r a c t i t i o n e r  because he leaves  others f r e e  to  
or not to  buy h is  remedies.
From the r i g h t  to  phys ica l  i n t e g r i t y  Spencer passes on to  the 
right to f r e e  motion and locomotion. We are qu ite  w i l l i n g  to  concede 
to Spencer that th is  r i g h t  i s  a simple c o r r o l l a r y  from " th e  p r in c ip l e  
°f preventing mutual coerc ion  and pain as much as poss ib le "  , and that  
the complete establishment o f  t h i s  r i g h t  w ith in  the l im i t s  o f  a 
C1vilised State  i s  undoubtedly a r e s u l t  o f  the process o f  c i v i l i s a t i o n  
to modern times" (S idgwick, Eth ics o f  Green, e t c .  p. 281). But at 
toe same time we must add with Sidgwick tnat  " i f  we are to  dea l  w i th  
toe coro l lary  with p r e c is io n ,  we must d is t in gu ish  d i f f e r e n t  thingB 
toich Mr. Spencer puts together"  (pp. 281-2 ).  I t  w i l l  be g e n e ra l l y
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admitted that the r igh t  o f  f r e e  motion and locomotion i s  f a r  too
«
inadequate to condemn s lavery  and serfdom, and yet Spencer regards
these in iqu it ies  as mere in ter ference  with the said r igh t .  Common
ers
sense seems to he on the side o f  i d e a l i s t i c  think/ who condemn s la v e ry  
on the ground that i t  i s  a v i o l a t i o n  o f  the s a n c t i t y  o f  human 
personality, in  that i t  subjugates one ’ s w i l l  to  anoujuer’ s ,  as w e l l  
as on the side o f  U t i l i t a r i a n s  to  whom s la ve ry  i s  " i n t e r f e r e n c e  or - 
rather a p ro tec ted  r i g h t  o f  general in t e r f e r e n c e  - w ith  the f r e e  a c t ion  
of the in d iv id u a l ,  w itn  a view o f  d i r e c t i n g  that a c t ion  to  the a t t a i n ­
ment of the purpose o f  the s lave-owner" (Sidsiwick, p. 282). But i t  
seems hardly to  g ive  any support to  Spencer ’ s deduction. I f  s la v e r y  
were to be condemned simply because i t  i n t e r f e r e d  w i th  a pe rson ’ s 
right to f r e e  motion and locomotion, many other th ings l i k e  t r a f f i c  
rules and immigration and emigrat ion laws -  which are qu ite  e s s e n t ia l  
for c i v i l i s e d  ex is tence  -  would a lso  have to be condemned f o r  the same 
reason. i t  may even be contended that a l l  h i r ed  labour,  under which a 
■»an is not the master o f  h im se l f ,  i s  wrong, because i t  in v o lv e s  c u r t a i l ­
ment of the r i g h t  to  f r e e  motion and locomotion. But Spencer would 
probably p r e fe r  to  deal w i th  t h i s  case under the law o f  c o n t ra c t ,  and 
therefore we can leave  i t  out t i l l  we come to d iscuss the r i g h t  o f  
contract. Even s e r fa g e ,  i t  must be admitted , i s  not mere i n t e r ­
ference with locomotion, but ra ther  "an inc iden t  o f  the r i g h t  on the 
Part of A to  d i r e c t  the labour o f  B to  A 's  p r o f i t "  (S idgw ick ,  p . 282).
One thing more which needs to be emphasised, in examining 
sPencer‘s deduction of the right to free motion and locomotion,
is that Spencer does not here take in to  account the f i r s t  o f  the two 
accompanying q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  o f  h is  fundamental formula which renders 
it (the formula) app l icab le  only to  ac t ions  conducive to  the 
maintenance o f  l i f e .  Consequently, he does not seem to  think that  he
I
is called upon to  answer the quest ion whether a person has th e ’ “ r i g h t  
to move from Xfc® place to  p lace  without hindrance” ( J u s t i c e ,  p. 72) 
even when such f r e e  movement r e s u l t s  in  personal in ju ry  or death.
Compare, fo r  ins tance ,  J .S .  M i l l ’ s example o f  a man attempting  to  
cross an unsafe b r idge  ( L ib e r t y ,  pp. 151-2 ),  Spencer would ve ry  p ro ­
bably regard a case o f  th is  kind as coming under the purview o f  
beneficence, and not under that  o f  ju s t ic e?  But i t  i s  necessary to
i
remember that the quest ion to  be s e t t l e d  here i s  not one o f  c l a s s i ­
fication, nor o f  convenience, but o f  r i g h t s .  S t r i c t l y  speaking, i t  
seems to us thao on Spencer ’ s own premisses - the law and i t s  q u a l i ­
fications - a. person has a r i g h t  " t o  the use o f  unshackled limbs" 
only when such use i s  not contrary  to  ac t ions  necessary f o r  the 
maintenance o f  l i f e .  I f  Spencer agrees to  th is  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  what 
objection i s  there  on h is  own theory to the State  " i n t e r f e r i n g " ,  or 
at least warning, ' in  cases l i k e  the one mentioned above o f  a man 
attempting to  cross an unsafe b r id ge r  Surely  Spencer must grant that
I
hi6 action o f  the State  in  such cases i s  not a "super f luous i n t e r -
1
ference." (Where " i n d i r e c t l y  i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  in t e r f e r e n c e 71 o f  th is
j . :
8°rt, once begun, i s  to  stop, cannot be decided by the law o f  equal 
freedom). Further, i f  Spencer has no o b je c t io n  to  c a l l i n g  upon the 
State to abo l ish  s la ve ry  and serfdom (where found ) ,  which, as we have
T " — --------
sidgwick: Elements o f  P o l i t i c s  p. 130f.
223.
224.
ieen, are properly not mere v io la t io n s  of the p r in c ip le  o f  f r e e  motion 
ind locomotion but of a more general p r in c ip le  l i k e  the sacredness of 
imnan personality or s o c ia l  u t i l i t y ,  there is  no reason why he should 
object to the State warning a person against any harm that he might 
bring upon h imself ,  and in d i r e c t l y  upon others, in the exerc ise  of 
lis right to freedom o f  movement, or i t s  punishing him, i f  and when 
lecessary, f o r  an abuse o f  that r igh t ;  f o r  such actions a lso ,  i t  is  
blear, can be e as i ly  brought under one or other o f  the same general 
principles.
The group of r igh ts  to which Spencer passes next, and which
nhis mind seems to occupy a middle pos i t ion  between tne r igh ts  o f
ife and l i b e r t y  on the one hand and the r igh t  of property on the
in
other, is  the r igh t  to the uses of natural media, ("^Social S ta t ics "  , 
t is right to the use o f  the earth a lone ) ,  the c h ie f  natural media 
discussed being l i g h t ,  a i r ,  and land. The la s t  o f  these media is  so 
closely re la ted  to the r igh t  of  property that we may consider Spencer’ s 
reatment of i t  in  connection with propr ie tary  r ig h t .  As regards a
|
person's r igh t  to l i g h t  and a i r ,  we may concede to Spencer that,  to 
large extent, i t  is  capable of  deduction from the law of equal
it
reedom; though at the same time doubting the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  r i g i d l y  
bringing a l l  i t s  d ic ta tes  under ordinary law, because " o f  the 
^definiteness and uncertainty of the mischievous resu lts "  (Jus t ice ,
P* 69) a r is ing  from a v io la t i o n  of the r i g h t .  Even with regard to
deduction o f  the r igh t  i t s e l f ,  i t  seems necessary to say that in 
one oi> the cases mentioned by Spencer, the case of  those who are
p
adjacent to one another, e sp ec ia l ly  indoors, and who "are  compelled 
to breathe the a i r  that has already been taken in  and sent out time 
after time" (Just ice ,  p. 83),  Spencer r e a l l y  throws his p r in c ip le  
away when he t r i e s  to ju s t i f y  the " in te r fe r en ce "  by saying that where 
vit iat ion o f  a i r  is  mutual, there is  no aggression and counter­
aggression, because such v i t i a t i o n  might e a s i ly  hinder the maintenance 
of the l i v e s  o f  the "mutual v i t i a t o r s "  (Sidgwick, Mind, U.S. 1_, p.
115). Even i f  we grant that v i t i a t i o n  does not hinder the 
maintenance o f  l i f e ,  there is  no reason why Spencer should ob ject  to 
a parallel case noted above, v i z . ,  Rugby f o o t b a l l ,  where the in ­
f l ic t ion  of in ju r ie s  i s  mutual and something agreed upon and where, 
we may be reasonably sure, there is  a balance of pleasure over pain.
In a l l  these cases, then, i t  seems to us that Spencer’ s deductive 
Utilitarianism is  not o f  much a v a i l ;  the empirical method of 
orthodox U t i l i t a r i a n  raws: serves the purpose admirably. The truth 
of this c r i t ic ism  is  seen c l e a r l y  in the new r igh t  to freedom from 
disturbing sounds that Spencer seeks to estab l ish .  I t  indeed seems 
reasonable to suppose that the amount o f  "bad s t ree t  music", " o f  
loud noises proceeding from fa c to r ie s "  " o f  church b e l l s  rung at ea r ly  
hours" and " o f  ra i lway whistles at centra l s tat ions" that cons t i tu tes  
public nuisance, and how much should be brought under law, should be
.
left to empirical U t i l i ta r ian ism ,  rather than be formally  deduced 
from an abstract law (even i f  that is  p o s s ib le ) .  Yet Spencer 
believes in the a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  his formula to  a l l  these cases.
Next to the r igh ts  snd of l i f e  and l i b e r t y ,  the most sacred
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right of man is  probably his r igh t  to  property, and i t  is  here that
we find the aeid te s t  o f  the value o f  Spencer’ s law o f  equal freedom.
The question to be answered here i s ,  can the in s t i tu t io n  o f  p r iva te
property, whether in  land or in  any other commodity that is  capable
of being owned, be l e g i t im a te ly  derived from Spencer’ s fundamental
'formula'? And i f  the question can be answered by Spencer in the
affirmative and i f  propr ie tary  r igh ts  ©an be placed by him beyond
"the reach of any assaults that can be made by s o c i a l i s t  or
opportunist" (Maitland, Mind O.S. v o l .  8, p. 521), we may w i l l i n g l y
grant the value o f  his law of equal freedom, whatever i t s  shortcomings
in reference to  other r igh ts  may be. But before  d iscover ing
Spencer's answer, i t  i s  in s t ruc t ive  to  note the judgment o f  Co ler idge ,
1
who knew wel l  the law o f  equal freedom. Co ler idge ,  as Maitland 
points out, was c e r ta in ly  not biased against the claims o f  pure 
reason, and yet re jec ted  the law o f  equal freedom because, as he
thought, i t  must condemn property. " I t  is  imposs ib le ",  he says,
«
"to deduce the r i g h t  of property from pure reason" (F i r s t  Section,
Essay 4, v o l .  1, pp. 222, quoted by Maitland, p. 510), though he 
adds at trie same time that "abs trac ted ly ,  the r i g h t  to property is  
deducible from the f r e e  agency o f  man. I f  to act f r e e l y  be a r i g h t ,
In the fo l low in g  passage from the f i r s t  Section o f  his Essay 4 
wol. 1, pp. 219-220), quoted by Maitland, p. olO, we see Coler idge 
not in d is t in c t ly  foreshadowing the main doctr ine o f  Spencer’ s 
Justice, austere, unrelenting jus t ice  is  everywhere holden as the 
°ne thing needful; and the only duty of the ci-fizen, in f u l f i l l i n g  
which he obeys a l l  the laws, i s  not to  encroach on another ’ s sphere 
of action. The greatest possible  happiness o f  a people i s  not, 
according to th is 'system, the object of a governor; but to preserve 
the freedom of a l l ,  by coercing within the requ is i t e  bounds the 
freedom of each. Whatever a government does more than th is ,  comes 
of e v i l :  and i t s  best employment is  the repeal of  laws and regu la ­
tions, not the establishment of them. Each man is  the best judge of 
hib own happiness, and to himself must i t  there fore  be entrusted.
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a sphere of action must be so too . "  What Coler idge seems to mean 
by his qua l i fy ing  statement i s ,  as Maitland points out, that between 
proprietary r igh ts  and the law of equal l i b e r t y  there is  no formal, 
though there is  o f  necess ity  a p ra c t ic a l ,  contrad ict ion .  To th is  
interpretation of property, however, we may be sure, Spencer w i l l  
not agree. When he speaks of  property, he does not mean property 
in some abstract sense which can be of l i t t l e  value to i t s  owner, 
but property in  the most orthodox sense as implying appropriation 
and recognition of appropriation by others. I t  is  property in  the 
latter sense that Spencer must deduce from his law of equal freedom 
before estab l ish ing  the super io r i ty  of  h is  theory over other theor ies  
of justice.
Let us take the case of  the surface o f  the earth and ask our­
selves what maximum equal freedom means with regard to i t .  " I t  is  
obvious" says Sidgwick " tha t  the maximum freedom - i f  we take the 
word simply in i t s  ordinary meaning - is  atta ined by simply pro­
tecting each man while  using any port ion  of land for  the s a t i s fa c t i o n  
of his needs and desires -  say by ly in g  on i t ,  walking on i t ,  p icking 
wild strawberries, e tc .  - without excluding any other from s im i la r ly  
using the land at the same time or afterwards. (A c tua l ly  l e g i s l a t i o n  
d°ss treat roads, commons, e tc .  in  th is  way.) .  (Ethics o f  ' j
(Contd.) Remove a l l  the in ter ferences  of p o s i t iv e  s ta tu tes ,  a l l  
monopoly, a l l  bounties, a l l  p roh ib it ions ,  and a l l  encouragements 
°f importation and exportation, o f  part icu la r  growth and par t icu la r
manufactures; and a l l  things w i l l  f ind  th e ir  l e v e l ,  a l l  i r r e g u la r ­
ities w i l l  co r rec t  each other, and an indes truc t ib le  cyc le  of
harmonious motions take place in the moral equally  as in  the natural
world. The business of  the governor is  to watch incessant ly ,  that 
the state shall  remain composed o f  ind iv idua ls ,  act ing as ind iv idua ls ,  
oy which alone the freedom of a l l  can be secured."
reen, etc., pp. 282-3). But this use of land, it is clear, does not 
onstitute property, for "we are not accustomed to say that the man in 
he street is proprietor of the spot upon which he is standing" (Mait- 
and, Ibid, p. 512). Spencer himself is aware of the difficulty and,
►
n fact, argues against property in land in Social Statics. Thus he says 
"Given a race of beings having like claims to pursue the objects 
f their desires - given a world adapted to the gratification of those 
esires - a world into which such beings are similarly born, and it 
navoidably follows that they have equal rights to the use of this 
orld. For if each of them has freedom to do all that he wills, 
rovided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other, then each 
f them is free to use the earth for the satisfaction of his wants, 
rovided he allows all others the same liberty. And, conversely, it 
a manifest that no one, or part of them, may use the earth in such 
way as to prevent the rest'from similarly using it; seeing that to 
o this is to assume greater freedom than the rest and consequently 1-j 
o break the law. Equity, therefore, does not permit property in land" j
ut to this sound and coherent argument Spencer does not adhere when
i
te comes back to the question of land in Justice. He still holds to 
;he belief that "the aggregate of men forming the community are the 
mpreme owners of the land" but adds that "individual ownership sub­
set to State-suzerainty, should be maintained," (Appendix B? p. 270).
'his addition, however, it will be readily seen, is based not on the law j 
of equal freedom, but on Utilitarian (empirical) and other grounds, 
nstead of discussing the equal claims of human beings to land, Spencer 
concerns himself with the best form of governmental regulation which 
secure the common interests of all concerned. The question of 
expropriation by State-decree is not, as Spencer supposes, a question 
°f the "prior right of the community at large" which, he says, consists 
of the sum of the individual rights of its members" (Justice, p. 93),
Social Statics, section 1, of chap. 91
ut a question o f  the l i f e  o f the community being better ,  maintained 
iy restr ict ing the par t icu la r  freedoms o f  ind iv idua ls .  ¥Je may wel l  
;ympathise with Spencer when he says that " long standing appropriat ion, 
ontinued culture, as weljjae sales and purchases, have" so "complicated ,
.atters" that "the dictum o f  absolute e th i c s ................... i s  apt to be
enied altogether" ( i b id .  p. 85). But, we cannot gainsay the fa c t  
tat " i f  A is  allowed exc lusive  use of a portion of land, the freedom 
f B, G, D, is  necessar i ly  pro tanto r e s t r i c t e d  with regard to i t "
Sidgwick, Ethics of Green, e tc .  p. 283). " I t  i s  not enough to say 
hat B, 0, D, have equal freedom to appropriate s im ilar  land, the 
oint is that appropriation in ev i ta b ly  l im i ts  freedom f o r  the sake o f  
t i l i ty .  And in fa c t  - even i f  f o r  s im p l ic i ty  we concentrate 
ttention on land h itherto  unoccupied, land (say) in a new colony -  
he equal freedom to appropriate s im ilar  land w i l l  soon be impaired i f  
■ppropriation' is  f u l l y  allowed" ( i b i d ) .  The fa c t  o f  the matter, then, 
s that "the idea of mere equal freedom, mere p ro tect ion  from mutual 
incroachmeht is  c l ea r ly  inappl icab le"  ( I b id ,  p. 284) to the case o f  
and. Spencer h imsel f ,  as said above, instead o f  addressing h imself  
,0 the equal claims of human beings to  freedom, concerns h imsel f  w ith  
'he claims of general u t i l i t y  (Compare, Just ice ,  sec t ion  52).
Casting about to see whether there is  any poss ib le  way by which 
dividual ownership in land, which in "Just ice "  at l e a s t ,  Spencer 
eebs to think is  essen t ia l  fo r  s o c ia l  ex is tence ,  can be harmonised 
n-th the fundamental lav/ o f  equal freedom, i t  seems at f i r s t  s ight 
a way out may be found in the idea of communal ownership
located by Spencer both in Socia l S ta t ics  and Justice.  But on
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lose examination we f in d  that  th is  i s  not r e a l l y  so. I t  i s  necessary 
o remember that even in  s o c i a l  S t a t i c s ,  where Spencer s ideas on the 
ubject of land are more heterodox than elsewhere in h is  l a t e r  w r i t in g s ,  
ommunal ownership does not mean what we to-day  c a l l  " th e  nat ior^ isat ion  
f land"• Even i f  Spencer meant to  recommend n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n ,  that 
ould have helped him but a l i t t l e  way towards e s ta b l i s h in g  an eq u i ta b le  
ystem of p roperty .  For i f  land i s  to be n a t io n a l i s ed  on the ground 
hat i t  is  the common property  o f  a l l ,  inexorab le  l o g i c  w i l l  d r i v e  us 
o the conclusion that every  th ing  which nas come out o f  land, d i r e c t l y  
r ind irect ly ,  in  f a c t ,  n ea r ly  a l l  forms cf p roper ty ,  w i l l  a lso  have to  
e nationalised. But the meaning which Spencer g ives  to  communal 
wnership, in  Soc ia l  S ta t i c s  at l e a s t ,  i s  that  the burface o f  the earth  
s to be owned by " the  p u b l i c " ,  " th e  grea t  corporate  body - S o c i e t y " ,  
the community" , "mankind at la rg e "  , and i s  to be l e t  out upon leases  
t the best ren t .  When th is  i s  done, " a l l  men" Spencer claims 
would be equa l ly  land lords ;  a l l  men would be a l ik e  f r e e  to  become 
enants" . But i s  th is  r e a l l y  so? Over looking the p r a c t i c a l  
i f f iculty in the way o f  "mankind at la rg e "  resuming i t s  ownership 
the s o i l ,  and supposing f o r  the sake o f  argument that such 
eeumption has taken place a lready ,  i s  i t  true to  fa c t s  t o  say that  
ffien are equal ly  f r e e  to become tenants? Obviously not .  " A l l  
i t  i s  t rue ,  "observes  Mait land, "a re  equ a l ly  f r e e  to  b id  f o r  a 
arm> just as a l l  men are even now eq u a l ly  f r e e  to  b id  f o r  whatever 
ands or goods are in  the market* I f  a l l  that the law'- o f  equal 
iberty requ ires  in  the matter o f  land-tenure i s  that every  man s h a l l  
e equally f r e e  to  b id  f o r  land that law i s  p e r f e c t l y  f u l f i l l e d  in  
country (England) at th is  mo&<e®Lt ( i b i d ,  p. 515). In  r e p ly  to
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;his cr it ic ism, however, i t  is  open to Spencer to say that our 
¡xisting t i t l e s  to land are not v a l id  and that men cannot at present
lurchase an "equ itab le "  t i t l e .  But our answer to i t  is  " tnat this
;ruly unfortunate state o f  things w i l l  not be improved by the resumption, 
r. A w i l l  outbid his f e l low s  f o r  a s i t e  in che best quarter, f o r  the 
lest farm, the best moor" ( i b i d . ) .  What w i l l  enable him to do so w i l l  
e his greater wealth ( f o r  Spencer does not contemplate the resumption 
i  land by soc ie ty  without f u l l y  compensating present landowners), 
and his wealth w i l l  be then as now i l l g o t t e n .  In whatever i t  may 
onsist, coin or cotton or what not, i t  w i l l  consist  o f  matter sub­
tracted from tne common stock o f  mankind. Sale or bequest can not 
urn wrong into r igh t ,  lapise o f  time w i l l  not l e g a l i s e  what was once 
inlawful, and the long and short o f  i t  is  that A or his predecessors 
n t i t le  must have robbed mankind and he is  to be l e f t  in  possession
if the stolen goods and even suffered to acquire by means thereo f  a
eaee of public land. Our o r ig in a l  sin of  wrongful appropriat ion is  
lot thus to be purged away" ( ib id .  p. 516).
The conclusion, then, to which we are in ev i ta b ly  led  i s  that the 
basing out of  land by soc ie ty  to the highest ind iv idual bidders a f t e r  
°ull  compensation is  made to i t s  present holders,  is  not consonant with 
demands of equal freedom; and a c o ro l la ry  o f  that is  that 
individual ownership subject to S ta te -suzera in ty , recommended in 
Justice", also f a i l s  to f u l f i l l  the d ic ta tes  of equal freedom. We 
Centainly cannot agree with Spencer when he imagines that the demands 
of the law o f  equal freedom are s a t i s f i e d  by the occasional a l ien a t ion  
of land, fo r  public purposes a f t e r  f u l l  compensation has been made to
andowners compensating the landless,  introduced by him in to  his d is -
Lssion on the Land-Question (Appendix b ) ,  there is  a way -whether
itisfactory or not, is  another question - o f  approximately r e con c i l in g
le claims of freedom with p r iva te  appropriation. But unfortunate ly
lencer does not make much o f  th is  idea, and part o f  his argument is
even
] direct v io la t io n  o f  i t .  ^And/if he had developed the idea f u l l y  
id consistently, i t  would probably be seen, in the end that Spencer was 
ile to do so, not by means of  his favou r i te  deductive method, but by 
le empirical method o f  orthodox U t i l i ta r ian ism .  I t  w i l l  be r e a d i ly  seen 
lat in determining what constitutes  a f a i r  compensation " t o  those who 
ve spent th e i r  labour bona f id e  on tilings not properly  the irs "
¡idgwick, Ethics o f  Green, e tc .  p. 288) Spencer's law o f  equal freedom 
nbe of l i t t l e  serv ice ;  What we need is  some such p r in c ip le  as 
'Onformity to  normal exp ec ta t ion . '3 The ch ie f  argument in  Appendix 
is that since the year 1601 the poor have rece ived  something l ik e  
'00,000,000 from poor-rates charged on land which, Spencer suggests,
'tld be a high price f o r  " land in i t s  p r im it ive  unsubdued s ta te . "  
t this argument, as Sidgwick observes, i s  hardly re levant to the 
'Pal claims" of e x is t in g  human beings. " I t  seems more reasonable to 
•id that the poor-rates paid in the past are rather a compensation 
’ Past poor; and i t  might f a i r l y  be urged that they were inadequate 
®Pensation f o r  the in ju s t ic e  done to them" (Ethics o f  GUeen, e tc .
287-288). in  considering the s im ilar  case of a b o l i t i o n  of s lavery ,
)r instance, i t  would not be r igh t  to  take into account "money spent 
iave-owners in keeping slaves a l i v e  whom they might have k i l l e d .
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iigting h o ld e rs .  But y e t  we may grant  to  him tha t  in  the id e a  o f
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;f the poor were wronged by being kept out of the land, a p it tance  
Lied out under conditions of d is c red i t  seems inadequate to  balance the 
iast wrong, l e t  alone the present” ( ib id .  p. 288). Further, in  making 
.is elaborate ca lcu la t ion  of the amounts expended on the poor, Spencer 
ntirely ignores the important fa c to r  of  unearned increment in the 
alue of land, which is  due not to the labour o f  the landlords but to 
he increase of population. I t  is  an obvious in ference from 
pencer;s fundamental p r in c ip le  " that the e x is t in g  r en ta l ,  so f a r  as 
lot due to labour - e . g . ,  ground rents in towns ~ should be regarded 
s due to the poor" ( I b i d . ) .  But yet Spencer strongly argues against, 
t' elsewhere. Thus in  section 26, p. 44 o f  Just ice ,  he argues against 
ompensation to the landless when i t  takes the form of f r e e  l i b r a r i e s  
nd in sect. 37, p. 63 o f  the same t r e a t i s e ,  he seems to  disapprove 
i  poor-rates themselves.
Thus we f ind  that Spencer’ s t r ea tm en t  of land i s ,  ne ither  in
¡ooial Statics nor in Justice ,  in  s t r i c t  accordance with the demands
[f equal freedom. And i f  p r iva te  ownership of land (or lease )  is  not
leducible from the law of equal freedom, i t  fo l lows that the r i g h t  of
)roperty in material objects cannot be deduced from i t  e i th e r ;  f o r ,
ls Spencer himself  says, "Since a l l  material objects capable o f  being
)wned, are in one way or other obtained from the Earth, i t  resu lts
that uhe r igh t  of property i s  o r i g in a l l y  dependent on the r i g h t  to the
lae of the Earth" (Just ice ,  p. 94).  The connection between"the
“Ultitudinous possession^" of modern soc ie ty  and land may be "remote
entangled" , but i t  " s t i l l  continues" I (p. 94). in  the l i g h t
5f this argument, there fo re ,  the d is t in c t io n  made by Spencer in h is  
’
olit ical Ins t i tu t ions"  between property ih  land and property in  other
iiings, does not seem to be v a l id .  I t  i s  not true to say with him 
liat property in land is  s t i l l  "es tab l ished  by f o r c e " ,  and that property 
n other things is  a l l  "es tab l ished  by con trac t . "  As Maitland r i g h t l y  
beerves, "Purchase, g i f t ,  inheritance,  undisputed possession - these 
re the t i t l e s  to land as we l l  as to goods" (p. 519). When he comes to 
ustice, Spencer thinks that there are three ways in which under 
avage, s em i-c iv i l i s ed ,  and c i v i l i s e d  condit ions, men's severa l  r igh ts  
property may be established with due regard to the equal r igh ts  of
II
11 other men: ( l )  In  the savage condit ion , there may be a t a c i t  agree- 
ent among the occupiers of  a trac t  by which appropriation of w i ld  
roducts achieved by any one is  pass ive ly  assented to by others, - but, 
s Spencer's instance shows, "the assent may g ive  a vary ing amount to 
he individual" (Sidgwick, Ethics of Green, e tc .  p. 286). (2 ) In the
emi-civiliaed stage, there may be t a c i t  assent (or  po ten t ia l  contract )  
o the ownership o f  food grown by any one on the occupied area. (3 ) 
n the c i v i l i s e d  stage, there mlght be an actual contract by which 
ultivators should give a part o f  the ir  produce to those who devote 
temselves to other occupations and who, in so doing, fo rego  the r i g h t  
o their shares o f  land, though "we have no evidence that such a
slation..............has ever arisen" (Just ice ,  p. 97). i t  is  surpr is ing
,hat Spencer should have regarded these suggestions as amounting to a 
unification of  the actual r igh t  o f  p r iva te  p r o p e n . y ^  For wnat 
)r°of i 8 there f o r  the present landless that the assents that Spencer 
Peaks of were given by th e ir  predecessors? Even granting that there 
sufficient proof of  i t ,  Spencer makes no e f f o r t s  to show that these 
i’evious assents could bind the present landlessjones. "What modern
10ciali8m claims is  that ohe present system of p r iva te  property
______ ______________ ___ o ______
Cp* %dgwick> Ethics o f  Green, e t c . ,  pp. 286-287.
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revents the worker r e c e i v in g  f u l l  natural re turn  f o r  h is  work; aga inst  
his Spencer’ s defence o f  Ind iv idua l ism  i s  s u rp r is in g ly  weak" (_Sidgwick, 
bid. p. 287 ) .
We have examined at length  the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  de- 
ucing the r i g h t  o f  property  ( i n  land as welljas in  movables) from the 
aw of equal freedom, and have come to the conclusion that the con- 
eption of equal freedom, and the i n s t i t u t i o n  of p r i v a t e  p roper ty  
annot, in tn e i r  ve ry  nature, f i t  toge tner  harmoniously. I f ,  as
pencer's argument im p l ie s ,  the in d i v id u a l ' s  claim to  equal freedom i s  
atisfied by communal ownership o f  land, " the  quest ion  s t i l l  remains 
pen as to the extent o f  the in d i v id u a l ' s  r i g h t  o f  p roper ty "  (S idgw ick ,  
• 286). VJhat a perusal o f  his treatment o f  p roper ty  in  Ju s t ice  seems 
o reveal to us i s  that Spencer, l i k e  Locke, i s  convinced that  p r i v a t e  
iroperty there must be i f  s o c i e t y  is to e x i s t ,  but u n l ike  him, he t r i e s
| tnough unsuccessfu l ly  - to  r e c o n c i l e  th is  foregone conc lus ion  with
he law of  equal freedom, ins tead  o f  f o l l o w in g  the r i g h t  course adopted
y Coleridge o f  r e j e c t i n g  the law complete ly .
While the law o f  equal freedom thus f a i l s  to  prov ide  a j u s t i f i c a -  
'i°n of p r iva te  p roperty ,  the I d e a l i s t i c  and em p ir ica l  U t i l i t a r i a n  
neories o f  ju s t i c e  with which we have been co n tra s t in g  Spencer 's  
■heory r ight  a long ,  f in d  no such d i f f i c u l t y .  To a writer l i k e  T.H.
¡reen, l i f e  is  va lu e less  without freedom and f r e e  l i f e  is  v a lu e le s s
m
rithout property ,  because p roper ty ,  to  him is  " r e a l i s e d  w i l l "
^-ncipies o f  P o l i t i c a l  O b l iga t ion ,  p. 217). The r i g h t  o f  p roper ty ,  
ln other words, i s  regarded by him simply as an ex tens ion  o f  the 
rights of l i f e  and l i b e r t y ;  i t  i s  a means o f  a person en joy in g  his
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¡ike Sidgwick, the r i g h t  o f  ex c lu s ive  use, which co n s t i tu t e s  the most
1
' ssential element in  the r i g h t  o f  proper ty  and which cannot he upheld
if we take freedom - in the ordinary sense - as an ult imate end, w ith-
ut any regard to u t i l i t y ” (Elements o f  P o l .  p. 49) i s  f u l l y  j u s t i f i e d
ecause the protect ion of  such a r igh t  " i s  obviously required in order
hat individuals may have adequate inducement to labour in  adapting
atter to the s a t i s f a c t i o n  Qf t h e i r  needs and d e s i r e s -  ( i b i d . )  I f ,  then, 
and the U t i l i t a r i a n  In d i v id u a l i s t
he Idea l is t ic  ̂ theories of just ice  can, in addit ion  to accounting f o r  
he rights of l i f e  and l i b e r t y ,  e a s i l y  account f o r  the r igh t  of 
operty, fa irness demands that we should recognise the ir  su p er io r i ty  
o Spencer's fundamental formula., from which, as we have t r i e d  to  show, 
ittle beyond the r igh t  to personal freedom and the r igh t  to l i f e ,  
eems possible of deduction.
The r i g h t  o f  incorporea l  p r o p e r t y ( in  Soc ia l  S t a t i c s ,  i t  i s  " th e  
ight of property  in  id e a s " )  to which Spencer passes next ,  seems at 
irst sipht to be f r e e  from the d e fe c ts  attendant on the r i  gnt o f  
roperty in m ater ia l  th ings ,  but in  r e a l i t y  i t  i s  not so- We are 
uite w i l l in g  to grant to Spencer tha t ,  in  w r i t in g  a book or producing 
‘ Work of a r t ,  a person does not d i r e c t l y  i n t e r f e r e  with the equal 
reedom of others to  w r i t e  books or produce works o f  a r t  in  t h e i r  turn; 
,nti we may even concede to  him f o r  the sake o f  argument that a produc- 
'ion of mental labour may, in  f a c t ,  "be regarded as p roper ty  in  a 
uller sense than may a product o f  b o d i l y  labour; s ince that which
236-
hare of the common s o c i a l  good o f  the community. To ia»- U t i l i t a r i a n
Compare Sidgwick, Elements o f  P o l i t i c s  (3rd E d i . )  p. 68.
institutes i t s  value i s  e x c lu s i v e l y  ( ? )  created  by the worker" 
iustice, pp« 108-10©). But we c e r t a in l y  cannot agree w i th  him when 
I extends the r i g h t  o f  producing and p r i v a t e l y  en joy ing  a mental product 
; the r ight o f  imposing on others o f  any terms that the producer 
looses before g i v in g  them the p r i v i l e g e  * o f  using h is  product or o f  
ipropriating i t  to  themselves. A l l  that an a r t i s t  or a w r i t e r  can 
illy claim as h is ,  accord ing to  the law o f  equal freedom, would seem 
) be fu l l  l i b e r t y  to  do his work, so long as he does not i n t e r f e r e  w ith  
le like l i b e r t y  o f  o thers .  Nobody can f o r c i b l y  take away from the 
'oducer his hones t ly  produced work o f  a r t  or book, but when he o f f e r s  
; for sale, i t  would appear that he should fo re go  h is  o r i g i n a l  freedom 
id submit h im se l f  to whatever cond it ions  s o c ie t y  may impose on him in  
is interests , because s o c i e t y  c rea tes  a good part of the va lue o f  the 
ffliDodity. But obv ious ly  the d i f f e r e n t i a l  treatment o f  d i f f e r e n t  kinds 
' property Wxiich i s  implied here ,  cannot be deduced from the law o f  
[Ual freedom; i t  w i l l  p roper ly  come under the p r in c ip l e  of s o c ia l  
:pediency. Spencer h im se l f  seems i n d i r e c t l y  to  recogn ise  the t ru th  
P this c r i t i c i s m  when he comes to draw a c l e a r  d i s t i n c t i o n  between the 
•se of patents and other inco rporea l  property  on the bas is  that i t  i s  
LPhly probable that "when one man makes a d is cove ry  or invents  a 
Whine, some otner man possessed o f  s im i la r  knowledge and prompted
i
i like imagination, i s  on the way to the same d is cove ry  or inven t ion "  
Justice, p. 112). Such be ing  the f a c t  , Spencer t e l l s  us in  S oc ia l  
tatios, " there  arises Q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  to the r i g h t  o f  p roper ty  in  ideas 
Mch i t  seems d i f f i c u l t  and even impossib le  t o  s p e c i f y  d e f i n i t e l y "  
s°cial S ta t ic s ,  Ch. 11, se c t .  5 ) ,  and yet  he b o ld ly  adds that  "such
1'°r the corresponding statement in  S oc ia l  S t a t i c s ,  r e f e r  to  Ch. 12,
s e c t .  p.
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a d i f f i c u l t y  does not in  the l e a s t  militate aga inst  the r i g h t  i t s e l f " ,  
hardly r e a l i s i n g  tha t ,  in  so doing, he i s  r e a l l y  handing over another 
important department o f  law to  the em p ir ica l  U t i l i t a r i a n s .  Further ,  
i f  the duration o f  possess ion in  the case o f  d is c o v e r i e s  and 
inventions i s  to  be l im i t e d ,  w i l l  not the same l o g i c  apply in  some 
degree to books and works o f  a r t  too? "A man who wrote a book and 
could consc ien t ious ly  say of i t  that nothing th e r e in  conta ined was 
due to any one but h im se l f ,  would assured ly  need no law o f  copywright 
to protect him in  the enjoyment o f  h is  p e r f e c t  o r i g i n a l i t y "  (Ma it land , 
p. 523). I t  has even been suggested that  the w r i t e r ,  the a r t i s t ,  
the inventor and the d is co v e r e r ,  have a l l  l i k e  the backwoodsman in  
Social S ta t ics  made unto themselves a c l e a r in g ,  improved some part  
of the common inher i tance ,  and mixed t h e i r  labours therew ith ;  and 
that the ir  approp r ia t ion  i s  only law fu l  when "enough and as good Is  
left in common fo r  others" (Locke ) .  But we s h a l l  not a v a i l  ourse lves  
of this c r i t i c i s m ,  because o f  the extreme way in  which i t  s ta te s  the 
defect in Spencer 's  p o s i t i o n .
There are two fu r th er  po ints where the r i g h t  o f  inco rporea l
property, as developed by Spencer, seems open to  c r i t i c i s m .  In  the
first place, in  the case o f  land we found that  Spencer tended to  say
that soc ie ty  was the supreme owner o f  i t  and that in d iv id u a l  owner-
ahip was a qu a l i f ied  ownership. But in the case of  incorporeal
Property, on the contrary ,  the a r t i s t  and the wri-terare a l lowed to
claim the exclusive b e n e f i t  o f  the products of t h e i r  labour.  A
question which n a tu ra l ly  a r is es  here i s  whether to  the ex ten t  that  
Possession in  immaterial things im pl ies  con tro l  o f  m a te r ia l  th ings
238.
(and in d i r e c t l y  o f  la n d ) ,  the r i g h t  o f  in corporea l  p roper ty  must not
also be subject to  the S ta te -su ze ra in ty  to  which land i s  sub ject?
A second, p o in t , to  which Sidgwick d i r e c t s  a t t e n t io n ,  i s  that the
protection o f  the r i g h t  to inco rporea l  p roperty  r equ ires  in t e r f e r e n c e
in
of a novel kind - the prevent ion  o f  im i ta t io n .  But/the other cases 
considered by Spencer so f a r  (except  in  the case o f  l a n d ) ,  r i g h t s  
were secured by prevent ing  in te r fe rences  with "iaoii©®® conducive to 
maintenance o f  l i f e " .  Now, i f  as M. Tarde contends, im ita t ion -  i s  
the fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  s o c ia l  man and the mainspring of 
social progress,  "'would i t  not be p la u s ib le  to  l a y  down a 'R igh t  to 
Free Im i ta t ion '  as ind ispensable  to the improvement o f  a gregar ious  
animal? I t  would be qu ite  as p la u s ib le  as much o f  Mr* Spencer 's  
reasoning" (S idgwick, Ethics o f  Green, etc* p. 290 )*
A r igh t  which Spencer inc ludes under the r i g h t  o f  in co rpo rea l  
property, and o f  whose deduction from the law of  equal freedom he does 
not seem to be qu ite  c e r ta in ,  i s  the r i g h t  to r epu ta t ion .  ( i n  
Social S ta t i c s ,  i t  i s  " the  r i g h t  o f  p roperty  in  c h a r a c t e r " ) .  Thus, 
in Social S t a t i c s ,  a f t e r  arguing that a good repu ta t ion  may be 
regarded as property ,  Spencer in the end admits that  p o ss ib ly  h is  
reasoning may be thought in conc lu s ive .  To quote h is  own words,
"The pos i t ion  that character i s  property  may be considered open to  
dispute; and i t  must be confessed that the p r o p r i e t y  o f  so c l a s s i f y -  
n̂g i t  ig  not provable  with l o g i c a l  p r e c is io n .  Should any urge that  
this admission i s  f a t a l  to the argument, they have the a l t e r n a t i v e  
of regarding slander as a breach, not of that primary law which 
forbids us to  trench upon each o th e r 's  spheres of a c t i v i t y ,  bur o f
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that secondary law which fo rb id s  us to  i n f l i c t  pain on each o ther ” 
(Social S t a t i c s ,  ch. 12). The same u nce r ta in ty ,  though in  a le ss  
marked degree, i s  found in  J u s t ic e ,  where a f t e r  p a r t l y  adm it t ing  that  
"the in t e rd ic t  aga inst  in ju r in g  another 's  cn arac te r ” may he c o n s id e r ­
ed "as an in t e r d i c t  o f  nega t ive  bene f icence  ra ther  than an i n t e r d i c t  
of justice"^ Spencer says " S t i l l . . . .  i t  may be argued : that  the 
right to character  i s  a c o r o l l a r y  from the law o f  equal freedom"
(p. 115). Now with regard to these two quotations i t  must be said 
that i f  our problem here were one of mere c la s s i f i c a t i o n ,  i t  would 
not matter much whether we regarded the ru le  which forb ids  slander
as coming under Justice or under Beneficence, i t  being la r g e ly  a
matter of tas te .  But, as Maitland aptly  observes, "the question *
whether slander be forbidden by the F i r s t  P r in c ip le ,  is  surely one 
of substantial importance, fo r  on our answer to i t  depends whether or 
not the community may r i g h t l y  s t r i v e  to prevent slander by punishing 
the slanderer and g iv ing  the slandered a claim f o r  reparat ion. To
use coercion when i t  is not needed for the maintenance o f  equal 
liberty is  00 in fr in ge  the sovereign ru le" ( ib id .  p. b23). In the 
quotation from Social S ta t ic s ,  i t  -is evident that Spencer pre fers
regard l i b e l  as coming under the ju r isd ic t ion  o f  ju s t ic e .  But
cl!f anybody disputes i t ,  he would w i l l i n g l y  allow him to consider it, 
a violation o f  negative beneficence. But in "Just ice "  Spencer i s  not 
quite so frank. To his adversary who says that slander should not be 
Seated as a v io la t io n  of the law of equal freedom because i t  does not 
atand in the way o f  "the mutual c a l l in g  of names" Spencer has ready at 1 
üand the f i r s t  q u a l i f i c a t io n  of the fundamental formula to which we
called, a t t en t ion  at  the outset  that  the law, " r i g h t l y  in t e r p r e t e d ,  
does not permit exchange o f  in ju r i e s "  (p . 115). Repeat ing  a 
question which we put e lsewhere , what i s  the r e a l  d i f f e r e n c e  between
negative bene f icence ,  which " f o r b id s  us to  i n f l i c t  pain on each other"  
(Social S ta t i c s ,  ch. 12) and ju s t i c e  which does not permit mutual 
exchange o f  i n ju r i e s  (not only "p h ys ica l  r e t a l i a t i o n " , but a lso  
"moral r e t a l i a t i o n " ,  (cp .  " J u s t i c e " ,  p. 115)? I f  th e re  i s  l i t t l e  
or none, and i f  n ega t ive  benef icence  ought s t r i c t l y  to  be inc luded 
under the f i r s t  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  o f  ju s t i c e ,  i s  not Spencer wrong in  
making the l im i t  o f  S ta t e -a c t io n  co inc ide  with the l i m i t  o f  ju s t i c e  
narrowly conceived? A lso ,  does he not unconsciously  f a l l  in  l i n e  
with a c r i t i c i s m  that we advanced elsewhere tha t ,  on h is  own premisses, 
the guiding f a c t o r  of S ta te -duty  i s  not the p r in c ip l e  o f  ju s t i c e  or 
of beneficence as such, but a combination of both on the bas is  o f  
public advantage?
Going back to  the quest ion of the r e l a t i o n  o f  the r i g h t  o f  
reputation to  the law o f  equal freedom, i t  seems to  us that  we 
oust in s i s t  that i f  Spencer ’ s sovere ign  ru le  of s o c ia l  ju s t i c e  is  to 
®ean anything at a l l  in  the present contex t ,  i t  must, in  a d d i t i o n  
to deducing the r i g h t  of repu ta t ion  t h e o r e t i c a l l y ,  g i v e  us a 
practical in d ica t io n  as to  what cons t i tu tes  the law of  l i b e l  and 
slander. Merely to  say that the law o f  equal freedom demands 
property in  character  i s  not enough. We must know what th i s  
Property i s ,  but th is  we are not l i k e l y  to geu from the law o f  equal
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1
Compare Spencer 's s im i la r  statement with regard to  j u s t i c e :  " c o n s id ­
ered as the statement o f  a cond i t ion  by conforming to  which the 
greatest sum o f  happiness i s  to be obtained, the law o f  equal f r e e ­
dom fo rb ids  any act  which i n f l i c t s  phys ica l  ga in  or derangement"
( l u s t i c e ,  p. 6 4 ) .
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freedom. Spencer, however, t e l l s  us in  "Ju s t ice ” that true damaging 
statements are to he allowed and untrue damaging statements to be pro­
hibited, even complaining that in present day soc ie ty  "uhat which may 
be regarded as f a i r  c r i t i c ism  is  sometimes held to be l ib e l l o u s "
(p. 117). But is  this  simple so lut ion  r e a l l y  derived from the law 
of equal freedom? I f  the law, as Spencer says elsewhere, proh ib its  
the in f l i c t i o n  of any pa in , the question whether a damaging statement 
is true or not, w i l l  not a l t e r  the s i tua t ion .  In rep ly  to th is ,  i t
is open to Spencer to say that to allow f a i r  c r i t i c i s m ,  in sp ite  of
the pain i t  may cause, i s  the lesser  of  two e v i l s .  But in that case, 
we need for  our ult imate .guiding p r in c ip le  a more general' p r in c ip le  
than the law of equal freedom - a p r in c ip le  l ik e  public sa fe ty  or 
social wel l-be ing.  Even i f  we grant to Spencer that the so lu t ion  
suggested by him is  capable of deduction from the law o f  equal f r e e ­
dom, the question remains as to whether i t  w i l l  e f f e c t i v e l y  pro tect  
the true character of ind iv iduals  as we l l  as the general good o f  the
community. To this question, we shall  return lauer in the chapter
when we come to examine the correspondence between Spencer s de­
ductions and our ordinary le ga l  enactments. In the meantime i t  is  
necessary to say that while i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to apply the law o f  equal 
freedom to the making of  damaging statements - wnether true or f a l s e  - ,  
it car. be e a s i l y  applied to the , gratuitous in su lt in g  o f  one anotuer.
But cases of th is  class of  in ju r ie s  are probably not many.
Passing over to the r ights  of  g i f t  and bequest, which, s trangely  
enough, are omitted from the discussion in Socia l S ta t ic s ,  l e t  us see 
to what extent they are deducible from Spencer s fundamental formula
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of justice. Spencer supports the r igh t  of  g i f t ,  to which we f i r s t  
turn our attention,from three d i f f e r e n t ,  though c lo s e ly  - r e la ted ,  
points of view. In the f i r s t  p lace,  he says, the r igh t  o f  g i f t  may 
be viewed as a co ro l la ry  from the r igh t  o f  property. "Complete 
ownership", he argues, "imples power to make over the ownership to 
another" and, on the basis of  i t ,  concludes that " i f  the r igh t  of  
property is  admitted, the r igh t  o f  g i f t  i s  admitted" (Jus t ice ,  p. 118). 
But the unfortunate thing about this  deduction is  that Spencer, as 
seen above, has not been able to show uniformly that ownership is  
complete. In his discussion of landed property in Justice ,  he p la in ­
ly te l ls  us that o n es  r igh t  to pr ivate  property is  l im ited  and that 
it is v i r tu a l l y  subject to the exigencies of soc ie ty .  Even in  the 
matter of incorporeal property, he sees a decided need f o r  the 
limitation of  the period o f  p rotect ion  ( e . g . ,  patent laws),  rie 
further be l ie ves  that fo r  the purposes o f  defensive war and f o r  
"supporting those public administrations by which the r igh t  o f  
property, and a l l  otner r igh ts  are enforced" (Just ice ,  p. 102), 
property must be trenched upon. Therefore,  i t  seems r igh t  to say 
that there can be an unquali f ied  r igh t  to g i f t  only when there Is an 
unqualified r igh t  to property. In modern soc ie ty ,  f o r  instance, 
a person is  noo allowed to do whatever he l ik es  with h is  property.
He has to support his w ife  and children; and public opinion may even 
require him, i f  he is  ab le , to  support others l e g i t im a te ly  dependent 
uPon him. In the l i g h t  o f  a l l  th is ,  there fo re ,  we may say that the 
right of g i f t ,  l ik e  the r igh t  of  property, is  subject to  the 
interests of soc ie ty .  But i f  our e a r l i e r  c r i t i c i sm  is  valid"~that the
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right of p r ivate  property cannot be s t r i c t l y  deduced from the law
of equal freedom i t  fo l lows that the r igh t  of  g i f t  cannot be viewed
as a coro l la ry  o f  the f i r s t  r igh t .
In the second p lace,  Spencer claims that the r igh t  o f  g i f t  is  
a corollary from the primary p r in c ip le  o f  jus t ice  i t s e l f .  With 
regard to this  claim, i i  ig  necessary to say that i t  indeed seems 
absurd to remark that A has a r igh t  to g ive away his property to B, 
provided that he does not in fr in ge  the equal freedom o f  C to g ive
away his property to D or any one e lse ;  f o r  i t  is  obvious that A has
the right of g i f t  without this  proviso . Spencernhimself says that 
"the jo in t  transaction of g iv ing  and re ce iv in g ,  d i r e c t l y  concerns 
only the donor and the rec ip ien t^ ;  and leaves a l l  other persons 
unaffected in so fa r  as th e ir  l i b e r t i e s  to act are concerned (Jus t ice ,  
pp. 118-119). But is  th is  r e a l l y  so? Does not Spencer here seem 
to regard soc ie ty  as a loose c o l l e c t i o n  of  ind iv iduals  whose sc tions 
affect onl those immediately concerned and have no d i r e c t  or remote 
effect upon soc ie ty  as a whole? I f  the idea of a soc ia l  organism 
that Spencer employs elsewhere i s  to be taken ser ious ly ,  i t  is  
certainly wrong to say that the jo in t  transaction of g iv in g  and 
receiving does not a f f e c t  any one except the donor and the r e c ip ie n t .
We grant that wnen A makes a g i f t  to B, he does not in t e r f e r e  with 
the freedom of G to make a g i f t  to D. But i t  is  quite evident that 
the re lat ion  of A and B to sooieuy at large are d i f f e r e n t  from what 
they were before  the jo in t  transaction took place. Supposing B is  
a thri f t less  and an u t t e r l y  f o o l i s h  person and that lie withdraws the
II
.
Urge g i f t  made to him by A, say in the form o f  stocks and shares
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in a f lour ish ing  business, and squanders i t  r e ck le ss ly ,  w i l l  not 
the freedom o f  others " to act” be g rea t ly  a f fec ted?  For one thing,
then, and much more in that of bequest, we f ind  a good i l l u s t r a t i o n  
of a truth to which we ca l led  a t ten t ion  e a r l i e r ,  that throughout 
Spencer's app l ica t ion  of  the law o f  equal freedom to p rac t ica l
to claim f o r  themselves whatever r igh t  any one of them claims fo r  
himself and the resu lt ing  freedom to a l l  concerned from the act ion  o f  
any one ind iv idual.  I f  the " in ten t ion ” or "the essen t ia l  meaning” 
(Justice, p. 46) of Spencer s formula were to be in terpre ted  to impjy 
the result ing freedom of a l l  concerned, the r igh t  of g i f t  would not
For his third argument in support of the right of gift, Spencer
goes back to one of the primary laws of life in both the human and the 
sub-human world, according to which, "the preservation of the species 
depends on the transfer of parts of .... products, in either prepared 
or crude forms, from parents to offspring" (Justice, p. 118). But 
this argument which applies only to gifts to children, can be best 
considered under the rights of bequest and inheritance, to which 
we now pass.
Even if we grant to Spencer that so far as the right of property 
ts valid, the right of gift is valid, it does not mean that a right 
of bequest, therefore follows. Spencer ; s argument tnat "the right 
of gift implies the right of bequest; for a bequest is a postponed
many persons may be thrown out of  employment. In the case of g i f t
questions, we note an essen t ia l  confusion between tue freedom of a l l
be a corollary of the law of equal freedom, bux, of the principle of 
social well-being.
u;, f,
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gift” (Ju s t ice ,  p. 117) i s  v a lu e le s s ,  because i t  assumes that  the 
effect of ownership continues even a f t e r  death, and con trad ic ts  
Spencer’ s own statement, that " th e  p rop os i t ion  that a man can own a 
thing when he i s  dead, i s  absurd" (J u s t i c e ,  p. 122). Prom the po in t  
of view o f  the law of equal freedom, what Spencer has to  show, in  the 
words of S idgw ick , i s  " th a t  a man s freedom i s  in t e r f e r e d  w ith  by- 
refusing him the r i g h t  o f  determining what i s  to  be done w ith  any 
portion of  h is  m ater ia l  environment a f t e r  death" (E th ics  o f  Green, 
etc. p. 292). But th is  he cannot ve ry  w e l l  do. Even i f  Spencer 
should say that A has a r i g h t  to  bequeath prov ided that  he does not 
infringe the freedom o f  B,C,D, e t c .  a lso  to bequeath, we have at  hand 
an argument used by us e a r l i e r  that the r e s u l t in g  freedom to  a l l  
concerned from A 's  a c t ion  may be much l e s s  than whao i t  might o th e r ­
wise have been. That th is  i s  not a mere p o s s i b i l i t y  but o f t e n  a 
certainty, can be shown from the f a c t  that in  modern s o c i e t i e s  there  
are many cases where " i f  the t e s t a t o r ’ s design i s  c a r r i ed  out i t  may 
become worse than u se le ss ,  owing to  change o f  circumstances, even when
*
it was o r ig in a l ly  wel l  conceived" (Sidgwick, Elements of  P o l i t i c s ,  p.
1
102) - not to speak o f  f o o l i s h  and mischievous bequests. There fore ,
if we are to have the greatest  possib le  freedom which, according to  
Spencer, is  necessary fo r  the r e a l i s a t io n  o f  the U t i l i t a r i a n  end o f  
tl:1e greatest possible  happiness, the r igh t  of a person to f r e e  bequest 
becomes dubious. On the other hand, i t  must be said that i f  a
1 In repjjy'to this c r i t i c i sm ,  however, i t  may be said that i t  doe sapply to Spencer, since he definitely says that the right of bequest does - -■* -I--*- + ~ i  - - ...8 not include the r i g h t  o f  determining what i s  to  be done w i th  a 
Ban s property a f t e r  h is  death. But u n fo r tuna te ly  f o r  t h i s  r e p l y ,  
Spencer con trad ic ts  h im se l f  when he a l lows Jhe t e s t a t o r  f u l l  freedom 
ln the choice o f  r e c ip ie n ts  and in the amounts assigned to  such
recipients.
person "could own property and transfer  i t  up to the moment of  
death, without encroaching on the freedom, o f  other members of the 
community, i t  is  hard to see how th is  can be in te r fe red  with by a 
transfer that takes place a f t e r  death" ( Ib id .  p. 55). Thus we seem 
to be caught beuween the horns of a dilemma: the law o f  equal freedom
seems capable of both ju s t i f y in g  and condemning the r igh t  of  bequest. 
The only way of ex t r ica t in g  ourselves from the d i f f i c u l t y  i s  tojadmit 
that the lav; o f equal freedom is  too inadequate to  explain the r igh t  
of bequest, and to look f o r  a p r in c ip le  l ik e  U t i l i t a r i a n  indiv idualism 
which values the indiv idual s freedom "as a means, not to h is  own 
happiness alone, but to the general happiness"; which, in  other 
words, takes into consideration not only the in te res ts  o f  the fam ily  
but also the inuerests o f  the community at la rge ,  and conserves
I
whatever inducements may have been found necessary " t o  the exerc ise
C,
of industry and t h r i f t  in advancing yearA" (Sidgwick, P o l i t i c s ,  p. 55).
The inadequacy of the law of equal freedom fo r  the deduction 
of the r igh t  of bequest, comes «mi c l e a r l y  when Spencer proceeds 
to qualify his statement that the r igh t  o f  bequest does not include 
the right o f  p rescr ip t ion  as to the uses o f  bequeathed property.
In the f i r s t  place, he says that in order " t o  f u l f i l  parental 
obligations as fa r  as poss ib le ,  parents must so spec i fy  the uses of 
bequeathed property as to further  th e ir  ch i ld ren 's  we l fare  during 
immaturity" (Just ice ,  p. 125). We shall  not quarrel with Spencer 
for tnis q u a l i f i c a t io n ,  since, according to any system o f  Eth ics ,
ihe case of children and other such persons needs to  be treated
_  may observe in  passing that in determining
separately, although we
.
o^Ply to th is  c r i t ic ism ,  however, i t  may be said that i t  does not 
■I oo Spencer since he d e f in i t e l y  says that the r igh t  o f  bequest does 
.hiclude the night of determining; what is  to be done with  a man s 
Perty a f te r  his death. But unfortunately f o r  ttiis repTty, gpencer
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when the immaturity o f  ch i ldren  ends and wnen th e i r  claim to assert
their own f r e edom begins, which from Spencer's point o f  view is  an
extremely important question, Spencer f inds that h is  sovereign ru le
can give him no help, and so f a l l s  back upon the "ord inary experiences
■
of men. I f  by his expression, Spencer means a conventional age 
limit set by the State ,  i t  would appear that freedom a f t e r  a l l  is
I!';
not of such paramount importance as Spencer would have us b e l i e v e .
In the second place,  Spencer allows bequest of  personalty ,  though 
not rea l ly  to d t f i n i t e  uses; but here, as in  many other p laces,  where 
his sovereign rule does not apply, he says, "an empirical compromise
* :
appears needful" (Just ice ,  p. 125). The l im its  imposed on the
.
prescription of bequest o f  personalty, instead o f  those prescribed 
by equal freedom, are those " s e t t l e d  by experience o f  resu lts "
(Ibid.). Besides, while we agree with Spencer that the bequest of
.
personalty must be placed in a d i f f e r e n t  category from the bequest
of realty,  w6 f a i l  to see how the law of equal freedom can help us
in tnis matter. Thus, when Spencer says "One who holds land subject
to that supreme ownership o f  the community which both e th ics  and law
assert, cannot r i g h t l y  have such power of w i l l i n g  the app l ica t ion  of
it as involves permanent a l iena t ion  from the community" (Jus t ice ,  p.
124), he fo rge ts  that land may be permanently a l ienated  from the
community by a ser ies  of g i f t s  to ind iv idua ls .  "Of course the land
®ight be taken by the community; but why not with compensation"
ntdp^ontradicts nirnself when he allows the te s ta to r  f u l l  freedom in the : 
ice of rec ip ients  and in the amounts assigned to such r e c ip ien ts .  I f  
Bcription, of the uses of  bequeathed property is  denied, "persons d e s i r -  
of posthumously regu la t ing  the use of th e ir  property would t r y  to 
this by bequeathing i t  to persons pledged to carry out th e ir  
Nations, and would probably in a large measure succeed" (Sidgwick,
"tica, p. 53).
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(Sidgwick, Ethics of  Green, e tc .  p. 293)?
The e n t i r e l y  empirical character o f  Spencer;s treatment o f  the
bequest of personalty is  we l l  brought out in the f o l lo w in g  e x t r a c t : -
"In respect of what is  classed as personalty , however, the case is  
different. Property which i s  the product o f  e f f o r t s ,  and which has 
resulted e i ther  from the expenditure of such e f f o r t s  upon raw 
materials fo r  which equivalents (represent ing so much labour) have 
been given or from the savings out of wages or sa la r ie s ,  and is  thus 
possessed in v ir tue  o f  that r e la t io n  between actions and th e ir  
consequences on the maintenance of which jus t ice  in s i s t s ,  stands in 
another category. Such property being a portion o f  that which 
society has paid the indiv idual f o r  work done, but wh'ich he has not 
consumed, he may reasonably contend that in g iv ing  i t  back to s oc ie ty ,  
either as represented by certa in  o f  i t s  members or by some incorporat­
ed body, he should be allowed to spec i fy  the conditions under which 
the bequest is  to be accepted. In th is  case, i t  cannot be said that 
anything is  a l i e nated which belongs to others. Contrariwise,  others 
receive that to which they have no claim: and are bene f i ted ,  even
when they use i t  f o r  prescribed purposes: re fusa l  of i t  being the
alternati v e i f  the purposes are not regarded as bene f i c i a l .  S t i l l ,  
as bequeathed personal property is  hab itua l ly  invested, power to 
prescribe i t s  uses without any l im i t  may resu lt  in i t s  being • 
permanently turned to ends which, good though they were when i t  was 
bequeathed, have been rendered otherwise by s o c ia l  changes" (Jus t ice ,  
p. 125.
In the underlined sentences we f ind  that Spencer, instead of 
using the argument that we would expect him to use, that A has a r igh t  
to the prescr ipt ion  of the use o f  bequeathed personalty provided that
ue does not in te r f e r e  with the freedom o f  B,C,D, e tc .  to prescr ibe
bequeathed
the uses o f  their/personalty ,  concerns himself  with the r e su l t in g  
freedom and happiness to B,C,D, e tc .  from A 's  act ion. I t  i s  obvious 
that Spencer, no more than others, can both run with the hare and 
hunt with the hounds.
The r igh t  of bequest, then, seems to  us not capable o f  easy 
deduction from the law of equal freedom. But more than that,  i t  
seems to be capable of coming in to  v io len t  c o n f l i c t  with Spencer’ s
fundamen"tel b io lo g i c a l  basis o f  soc ia l  ju s t ice .  To s uate the 
criticism a l i t t l e  more f u l l y ,  even i f  we grant to Spencer f o r  the 
sake of argument that the r igh t  of  bequest is  deducible from the law 
of equal freedom, the consequences which fo l low  an assert ion  o f  the 
right may mean unequal freedom fo r  others, and tn is ,  in turn, may 
mean a v io la t io n  o f  Spencer’ s b io lo g i c a l  e th ica l  p r in c ip le  that each 
individual ought to rece ive  "the b ene f i ts  and e v i l s  o f  his own 
nature" and consequent conduct. A large  bequest to a thoroughly 
foolish and in e f f i c i e n t  person, f o r  instance, w i l l  mean re v e rs a l ,  
in his case, o f the fundamental law of bene f i ts  being proportionate 
to e f fo r ts  or merits ,  and re tardat ion  o f  Spencer’ s absolute s ta te .
In his treatment of the r igh t  of bequest, Spencer overlooks these 
important considerations and concerns himself only with the equal 
freedom of tes ta to rs .  He g ives l i t t l e  or no thought to the freedom 
of benef ic iar ies  and of the public at la rge ,  not in respect to  th e i r  
freedom to bequeath, but in respect to the ir  freedom to f u l f i l  the 
laws of l i f e  and the conditions of existence.
The r igh t  of  f r e e  exchange, says Spencer, i s  a c o ro l la r y  from 
the rights of property and g i f t  as we l l  as a d i r e c t  deduction from 
the law of equal freedom. I f  by f r e e  exchange Spencer means an 
unqualified r igh t  to exchange subject only to  the law of equal 
freedom, i t  cannot be true, f o r ,  on his own tneory, we have seen that 
one's r ight to property and, in  turn, to g i f t  i s  not absolute; and 
inasmuch as the l im ita t ion  imposed is  on grounds otner than the 
ground of equal freedom, e . g . ,  public good, expediency, e t c . ,  the
2 b l .
the right o f  exchange also must he subject to the same kind of  
limitation. In deducing the r igh t  o f  f r e e  exchange from the law 
of equal freedom, i t  does not seem accurate to say that !i o f  the two 
who vo luntar i ly  make an exchange»neither assumes greater  l i b e r t y  of 
action than the other, and fellowmen are un inter fered  with" (Jus t ice ,  
pp. 127-128), f o r  the bargaining power o f  the two may not be, and 
often is not, the same; and the d i f fe ren ce  in th e ir  bargaining 
powers is  by no means a sure index of tn e i r  d i f f e ren ce  in adaptation 
to the laws o f  l i f e .  Also, the resu l t ing  freedom to th e i r  f e l l o w ­
men from the action o f  A and B may be profoundly d i f f e r e n t  from what 
it was before the transaction took place.
In dealing with the r igh t  to f r e e  industry which is  c lo s e ly  
related to the r igh t  o f  f r e e  exchange, Spencer claims that each man 
is free " t o  carry on his occupation, whatever i t  may be, a f t e r  what­
ever manner he prefers  or thinks best ,  so long as he does not t r e s ­
pass against h is  neighbours“ (Just ice ,  p. 133). The important thing 
here is to know what i s  meant by the s ign i f i c a n t  phrase, "trespass 
against his neighbours." From one point o f  view, i t  i s  poss ib le  
to argue that when a b ig  commercial trust or combination goes about 
crushing i t s  competitors by ruthless underse l l ing ,  la rge -sca le  
advertisement (making extravagant claims fo r  i t s  goods), e t c . )  i t  
hoes not in te r f e r e  with th e ir  equal freedom, because they a lso are 
free to combine and to adopt the same unscrupulous t a c t i c s .  But 
from another point of view, the action o f  the trust may be construed 
as a trespass against i t s  competitors, f o r  the re su l t in g  freedom to
!
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them from i t s  action is  decidedly less than what i t  was before  i t
came on the scen6. And Spencer h imsel f ,  as we have seen e a r l i e r ,
occasionally takes in to  consideration the r e su l t in g  freedom to a l l
concerned from the act ion of any one ind iv idua l ,  in addit ion  to
considering the freedom of a l l  to claim f o r  themselves whatever r i g h t
any one of them claims fo r  h imsel f .  Even i f  th is  observation o f  ours
were proved to be wrong, i t  could e a s i l y  be shown that in  the case
under discussion s oc ie ty  is  not a t ta in ing  the maximum net freedom
that is  possible  fo r  i t  to a t ta in ,  and. that,  there fo re ,  i t  does not
realise i t s  maximum possible  happiness. I t  would appear then that
what we need in the present case f o r  the achievement of maximum
possible freedom, and there fo re  of maximum poss ib le  happiness, is
State control and regu lat ion  on a basis of s oc ia l  and economic 
1
u t i l i t y .
Even i f  we grant to Spencer f o r  the sake of argument that to  the
extent that the r ights  of  property and g i f t  are v a l id ,  the r igh t  of
free exchange is  v a l id ,  we cannot agree with him when he says that
the right of  f r e e  contract is '  implied in the r igh t  of f r e e  exchange
(Justice, p. 129), because o f  a new element introduced in to  i t ,  v i z . ,
the element o f  f u t u r i t y . Borrowing the words o f  Sidgwick in h is
Polit ics, we may say that we do not see how the performance of
contracts to render future services "can be c le a r ly  deduced from
1 Compare Green*s words on the discussion here: "The freedom to do 
as they l ik e  on the part o f one set of men may invo lve  the 
ultimate d isq u a l i f i c a t io n  of  many o t t e r s ,  or o f  a succeeding
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the princip le  that adopts Freedom as an ult imate end; since man
would be more completely  f r e e  - in  the ordinary sense -  i f  h is
vo l i t ion  at any g iven time could not be l e g a l l y  r e s t r i c t e d  by any
previous expression o f  w i l l  as regards the fu tu re :  though h is  power
of a t ta in ing  h is  ends would, o f  course ,  be diminisned by h is  be ing
less able to r e l y  on the fu ture  ac t ions  o f  others"  (p .  54 ).  Moreover,
i f  freedom were our u l t im ate  p r a c t i c a l  end, i t  would appear that  a l l
contracts which "do not tend to impair the freedom o f  any th i rd
party" ( I b i d . )  ought to be l e g a l l y  en forced. But, in  po in t  o f  f a c t ,
such i s  not the case. Bo reasonable State  w i l l  en force  a contract
that is  immoral or d e f i n i t e l y  aga inst  public  good, o f  which the good
of the con tract ing  p a r t i e s  i s  an i n t r i n s i c  pa r t .  Ordinary
experience shows us that  i f  we are to  have the maximum net freedom
possible, not a l l  contracts  f r e e l y  entered inuo ought to  be eq u a l ly
enforced* Sidgwick says that from a b t i l i t a r i a n  po in t  o f  v iew ,
"what is  p r im a r i ly  important i s  not that A should perform h is  promise
to b , but that B should not be damaged by A ‘ s non-performance"
( ib id ) .  Although we cannot whol ly  agree with th is  statement, which
reduces the enforcement of a l l  con tracts  to a matter of expediency,
i t  seems to us that on the u t i l i t a r i a n  bas is  i t  i s  more s a t i s f a c t o r y
than a mechanical and absolute enforcement o f  a l l  con tracts  f r e e l y
TContd.) generat ion ,  f o r  the exe rc is e  o f  r i g h t s .  This app l ie s  most 
obviously to  such kinds o f  con trac t  or t r a f f i c  as a f f e c t  the hea l th  
and housing o f  the people ,  the growth o f  populat ion r e l a t i v e l y  to 
the means o f  si ib 's istence» and the accumulation or d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
landed property"  (S ec t ion ,  209).
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greatest possib le  nappiness. From our point of  v iew, which regards
freedom as a secondary p r in c ip le  subordinate to the primary p r inp ip le
of the highest we l l -be ing  of s oc ie ty ,  i t  would seem that a theory of
justice which, in speaking of in ter ference  with the freedom of 
'
contract, considers not only the freedom of those who are in te r f e r ed
with, but also those whose freedom is  increased as a resu lt  o f  that
interference, has more in i t s  favour than Spencer’ s law o f  equal 
1
freedom.
Spencer himself qu a l i f i e s  the r igh t  to f r e e  contract in  consider- 
ing slavery. I t  i s  worth our while  to look somewhat into  th is  
qualif ication because we have here a good i l lu s t r a t i o n  o f  the 
inadequacy and hollowness o f  the law of equal freedom. In  r e fu t in g  
those who claim s lavery  to be a contract,  i t  seems to us that Spencer 
really g ives up his case, even as J.S- M i l l  does in  dea l ing with the 
same subject. The f i r s t  ob ject ion  that Spencer ra ises  against 
slavery is  that i t  suspends " that  r e la t io n  between e f f o r t s  and the
products of e f f o r t s  which is  needful fo r  the continuance of l i f e "
■
(Justice, p. 130)* But th is  infringement o f  the b i o l o v i c a l  basis o f  
justice is  not peculiar to s lavery alone. I t  applies to other cases 
too. a large g i f t  fex to a useless son by an abile fa ther  ( to  which 
spencer has no ob ject ion )  may be regarded as a case in point. In 
rePly to the second object ion  that s lavery  v io la te s  the imp l ica t ion  
of the law of equal freedom that "con tract ing  part ies  snail  s e v e ra l ly
T~ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------
Compare Green’ s P r inc ip les  of P o l i t i c a l  Obligation. Sect. 209.
made, which, on the f a c e  o f  i t ,  seems in capab le  o f  p roduc ing  the
2  •
give what are approximately equ iva len ts "  ( i b i d . ) ,  we must ask with 
Sidgwick the p e r t in en t  quest ion ,  i:i f  the judgment o f  c o n tra c t in g  
parties as to equiva lence i s  to be overru led  nere ,  why not i n t e r f e r e  
further to  secure equiva lence"  (Eth ics  o f  Green, e tc  .p pp. 294-5)?
The group of r igh ts  to which Spencer next passes comprises 
the rights o f  f r e e  b e l i e f  and worship and the r igh t  of f r e e  speech 
and publication. The r igh t  o f  f r e e  b e l i e f  does not, as Spencer 
think i t  does, mean freedom, to profess b e l i e f ,  f o r  the consequence 
of the former may be confined to the indiv idual alone, while that of 
the la t te r  necessar i ly  touches others- Nor is  i t  true to say that 
"the assert ion o f  the r igh t  to  freedom o f  b e l i e f  imples the r igh t  
to freedom o f  speech" (Just ice ,  p. 141) and the r ig h t  to pub licat ion ; 
nor that " in  respect of th e ir  e th ica l  re lat ions.,  there ex is ts  no 
essential d i f fe ren ce  between tne act of speaking and the act of 
eyrnbolising speech by w r it ing ,  or the act of mult ip ly ing  copies of 
that which has been written" (Just ice ,  pp. 14-1-2). B e l i e f ,  pro­
fession of b e l i e f ,  speech, and publication do not a l l  lead to  the 
same social resu lts ,  and, there fo re ,  i t  i s  necessary to  consider them 
separately and not t ry  to l ink  them together,  as Spencer does, in  
the form of a s o r i t e s .  In  deducing the r igh t  of f r e e  b e l i e f ,  Spenoer 
says, "The profession of a b e l i e f  by any one, does not o f  i t s e l f  
interfere with the professions of other b e l i e f s  by others" (Just ice ,
P* 136). But i t  is  apparent that Spencer here is  not considering, 
as he sometimes does, the resu lt ing  freedom to others from the act ion  
any one indiv idual.
On the s t r e n g th  o f  h is  t rea tm ent  o f  the r i g h t  to  f r e e  b e l i e f . ,
one would expect Spencer to  take an extreme view in  r espec t  o f  the 
other r igh ts  o f  worship, speech, and p u b l ic a t ion .  But, as a matter 
of fa c t ,  he does not do so. He l im i t s  these r i g h ts  cons id erab ly  
by using the f i r s t  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  o f  h is formula which r e fu ses  to  
countenance aggress ion  and counter-aggress ion .  Thus he says that 
freedom o f  worship extends only to acts wnich "do not i n f l i c t  
nuisances on neighbouring people" (J u s t i c e ,  p. 137) and that 
"freedom o f  speech, spoken, w r i t t e n ,  or p r in ted ,  does not inc lude 
freedom to use speech f o r  the utterance  o f  calumny or the propagation  
of i t ; nor does i t  include freedom to  use speech f o r  prompting the 
commission o f  In ju r ies  bo oth e r s " • Let  us a l low  that a l l  these 
limitations are equa l ly  de r ived  from the f i r s t  q u a l i f i c a t i o n .  But 
that is  not enough. What we wish to  know most from one who values 
individual freedom h ig h ly ,  i s  the p rec ise  meaning o f  the under l ined  
expressions. Unfor tunate ly  the law of  equal freedom is  incapable  
of helping us to  decide th is .  I f  f o r  ins tance ,  the in ju n c t ion  
against nuisances i s  to be c a r r i ed  to the extent of p reven t ing  "bad 
street music" and " the  uproar o f  Sa lva t ion  Army processions"  ( J u s t i c e ,  
P* 137). cis recommended by Spencer, I t  i s  c l e a r  that the freedom 
of action o f  a l l  concerned ( i n  the .case o f  bad s t r e e t  music, freedom 
to carry on one ’ s occupation in  one 's  own way) w i l l  be g r e a t l y  
curtailed. Both f o r  the conservat ion  o f  the maximum net freedom 
°f ind iv iduals  and f o r  the r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  the w e l l - b e in g  o f  s o c i e t y  
(in connection w ith  the r igh ts  under d iscuss ion )  the gu id ing p r in c ip l e  
heeded i s  a p r in c ip l e  l i k e  p r a c t i c a l  expediency and not the mechanical 
and impotent law o f  equal freedom.
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'When we turn to the r i g h ts  o f  women and ch i ld ren ,  we n o t ic e  that
Spencer passes from the sub ject-matter  o f  r i g h ts  to  the persons to
whom r igh ts  be long ,  and ye t  n a iv e l y  b e l i e v e s  in  the a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f
the law o f  equal freedom. So long as Spencer con f ines  h im se l f  to the
subject-matter o f  r i g h ts  we can see how h is  formula o f  ju s t i c e  can be
made to apply to  i t .  But when he turns to a cons id era t ion  o f  the
persons to whom r i g h ts  be long ,  i t  becomes d i f f i c u l t  to  see the
app l icab i l i ty  o f  the formula. I t  would appear tha t  the only  way
by which the law o f  equal freedom could be r e la t e d  t o  the personnel
of r ights i s  to p o s i t  that a l l  human beings - both men and women
(leaving out f o r  a moment the case o f  ch i ld ren  which deserves sp ec ia l
consideration) - have the same f a c u l t i e s  to  e x e r c is e  and, t h e r e f o r e ,
the same r i g h t s ,  which means, in  other words, that  whatever
conditions the law o f  equal freedom d ic ta t e s  apply to  men and women
alike. This i s  e x ac t ly  'what Spencer does in  Soci-al S ta t i c s -  But
in his l a t e r  and more mature w r i t in g s ,  he cons iderab ly  m od i f ies  th is
Kb
position, and to the extent  which he does tha t ,  he seems to  us to 
wander from h is  f i r s t  P r in c ip l e -  Thus, when in  Just ice  he holds 
that the r i g h ts  o f women are p a r t ly  d i f f e r e n t  from the r i g h t s  o f  men 
and yet expects the law of equal freedom to  he lp him in e f f e c t i n g  
some kind o f  a f a i r  exchange between the r e s p e c t i v e  r i g h ts  o f  men 
and women, we f a i l  to  see the l o g i c  o f  h is  p o s i t i o n .  Con f in ing  
ourselves f o r  the sake of convenience to  the case o f  married 'women, 
it would appear that  the only poss ib le  way by which Spencer ’ s 
sovereign ru le  ©ould be brought to  bear upon i t  i s  to  regard the
257.
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conjugal re la t ions  of men and women as being determined by f r e e  con­
tract. But Spencer neither accepts nor r e je c ts  th is  in ference wholly. 
Without g iv ing  any reason fo r  his b e l i e f ,  he simply assumes that 
marriage ought to be monogamic and permanent. I f  pressed f o r  a 
reason fo r  this  r e s t r i c t i o n ,  he would probably say that i t  is  in the 
interests of  children or of " s o c ia l  s e l f -p reserva t ion "  ( in te rp re ted  
in the wider sense). Granting the v a l i d i t y  of  this  claim, we are 
bound to say that the law of equal freedom is  u t t e r l y  incapable of  
deciding what the equitable re la t ions  o f  husbands and wives are to be, 
beyond the possible  ju s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the r e s t r i c t i o n  just mentioned. 
Spencer himself says, "Nothing more than a compromise vary ing accord­
ing to the circumstances seems here poss ib le .  The discharge of 
domestic and maternal duties by the w i fe  may o rd in a r i ly  be held a 
fair equivalent f o r  the earning of an income by the husband" (Jus t ice ,  
p* 164). The p r inc ip le  of just ice  in  th is  case is  c e r ta in ly  not the 
law of equal freedom, "and th is  is  the more surpris ing because i t  is  
obvious that tne r e la t i v e  powers and duties of the married might be 
settled by f r e e  contract" (Sidgwick, Ethics o f  Green, e t c . ?p .298).
The same c r i t i c ism  applies equally we l l  to another statement of 
Spencer that "s ince ,  speaking genera l ly ,  man is  more ju d ic ia l l y  
minded than woman, the balance of authority  should in c l in e  to the 
side of the husband" (Just ice ,  p. 161).
In connection with the p o l i t i c a l  r igh ts  o f  women, we must 
say that Spencer has no warrant from his F i r s t  P r in c ip le  f o r  the 
assertion that since women do not " furn ish  contingents to the army and 
n&vy euch as men furnish" (Just ice ,  p. 166), they cannot have the same
polit ical r igh ts  as nen u n t i l  there is  reached a s tate  of  permanent
psace, f o r  such a sse r t ion  con trad ic ts  Spencer 's  own argument tnat
the only v a l i d  meaning o f  p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  i s  that they are means
to’ the end o f  p ro t e c t in g  c i v i l  r i g h t s .  -What reason i s  there fo r
supposing that the c i v i l  r i g h ts  o f  women do not need p r o t e c t i o n  as
1
much as those o f  men? Spencer g ives  none^ though he says elsewhere
"Generosity - a s id e . . . . ,  jus t ice  demands that women, i f  they are not
a r t i f i c i a l l y  advantaged, must not ,  az any r a t e ,  he a r t i f i c i a l l y
disadvantaged" (J u s t ic e ,  p. 160 )•
As regards the r i g h ts  o f  c h i ld r e n ,  Spencer, in S'ocial S t a t i c s ,
says that a true ru le  has no exceptions and that "The law -
Every man has freedom to do a l l  that he w i l l s ,  prov ided he in f r in g e s
not the equal freedom o f  any other man - app l ie s  as much to the young
as to the mature". (eta- x v i i ,  s e c t .  l ) .  But in  h is  l a t e r  w r i t in g s ,
he abandons th is  extreme (and what seems on h is  own premisses to  be
s t r ic t ly  l o g i c a l )  p o s i t i o n  on the ground that the r i g h t s  o f  ch i ld r en
should p roper ly  come under the e th ics  o f  the fa m i ly  and not under the 
the
ethics o f/S ta te ;  and y e t  holds that, the law o f  equal freedom, the 
supreme law o f  the e th ic s  o f  the S ta te ,  i s  capable o f  h e lp in g  him in  
determining the r i g h t f u l  claims o f  c h i ld r e n  or  t h e i r  parents and
rt.
tiieir c o r e la t i v e  dut ies  to them. We can w e l l  sympathise w ith
A
Spencer when he contends than as children do not always remain c h i ld ­
ren, but "are gradually transformed into  adults, there must be a 
continually changing r e la t io n  between the two hinds o f  r igh ts  (the
1 Compare Sidgwick, Eth'iorB of Green$ , e tc . »  p. 300.
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rights of children and the r ights  o f  adu lts ) ,  and need f o r  a vary ing 
compromise", but we cannot see how the law o f  equal freedom can 
possibly determine this  "vary ing  compromise". What we need r e a l l y  
is some law of f a i r  exchange governed by s o c ia l  and u t i l i t a r i a n  
considerations. Although Spencer does not admit th is  in ference 
avowedly, i t  seems to us that he is  forced to do so in an in d i r e c t  
way. Not ice ,  fo r  instance, the comparatively f e e b le  hold that he 
has on his law o f  equal freedom when he says, "Though here (counter­
claim of parents) there can be made no such measurement of r e l a t i v e  
claims as that which the law of equal fr^dora enables us to make 
between adults; ye t ,  i f  we guide ourselves by tnat la?/ as we l l  as 
may be, i t  resu lts  that f o r  sustentation and other aids rece ived  
there should be given wnatever equivalent is poss ib le  in  the form 
of obedience and the rendering o f  small serv ices"  (Jus t ice ,  p. 170); 
or, again, the vagueness and inadequacy of the law in  determining the 
rightful claims of ch i ldren  to "a ids and opportun it ies" .  Is  i t  the 
parent or the State that i s  to decide what those "a ids  and 
opportunities" are to be? From his discussion in s e c t .98 of Just ice ,  
it would appear that i t  is  not the State. In that case are we to 
suppose that the r ig h t fu l  claims o f  chi ldren are not lega l?  But " i f  
the claim o f  the ch i ld  is  a r igh t ,  why is  i t  not lega l?  I f  i t  is  
tegal, the State must determine wnat education the ch i ld  shall  
receive. A l l  tn is  wants more explanation" (Sidgwick, Ethics of 
Green, e tc .  p. 298).
The general conclusion, then, to which we seem to be led in 
reapect of the r ights  o f  children, is  that, on the basis o f  the law
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of equal freedom, there is  no possible  middle course between the
extreme view held in Socia l S ta t ics  that "the ch i ld  has claims to
freedom.. . . co-sxtensive  with those of the adult" (c ta-xv i i ,  sect* l )
and common opinion. "For,  i f  i t  be asserted that the law o f  equal
freedom applies only to adults; that i s ,  i f  i t  be asserted that
men have rights, but that ch i ld ren  have none, we are immediately met
by this quest ion .-  When does the ch i ld  become a man? at what period
doss the human being pass out o f  the condition o f  having no r igh ts
into the condition of  having rights? Hone w i l l  have the f o l l y  to
quote tu.^.rbitrary dictum o f  the statute-book as an answer" ( I b i d . ) .
But the important thing is  to know what kind of answer Spencer h imself
would g ive. From his discussion in Justice and other w r it ings  l a t e r
than Social Stat ics  " i t  seerns l i k e l y  that the word man in  our supreme 
must
rule/be subjected to an in te rp re t ing  clause which w i l l  be no b e t te r
than a piece of most empirical u t i l i ta r ian ism "  (Maitland, p. 524).
Into the p o l i t i c a l  discussion that fo l low s ,  we do not propose
to enter, f o r  to do so would be to go in to  a consideration of
Spencer1 s theory of the State ,  which from the point of view of soc ia l
justice i s  not very important; the theory of the State advocated by
Spencer is  more a consequence o f  his theory o f  soc ia l  jus t ice  than
an in tr ins ic  part of i t .  Besides, many of the centra l  ideas of
have
Spencer:s theory o f  the State/already been incorporated in our 
thesis, and so there is  no need to go over them again.
At very great,  and perhaps wearisome, length, we have examined
all the fundamental r igh ts  of man ( “ r igh ts ,  t ru ly  so c a l l e d " ,  Just ice ,
P* 176) discussed by Spencer with a view to seeing to what extent
they are deducible from the absolute law of equal freedom, and we 
have come to the conclusion that no important r igh ts  beyond the 
right to personal freedom and the r igh t  to l i f e ,  are capable of 
strict deduction from i t .  The reason f o r  regarding this  conclusion, 
negative though i t  be, as of considerable importance, is  that i t  
e f fec t iv e ly  disproves the value of Spencer's deductive method in 
reference to soc ia l  jus t ice  and of  his dec lara t ion  " that  his formula 
for Justice may be treated as an absolute 01- ult imate e th ica l  
principle having an authority transcending every otner" ( S id-w ick ,
Ethics of Green, e tc .^p. S79) . Spencer's theory o f  ju s t ic e ,  at 
best, tnere fore ,  can be only on a par with the otner theor ies  of 
justice that i t  c r i t i c i s e s .  But, as a matter of f a c t ,  i t  is  not 
really so, anu this we have indicated at several places in our 
discussion. The I d e a l i s t i c  and the empirical U t i l i t a r i a n  theo r ies ,
j!
though not actua l ly  deducing the righus o f  man from a F i r s t  
Principle, we l l  account f o r  them from th e ir  own points o f  view.
Neitner of them is  so unmanageable or inadequate as Spencer's tneory. 
Their basis is  fa r  wider, and the ir  method, though not so 
’ s c i e n t i f i c ’ as Spencer1s t takes f u l l  account of  actual f a c t s ,  which 
after a l l  is  the most important requ is i t e  of any theory perta in ing  to 
society.
With a systematic examination o f  the f i r s t  o f  the four  claims 
made by Spencer wel l  out o f  the way, we are now in a pos i t ion  b r i e f l y  j
H
to consider the res t .  We do not propose to  go into them at length 
because Spencer himself considers them only of secondary importance.
Tne second and third claims, i t  w i l l  be remembered, are that the
c o r o l l a r i e s  of  the law o f  equal freedom "one and a l l  co in c id e  w ith
I
ordinary e th ic a l  conceptions" and that they "one and a l l  correspond 
with lega l  enactments" (J u s t i c e ,  p. 63 ) .  With r ega rd  to  these 
claims we have a lready said that  even i f  the co inc idence were exact 
and accurate, which i t  i s  not,  i t  would not prove the s u p e r i o r i t y  
claimed f o r  Spencer s theory over other th eo r ie s  o f  ju s t i c e .  Severa l  
of the r i g h ts  to  l i f e ,  l i b e r t y ,  p roper ty ,  and con trac t ,  are so ve ry  
essential f o r  s o c ia l  ex is tence  tnat no reasonable th eo ry  o f  ju s t i c e  
can f a i l  to  account f o r  tnem; they are almost ax iom a t ic .
Proceeding now to examine the correspondence between Spencer : s 
deductions and ordinary law and m o ra l i t y ,  we sh a l l  endeavour to  see 
(l )  to what extent  th is  correspondence i s  a c tu a l ,  (8 )  to  what ex ten t ,  
where there i s  no actual co inc idence ,  the trend o f  ord inary  e th i c a l  
thinking and l e g a l  enactments i s ,  and has been, in  s p i t e  o f  
temporary setbacks, a long the l in e s  suggested by Spencer 's  
co ro l la r ies ,  and (3 )  to  what ex ten t ,  where there  i s ,  or has been, 
no such trend, our ord inary  e t h i c a l  and l e g a l  th ink ing  ought to  be, 
and is l i k e l y  to  be, changed in  conformity  with Spencer s con­
clusions. Let us f i r s t  take the a l l - im p or ta n t  r i g h t  to  l i f e .  The 
only l im ita t ion ,  o f  t h i s  r i g h t  recogn ised  by Spencer, i s  in  the 
interests o f  de fens ive  war, when v i c t o r y  is  reasonably c e r ta in  ( e . g . ,  
(Justice, p. 71 ) .  But there are p len ty  o f  other cases in  any 
society where an in d iv idu a l  i s  o c ca s ion a l ly  c a l l e d  upon to  r i s k  his 
l i f e  f o r  the sake o f  others and where our or&ihary e t h i c a l  not ions 
Jo not lend support to the view that there has been a breach o f  the
right to l i f e .  Take, f o r  example, the case of a swimmer t r y in g  to 
save the l i f e  of a drowning person and poss ib ly  lo s in g  his l i f e  in the 
attempt. Would Spencer's Ethics condemn th is  act o f  Heroism? Perhaps 
not1«- Spencer would probably regard i t  as going beyond ju s t ic e  into  
the realm of beneficence. In that case, wnat i s  to become o f  the 
biological p r inc ip le  of the surv iva l  of the f i t t e s t ,  on which 
Spencer's tueory of jus t ice  is  made to r e s t  (assuming that the swimmer 
is better f i t t e d  fo r  l i f e  condit ions)?  Whatever that may be, there 
can be no doubt that common sense refuses to consider the act o f  the 
heroic person in  the case (or in the s im ilar  case of a doctor who, 
in a time of great epidemic, r isks his hea lth , i f  not l i f e  i t s e l f )  v 
an act of beneficence or of supererogation; i t  rather demands, by 
means of soc ia l  approbation and disapprobation, that a person who is  
strong and able to swim should attempt to save the l i f e  o f  a drowning 
person. In common parlance, i t  is  his moral duty. A study of 
history and human nature seems to show us that our ordinary moral 
judgment has been, and probably w i l l  always be, on the side of  the 
nero who risks his l i f e  in the in te re s t  of soc ia l  w e l l -be ing .  I t  
would appear, there fore ,  that our ordinary e th ica l  conceptions, 
instead of tending to f a l l  in l in e  with Spencer's c o r o l l a r i e s ,  requ ire  
that the c o ro l la r ie s  should reckon with them. Further, while our 
ordinary conceptions regard the case under discussion as coming w itn in  
the realm of s oc ia l  ju s t ice ,  they do not require that i t  should be made 
a legal duty. Here again there seems to be a divergence between 
Spencer's views and common e th ica l  ideas. We grant that,  on 
Spencer's theory, i t  is  not always c lea r  whatner he means to regard our
264.
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ordinary notions regarding soc ia l  jus t ice  as also le ga l  duties .  But 
isuch would seem to be the implica t ion ,  when he says that jus t ice  
| (which coincides with ordinary e th ica l  conceptions) is  o f  public 
¡concern and there fo re  ought to come under State con tro l .  Common 
[sense, on the other hand, does not grant that whatever i s  just ought- 
to be l e g a l l y  enforced. Not unfrequently i t  contents i t s e l f  with 
such moral weapons as appeal to personal honour, appeal to  the des ire  
to win the approbation of one’ s fellow-men, e t c . . f o r  the accomplishing 
| of its ends. In considering the r igh ts  of  chi ldren, Spencer says 
that parents nave certa in  counter-claims on tn e ir  o f f sp r in g  in  return 
for the ’’ aids and opportunit ies” rendered to them. I f  these counter­
claims are just,  as Spencer thinks they are, they ought a lso to be 
legally en forc ib le  on his theory. But our ordinary e th ica l  con­
ceptions are not ever l i k e l y  to regard gratitude to parents, f o r  
instance, as a lega l  duty, and i t  is  des irab le  that they sh ould not 
do it, for  obvious reasons. Revert ing to the r i g h t  to l i f e ,  i t  would 
be interest ing to know what Spencer’ s judgment would be on the 
question o f  suic ide. I t  would appear that,  s t r i c t l y  speaking, the 
law of equal freedom would ju s t i f y  a r igh t  to suic ide.  But that such 
a right stands condemned in  ordinary law and mora l i ty ,  needs no 
mention; and. i t  is  des irab le  that i t  should be so in the in te re s t  of 
public welfare.
An important conclusion to which our discussion with regard to 
the right to l i f e  seems to point, is  that from the p rac t ica l  point of  
Vlew suggested by ordinary moral codes and le ga l  enactments, no less
than from the th eo re t ica l  point o f  view suggested by e th ica l  th eo r ies ,  
conduciveness to public we l fa re  or the highest good of s oc ie ty  i s  the 
touchstone of soc ia l  act ion. This is  by no means to deny the 
importance of freedom. Both our ordinary e th ica l  thinking and 
legislation attach much importance to the educative value o f  f r e e ­
dom, but they refuse to make a f e t i s h  o f  i t  or to g ive i t  the spec ia l . ^
interpretation given i t  by Spencer. I f  i t  b© argued that we have no 
’
right to base an important conclusion l ik e  the present on a few 
solitary and rather exceptional cases, we may g ive  otner i l lu s t ra t io n s .  
Turning to tiie r igh ts  of f r e e  motion and locomotion, we are w i l l i n g  
to concede to Spencer tnat law and mora l i ty  recognise that,  under
111
ordinary circumstances, each person ought to have "the r ig h t  to the 
use of unshackled limbs and the r i g h t  to move from place to place 
without hindrance" (Just ice ,  p. 72)- But i t  needs very  l i t t l e  
experience to show us that these r igh ts  are g rea t ly  q u a l i f i e d  by 
social conditions. I f  in rep ly  to  th is ,  Spencer should say tnat 
his co ro l la r ies  would be p e r f e c t ly  r ea l is ed  only in  the f i n a l  or 
absolute s ta te ,  our answer is  that h is to ry  does not seem to point 
that way. Our r ights  to the use of  unshackled limbs and l i b e r t y  to 
®ove about f r e e l y  are much more r e s t r i c t e d  in a c i v i l i s e d  soc ie ty  
than in the savage s ta te ,  and yet we do not object to  such re s t r i c t io n s  
because of the greater public sa fe ty  which is  the consequence. I t  may 
be true that "where governmental control does not e x is t  or i s  very 
feeble, the t a c i t  claim to unhindered movement is  s trong ly  pro­
nounced" (Just ice ,  p. 75).  But the freedom which resu lts  from such 
a state of a f f a i r s  is  the freedom o f  the jungle. Bo modern soc ie ty
2  6 .
267.
can get on without t r a f f i c  ru les ,  and in  some cases, without
immigration and. emigration laws; and i t  is  not l i k e l y  that such
rules and regulations would he done away with (and even i f  l i k e l y ,  
not desirable that they should),  u n t i l  b e t te r  methods o f  securing 
public safety  and welfare  are devised. Passing on to the question 
of land , we have already seen that the only reason fo r  a l lowing 
appropriation is  tnat i t  contributes to soc ia l  we l l -be ing  or public 
welfare; and i f  to-day ordinary e th ica l  judgment and l e g i s l a t i o n  
favour the lease of land more tnan tney do permanent ownership, the 
reason is  that with changed s o c ia l  conditions leas ing  seems to be 
productive o f  greater good to soc ie ty .  In discussing the r i g h t  of 
incorporeal property, Spencer says "Without overstepping the pre ­
scribed l im i ts ,  the inventor may claim the/6xcluaive b en e f i t  of his 
invention; and, i f  he d isc loses  the sec re t ,  may, without aggressing 
upon any one, d ic ta te  the terms fo r  u t i l i s a t i o n "  (Just ice ,  p. 109). 
But this r i gh t ,  in trie form stated, does not seem to be f u l l y  observed 
in modern pract ice-  Socie ty ,  i t  is  true, does protect  by means of 
copyrights, parents, e t c . ,  the in d iv id u a l 's  r ign t  to the enjoyment 
of the law of  equal freedom; i t  is  to prevent commercial and 
intel lectual dishonesty and to "ac t  as a stimulus to  industry and 
talent" (Just ice ,  p. 110). I t  is  in the in te re s t  o f  s oc ie ty  at
large. Spencer himself modifies his pos i t ion  l a t e r  in  the chapter
when he brings out his c lea r  d iv is io n  between monopolies and 
patents; but i t  i s  in  the in te re s t  of other poss ib le  inventors 
and not in the in te res t  of both inventors and consumers, i .  e . ,  
in the in te ree t  of soc ie ty  at la rge .  I f  further examples o f  the
Uide divergence between Spencer s c o r o l la r i e s  and our ordinary e th ica l  
sonceptions and le ga l  enactments are needed, we may mention poor 
relief, free  education, fa c to ry  and industr ia l  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  and the 
law of l i b e l .  The f i r s t  three cases c l e a r l y  go against Spencer's 
[eductions; and Spencer, aware of the f a c t ,  seems to say that in  the 
ideal state there w i l l  be no need f o r  them and that,  even now, there 
is a trend in that d ir e c t ion .  But th is  does not seem to be the 
rerdict of h is to ry .  We do not preter.d to  be able to judge what w i l l  
>e the condition of a f f a i r s  in the ult imate or penultimate s ta te .  But 
10 far as we can foresee  the future ,  we may say that much s o c i a l i s t i c  
Legislation is  bound to go on, and that i f  the time comes when a l l  such 
Legislation w i l l  be regarded as mischievous and out of date, i t  w i l l  
)e not because of our des ire  to enthrone the sovereign ru le  of freedom 
jut because of i t s  possib le  harmful e f f e c t  upon soc ia l  good, of which 
coral good is  an important part.  I l lu s t r a t in g  our statements by the 
concrete case of l e g i s l a t i o n  regarding work in coal-mines, we may say 
Kith T.H. Green that "however ready men may be f o r  high wages to work 
In a dangerous p i t ,  a wrong is  held to be done i f  they are k i l l e d  in  
I f  provisions which might have made i t  safe^been neg lected,  
someone is  held responsible. I f  nothing could make i t  sa fe ,  the work­
ing of the p i t  would not be allowed " (P r in c ip les  of P o l i t i c a l  
Obligation, p. 165). This present-day p rac t ice ,  of course, g0 6 s 
against Spencer's deductions regarding f r e e  industry. But our 
ordinary e th ica l  judgments and le ga l  enactments seem to agree with 
Green that in a case l ik e  the present soc ia l  contro l i s  necessary; and 
they seem further to agree that such contro l  should not be carr ied  to
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a minute degree so as to crush out character and indiv idual 
development. In the words of  Green, " the  reason f o r  noL more 
generally applying the power o f  the s tate  to prevent voluntary 
noxious employments, is  not that there is  no wrong in the death o f  an 
individual through the incidents of an employment which he has 
voluntarily undertaken, hut tnat the wrong is  more e f f e c tu a l l y  
prevented by tra in ing  and trust ing  indiv iduals  to  protect  themselves 
than by tne state preventing them" ( i b i d . ) .  As regards the law of 
libel, we noticed e a r l i e r  that Spencer's solution consisted in 
allowing true damaging statements to be made but p roh ib i t in g  fa l s e  
ones. But th is  does not seem to be our actual p rac t ice ;  nor is  i t  
desirable that i t  should be otherwise, "s ince  to penalise every 
untrue statement, even though made in p e f fe c t  good f a i t h ,  would 
render the functions of warning, and o r i t io ism  too'clangerous ( 'Examples 
of this class are con f iden t ia l  communications about tne character of  
a servant; warnings given by a s o l i c i t o r  to a c l i e n t  or a guardian 
to a ward; " f a i r  comments" on matters that have been brought before 
the public; on the other hand, there are true statements o f  which 
the publication would be c l e a r ly  mischievous, - as the pain and 
bitterness caused by them would much outweigh tne ir  u t i l i t y  in  the 
way of warning" (Sidgwick, Elements of P o l i t i t s ' ,  pp. 62-65).
The conclusion, then, to which we come back with  renewed strength
i- Cp. the words of Schurman in Philosophical Review, v o l .  1 (1892) ,
P* 86; "the ' r i g h t  of f r ee  speech and publicat ion '  may at times be 
Properly w i th h e ld . . . .  'Tne r ign t  of free^xchange' ex is ts  nowhere in 
the world outside of Great B r ita in ;  and c e r ta in ly  American c i t i z e n s  
are pecul iar ly  sens it ive  to th e ir  r igh ts .  I f  we be l ieved  that 
freedom of worship' imper i l led  tne public we l fa re ,  no assert ion  of 
individual r igh ts  would prevent i t s  ab o l i t ion  ( efi, the great Mormon 
°ase, v. United S ta tes ) .  'The r igh t  to property* is  one of  the most
sacred of r igh ts ;  yet i t  may be modified or se t  aside fo r  the good o f  
t3:ie community, as is  i l lu s t ra te d  by recent lan d - le g is la t io n  in England"
270.
enactments, public we lfare  or the highest good of soc ie ty  i s  the
guiding pr inc ip le  of soc ia l  action. A c o ro l la ry  of  this conclusion
which is not s u f f i c i e n t l y  appreciated by Spencer, is  that no one d>f
1
our fundamental r ights  is  un iversa l ly  app l icab le .  H is tory  eh ows us 
that the l im ita t ions  imposed on our r igh ts  are not merely the 
limitations mentioned by Spencer - the l im ita t ions  perta in ing  to 
"aggression and counter-aggression" and " s o c ia l  s e l f -p rese rva t ion "  
narrowly conceived; hut l im ita t ions  in  the in terest  of the good o f  
the community. This is  one reason why ordinary e th ica l  thinking 
sets i ts  face against any system of natural r igh ts  and demands that 
social recognit ion should be the basis of every r i g h t fu l  c laim. In 
the words of Schurman* "Instead of acquiescing in the doctr ine that 
the individual in v ir tue  o f  his humanity, and without any regard to 
the state of soc ie ty  in  which he l i v e s ,  has cer ta in  ina l ienab le  
fights, i t  migut be neld that the s tate  is  the source, the bas is ,  
and the regulator of every human l ib e r t y "  ( ib id .  pp. 87-88). Or, to 
luote T.il. Green, the State is  "the susuainer and harmoniser of  
social re la t ions"  (P r inc ip les  of  P o l i t i c a l  Obligation, p. 148).
Spencer’ s conception of the State as a jo in t -s tock  pro tect ion  company, 
which exists for  tne sake of safeguarding a set of p re -soc ia l  and 
Reductive r igh ts ,  c e r ta in ly  runs counter to our ordinary p o l i t i c a l  
and legal -chinking.
it
The fourth and las t  claim made by Spencer in  behalf  o f his 
formula, to a consideration of which we now pass, is  that what is  
iCund to be id e a l l y  just according to the law of equal freedom also
is that, a cco rd ing  to  our o rd in a ry  e t h i c a l  concep t ion s  and l e g a l
\
happens to be economical ly  exped ient .  To s ta te  the c la im  in  
Spencer's own words, " p o l i t i c a l  economy reaches conclusions which 
ethics independently deduces" ( J u s t i c e ,  p0 Ibb ) .  I t  i s  not our 
purpose here to catalogue the pros and cons o f  th^/economic doc t r in e  
of la issez  f a i r e ; our aim i s  merely to  in d ica te  g e n e ra l l y  that 
laissez f a i r e ; ( o r ,  to use Spencer 's own phrase, "S p e c ia l i s e d  
Administration") i s  not ^economically most e f f i c i e n t  and does not 
represent r ea l  freedom. Taking our stand with Spencer on the 
ind iv idu a l is t ic  b a s is ,  we may c o n f id e n t ly  dec la re  that a lesson  
which tne complex condit ions  o f  modern s o c i a l  and in d u s t r ia l  l i f e  
teach us i s  that a system mainly i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  r equ ires  to  be 
supplemented by what Sidgwick c a l l s  " i n d i r e c t l y  i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c " ,  
"paternal", and " s o c i a l i s t i c "  l e g i s l a t i o n  (cp. Sidgwick, Elements 
of P o l i t i c s , cns. IV. IX* & X ) . Ordinary exper ience shows us t  at 
i t  is no longer true to  say that men are always " the best guardians 
of their  w e l fa re "  and tha t ,  th e r e fo r e ,  the S ta te  ought to a l l o w  each 
individual to  f o l l o w  his own in t e r e s t s  ( e . g . ,  drunkenness, gambling, 
opium smoking, e t c . ) .  Paternal and i n d i r e c t l y  i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  
interferences may thus be rendered necessary in  some cases (even from 
the point o f  view o f  economics).  And even i f - we  grant that in  most 
cases the "economic man" pos ited  by w r i t e r s  on economics would know 
his s e l f - i n t e r e s t  bes t ,  tuat i s  not n e c e s s a r i l y  to argue that  to 
allow each in d iv idu a l  to f o l l o w  h is  own in t e r e s t  would be most
i* cp. Sidgwick, P o l i t i c a l  Economy, p. 410). ~ ~
conclusive to tne common in te re s t .  This "divergence "between u t i l i t y
to the indiv idual and u t i l i t y  to soc ie ty"  (Sidgwick, P r in c ip les  cf
political Economy, p. x ix )  can he i l lu s t r a t e d  by the case of c e r ta in
fisheries where to permit each se l f -seek in g  indiv idual to  catch f i s h
at, whatever season he l iked  and in whatever way ne l iked  would be
contrary to the general interest-and where voluntary assoc ia t ion  of
1
the majority would not check the abuse. In th is  and s im ilar  cases 
like protection o f  mines from wasteful exhaustion and saving o f  "ra re  
and useful species of plants from extermination" (Sidgtvick, P o l i t i c s ,  
p. 147), we may sajs tnat voluntary associat ion (or what Spercer c a l l s  
voluntary co-operation) not being able to conserve the in te res ts  of 
the community, the contro l  and supervise on o f  the State is  rendered 
needful. Modern soc ie ty  provides us with any number of cases, besides 
those mentiored already, in support o f  the truth that compulsory 
co-operation ( to  use a phrase of Sper.cer's) not unfrequently i s  the 
only way of seci^ring the naximum net freedom of soc ie ty  and the most 
economic fermsfo f  organisation and production. Take, f o r  instance, 
oases l ike  drainage, water supply, e l e c t r i c  l i g h t in g ,  precaution 
against in fec t ious  diseases, inspection of  poisonous or unhealthy 
articles of food l ik e  p ickles and oysters ,  p rotect ion  of land below 
sea-level against f loods ,  c los ing  of shops on Sundays, e t c .j where the 
refusal of a handful of persons to co-operateftmay r e su l t  in untold 
harm to the great majority and in the loss of Lheir true freedom and 
happiness. There are also many oases l ik e  the bu i ld ing  and 
naintenance of bridges, roads, and l ighthouses, wiaich cannot
^  j ~*{j> . Lj I O .
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conveniently be undertaken by p r i v a t e  en te rp r is e -  Cases l i k e  the 
keeping up o f  f o r e s t s  f o r  the sake o f  moderating and eq u a l i s in g  r a in ­
fa l l ,  carry ing  out o f  an em igrat ion  p o l i c y ,  f o s t e r in g  o f  a r t ,  s c ience ,  
and cu l tu re , -  a l l  these not opening up f r u i t f u l  f i e l d s  f o r  p r i v a t e  
enterprise, but yet  being necessary f o r  publ ic  w e l f a r e ,  have to  be 
undertaken by the Government. \ln most, i f  not a l l ,  of these case3, 
Spencer would probably say that i f  the in d iv id u a ls  by themselves 
cannot get the goods that they d e s i r e ,  and thao are o f  value to  them, 
they must go witnout them«, But that  would probably be to  make 
c iv i l ised  ex is tence  d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  not im poss ib le .  There are p o s s ib ly  
many in our modern s o c i e t y  who would^for ins tance ,  ra th e r  fo r e go  a
part of t h e i r  in d iv idu a l  " freedom" in vo lved  in  the S ta te  in sp ec t ion  o f
-
oyster beds than go without ea t in g  o y s te rs ,  which may be ve ry  e s s e n t i a l  j 
for the ir  "g rea te s t  happiness” Vj Even such s t r i c t l y  s o c i a l i s t i c  
measures as poor r e l i e f ,  f r e e  education, f r e e  t ech n ica l  and p r o f e s s i o n ­
al tra in ing can be j u s t i f i e d  from the po int o f  view o f  tne economic 
Question o f  cos ts ;  f r e e  education, f o r  ins tance ,  may be looked upon 
as a prudent insurance against the l i k e l ih o o d  o f  ch i ld r en  becoming 
miscnievous or dangerous- to  s o c i e t y  in  a f t e r - l i f e .  One other  c lass  
°f cases that proper ly  comes under State  con tro l  and superv is ion  i s  
cases per ta in ing  to the in t e r e s t s  o f  remote generat ions .  Even the 
economic man” comprising the id e a l  s o c i e t y  pos i ted  by economists
cannot be expected to see much beyond the w e l fa re  o f  fjeis own 
1
g e n e r a t i o n .
The conclusion, then, that  we a r r i v e  at i s  that  even on an
1; Most o f  theifexamples c i t e d  in  th i s  paragraph are taken from 
Sidgwic|p: s Elements o f  P o l i t i c s ,  chs . IX. & X and h is  P r in c ip l e s  o f  
^ ° l i t icA Economy, Bk. I l l , ch. 11.
individualistic and economic bas is ,  we cannot stop short with the
"Specialised Administrat ion" advocated by Spencer, i . e . ,  p r o t e c t i o n
narrowly
against external and in ternal aggressors/interpreted. But th is  is  
not the same as saying,as Sidgwick points out ," that  wherever la is sez  
raire f a l l s  short governmental in ter ference  is  expedient; since the 
inevitable drawbacks and disadvantages of  the l a t t e r  may, in  any 
particular case, be worse than the shortcomings of p r iva te  enterpr ise"  
(Principles of P o l i t i c a l  Economy, p. 414 J . We cannot, l ik e  Spencer, 
once and for a l l  la y  down dogmatically that i t  is  economically 
expedient f o r  tne State to undertake c er ta in  things and inexpedient 
to undertake certa in  other things. The sphere of  State act ion ,  i t  
seems to us, w i l l  vary according to times and places, depending 
largely upon the soc ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  t rad i t ions  of the people and 
their temper and character.
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We now gather together the d i f f e r e n t  l in e s  o f  thought with 
which we have been concerning ourselves in our c r i t ic ism .
We opened our discussion o f  Spencer with an enquiry into 
the p rac t ica l  value o f  his theory o f  the "absolute" or the " id e a l "  
state. We discovered that the " id ea l "  o f  a p e r fe c t  man in a p e r fe c t  
society posited by him is  so fa r  removed from the fa c ts  o f  expe r i ­
ence and the actual conditions o f  l i f e  that i t  is  impossible f o r  
us even to conceive o f  i t ;  that, even i f  i t  i s  poss ib le  f o r  us to 
conceive o f  i t ,  there is  no p rac t ica l  method o f  d iscover ing  with 
su f f ic ien t  clearness and certa in ty  the rules which would govern 
the soc ia l  l i f e  o f  human beings in such a s ta te ;  and that,  even i f  
we could d iscover  some o f  those rules by in tu i t i v e  and deductive 
methods, as Spencer claims that he is  able to do, th e i r  a p p l i c a b i l ­
i ty  to soc ie ty  here and now could not be ascertained without the 
aid o f  the empirical method, which Spencer’ s " s c i e n t i f i c "  e th ics  
seeks to supplant.
With th is  general c r i t ic ism  o f  Spencer's "absolute" s ta te ,  
we aporoached the theory o f  " id ea l "  soc ia l  ju s t ic e ,  ser iously  
suspecting i t s  "absoluteness", and found that th is  theory has no 
app l icab i l i ty  e i ther  to the ultimate or to the penultimate s ta te ,  
and that, there fore ,  i t  stands or f a l l s  en t i r e ly  by i t s  a p p l i c a b i l ­
i ty  to a soc ie ty  such as our own. We also saw that Spencer's theory 
of jus t ice ,  which he compresses into the law o f  equal freedom, is  
primarily based upon the r e la t i v e  s ta te ,  as conceived by him, and 
is secondarily transferred by him to the "absolute" s ta te ;  that, 
in other words, his theory o f  just ice  i s  not so much a guide which
S U M M A R Y  O F  C O N C L U S I O N S .
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the " id ea l "  g ives  to the r ea l ,  as a suggestion fo r  the construction 
of a ^topia gathered from the requirements o f  present soc ia l  l i f e
(Cp. Sorley, Ethics o f  Naturalism, pp.W?R 254-5)- We were thus
o f
able to show that Spencer s theory o f  soc ia l  ju s t ice  i s / le s s  per­
manent value than some other theories .
We further stated, in the same chapter, that, while those 
who hold that th e ir  idea ls  are progressive may l e g i t im a te ly  use
H
the idea o f  approximation to an id ea l  , those l i k e  Spencer whose 
ideal i s  avowedly s ta t ic  may not do so. We also denied any spec ia l  
value to Spencer's claim that, in the " id e a l "  s ta te ,  there would 
be a natural and spontaneous fu l f i lm en t  o f  h is  pa r t icu la r  law o f  
justice ,  because a s im ilar  claim might be made on behalf  o f  any 
reasonable law o f  jus t ice  whatever.
We therea f te r  passed on to a discussion o f  the way in which 
Spencer deduced his law o f  equal freedom (1) from the doctr ine  o f  
the Moral Sense or In tu i t ion  and (2) from the p r in c ip les  o f  b io logy 
and devoted a chapter to each o f  these methods. In the f i r s t  o f  
these chapters we formed the impression, which was l a t e r  confirmed 
by a quotation from the "Inductions",  that, in the ear ly  part o f  
"Social S ta t ics "  (the f i r s t  two o f  the three methods sketched in 
our Exposit ion, Ch . I ) ,  Spencer extracts  from the doctr ine  o f  the 
Moral Sense more than i t  i s  capable o f  g iv in g  and, in the l a t t e r  
part o f  "Soc ia l  S ta t ics "  (the th ird  method) and in the "P r in c ip le s  
of Ethics" in general,  he extracts  from th is  doctr ine le ss  than 
i t  is  capable o f  g iv ing .  We also noticed that in attempting to 
mediate between Intuit ionism and Empiricism in his l a t e r  wr it ings ,  
Spencer is  r e a l l y  deciding in favour o f  Empiricism i t s e l f ;  f o r  he
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comes to regard moral In tu it ions  as the accumulated experiences o f  
the race which have survived on account o f  th e i r  u t i l i t y  value. His 
Chapter on the "Idea o f  Just ice " ,  we had reason to think, i s  a 
caricature o f  true Intuitiondism, because no true Intu it ion ism takes 
into consideration fea r  o f  man, or, f o r  that matter, any consequences 
at a l1.
Turning from Spencer to the avoxved adherents o f  the In tu i t -  
ionlst theory, we found that they are not agreed that the U t i l i t a ­
rian view o f  "g rea test  hapoiness" as end is  a d ic ta te  o f  our i n t u i t ­
ions; neither are they agreed that jus t ice  is  merely a means to 
"greatest happiness"; nor that i t  is  capable o f  being reduced to 
the "predise expression" o f  the law o f  equal freedom. To them, we 
saw, just ice  i s  a value in i t s e l f ,  and i t  can not be reduced to 
anything beyond the law o f  t rea t ing  s im ilar  persons s im i la r ly ,  or 
the law o f  equal i ty  o f  consideration. We also saw that the avowed 
adherents o f  Intuit ionism do not approve o f  Spencer's d is t in c t io n  
between the empirical treatment o f  beneficence and the in tu i t io n a l  
treatment o f  ju s t ic e ;  to them both pr inc ip les  are s e l f - e v id en t  
truths incapable o f  contradict ing each other.
Passing over to the der iva t ion  o f  the law o f  equal freedom 
from the p r inc ip les  o f  b io logy ,  we began our enquiry with a general 
statement that Spencer is  able to construct a workable theory o f  
justice only by a s k i l fu l  se lec t ion  and an indiv idual in te rp re ta ­
tion o f  the varied and complex fac ts  o f  surv iva l  on which his theory 
is based. Part icu lar is ing ,we noticed that Spencer a r r ives  at h is  
abstract and universal law o f  equal freedom (a) by underrating the 
importance o f  such facts  as gregariousness in man and the organic
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nature o f  soc ie ty ,  (b) by overemphasising the h igh ly questionable 
doctrine o f  the t ran sm iss ib i l i t y  o f  acquired characters and the 
supposed "equa l i ty "  o f  man, and (c )  by ignoring such important 
truths as (1) that conditions which hold good in the w i ld  s tate  do 
not necessari ly  hold good in the c i v i l i s e d ,  and (2) that, with the 
appearance o f  the r e f l e c t i v e  in te l l i g en c e  o f  man and o f  human sym­
pathies on the stage o f  evolut ion, we enter upon a "genuinely new" 
phase o f  development, - "natura l  s e lec t ion "  g iv in g  place to "pur­
posive s e le c t ion " .
We also saw that Spencer o f ten  mistakes analogy f o r  identity^ 
that the p r inc ip les  o f  animal surv iva l ,  on which he is  apparently 
basing his view o f  human ju s t ic e ,  are true only genera l ly  o f  animal 
l i f e ,  and that these p r inc ip les  do not e as i ly  lend themselves to 
the specià l  in te rp re ta t ion  which he puts on them. Taking the analogy 
of domestic animals, with which mankind has c lose r  connection than 
with sub-human beings in general,  we showed how, with some ingenuity
J
i t  i s  possible  to work out an elaborate theory o f  ju s t ic e  t o t a l l y  
d i f fe ren t  from Spencer's.
We further said in  the same chapter that, while ,  in his 
theory, Spencer tends to ignore the importance o f  the " s t a r t l i n g l y  
new" stage o f  development reached by human in t e l l i g e n c e ,  in practice 
be ava i ls  himself o f  i t  to the extent o f  advocating "Spec ia l ised  
(or l im ited )  Administration" to ass is t  the processes o f  "natural 
se lect ion".  We Ins isted  that when "natural s e lec t ion "  is  made the 
basis o f  ju s t ice ,  there is  no a l te rna t ive  but to accept the freedom 
of the jungle as our law. Régularisat ion o f  the grim struggle  f o r
existence, however, as necessitated by the law o f  equal freedom,
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shifts  the basis o f  discussion from the plane o f  "natural s e le c t  
tion" to the plane o f  "purposive s e le c t ion " ,  and renders nu l l  and 
void the d i f f e ren ce  in p r inc ip le  between State Socialism and 
" la issez  f a i r e " .
In concluding th is  chapter we maintained that,, while con­
templation o f  the fa c ts  o f  surv iva l may be valuable in suggesting 
l ines f o r  the r igh t  ordering o f  soc ia l  re la t ionsh ips ,  i t  would
be disastrous to base e th ics  on evolution.
In Chapter IV we concerned ourselves with the prec ise  mean­
ing o f  Spencer's doctr ine o f  ju s t ic e ,  We f i r s t  in s is ted  that his 
law o f  equal freedom, which he considered to be the most essen t ia l  
condition o f  l i f e ,  ought, on the basis o f  the r e la t io n  o f  his
" ju s t ic e "  to his U t i l i t a r i a n  pos it ion ,  to produce the g rea tes t
happiness (present or future) that' is  possib le  f o r  an ind iv idua l ;  
but we found that th is  law i s  un l ike ly  to achieve such a r esu l t .  
Some o f  our reasons were:
(1) that, even though there is  a general tendency f o r  l i f e  
and pleasure to coincide, there is  no p robab i l i ty  or even poss i­
b i l i t y  o f  th e ir  ever becoming exact ly  id en t ica l  with one another;
(2) that hid idea l  o f  jus t ice  which i s  based on the b io lo g ­
ica l  conception o f  "adaptation" implies present pain, or at l e a s t  
absence o f  pleasure, except perhaps in so fa r  as i t  a f fo rds  room 
for  the successful energis ing o f  fa c u l t i e s ;
(3) that, in the t rans i t iona l  state ,  in which we (according 
to Spencer) we l i v e  and progress towards the "p e r fe c t "  s ta te ,  
there must necessari ly  be frequent s a c r i f i c e  o f  ind iv idua l  l i f e  
and pleasure in the in te res ts  o f  "race-preservat ion" (and "race-
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preservation, we said, can not be le g i t im a te ly  l im ited  to pro tect ion  
against external and in terna l  aggressors);
(4) that Spencer himself confesses that the app l ica t ion  o f  
the law o f  equal freedom is  capable o f  g iv in g  pain to the necessary 
feelings o f  others" and f o r  that reason, i t  must be corrected and 
supplemented by negative beneficence;
(5) that, in a soc ie ty  such as our own, the law o f  equal 
freedom might be so used as to make i t  impossible ior  some to obtain 
the means necessary f o r  th e ir  happiness, not to speak o f  th e i r  
"greatest happiness";
(6 ) that Spencer's " ju s t i c e " ,  which was deductive ly  arr ived  
at, does not s u f f i c i e n t l y  take account o f  the subject ive  and com­
plex nature o f  pleasure, and that, there fore ,  empir ical Hedonism 
has an advantage over i t .
Moreover, we were unable to allow to Spencer as a U t i l i t a r i a n  
the in terpreta t ion  o f  "general happiness" as meaning the wider con­
ception o f  the maximum wel l -be ing  o f  soc ie ty ,  since the f e e l in g  o f  
Pleasure i s  exact ly  the point where soc ie ty  i s  not an organism, 
but a c o l l e c t io n  o f  competing indiv iduals  (S o r le y ) .  Even i f  we allow 
him such an in te rp re ta t ion ,  his law o f  equal freedom, which sets 
individual against ind iv idual,  i s  not the best meanh to a t ta in  that 
maximum well-be ing o f  soc ie ty .
While we were convinced that the law o f  equal freedom is  not 
the best means to the r e a l i s a t io n  o f  the g rea tes t  poss ib le  happiness 
of the indiv idual or soc ie ty ,  we were w i l l in g  to admit that i t  g ives 
us a vague and general rule o f  happiness, whose value in each case
can be ascertained by the empirical method o f  orthodox U t i l i t a r i a n ­
ism.
Spencer's id ea l  o f  ju s t ice ,  we Said, f a i l e d  to be the best 
means not only to the maximum possible  happiness, but also to 
maximum "net" freedom and to the f r u i t s  o f  freedom. In h is  passion­
ate advocacy o f  the p r inc ip le  o f  leas t  in te r fe r e n ce , and in his 
zeal f o r  the r ea l is a t io n  o f  freedom as an ult imate end o f  d i s t ib -  
utive ju s t ic e ,  we saw that Spencer tends to fo r g e t  the vast d i f f e r ­
ence that there is  between th eo re t ica l  freedom and p ra c t ica l  f r e e ­
dom. We saw in part icu lar :
(1) that Spencer's id ea l  o f  ju s t ice  sets i t s e l f  against 
" interference" in the case o f  a person who i s  bringing ruin upon 
himself, (and in d i r e c t ly  upon o thers ) ,  through his own f o l l y  or 
carelessness or inadequate mental and moral development;
(2) that i t  indiscr im inate ly  groups together a l l  the members 
of soc ie ty ,  without making any e f f o r t  to study the spedia l  condit­
ions o f  l i f e  under which they l i v e  or th e i r  spec ia l  requirements 
and ne ed s ;
(3) that i t  does not make any rea l  prov is ion  against people 
seriously cu r ta i l in g  th e ir  own freedom, or the freedom o f  soc ie ty  
at large,  by means o f  contracts and combinations;
(4) that i t  concerns i t s e l f  only with freedom from physical 
coercion, and pays l i t t l e  or no at tent ion  to freedom from mental 
annoyance and moral compulsion ( e .g . ,  u n o f f i c i a l  public op in ion ) ;
(5) that i t  g ives  no thought to the f a c t  that, in any 
c iv i l i s e d  soc ie ty ,  there i s  very l i t t l e  f r ee  access to the mater ia l  
means o f  l i f e  and happiness; and
(6) that i f  Spencer's idea l  were to be s t r i c t l y  enforced, 
i t  would probably mean an extreme form o f  State Socialism, thus 
defeating his own end.
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On the p os i t i v e  s ide, however, while ob jec t ing  to Spencer*$ 
way of confining soc ia l  jus t ice  to the law o f  equal freedom, we 
could not deny the importance o f  freedom i t s e l f  as a means to a 
healthy and manly individualism. Freedom, however, should be used 
as a minor end, with soc ia l  we l l-be ing  as the ult imate or grand 
end. I t  should also be borne in mind that "freedom" and " c o n tro l " ,  
or "regu la t ion " ,  are not necessar i ly  a n t i th e t i c a l  terms.
Passing on to the economic and d is t r ib u t iv e  aspects o f  
Spencer's idea l  o f  soc ia l  ju s t ic e ,  we t r i ed  to show how f a r  short 
i t  f a l l s  o f  other idea ls  o f  soc ia l  Justice. C lass i fy ing  i t  as a 
species o f  the la is s e z  f a i r e  type o f  theory, we said that (1) in 
f a i l in g  to provide f o r  anything l ik e  an equ l i ty  o f  opportunity, 
which would remove some o f  the abuses o f  a r t i f i c i a l  in equa l i ty ,  
and make reparation f o r  past in ju s t ic e ;  and (2) in n a ive ly  assum­
ing that everybody would get what he ought to ge t ,  when the State 
r i g id ly  enforced a l l  contracts vo lu n ta r i ly  made, (except the 
contract o f  s la ve ry ) ,  Spencer renounces p rec is e ly  those elements 
of the la is sez  f a l r e  type o f  theory, which g ive  i t  what l i t t l e  
strength i t  has. Spencer's law o f  equal freedom, i f  we do not 
place much stress upon the word "equal" ,  v i r tu a l l y  means a mere 
maintenance o f  the status quo; and no reasonable theory o f  soc ia l  
just ice would support a " ju s t i c e "  o f  that kind. Economic and 
d is t r ibu t ive  jus t ice ,  must include something more than mere po l ice  
protection o f  l i f e ,  l ib e r t y ,  and property. And since the in s t i t u ­
tion o f  p r iva te  property has come into existence without tne aid 
of,  and o ften  in opposit ion to ,  Spencer's law o f  equal freedom 
i t  is  r e a i l y  i l l o g i c a l  to apply that law to present-day conditions,
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without s ta r t ing  soc ie ty  anew.
Some o f  the other respects in which Spencer's id ea l  o f  
justice seemed to us to f a l l  short o f  enlightened individualism, 
were:
(1) i t s  s i lence  on such vexing questions as inheritance, 
unearned increment, p ro f i t e e r in g ,  manipulation in stock market, etc;
(2 ) i t s  brushing aside o f  the important question o f  con­
sideration f o r  future generations, which cannot be l e f t  e n t i r e l y  
to indiv iduals ;
(3) i t s  f o r g e t t in g  the truth that to a l l o t  spec ia l  p r iv i le g es  
and burdens to specia l  classes o f  the community is  not necessar i ly  
unjust (Sidgwick);
(4) i t s  ignoring o f  the fac ts  that economic value i s  r e la t iv eJ
largely  determined by the law o f  demand and supply, and that many 
valuable serv ices to the community may have l i t t l e  market value 
in present-day soc ie ty ;
(5) i t s  ind i f fe rence  to our everyday experience that un­
foreseen circumstances and conditions outside the contro l  o f  any 
individual or group o ften  help to upset the "exact proportion" 
between returns and labours; and
(6) i t s  overlooking o f  the fa c t  that the ch ie f  reason why 
competition is  supported by In d iv idua l is ts  in general i s  that i t  
subserves economic we l fare ,  whether or not i t  i s  in the in te re s t  
of idea l  just ice .
We further saw that Spencer's id ea l  o f  ju s t ic e ,  on i t s  
economic side, i s  o f  less  value than the I d e a l i s t i c  theor ies  o f  
justice which transfer  the question o f  d is t r ibu t ion  from the jbiane
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of economics to the plane o f  personal i ty ,  and regard the good o f  
the indiv idual as an in t r in s ic  part o f  the soc ia l  good, and which 
also be l ieve  that each indiv idual ought to do that kind o f  work 
for which he is  best f i t t e d  by nature and tra in ing ,  and to rece ive  
in return that reward which w i l l  keep him in maximum e f f i c i e n c y  as 
a member o f  soc ie ty .
In the same chapter we t r ied  to show that the inadequacy 
and in terna l inconsistency o f  Spencer's p r in c ip le  o f  ju s t ic e  are 
markedly found in i t s  r e la t io n  to i t s  tw in -p r inc ip le  o f  beneficence. 
Taking as our guide his d is t in c t io n  between ju s t ice  and beneficence
- that the former i s  needful f o r  soc ia l  equilibrium and, the re fo re ,
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is a matter o f  public concern, and that the l a t t e r  i s  not needful 
for  soc ia l  equilibrium and, there fore ,  a matter o f  only p r iva te  
concern - ,  we were able to show (by means:of his own i l lu s t r a t i o n s )  
that Spencer is  unable to work out the d is t in c t io n  p ra c t i c a l l y .
The p r in c ip le  which he r e a l l y  requires, on his  own premisses, f o r  
a sa t is fac to ry  solution o f  the problem o f  S ta te -act ion  i s  soc ia l  
expediency or public advantage. In dea l ing with h is  treatment o f  
pos it ive  beneficence in part icu lar ,  we noted that Spencer was 
rea l ly  abandoning the p r inc ip le  o f  the surv iva l  o f  the f i t t e s t  on 
which he claimed to build h is  idea l  o f  ju s t ice .
Section I I  o f  Part I I ,  we devoted to a care fu l  and d e ta i led  
examination o f  the many applications made by Spencer to the orac- 
t i c a l  questions o f  soc ia l  l i f e .  In so doing, we f i r s t  d irec ted  
attention to the vagueness and ambiguity introduced into his 
"exact" formula o f  soc ia l  jus t ice  by such expressions as "s im i la r  
freedom", " l i k e  l i b e r t y " ,  acts "conducive to the maintenance o f
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l i f e " ,  "aggression and counter-aggression", " s o c ia l  s e l f -p r e s e r va ­
t ion",  "empirica l compromises", and by smch contrasts as that 
between " family  e th ics "  and "s o c ia l  e th ics "  and that between a 
period o f  war and a period o f  permanent peace. We th e rea f te r  passed 
on to show that none o f  the important r igh ts  discussed by Spencer, 
save the r igh ts  o f  l i f e  and personal security ,  are s t r i c t l y  de- 
ducible from the law o f  equal freedom; that they are not, as Spen­
cer claims, to any great extent coincident with the d ic ta te s  o f  
ordinary law and morality ;  that, even i f  the coincidence were 
exact at every point, that would not necessar i ly  prove Spencer's 
theory o f  soc ia l  jus t ice  to be o f  more permaneht value than other 
theories; and that Spencer's deductions with regard to the r igh ts  
of property and contract do not, as he thinks, correspond to the 
demands o f  economic expediency. An important point to which we 
continually returned i s  that, in his app l ica t ion  to p ra c t ic a l  
issues o f  the law o f  equal freedom, there i s  an essen t ia l  con­
fusion between the freedom o f  a l l  to claim f o r  themselves whatever 
r ight any o f  them does claim, and the freedom to a l l  concerned 
result ing from the action o f  any one indiv idual.
In b r i e f ,  our f ind ing  i s  that, while Spencer's doctr ine  o f  
social jus t ice  is  a b r i l l i a n t ,  exhaustive, and I l lum inating  ex­
posit ion o f  the many phases o f  the v i t a l  problem o f  ju s t ic e ,  i t  
f a l l s  considerably short, both as an abstract theory and as a 
pract ica l  guide, o f  i t s  claim to be a f in a l  system.
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